Pittman v. Brown County IL et al
Filing
22
OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 1/2/2018. For the foregoing reasons, the Partial Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss [d/e 13] filed by Defendant City of Mount Sterling, Illinois, is DENIED. Pursuant to Rule 12(a)(4)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mount Sterling has 14 days from the date it receives a copy of this Order to answer Counts 4 through 6 ofPlaintiff's First Amended Complaint. (KB, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 03 January, 2018 02:31:50 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
OF THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
LYNDSEY J. PITTMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF MOUNT STERLING,
ILLINOIS, and CHASE FOX,
individually and in his capacity
as police officer with City of
Mount Sterling, Illinois, Police
Department,
Defendants.
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Case No. 16-cv-03314
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Before the Court is the Partial Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
(d/e 13) filed by Defendant City of Mount Sterling, Illinois (Mount
Sterling). The motion is DENIED. Plaintiff Lyndsey J. Pittman, in
her First Amended Complaint, sufficiently pleads state-law claims
against Mount Sterling based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts come from Plaintiff’s First Amended
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Complaint (d/e 7). The Court accepts them as true at the motion to
dismiss stage. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th
Cir. 2008).
On October 21, 2015, Plaintiff, then 17 years old, was driving
an automobile in Mount Sterling, Illinois. Defendant Chase Fox, an
officer with the Mount Sterling Police Department, activated his
squad car’s overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop of Plaintiff’s
vehicle because Plaintiff had allegedly failed to make a complete
stop at a stop sign. Plaintiff brought her vehicle to a stop.
Defendant Fox obtained Plaintiff’s driver’s license, thereby learning
that Plaintiff was a minor, and asked Plaintiff whether marijuana or
any other illegal substance was present in Plaintiff’s vehicle.
Plaintiff answered in the negative.
Defendant Fox proceeded to order Plaintiff to exit her vehicle
and stand in front of his squad car. A passenger exited Plaintiff’s
vehicle and inquired as to why Defendant Fox was detaining
Plaintiff. Defendant Fox ordered the passenger to get back in
Plaintiff’s vehicle, but as the passenger was getting back into
Plaintiff’s vehicle, Defendant Fox violently grabbed the passenger
and forced him out of the vehicle.
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Because of Defendant Fox’s actions, Plaintiff reentered her
vehicle and drove away. Defendant Fox drew his service weapon
and shot out the back window of Plaintiff’s vehicle. Defendant Fox
then holstered his weapon and initiated a high-speed pursuit of
Plaintiff’s vehicle, a pursuit that reached speeds exceeding 100
miles per hour. Eventually, Plaintiff lost control of her vehicle,
which was destroyed after it left the road and rolled over. As a
result of the accident, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer
physical pain, emotional trauma, fear, and anxiety.
On December 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (d/e 1),
seeking recovery for her physical and emotional injuries. Plaintiff
subsequently filed a five-count1 First Amended Complaint on March
3, 2017. Count 1 alleges a § 1983 claim against Defendant Fox.
Count 2 alleges a § 1983 claim against Mount Sterling. Counts 4
through 62 allege state-law claims for assault and battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction
of emotional distress. On April 21, 2017, Mount Sterling filed its
1 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint refers to each alleged cause of action as a
“Claim.” However, in this Opinion, the Court uses the term “Count” to
delineate among Plaintiff’s various claims.
2 There is no Count 3 in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
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Partial Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff’s three
state-law claims should be dismissed as to Mount Sterling because
Plaintiff had not named Mount Sterling as a defendant in those
counts and failed to make any allegations against Mount Sterling in
those counts. Plaintiff did not file a response to the motion.
II. JURISDICTION
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s §
1983 claims because they are based on federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”). Further, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s state-law claims because those claims and Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims “form part of the same case or controversy.” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper in this district because the
events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred here. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(2) (stating that a civil action may be brought in “a judicial
district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred”).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
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sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Plausibility means alleging factual content that allows a
court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged
misconduct. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547
(2007). A plaintiff’s complaint must suggest a right to relief,
“raising that possibility above a speculative level.” Kubiak v. City of
Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2016). “The required level of
factual specificity rises with the complexity of the claim.” McCauley
v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616-17 (7th Cir. 2011).
When faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court
“accept[s] as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and
draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Roberts
v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016). However,
“legal conclusions and conclusory allegations merely reciting the
elements of the claim are not entitled to this presumption of truth.”
McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616.
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff has alleged three state-law tort claims based on
actions taken in Illinois by Defendant Fox in Illinois. Accordingly,
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Illinois law applies to these three claims. See Boogaard v. Nat’l
Hockey League, 255 F. Supp. 3d 753, 758-59 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
Under Illinois’ doctrine of respondeat superior, “a principal
may be held liable for the tortious conduct of an agent, even if the
principal does not engage in any tortious conduct.” Skaperdas v.
Country Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N.E.3d 747, 758 (Ill. 2015). The doctrine
applies to torts committed by an employee within the scope of his
employment, even if the employee’s actions are “willful, malicious,
or even criminal.” Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 862 N.E.2d 985,
991 (Ill. 2007). An employee’s conduct falls within the scope of his
employment if the conduct is of the kind the employee is employed
to perform, occurs substantially within authorized time and space
limits, and is done, at least in part, to serve the employer. Id. at
992.
The allegations included in Counts 4 through 6 of Plaintiff’s
First Amended Complaint are sufficient to state tort claims against
Mount Sterling based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Mount Sterling’s arguments for dismissal are that Plaintiff’s statelaw claims do not name Mount Sterling as a defendant and that the
counts contain no allegations directed against Mount Sterling. But
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Plaintiff’s state-law claims incorporate the allegations of each
preceding paragraph in the First Amended Complaint. See First
Am. Comp., ¶¶ 34-36. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-law claims
include the allegation that, at all relevant times, Defendant Fox was
an employee of the Mount Sterling Police Department, a municipal
agency of Mount Sterling. See id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff’s state-law claims
also include the allegation that, at all relevant times, Defendant Fox
was acting within the scope of his employment and on behalf of
Mount Sterling. See id.
Although these allegations, by themselves, would not satisfy
federal pleading standards, given that they merely recite elements of
a claim based on vicarious liability, the First Amended Complaint
also alleges that Defendant Fox initiated a traffic stop of Plaintiff’s
vehicle in Mount Sterling, Illinois, fired his service weapon at
Plaintiff’s vehicle, and conducted a high-speed pursuit of Plaintiff’s
vehicle. See id. ¶¶ 8, 12-13, 21-22, 24. These allegations indicate
that the alleged actions of Defendant Fox on which the state-law
claims are based fell within the scope of his employment as an
officer with the Mount Sterling Police Department. As such, the
allegations are sufficient to put Mount Sterling on notice that it is
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plausible that Mount Sterling is vicariously liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for the alleged actions of Defendant
Fox.
Further, the cases cited by Mount Sterling in its partial motion
to dismiss are distinguishable. In Morales v. Lashbrook, the district
court dismissed a failure-to-treat claim because the plaintiff had
not alleged that any of the defendants denied him medical care. No.
16-CV-00571-NJR, 2016 WL 3753703, at *4 (S.D. Ill. July 14,
2016). In Butler v. Harrington, the plaintiff failed to state plausible
claims when he failed to identify which of the eight defendants was
responsible for each alleged constitutional violation. No. 13-CV1270-JPG, 2014 WL 90724, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2014). In
Suburban Buick, Inc. v. Gargo, the district court found a complaint
deficient because the plaintiff had failed to include allegations
sufficient to meet the heightened pleading standard required by
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No. 08 C 0370,
2009 WL 1543709, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2009).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to assert state-law
claims for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and negligence infliction of emotional distress against
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Defendant Fox. Plaintiff has also alleged facts sufficient to allege
those same tort claims against Mount Sterling under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. The state-law claims made by Plaintiff are not
subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), and
this case does not involve so many defendants that the Court and
Defendants cannot determine who Plaintiff is alleging is responsible
for her alleged injuries under the state-law claims.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Partial Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to
Dismiss (d/e 13) filed by Defendant City of Mount Sterling, Illinois,
is DENIED. Pursuant to Rule 12(a)(4)(A) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Mount Sterling has 14 days from the date it
receives a copy of this Order to answer Counts 4 through 6 of
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
ENTER: January 2, 2018
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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