Martin v. Southern Illinois University School of Medicine

Filing 18

OPINION - Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 10/23/2017. See written Order. Plaintiff Motion for Leave of Court to File Late 14 is GRANTED. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 12 is GRANTED. All pending deadlines and hearing are VACATED. This case is closed. (LN, ilcd)

E-FILED

Monday, 23 October, 2017 11:34:10 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ANTONIO B. MARTIN,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY )
SCHOOL OF MEDICINE,
)
)
Defendant.
)

No. 16-CV-3294

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the Motion for Summary
Judgment (d/e 12) filed by Defendant Board of Trustees of
Southern Illinois University. 1 Plaintiff Antonio B. Martin’s Motion
for Leave [14] to file his untimely response to the Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Because Plaintiff has failed to
produce evidence to show that there is evidence upon which a jury
could find in his favor, the Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED.
The Defendant is improperly named “Southern Illinois University School of
Medicine” in the Complaint.
1

Page 1 of 40

I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2016, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a
Complaint of Employment Discrimination (d/e 1) on a preprinted
form. Plaintiff was a student in the M.D. program at Southern
Illinois University (SIU) School of Medicine before being dismissed.
Compl., Statement of Facts ¶ 1.
Plaintiff is a black male who suffers from Attention Deficient
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Id. Despite completing the 20142015 academic year, Plaintiff was dismissed from the medical
school in June 2015 for poor grades. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges,
however, that the causes of his difficulties were Defendant’s failure
to accommodate his disability, Defendant’s falsification of
information contained in Plaintiff’s student record, Plaintiff’s
health issues resulting from the hostile environment, and
Defendant’s practice of assigning African-American students to
less-qualified clinical mentors. Id. Plaintiff claims that he was
discriminated against on the basis of disability in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, and the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701; and on the basis of his race

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and gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
Defendant moves for summary judgment. Defendant states
that Plaintiff was not an employee of SIU but was a medical
student. Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff’s use of the form
employment discrimination complaint is erroneous and the cited
statutes do not apply. Defendant agrees, however, that a recipient
of federal funds, like SIU, is prohibited from discriminating against
individuals based on race, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d and based on sex, Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Defendant further agrees
that SIU is required to reasonably accommodate a student’s
disability, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 701. The Court will address Plaintiff’s claims under the
statutes identified by Defendant. See Hatmaker v. Memorial Med.
Ctr., 819 F.3d 74, 743 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Even citing the wrong
statute needn’t be a fatal mistake, provided the error is corrected
in response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and
the defendant is not harmed by the delay in correction”).
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Plaintiff’s response to the Motion for Summary Judgment was
due on August 7, 2017. 2 On August 10, 2017, this Court entered
a Text Order noting that Plaintiff had failed to respond to the
motion. The Court granted Plaintiff until August 18, 2017 to file a
response. The Court also advised Plaintiff that a failure to respond
would result in the Court assuming that all of Defendant’s
undisputed material facts are true. Plaintiff failed to file a
response.
On September 1, 2017, the Court noted that the Clerk’s office
did not send Plaintiff the standard Rule 56 notice that is sent when
a motion for summary judgment is filed in a pro se case. The
Court directed the Clerk to send Plaintiff the notice and granted
Plaintiff until September 15, 2017 to file a response. Plaintiff again
failed to file a response.
On Friday, September 22, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Petition for
Leave of Court to File Late (d/e 14). Plaintiff asserted that his
response was complete but that he did not have the chance to
include citations in the filing. The response did not include any

The Court granted Plaintiff’s request to electronically file. See February 17,
2017 Minute Entry.
2

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evidentiary support. Plaintiff asked for the opportunity to update
the motion so that the citations could be “noted” over the weekend.
Plaintiff did not file his updated motion the following Monday,
September 25.
On September 26, 2017, the Court entered a text order
stating: “Before the Court rules on Plaintiff’s motion for leave, the
Court grants Plaintiff one last extension of time.” The Court
directed Plaintiff to file his updated response on or before
September 29, 2017. The Court warned Plaintiff that failure to do
so would result in the Court denying Plaintiff leave to file his late
response. Plaintiff has filed to file an updated response with
citations and/or evidence. Nonetheless, the Court will grant
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave of Court to File Late (d/e 14) but notes
that no evidentiary support has been submitted.
II. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
The Court takes the following facts from Defendant’s
Statement of Undisputed Facts. Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s
statement of undisputed facts failed to cite evidentiary
documentation for his response, as required by Local Rule
7.1(D)(b)(2). Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2008)
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(although a court must construe pro se pleadings liberally, a pro se
party must still follow the procedural rules). Therefore, the facts
are deemed admitted.
The Board of Trustees of SIU operates and manages SIU. a
public university with campuses in Carbondale, Edwardsville,
Springfield, and Alton, Illinois. SIU operates an accredited medical
school.
Plaintiff was a student of SIU who attempted to complete the
first year of the medical school program three times. The first year
of the four-year medical school program is conducted on the
Carbondale, Illinois campus. The first year of the school program
includes an introduction to professional life as a physician,
including basic clinical skills; basic concepts of disease and
disorders, which integrate basic sciences; and the development of
life-long learning skills. The first year is divided into three units
based on body systems: the cardiovascular/respiratory/renal unit;
the sensomotor systems and behavior unit; and the
endocrine/reproductive/gastrointestinal unit.
Students are evaluated on three broad categories of
performance: cognitive academic performance, which includes
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concepts of basic anatomy, physiology, and sciences; non-cognitive
academic performance, which includes the consistent display of
behavior congruent with the standards of the profession such as
good judgment, integrity, appropriate interpersonal relations with
patients, faculty and peers, self-discipline, and dependability; and
“doctoring” which introduces students to applying their knowledge
in the setting of simulated patients, focusing on taking and
interpreting normal histories and physical findings. Students are
graded with a system that assigns a rating of Satisfactory,
Concern, or Unsatisfactory to each category on which they are
evaluated. A Concern rating is an indication that student
performance is less than expected and the student must modify
his or her learning activities. A succession of Concern ratings, or
an Unsatisfactory rating, may result in recommendations for
remediation from the Student Progress Committee.
Each medical student is assigned a clinical mentor during his
or her first year as part of the student’s clinical skills (doctoring)
sessions. While Plaintiff was a student at SIU, a student was
expected to spend a minimum of sixteen hours per unit with his or
her assigned mentor on at least three different dates, during which
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time the student was to learn basic clinical skills such as history
taking, use of instruments, physical examinations, and oral case
presentations. Students are evaluated by their mentors and, in
turn, each student submits a mentor evaluation in January and
May. Mentors are not assigned to students based on the race of
either the student or the mentor. During Plaintiff’s first two years,
he was assigned a physician mentor. During Plaintiff’s third
attempt at the first-year curriculum, he was assigned to Mike Staff,
a physician assistant, as a mentor. Mr. Staff is an experienced,
highly qualified mentor for SIU’s medical students who has
consistently received positive evaluations from those students that
he has mentored. A total of fifteen students, including Plaintiff,
have been assigned to Mr. Staff since the 2003-2004 academic
year. Only five of those students self-identified as minorities, four
African American and one Latino. Plaintiff gave Mr. Staff a positive
evaluation at the end of the 2014-2015 academic year.
The Student Progress System is the system employed by the
School of Medicine for considering matters of student progress.
The Student Progress Committee is a standing committee within
the school responsible for monitoring the progress of all students
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through the system. The Student Progress Committee functions as
an advisory body to the Dean and determines whether the
established standards of academic conduct have been met. The
Student Progress Committee is composed of a Chair, Vice Chair,
ten faculty members from the Springfield campus, four faculty
members from the Carbondale campus, five students, and several
ex-official members, one of whom is Erik Constance, M.D., the
Associate Dean for Students and Admissions.
SIU has an Office of Disability Support Services to provide
resources for disabled students pursuant to the Board of Trustee’s
policies for the protection and accommodation of disabled
students. Medical students who believe they need an
accommodation for a disability can contact an appropriate school
representative, identifying his or her disability and the requested
accommodations. During Plaintiff’s three attempts to pass the first
year of medical school, he twice requested one accommodation—
extended time on tests. That request was made during his first
and second attempts at the first-year curriculum and was granted
both times.

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Plaintiff was admitted to the School of Medicine as a first year
student for the 2012-2013 academic year (Class of 2016). On
September 19, 2012, the Student Progress Committee met and
discussed concerns related to Plaintiff’s professional conduct
reported by Linda Herrold, Assistant Dean for Student Affairs, and
Sandra Shea, Ph.D., the Year 1 Curriculum Director. Ms. Herrold
and Dr. Shea had submitted to the Student Progress Committee a
Concern Note of Non-Cognitive Academic Performance identifying
14 Preliminary Reports of Non-Cognitive Academic Performance.
The Concern Note referenced behaviors of Plaintiff related to
tardiness, absence from teaching activities, and failure to complete
required written assignments and other paperwork. After
considering the report of Ms. Herrold and Dr. Shea and Plaintiff’s
written response, the Student Progress Committee concluded that
Plaintiff had failed to abide by the terms and conditions of the
School of Medicine Honor Code in the categories of Accountability
and Respect for Others. The Student Progress Committee, with the
Dean’s concurrence, issued Plaintiff a Letter of Academic Warning
and advised that further lapses in non-cognitive academic
performance would be reviewed by the Student Progress
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Committee and could result in academic probation, a leave of
absence, or potential dismissal from SIU.
Plaintiff received an overall grade of Concern on his mid-unit
cardiovascular/respiratory/renal exam. Plaintiff received grades of
Unsatisfactory in embryology and gross anatomy and Concern in
pharmacology and respiratory physiology. On November 19, 2012,
shortly after the cardiovascular/respiratory/renal exam unit
ended, Plaintiff requested a leave of absence for the remainder of
the 2012-2013 academic year. Year 1 faculty staff reviewed
Plaintiff’s request. Year 1 faculty staff recommended to the
Student Progress Committee that Plaintiff be granted the option of
returning the next year on academic probation subject to certain
conditions. The faculty’s recommendation and Plaintiff’s request
for a leave of absence were reviewed by the Student Progress
Committee on November 28, 2012 and approved on a vote of 16-1.
On December 4, 2012, Plaintiff was advised in writing of the
approval of his request. A Letter of Academic Warning was sent to
Plaintiff advising him that, if he chose to return with the Class of
2017, he would be placed on academic probation with the following
terms of probation: (1) he must not receive any Preliminary Reports
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or Concern Notes related to non-cognitive academic performance;
and (2) he must receive a non-cognitive behavior and
professionalism performance rating (grade) of Satisfactory (not
Concerns or Unsatisfactory) for each of the three units in his
repeat of the Year 1 Curriculum. Plaintiff was also instructed to
meet with Ms. Herrold prior to his return to discuss the serious
concerns of the Student Progress Committee as well as the
requirements of his academic probation.
Plaintiff returned to SIU in August 2013 to attempt the first
year of medical school again. As advised by the Student Progress
Committee in December 2012, Plaintiff returned on academic
probation with the conditions outlined in the December 4, 2012
letter.
At its October 16, 2013 meeting, the Student Progress
Committee again discussed Plaintiff’s professional conduct since
returning in August 2013. Faculty members reported Plaintiff’s
repeated tardiness to his tutor group sessions and tardiness to the
Professional Development Lab.
The Student Progress Committee noted that Plaintiff’s
conduct constituted a violation of his academic probation and that
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a meeting to consider his dismissal from the school could be
scheduled. However, the Student Progress Committee
unanimously voted to allow Plaintiff to remain in school but sent
him another Letter of Academic Warning. That letter advised
Plaintiff that the Student Progress Committee was seriously
concerned about his lapses in professional conduct. The Student
Progress Committee instructed Plaintiff to meet with Ms. Herrold to
discuss the concerns of the Student Progress Committee and
encouraged him to meet with Dr. Wes McNeese from the Office of
Diversity.
The cardiovascular/respiratory/renal unit ended on
November 22, 2013. At the end of that unit in 2013, Plaintiff’s
overall grade was Unsatisfactory (with the lowest score in the class)
with Unsatisfactory grades in anatomy, embryology, biochemistry,
immunology, and renal physiology and Concerns in pharmacology,
behavioral and social sciences, cardiovascular physiology, and
respiratory physiology. Plaintiff also received a rating of
Unsatisfactory in doctoring. Based on his performance, the Year 1
faculty recommended that Plaintiff be dismissed from the School of
Medicine. At its December 18, 2013 meeting the Student Progress
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Committee again discussed Plaintiff’s performance and the Year 1
faculty’s recommendation. The Student Progress Committee noted
that, in addition to Plaintiff failing academics, he had also received
another Concern Note dated December 9, 2013, submitted by
Linda Herrold, identifying several non-cognitive deficiencies
relating to tardiness and failure to timely turn in work.
During the approximately five months of the 2013-2014
academic year that Plaintiff attended, the only accommodation he
requested for a disability was for extended time on tests. Plaintiff
took advantage of the accommodation during a
cardiovascular/respiratory/renal unit exam in 2013. He was
placed in a separate room for the exam. The exam was a computer
exam. Due to limitations associated with the facility, the number
of students, and the length of the exam, Plaintiff was scheduled for
the morning shift of the exam. Because Plaintiff was granted more
time to take the exam than his classmates, Dr. Shea explained to
Plaintiff that he could not start the examination with his
classmates without having the other students get up and leave and
without having people come in for the afternoon shift during his
extended time. When Plaintiff and Dr. Shea discussed these
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circumstances, Plaintiff agreed that it would be too distracting to
have the class rotating around him. The only alternative was to
place Plaintiff in a separate, quiet room. The purpose of placing
Plaintiff in a room by himself for the
cardiovascular/respiratory/rental exam was to ensure that
Plaintiff was provided with an environment free from distractions
to allow him all of the time he had requested to complete the
examination without the class rotating around him. This was
explained to Plaintiff both before and during the dismissal hearing.
During the exam, faculty checked on Plaintiff to see whether
he had any questions about the content of the exam or any
questions about the questions. Plaintiff did not indicate to Dr.
Shea or to any other SIU faculty member, to Dr. Shea’s knowledge,
any dissatisfaction or concerns with the accommodation that was
provided at any time prior to the dismissal hearing on June 19,
2015, when he complained about being in a room by himself and
being distracted by faculty members who came in to check on him.
On December 13, 2013, Plaintiff submitted a request for a
medical leave of absence effective December 18, 2013, for the
remainder of the 2013-2014 academic year. Following a
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discussion of his academic performance record, the Student
Progress Committee voted to approve Plaintiff’s request for medical
leave for the remainder of the academic year. The Committee
modified the conditions of Plaintiff’s academic probation to require
that Plaintiff provide written documentation from his treating
primary care physician and psychiatrist that he was fit to
participate in the curriculum and would meet all technical
standards of the School of Medicine. The written documentation
had to be submitted to Dr. Constance no later than July 1, 2014, if
Plaintiff intended to return to attempt the first year of medical
school for the third time. If Plaintiff provided the required
documentation, he would be permitted to re-enter the medical
school with the class of 2018 to repeat Year 1 in its entirety on
academic probation, with the following conditions:
a. Plaintiff must receive a basic science knowledge
performance rating (grade) of Satisfactory (not Concerns
or Unsatisfactory) for each of the three academic units
(cardiovascular/respiratory/renal; sensomotor systems
and behavior; and endocrine/reproductive/
gastrointestinal) in the Year 1 curriculum;
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b. Plaintiff must receive a clinical skills and clinical
reasoning performance rating (grade), of Satisfactory
(not Concerns or Unsatisfactory) in the doctoring
curriculum for each of the three units in the Year 1
curriculum;
c. Plaintiff must receive a non-cognitive behavior and
professionalism performance rating (grade) of
Satisfactory (not Concerns or Unsatisfactory) for each of
the three units in the Year 1 curriculum; and
d. Plaintiff could not receive any additional Preliminary
Reports or Concern Notes of non-cognitive academic
performance.
The Student Progress Committee vote was 10 in favor and 1
opposed.
On December 20, 2013, the Chair of the Student Progress
Committee sent Plaintiff a Letter of Academic Warning/Academic
Probation. The letter advised Plaintiff that the Student Progress
Committee continued to have very serious concerns about
Plaintiff’s academic performance deficiencies. The letter
emphasized that any violation of the requirements of Plaintiff’s
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academic probation would cause the Student Progress Committee
to take further action, including the reconsideration of Plaintiff’s
dismissal from the School of Medicine.
At the July 16, 2014 meeting, the Student Progress
Committee again discussed Plaintiff’s academic performance
record. The Committee noted that Plaintiff submitted the written
documentation from his primary care physician and psychiatrist
as required. Therefore, the Student Progress Committee voted
unanimously to permit Plaintiff to reenter the School of Medicine to
attempt the first year curriculum for the third time with the
conditions of academic probation outlined above.
On July 17, 2014, the Chair of the Student Progress
Committee sent Plaintiff a letter acknowledging that Plaintiff had
provided the required written documentation from his physicians.
The letter reiterated the terms of his academic probation for
Plaintiff’s third attempt at the first year of medical school.
At the end of the cardiovascular/respiratory/renal unit in the
fall of 2014, Plaintiff had an overall grade of Concern on his basic
science exam, a grade of Unsatisfactory in doctoring, and had
received an additional Concern Note regarding repeated tardiness.
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Each of those events constituted another violation of the terms of
Plaintiff’s academic probation.
The Year 1 faculty recommended that the Student Progress
Committee call for a dismissal hearing. At its December 17, 2014
meeting, the Student Progress Committee discussed Plaintiff’s
academic performance. A motion was made to approve the Year 1
faculty recommendation to convene a dismissal hearing, which
failed on a vote of 5 in favor, 8 opposed, and 1 abstention.
The Student Progress Committee continued to express
concerns regarding Plaintiff’s academic performance deficiencies.
The Committee voted to send Plaintiff another letter of academic
warning and to retain him on academic probation, emphasizing
that a further violation of the requirements of his academic
probation would cause the Student Progress Committee to take
further action including reconsideration of his dismissal from the
School of Medicine. On December 19, 2014, the Chair of the
Student Progress Committee sent Plaintiff a copy of the Letter of
Academic Warning/Academic Probation.
The Student Progress Committee again discussed Plaintiff’s
professional conduct at its January 21, 2015 meeting. Between
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December 16, 2014 and January 21, 2015, additional Preliminary
Reports of Non-Cognitive Academic Performance had been
submitted regarding Plaintiff’s conduct. This included Plaintiff
appearing to fall asleep in class on one occasion, not returning to
school on time following the holiday break, tardiness, and
forgetting his equipment for a simulated patient examination.
The Student Progress Committee noted at its January 21,
2015 meeting that, by receiving multiple Preliminary Reports of
Non-Cognitive Academic Performance, Plaintiff had again violated
the requirements of his academic probation. Nonetheless, the
Committee voted to allow Plaintiff to remain in the curriculum and
to be retained on academic probation. Plaintiff was again
reminded that students were required to conform to the standards
of professional conduct and that further incidents of non-cognitive
academic performance would be reviewed by the Student Progress
Committee. The Student Progress Committee required that
Plaintiff meet with Dr. Constance to discuss the Committee’s
concerns and to review the terms of his academic probation.
On February 11, 2015, Dr. Regina Kovach, Chair of the
Student Progress Committee, received information from two of
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Plaintiff’s classmates and his faculty tutor group leader suggesting
that Plaintiff may have violated the School’s Honor Code by
presenting work during a tutor group as his own work, when it was
actually work done by others. Dr. Kovach wrote to Plaintiff on
February 12, 2015, advising him of the reports and that an
investigatory team of two faculty members and one student would
be appointed to review the information, meet with him and the
complaining parties, and make a recommendation to the Student
Progress Committee. On March 2, 2015, Dr. Kovach received
information from one of the two students who had reported
Plaintiff’s conduct that, following her letter to him of February 12,
2015, Plaintiff engaged in further conduct potentially in violation of
the Honor Code, specifically deleting information from a web-based
site used by his tutor group to share information with one another.
Dr. Kovach wrote to Plaintiff on March 5, 2012, advising him of the
additional report and that the investigatory team would review the
additional report as well.
At the March 18, 2015 meeting, the Student Progress
Committee discussed Plaintiff’s academic performance. Plaintiff
received an end-of-unit basic science grade of Unsatisfactory with
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academic performance weaknesses noted in the following areas:
Unsatisfactory in physiology, population health, neuroanatomy,
gross anatomy and histology and Concerns in behavior and social
sciences, biochemistry, genetics and pharmacology. The Student
Progress Committee also discussed Plaintiff’s professional conduct,
noting Plaintiff’s continued tardiness and Plaintiff missed a
required child abuse session.
Student Progress Committee noted that, by receiving a basic
science grade of Unsatisfactory on the sensomotor systems and
behavior unit and receiving multiple Concern Notes and
Preliminary Reports of Non-Cognitive Academic Performance,
Plaintiff had again violated the terms of his academic probation.
The Student Progress Committee voted that grounds may exist to
dismiss Plaintiff from the School of Medicine for reasons of
unsatisfactory academic performance and to schedule a special
meeting to consider Plaintiff’s dismissal.
On March 27, 2015, Dr. Kovach wrote a twelve-page letter to
Plaintiff summarizing his academic performance, including as
attachments the Student Progress System document, a notebook
with all materials relevant to his academic performance. The letter
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advised Plaintiff that the Student Progress Committee would
convene a hearing to consider his dismissal from the School of
Medicine. At Plaintiff’s request, the meeting was continued until
June 19, 2015, after the end of the academic year, to allow him
time to concentrate on completing the remainder of the academic
year before appearing at the dismissal hearing. Plaintiff was
advised of his right to have an advisor present with him at the
hearing, his right to appear and present witnesses, and his right to
submit a written statement in advance to the Committee.
On May 20, 2015, the Student Progress Committee convened
a hearing to consider whether Plaintiff had violated the School’s
Honor Code in connection with the reports of his classmates and
tutor group leader. On June 2, 2015, Dr. Kovach wrote to Dean J.
Kevin Dorsey, the Dean of the School of Medicine. Dr. Kovach
advised that, based on the documentation and testimony
presented at the hearing, the Student Progress Committee could
not determine whether Plaintiff had truly represented the work of
his classmates as his own. Therefore, the first charge could not be
substantiated.

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With regard to the second charge—deleting information from
the web-based site used by Plaintiff’s tutor group—the Student
Progress Committee determined that Plaintiff had stated that his
intent was only to remove himself from the shared information.
Plaintiff stated he was unaware that his actions would affect the
other students’ access to the material and that the effect on the
other students’ access was a mistake and unintentional. The
Student Progress Committee concluded that Plaintiff’s action
demonstrated poor judgment and was inappropriate and
unprofessional. The Committee recommended that Plaintiff’s
academic probation be modified to also include the condition that
he not receive any further reports of unprofessional conduct.
On June 4, 2015, Dr. Kovach wrote to Plaintiff, advising him
of the Student Progress Committee’s conclusions and
recommendation, that the Dean concurred, and that the terms of
his academic probation would be modified to include the additional
condition that he not receive any further reports of unprofessional
conduct. However, by June 2, 2015, Plaintiff was also scheduled
for a Student Progress Committee hearing on June 19, 2015 to

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consider his dismissal for violation of his academic probation with
respect to his academic failings.
On June 19, 2015, the Student Progress Committee convened
the hearing to consider the dismissal of Plaintiff from the School of
Medicine based on Plaintiff’s unsatisfactory academic performance.
At the beginning of the hearing, Dr. Kovach verbally outlined the
record of Plaintiff’s academic performance during the three years
Plaintiff attempted the first year medical school curriculum. At the
end of Dr. Kovach’s summary, Plaintiff was specifically asked if
there were “any factual corrections that [he] would like to make in
this account of [his] academic performance.” Plaintiff responded
“No.”
At the dismissal hearing, the Student Progress Committee
called three witnesses. Dr. Sandra Shea, Year 1 curriculum
director; Dr. Chris Anderson, Director of Doctoring for the Year 1
curriculum; and Dr. Gregory Rose, the tutor group leader for the
sensomotor systems and behavior unit. After the testimony of the
three witnesses, the Student Progress Committee members then
questioned Plaintiff regarding his explanation for his academic
performance.
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On June 24, 2015, Dr. Kovach sent a letter to Dr. J. Kevin
Dorsey, Dean and Provost of the School of Medicine, advising that,
after meeting on June 19, 2015 to consider Plaintiff’s dismissal
from the School of Medicine, reviewing extensive documentary
information and hearing the testimony of witnesses, the Committee
had voted unanimously to approve a motion to dismiss Plaintiff
from the School of Medicine for unsatisfactory academic
performance and violation of his academic probation.
On June 29, 2015, Dean Dorsey, after reviewing the
recommendation of the Student Progress Committee and the entire
record of Plaintiff’s performance, decided that Plaintiff should be
dismissed from the School of Medicine for reasons of
unsatisfactory academic performance. Plaintiff had more noncognitive performance issues than any other member of his class
in each of the academic years that he attended SIU. He also
struggled in the areas of cognitive academic performance and
doctoring. During Dr. Constance’s tenure as Associate Dean and
Dr. Shea’s tenure at SIU, no student with a record of academic
performance similar to Plaintiff was permitted to remain at SIU,
regardless of the student’s race, gender or disability status.
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III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no
genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The Court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the
nonmoving party’s favor. Blasius v. Angel Auto., Inc., 839 F.3d
639, 644 (7th Cir. 2016).
The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the
Court of the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the
movant believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
A genuine dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact
could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Carroll v. Lynch, 698
F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012).
When the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of
persuasion on a particular issue, the movant need only show there
is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.
Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). The nonmoving party must then
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produce evidence, such as affidavits, depositions, or answers to
discovery, to show that there is evidence upon which a jury could
find in his favor. Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1169 (quoting Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986)). The nonmoving
party cannot rest on the allegations in his complaint but must offer
support for those allegations. See Mosley v. City of Chi., 614 F.3d
391, 400 (7th Cir. 2010). In addition, a district court is “not
required to scour every inch of the record for evidence that is
potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion.” Johnson v.
Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2003); Greer v.
Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., Ill., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001)
(noting, in a pro se case, that employment discrimination cases are
fact-intensive, that a court is not required to scour the record
looking for factual disputes, and “a lawsuit is not a game of hunt
the peanut”). The Seventh Circuit has described summary
judgment as the “put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a
party must show what evidence it has that would convince the trier
of fact to accept its version of the events.’” Steen v. Myers, 486
F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle
Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005)).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s admission of the facts set
forth in the motion for summary judgment does not necessarily
make a grant of summary judgment appropriate. The Court must
still find that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Wienco, Inc. v. Katahn Assocs., Inc., 965 F.2d 565, 568 (7th
Cir. 1992). The Court finds that Defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
A.

Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff’s Race and Sex Discrimination Claims
As noted above, the Court construes Plaintiff’s race

discrimination claim as having been brought under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act and the sex discrimination claims as having been
brought under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race by a recipient of federal funds:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

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42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Title VI only prohibits intentional
discrimination. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
To avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff must present evidence
sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant
dismissed him from the School of Medicine because of Plaintiff’s
race. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Werner Enter., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th
Cir. 2016) (involving an employment discrimination case under
Title VII and discarding the practice of distinguishing between
direct and indirect evidence). The legal standard “is simply
whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other
proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse
employment action.” Id.
The McDonnell Douglas framework, which applies to Title VI
cases, remains a method of assessing the evidence in
discrimination cases, but it is not the only way to assess
circumstantial evidence of discrimination. David v. Bd. or Trustees
of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 224 (7th Cir. 2017) (but
also assessing the evidence cumulatively to determine whether it
permits a reasonable factfinder to determine that the adverse
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action was attributable to the plaintiff’s age, race, or sex); see also
Andriakos v. Univ. of S. Ind., 867 F. Supp. 804, 80910 (S.D. Ind.
1992) (applying Title VII standards to Title IX) aff’d 19 F.3d 21, at
*4 (7th Cir. Feb. 17, 1994) (unpublished) (comparing Title IX to
Title VI cases, noting that other courts have applied McDonnell
Douglas framework to Title VI claims, and finding the district court
correctly relied on McDonnell Douglas); Rashdan v. Geissberger,
764 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2014) (joining the Third, Eighth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits in finding that the McDonnell
Douglas framework applies in Title VI cases).
Here, Defendant addresses the evidence using the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Under that framework, Plaintiff must meet
the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley Cnty., 866
F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2017). The prima facie case in the
educational context requires that a plaintiff establish that: (1) he is
a member of a protected class; (2) he was meeting the school’s
legitimate educational expectations; (3) an adverse educational
action was taken against the plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff was
treated worse than similarly situated students who are not in the
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protected class. Brewer, 479 F.3d at 921. Once a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination
arises, and the defendant bears the burden of articulating a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse decision.
McKinney, 866 F.3d at 807. If the defendant does so, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff, who must present evidence that the
stated reason was a pretext. Id.
Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a
protected class or that he suffered an adverse educational action.
Defendant argues, however, that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima
facie case because he was not meeting Defendant’s legitimate
educational expectations and because no similarly situated
individual who was not in the protected class was treated more
favorably. The Court agrees.
Defendant has submitted uncontradicted evidence that
Plaintiff was not meeting Defendant’s legitimate educational
expectations. Plaintiff was on academic probation from early in his
medical school enrollment until his dismissal. Plaintiff received
multiple letters of warning from the School based on his academic
and non-academic performance during his first two attempts at
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completing the first-year curriculum. In his third attempt to
complete the first-year curriculum, Plaintiff violated the terms of
his academic probation due to his pattern of tardiness and lack of
preparation. Plaintiff also failed to achieve satisfactory grades in
numerous classes, as well as the doctoring skills program.
Plaintiff fails to point to any evidence showing otherwise.
The record is also devoid of any evidence that a similarly
situated student not in the protected class was treated more
favorably. Defendant submitted evidence that no student with a
record of academic performance similar to Plaintiff was permitted
to remain in school, regardless of the student’s race, gender, or
disability status. See Dr. Constance Aff. ¶ 36 (d/e 12-1).
Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race
discrimination. See e.g., Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 790 (7th
Cir. 2002) (holding, in a discrimination case, that the “failure to
establish one element of her prima facie case . . . is enough to
support a grant of summary judgment to her employer).
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VI
claim.

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Similarly, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of sex
discrimination under Title IX. Title IX prohibits any education
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance from
discriminating on the basis of sex. 20 U.S.C. § 1681; Doe v. St.
Francis Sch. Dist., 694 F.3d 869, 870 (7th Cir. 2012). The
McDonnell Douglas framework applies to Title IX sex
discrimination cases. Hiatt v. Colo. Seminary, 858 F.3d 1307,
1315 n.8 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that the McDonnell Douglas
framework applies to Title IX sex discrimination cases); Andriakos,
867 F. Supp. at 809 (applying Title VII standards to a Title IX
claim), aff’d 19 F. 3d 21.
To establish a prima facie claim of sex discrimination under
Title IX, Plaintiff must show: “(1) he was in the protected class, (2)
he was performing the academic requirements well enough to meet
his educator’s legitimate expectations, (3) he suffered adverse
treatment, and (4) the educational program continued to instruct
and credit other students.” Andriakos, 867 F.Supp. at 10. As was
the case with Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim, Plaintiff has not
pointed to any evidence that he was meeting Defendant’s legitimate
expectations. Because a reasonable jury could not conclude that
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Defendant dismissed Plaintiff from School of Medicine on the basis
of his gender, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s Title IX claim.
B.

Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff’s Failure-to-Accommodate Claim
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to accommodate his

disability as required by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. See
Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840,
847 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA may be established by
evidence that the defendant refused to provide a reasonable
accommodation).
Both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act prohibit
discrimination against the disabled. Under the ADA, “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act provides that no qualified
individual with a disability shall, solely by reason of his disability,
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“be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794. Other
than some minor differences not relevant here, the statutes are
coextensive. CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d
524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Washington, 181 F.3d at 846 n.6
(noting that the chief differences are that the Rehabilitation Act
only applies to entities that receive federal funding and requires
that the exclusion be solely by reason of disability). Defendant
agrees that it is obligated to reasonably accommodate students
with disabilities pursuant to Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. Mem. at 28; see also Washington, 181 F.3d
at 847-48 (the prohibition on discrimination in Title II of the ADA
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires that the entity
provide a reasonable accommodation).
To avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff must submit evidence
that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability, (2) Defendant
was aware of his disability, and (3) Defendant failed to provide him
with a reasonable accommodation. See Hoffman v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 572 (7th Cir. 2001). As for the third element,
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the employer and employee must engage in an interactive process
to determine a reasonable accommodation. E.E.O.C. v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 2005) (ADA case). If
Plaintiff shows that his disability was not reasonably
accommodated, Defendant is liable only if Defendant is responsible
for the breakdown of the interactive process. See id. (modified for
the educational context).
Defendant argues that the undisputed facts show that
Plaintiff is not a qualified individual with a disability and that the
accommodation provided to Plaintiff was reasonable. Defendant
further argues that, even if the Court finds that the
accommodation was not reasonable, Plaintiff’s failure to
accommodate claim must still fail because Defendant did not
cause any breakdown of the interactive process.
The Court finds that the undisputed evidence shows that the
accommodation was reasonable and, even if the accommodation
were not reasonable, Defendant did not cause any breakdown in
the interactive process. Therefore, the Court does not address
Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff is not a qualified individual
with a disability.
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Plaintiff requested an accommodation in his first and second
attempts to complete Year 1 of medical school. Plaintiff requested
extended time on tests, and the request was granted.
Plaintiff took advantage of the accommodation during the
cardiovascular/respiratory/renal unit exam in 2013. The exam
was a computer exam and was given in two shifts—a morning shift
and an afternoon shift. When Plaintiff and Dr. Shea discussed the
circumstances of the test, Plaintiff agreed that it would be too
distracting to have the class rotating around him. Therefore,
Plaintiff was placed in a separate, quiet room to take the exam.
During the exam, faculty checked on Plaintiff to see if he had any
questions. Plaintiff did not express any dissatisfaction with the
accommodation until his dismissal hearing on June 19, 2015,
when he complained about being in a room by himself and being
distracted by faculty members who came in to check on him.
No evidence suggests that Defendant failed to reasonably
accommodate Plaintiff. Defendant granted Plaintiff the
accommodation he sought. See Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. Of
Med. & Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178, 188 (2nd Cir. 2015 ) (“It is
axiomatic that a claim for failure to accommodate does not lie
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where the accommodation received is the accommodation the
plaintiff requested.”).
Moreover, liability generally does not attach if the plaintiff
does not request an accommodation or does not provide sufficient
information for the defendant to determine a reasonable
accommodation. Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Amerson Elec.
Co., 201 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 2000); Reeves ex rel. Reeves v.
Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 759 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2014) (an
employer cannot be liable for failing to accommodate a disabled
employee if the employee does not provide sufficient information to
the employer to determine a reasonable accommodation). Plaintiff
did not advise Defendant of his dissatisfaction with the
accommodation provided until the dismissal hearing.
The Court also finds that the undisputed evidence shows
that, even if the accommodation provided were not reasonable,
Defendant did not cause the breakdown in the interactive process.
Plaintiff did not advise Defendant of his dissatisfaction with the
accommodation until his dismissal hearing. Therefore, Defendant
is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure-toaccommodate claim.
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The Court also construes Plaintiff’s complaint as raising a
race, gender, and/or disability harassment claim. However,
Plaintiff has submitted no evidence on such a claim sufficient to
raise a genuine issue of material fact.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff Motion for Leave of Court to
File Late (d/e 14) is GRANTED. Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (d/e 12) is GRANTED. All pending deadlines and
hearing are VACATED. This case is closed.
ENTER: October 23, 2017
FOR THE COURT:

s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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