Camacho v. Illinois Department of Transportation

Filing 34

OPINION entered by Judge Richard Mills on 10/8/2020. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant The Illinois Department of Transportation [d/e 26] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion is GRANTED as to Count I and DENIED as to Counts II and III. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION) (MAS, ilcd)

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E-FILED

Tuesday, 13 October, 2020 11:24:40 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

LUIS CAMACHO,

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Plaintiff,
v.
THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Case No. 16-3317

OPINION
RICHARD MILLS, United States District Judge:
Luis Camacho (“the Plaintiff” or “Camacho”) has filed a three-count amended
complaint wherein he asserts Defendant Illinois Department of Transportation
(“IDOT”) violated his rights by retaliating against him by treating him less favorably
than other employees, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203 (“ADA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e3) (Count I).
Plaintiff also alleges that IDOT did not reasonably accommodate him with
respect to his work assignment in violation of the ADA (Count II).

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Finally, Plaintiff asserts that his work assignment was retaliatory because of
his earlier charge of discrimination in violation of both the ADA and Title VII
(“Count III”).
Defendant IDOT moves for summary judgment.
I.

INTRODUCTION

IDOT moves for summary judgment on Camacho’s retaliation claims,
alleging he is unable to establish a prima facie case for retaliation. Moreover, the
Plaintiff has not identified an adverse employment action. He also was not meeting
the legitimate expectation of his employer as it relates to time and attendance. IDOT
claims it did not retaliate against the Plaintiff when it assigned him to another
position as part of a reasonable accommodation request. IDOT also contends it did
not discriminate against Camacho on account of his disability.
The Plaintiff claims the record contains substantial evidence which
undermines IDOT’s contentions and summary judgment should thus be denied.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
(A)

Plaintiff Luis Camacho began employment with IDOT in 2002 as a Geologist
I in the Bureau of Bridges and Structures in the Foundations and Geotechnical Unit.
He became a Geologist II in 2005 and a Geologist III in 2007. While employed as
a Geologist, Camacho received acceptable performance evaluations until 2012. By
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2014, Camacho had achieved the title of Geologist III but was not in a supervisory
role. Camacho has a bachelor’s degree in geology and a master’s degree in
geological engineering. His work experience was in that field. However, Camacho
is not a licensed engineer. In 2013, Camacho’s co-workers in the Foundations and
Geotechnical Unit consisted of Edgar Galofre and Bradley Hessing, the acting
supervisor. Hessing had been promoted to group leader in 2012.
William Kramer was employed by IDOT as the Unit Chief of the Foundations
and Geotechnical Unit in the Bureau of Bridges and Structures. Mr. Kramer was
Bradley Hessing’s direct supervisor.
Since July of 2015, Carlos Ramirez was the Chief of IDOT’s Civil Rights
Bureau and the ADA Coordinator. Karen Ward preceded Ramirez at the Civil
Rights Bureau, while David Dailey preceded him as the ADA coordinator. Michael
Prater worked for IDOT in the Office of Chief Counsel.
In 2014, Dianna Taylor was Payroll and Benefits Manager at IDOT. In
January of 2015, Taylor was appointed Bureau Chief of Personnel Management.
David Greifzu was employed by IDOT as the Bridge Planning Section Chief.
As Chief, he supervised the Foundations and Geotechnical Unit (“the Unit”).
Camacho alleges Greifzu directed Kramer to stop allowing Camacho to take time
off from work. The Defendants claim when Greifzu became Section Chief in 2012,
he more strictly enforced IDOT’s policy regarding time and attendance as to all
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employees—not just Camacho. Mr. Kramer, the prior Section Chief, did not enforce
IDOT’s time and attendance policy. Kramer had allowed employees to make up
time at the end of the shift. Camacho claims that Kramer never contemplated
disciplining him before Greifzu became his supervisor. Camacho worked in the Unit
with Kramer for 12 years. The Defendants state that the relevant time period is after
the Plaintiff filed his Complaint in October 2013. Any time period before that is
immaterial.
The Unit was responsible for assisting other units in endeavors relating to
bridge construction. The work of a geotechnical engineer and a Geologist III in the
Unit is much the same. The bulk of the work involved reviewing plans, reports, and
designs. The type of work Camacho performed in the Unit was both consistent with
his professional background and professionally fulfilling. There was no difference
in the type of work Camacho was assigned in 2004 and what he was assigned in
2011 and 2012.
After Hessing was promoted to group leader, the number of employees doing
the production work was reduced to two. However, the work load in the unit
increased. There was also a female contract worker in the Unit who performed the
same type of work as Camacho and Galofre. As group leader, Hessing supervised
Camacho and Galofre and assigned and reviewed their work.
(B)
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The Plaintiff alleges his supervisors treated him differently and less favorably
than other employees in his bureau by monitoring his time, preparing unfavorable
performance evaluations and ignoring his requests. IDOT alleges every employee
in Camacho’s unit was required to follow the same sign-in and sign-out procedures
and that Camacho was the only employee in the unit that had issues adjusting to the
new procedures. Camacho disputes this allegation.
In the performance evaluations Camacho received prior to June 30, 2013 for
fiscal years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2011, his performance was rated as fully
satisfactory. Moreover, it was not noted in any of those reviews that Camacho
lacked the technical skills necessary to perform the work required of him in the Unit.
Kramer prepared the July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013 performance evaluation of
Camacho. The evaluation was signed by Hessing and Kramer on August 1, 2013,
but was not signed by Camacho until January 21, 2014. Camacho had to file a
grievance through his union to obtain his evaluation. The evaluation had been held
at the direction of Kramer’s supervisor and Johnson for over five years.
Beginning in 2012, Camacho’s mental health issues began impacting his work
performance and attendance. IDOT claims it became most severe in 2013, while the
Plaintiff alleges it was most severe in 2014. In 2012-2013, Camacho was frequently
taking time off during the workday, with this occurring an average of two to three
times per week.
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The Plaintiff was first diagnosed with depression in 2002, though his
depression did not affect his work at that time. In 2013, Camacho was diagnosed
with bipolar disorder. Camacho states that he experiences symptoms such as anxiety
which lead to panic attacks. His symptoms began in 2012 and continued thereafter.
Camacho is not aware of anyone else in his unit, or in the units supervised by David
Greifzu, that had the same mental health conditions as he did.
Camacho made an accommodation request in 2012 asking to move cubicles
because the noise from co-employees was disturbing him. That request was allowed.
In August of 2012, Camacho requested accommodation for a work schedule
modification and flexible leave policy. He stated that he was not sleeping well
because of anxiety and panic attacks which prohibited him from getting out of bed.
He also said he was struggling to get to work on time. Camacho’s request was
denied. Camacho requested a flex schedule because if he arrived five minutes late,
he would be reminded that tardiness was subject to discipline.
Bradley Hessing made the call on what projects to assign to Camacho after
August 1, 2013. William Kramer believes that in 2013 and 2014 there was enough
work in the unit to keep everyone busy.
Beginning in late 2012, Camacho had to go to his counselor two to three times
a week, sometimes in the middle of the day, due to panic attacks. When Camacho

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was having anxiety issues, he used FMLA time and benefit time to cover his
absences. Once his benefit time was exhausted he was not paid during his absences.
The Plaintiff alleges his attendance problems were due to his depression. The
Defendant objects to that assertion on the basis that Camacho lacks the medical
training to offer such an opinion.
Camacho claims that others in the Bureau supervised by Greifzu, including
Tim Craven in the planning unit, were allowed to work extra at the end of the day.
Moreover, Camacho alleges his tardiness was no worse than anyone else on the unit
prior to 2012. The Defendant claims those assertions are based only on the
Plaintiff’s speculation.
In 2012 and 2013, Kramer kept track of time. Camacho claims he was singled
out by monitoring his time when others without a disability did not have their time
monitored.

The Defendant objects to this allegation, claiming Plaintiff lacks

personal knowledge.
In his last evaluation, Camacho’s production was characterized as lower than
in the previous year because he was absent from work more frequently. According
to Hessing, however, Camacho was still generally able to complete his work within
the required time frame.
(C)

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On August 13, 2013, the Plaintiff submitted an accommodation request to
IDOT wherein he sought an accommodation to modify his work schedule and allow
him a flexible leave policy due to his bipolar affective disorder type 2 with a “mainly
depressed mood.” Camacho claimed that anxiety and depression made it hard for
him to get out of bed and he usually stayed in bed “frozen” with anxiety not being
able to get up. He noted that he had been labeled, because of his condition, a
malingerer and challenger of the system by coming to work late.
IDOT claims that, as a result of this accommodation request, it negotiated a
flexible leave policy and work schedule for Camacho. Camacho disputes this
allegation. IDOT alleges that beginning in December 2013, Camacho was allowed
to arrive late on occasion, an allegation which he disputes. The Plaintiff discussed
his mental health diagnosis only with the personnel department.
The Plaintiff alleges that, on August 23, 2013, Kramer informed Johnson that
Camacho had a “flare up” the previous day and had to leave his work station for 45
minutes. Kramer recommended to Brian Johnson in Personnel that Camacho should
be able to take the time without pay given that he had a “serious genuine condition”
and is attempting to secure an FMLA approval. Johnson replied that the absence
should not be signed off as authorized and the situation “would be a valid case of an
unauthorized absence.” He was informed not to approve Camacho’s leave slip. The
Defendant objects to the assertion, claiming that Kramer was not speaking
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“concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment.” There is no
evidence Kramer’s responsibilities included employment hiring or firing decisions
or discipline decisions.
The Plaintiff does not believe Hessing or Kramer treated him unfavorably
because of his race or disability. In 2013, Camacho was approved for FMLA leave
to cover intermittent absences, appointments and flare-ups.

As a result of

Camacho’s August 2013 accommodation request and approved FMLA leaves,
Camacho was provided a number of different accommodations regarding his time.
On October 24, 2013, Camacho filed a Complaint with the Illinois Department
of Human Rights and an EEOC charge of discrimination alleging that he was being
discriminated against because of his disability and his race. His IDPH charge
claimed he had been prohibited from taking time off for medical and personal
reasons, been subjected to harassment and subjected to unnecessary disciplinary
action because of either his Hispanic ancestry or his disability.
If an employee complains about treatment from a supervisor in a
discrimination charge to the Department, his supervisor is interviewed by IDOT.
Carlos Ramirez testified regarding a number of potential ways IDOT would
investigate complaints filed with IDHR. Kramer was aware Camacho made a
discrimination claim. He answered questions via telephone for the Department
while Camacho was still working in the Unit.
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The Plaintiff alleges that after he filed his civil rights complaint in 2013, be
began to be assigned less work. Camacho communicated the idleness to Hessing by
sending reports on his work assignments. When Camacho reported he had little
work, Hessing told Camacho not to bother him. Camacho stopped telling Hessing
he did not have enough work when he got no results. During this time, Hessing
continued to assign work to both Galofre and the contractual worker. The Defendant
claims these allegations are based solely on Plaintiff’s speculation.
The Plaintiff claims that, initially, Kramer did not consider Camacho tardy if
he came in a minute or two late and covered the time at the end of the day. Greifzu
and Johnson later told Kramer being tardy was a problem, directed him to no longer
accept tardiness and to document Camacho’s tardiness. The Defendant objects to
the extent that Greifzu told Kramer to more strictly enforce IDOT’s time and
attendance policy as to all employees, not just Camacho. Moreover, Camacho was
the only employee in the unit that had issues adjusting to the new procedures.
Late in 2013, Attorney Carl Draper began representing Camacho.

On

December 18, 2013, Draper on Camacho’s behalf requested some accommodations
because of Camacho’s disability. The most important of these was that he be
allowed a 30-minute window at the beginning of each day for flex time in the event
he is having a medical problem making it difficult for him to get to work by the
normal starting time.
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The Plaintiff claims that, at that time, his supervisors were concerned about
his frequent tardiness. Mr. Draper understood Camacho’s tardiness was attributable
to his medical condition and believed that the requested accommodation would
address the tardiness problem. The Defendant disputes the Plaintiff’s assertion on
the basis that an attorney who lacks medical training cannot render conclusions or
opinions about an individual’s symptoms.
In late December of 2013, Camacho began calling in to notify Hessing or
Kramer if he would be late. According to Hessing, Camacho was normally good
about calling in when he would be late.
(D)
On March 20, 2014, Camacho submitted an accommodation request to IDOT
seeking a “temporary transfer to a new position that involves complete [sic] different
assignments, responsibilities.” He indicated he suffered from bi-polar II disorder,
severe depression, anxiety and panic attacks. He requested a temporary transfer to
a new position that involved different assignments, responsibilities and supervision
which would allow him time to develop strategies and techniques for managing the
symptoms of the condition. Camacho’s request remained open until he was offered
a new position in 2015.
The Plaintiff claims that a move to a different area would allow the treatment
at work to cease while he was being treated for his illness. Camacho wanted to be
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moved for six months. At the time, Camacho was suffering from symptoms of
anxiety and panic attacks. The idea of a temporary transfer was to enable him to
work temporarily in an environment where he did not have the stressors he was
experiencing in his present assignment while he was being treated for those
symptoms. The Defendant objects to these allegations to the extent that Camacho is
offering an opinion regarding how treatment would have affected him, on the basis
that that he lacks the medical knowledge and skill.
Camacho’s request for a temporary transfer was approved by JP Fyans, the
lawyer for his union.
When Camacho requested the temporary assignment his marital and financial
problems were behind him. However, his symptoms were getting worse. He had
anxiety and panic attacks every morning. He wondered what would happen at work
each day. His work assignments had decreased by 40%. Accordingly, he was often
idle at work. He became anxious and worried because he had no work.
The Plaintiff alleges that under his former supervisor, he had no times of
idleness. By March of 2014, Camacho might have a week of idleness. Sometimes
Camacho was waiting for Hessing to finish his review of his work before being given
a new assignment. It was stressful. When Camacho was busy at work, it helped him
deal with his symptoms. He could focus on work and not think about other things.
He became upset when he was idle. The Defendant claims these facts are immaterial
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because he has not established any evidence that his workload decreased because he
was being retaliated against because of IDHR complaints or his disability.
Camacho’s request for a reasonable accommodation was presented to
Kramer who passed it along to his supervisor. Kramer recommended that the request
for a reassignment to a vacant position be allowed. He thought it reasonable and
noted that Camacho “is ill and keeping him in this stressful environment is not
helping him or us.” Carl Puzey, the head of the Bureau, recommended its approval
as well. These recommendations were made on March 21, 2014. The Defendant
disputes the allegation, to the extent that no evidence establishes that Kramer or
Puzey’s responsibilities included making decisions regarding reasonable
accommodations.
Under IDOT policy, it is supposed to respond to an accommodation request
within 30 days. If IDOT cannot accommodate the request, IDOT will talk with the
employee and might request additional information from a physician. It is an
interactive process for reasonable accommodation. The employee is provided a
written response on whether the request is allowed or denied.
The Plaintiff alleges Kramer understood that he suffered from bipolar
disorder. Camacho was open about being ill and needing an accommodation. While
Kramer did not know what bipolar disorder is, he understood it to be a mental illness.
Camacho told Kramer that he suffered from panic attacks, severe depression and
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Kramer felt that Camacho was almost angered by the lack of

accommodation. Kramer was also aware that Camacho was being treated on a
weekly basis for his condition because he signed his leave slips. Between March 20
and July 30, 2014, Kramer believed that Camacho was feeling that he had been
persecuted and treated unfairly. The Defendant objects to these statements on the
basis that Kramer lacks personal knowledge of the facts alleged. Moreover, he lacks
the foundation to have any opinion regarding how Camacho’s medical conditions
were affecting his work or whether the medications were working correctly.
Camacho remained in the Unit until he was placed on administrative leave.
Kramer does not know what happened with Camacho’s request. The Plaintiff
alleges Prater does not know whether the collective bargaining agreement covering
Camacho prohibited a temporary transfer or reassignment. The Defendant claims
Prater was informed by Personnel that they could not provide a temporary transfer.
Once he submitted his request for accommodation, Camacho received no
response from IDOT between March 20, 2014 and July 31, 2014--the date he was
placed on administrative leave. Camacho does not know what happened to his
request. He had no follow-up conversations with anyone at IDOT about his request.
IDOT acknowledged that Camacho’s request was not resolved prior to his
administrative leave.

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Between March 20, 2014, when Camacho made his temporary transfer request
and July 30, 2014, neither Prater, Dailey nor any other IDOT employee ever
contacted Attorney Draper concerning Camacho’s accommodation request.
Camacho remained in the position he had been in throughout the course of his
employment for IDOT. Mr. Draper was never informed by an IDOT official that
IDOT could not grant Camacho a temporary transfer until September of 2015 when
he was assigned to work in the IDOT sign shop. Draper stated that Camacho’s union
was receptive to the idea of IDOT granting him a temporary transfer as he had
requested.
On the morning of April 3, 2014, Kramer sent an email to Camacho telling
him that his accommodation request had not yet been allowed. In a responsive email
to Kramer and David Daley, Camacho requested that Daley “please” let him know
when his request for an accommodation would be granted. On April 9, 2014, over
100 days after Draper made the request, the accommodation was granted. The
Defendant disputes that it did not work to accommodate Plaintiff’s disabilities
regarding a flexible work schedule when Plaintiff submitted an accommodation
request in August 2013. For purposes of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, moreover,
regular attendance is an essential function of many jobs.
(E)

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In January of 2014, Hessing knew that Camacho was seeking treatment for
personal problems and was aware he was on medication. Camacho was involved in
an incident with Hessing on January 31, 2014. He had arrived at work late that day
after a bad night. Hessing’s phone was busy when Camacho tried to call. Camacho
left a message with Galofre that he would be late and Galofre passed it on to Hessing.
Hessing thought Camacho did not attempt to notify him and became upset. He
directed Camacho to go to the hallway, which he did. While Camacho was leaning
against the wall, Hessing put his hand near Camacho’s ear, almost touching him.
Hessing berated Camacho for not calling him while pointing his finger in Camacho’s
face. They were about two feet apart. Hessing, who is much larger than Camacho,
acknowledged he was angry. Camacho felt threatened by Hessing and believed he
was in his personal space. He had never seen Hessing get upset with any of his
coworkers. On February 3, 2014, Camacho by email informed Kramer about his
concerns regarding Hessing’s conduct. The Defendant contends the allegations
relating to this incident are not relevant to Camacho’s retaliation claims. Moreover,
the altercation cannot form the basis of an adverse employment action.
In 2014, Camacho displayed symptoms to Hessing which caused him to
believe Camacho had a mental illness. Hessing thought Camacho’s symptoms were
getting worse. It appeared to Hessing that Camacho was having a rough time. The
Defendant objects to these allegations to the extent that Camacho is attempting to
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offer an opinion regarding symptoms of his medical condition given that he is not
qualified to do so.
On June 10, 2014, Kramer reprimanded Camacho for eating at his work
cubicle. On June 20, 2014, Camacho was two minutes late to work according to
Kramer’s computer. Camacho believed he was 30 seconds late and wrote 8:00 on
the time sheet. Kramer noted on the time sheet 8:02. On that day, Kramer informed
Hessing that Camacho signed in that morning indicating he was there at 8 a.m., when
according to Kramer’s computer the actual time was 8:02 a.m. Kramer made a point
of putting the designation “8:02 wmk” next to Camacho’s entry. He noted that
Camacho got upset when he saw it.
The Plaintiff alleges that, according to Kramer, by the time of that incident
there was now an intense scrutiny of Camacho’s time. According to Kramer, the
average employer was not under that scrutiny and it bothered Camacho. Kramer
would not have corrected the time sign in for other employees. He was directed by
his supervisor to document the exact time for Camacho only. This scrutiny of
Camacho increased over time until Camacho took administrative leave.

The

Defendant objects to these allegations to the extent he is suggesting the change in
policy applied only to him. Greifzu instructed Kramer to more strictly enforce
IDOT’s time and attendance policy as to all employees, not just Camacho. Every
employee was required to follow the same sign-in and sign-out procedures.
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The Plaintiff alleges that between July of 2013 and February of 2014, Kramer
was tardy 13 times, Hessing was tardy 24 times and Garfole was tardy 8 times. The
Defendant notes that, over the same time period, Camacho was tardy 78 times and
20 additional times Plaintiff was tardy but approved for a flex schedule. Moreover,
there were an additional 10 times that Plaintiff did not report to work and did not
call to say he would not be in. Camacho was allowed to work late 21 days during
that time period and was short of 7.50 hours 11 times. During that time period,
Camacho took leave on 54 occasions.
Kramer received no warnings or discipline for tardiness. Kramer spoke with
Hessing about being late and that as a supervisor it was a problem. According to
Kramer, there were a number of days in which Hessing was very late. Unlike
Camacho, Hessing lived close to work and had no medical issues.
In 2014, Camacho was on proof status. Johnson required that any leave slip
of Camacho had to be accompanied with a medical slip. That requirement did not
apply to others in the Unit. The Defendant objects on the basis that, pursuant to an
accommodation, Camacho was removed from proof status.
At one point, Kramer accused Camacho of falsifying the time he reported to
work and stated it would be reported to investigators. Camacho was also accused of
falsifying Kramer’s signature on the sign in sheet.

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On July 9, 2014, Camacho asked Hessing why he was not assigned some work
that had recently been received in the Unit. In response, Hessing stated that
Camacho had other responsibilities and “please don’t waste time worrying about
what has or has not been assigned to you.”
The Plaintiff alleges that from January 2014 to July 2014, when Camacho was
placed on administrative leave, he was receiving fewer work assignments. The
Defendant disputes the assertion, claiming Camacho lacks the foundation for this
fact and bases it solely on his own speculation.
(F)
On July 31, 2014, Camacho was placed on administrative leave with pay. He
was instructed to remain available by telephone during normal business hours and
was forbidden to enter upon IDOT property without prior approval. He was
informed that his failure to comply with these conditions would subject him to
disciplinary action.
On August 14, 2014, Camacho underwent a fitness for duty exam with Dr.
Kristen Ferguson, M.D., at Midwest Occupational Health Associates. Dr. Ferguson
noted that Camacho had exhibited some significant behavioral and disruptive
qualities at work and that those issues had existed for some length of time. After
examination, Dr. Ferguson determined he was not fit for duty.

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Additionally, at the request of IDOT, Camacho met with Terry Killian, M.D.
on September 12, 2014, September 22, 2014 and October 3, 2014, for the purpose
of an independent fit for duty exam. IDOT provided Dr. Killian with several
hundred pages of documents consisting largely of email communications between
Camacho and his supervisors. Dr. Killian issued his report on October 31, 2014.
Dr. Killian noted that Camacho had “missed an enormous amount of work time”
over the last few years.

Dr. Killian observed that in 2013, Camacho had

approximately 75 instances of time off without pay. Dr. Killian also noted that IDOT
submitted documents regarding instances accommodations were made for Camacho
concerning his time and attendance, including but not limited to, 24 separate
instances where Camacho was allowed to work late to make up for having been late
to work so he did not have to take leave time. In his October 31, 2014 report, Dr.
Killian found that Camacho was “currently suffering from severe depressive and
anxiety symptoms which are clearly severe enough to interfere with his capacity to
adequately perform the duties of his position.” He concluded the depression was
probably associated with bi-polar disorder. He also opined that Camacho had a
possible anxiety disorder. Dr. Killian opined that Camacho was not capable of
working at the time of the evaluation. Dr. Killian further recommended that, “when
Mr. Camacho is able to return to work, he start in a different bureau at IDOT.” He
reasoned that both Camacho and his supervisors contributed to making his work
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environment worse and the bad feeling between them was such that it would not be
possible to rebuild a mutually respectful working relationship.
Camacho remained on administrative leave with pay until around November
14, 2014, when he was removed from his paid administrative leave and placed on a
non-occupational disability leave. Thereafter, Camacho applied for and received
SERS disability benefits at half-pay from November 14, 2014, until Camacho
resumed working at IDOT on October 1, 2015. Prior to returning to work from the
non-occupational disability leave, IDOT required Camacho to attend a fit-for-duty
exam with Dr. Killian.
In conducting his evaluation, Dr. Killian requested that IDOT provide him
with Camacho’s performance reviews.

He noted that the August 1, 2013

performance evaluation was the first “significantly negative evaluation.”

The

evaluation referred to “continuing problems” with the quality of Camacho’s work,
though his prior performance evaluations had not been critical of his work quality.
It was the view of Dr. Killian that Camacho’s supervisors were excessively picky
(examples include making a big issue out of him being a minute or two late to work,
criticizing him for being at his desk too early and eating at his desk). Dr. Killian
stated, “All of this seems to me to be like a pretty silly way to treat a man with a
masters degree in engineering who has demonstrated more than adequate
competence (as per his performance evaluations the first few years”).
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Defendant claims these allegations are immaterial, given that relevant performance
evaluations would be those given near or at the time of any potential adverse
employment action.
In 2014 and 2015, Camacho was treated by Keith Buescher, Ph.D., a clinical
psychologist. On May 20, 2015, Dr. Buescher released Camacho to return to work
“only if transferred to another position away and separate from current position.”
Dr. Buescher stated that Camacho could not work under the same job stress,
supervision or work climate.
In a follow-up fitness for duty examination in July 2015, Dr. Killian noted that
it appeared Camacho had “improved sufficiently to be able to return to work;”
however, Dr. Killian “strongly recommended” that Camacho should not be returned
to his previous workplace and should be transferred to a different bureau. He
believed that if Camacho were to return to his previous workplace, the relationship
between Camacho and his supervisors would make it unlikely that they could rebuild
a productive working relationship and it was “much more likely that Mr. Camacho
and the supervisors would end up spending a great deal of their time documenting
each other’s behavior rather than focusing on the important work that the State of
Illinois needs IDOT to do.” Dr. Killian concluded that Camacho suffered from bipolar mood disorder, type II and possible anxiety disorder.

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Despite being found fit for duty in July of 2015, the Plaintiff was returned to
work on October 1, 2015. Camacho was not returned to administrative leave status
between July and October 2015 while waiting for a position to be found for him.
(G)
Prater was involved in locating a position for Camacho. In the summer of
2015, Draper had conversations with Prater about the position Camacho would
return to with IDOT. Because he has a master’s degree in geology and over 12 years
of geotechnical work experience with IDOT, Camacho and Draper hoped that a
position could be located that would allow him to utilize his education and
experience. Prater sent job descriptions to Draper for a sign shop in District 6, a
Geologist III position in District 6 and a job in the Bureau of Materials and Physical
Research.
While representing Camacho, Mr. Draper was his spokesman in dealing with
IDOT officials concerning Camacho’s employment issues that included his requests
for reasonable accommodation and his effort to return to work for IDOT in the
summer of 2015. Regarding each of those issues, Draper was always willing to meet
and confer with IDOT. Neither Camacho nor Draper ever refused to interact with
IDOT officials concerning these matters. Draper focused on Camacho’s disability
claims that were not being accommodated. Camacho and Draper sought a meeting
with Daly for assistance. He helped obtain one meeting with IDOT officers. The
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Plaintiff states it was difficult to obtain cooperation from IDOT officials. The
Defendant claims that, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging these facts rebut Defendant’s
argument that Plaintiff failed to engage in the interactive process, the facts are
immaterial because they do not relate to the correct time period.
In 2016, Camacho filed an IDHR complaint which gave rise to this lawsuit.
IDOT was actively looking for positions for Camacho to try to get him back
to work from leave. Camacho claims this is true only to the extent that beginning in
the summer of 2015, IDOT informed Camacho’s lawyer of some possible positions
for Camacho.

At IDOT positions are divided between those covered by the

personnel code with Central Management Services (CMS) having final authority,
and technical or non-code positions which IDOT has authority over.
IDOT claims it considered a number of jobs for Camacho. In finding a
position for which Camacho was qualified, IDOT looked at his job description, his
degrees and certifications, his bargaining unit, pay scale and personnel code. The
Plaintiff disputes these allegations.
IDOT considered a Geologist position in the Bureau of Materials and Physical
Research; however, because there was a Geologist I that had been recently hired,
there would not have been enough work for Camacho. IDOT also alleges Camacho
did not want a position in the Bureau of Material and Physical Research, an assertion
which Camacho disputes.
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IDOT alleges that Camacho, through his attorney, asked about a Geologist III
position in District 6 that was available. However, that Geologist position was not
vacant at the time, though it was held by an employee who was suspended and never
returned to work. Prater does not know who was performing the duties of the
position while the employee was gone. IDOT claims it did not believe it would be
a good fit for Camacho because it was a supervisory position and Camacho had not
been in a supervisory role previously. Camacho contends that at no time did Prater
or any other IDOT official ever inform Draper that either the District 6 position was
unavailable or that Camacho was not suited for the position. Prater claims what he
knew about the supervisory duties is only what was listed in the job description.
The Plaintiff alleges Draper informed him and his union representative that
Prater had confirmed to Draper that Camacho would be reinstated in a geologist
position in a different building. He told them Prater said that he “has other work to
do with Personnel on this but sees no problems.” IDOT disputes these allegations,
claiming Camacho has misstated the evidence.
IDOT also considered a display shop position for Camacho. However, the
display shop position was a position covered by the personnel code, and CMS
informed IDOT that it could not place Camacho in that position. Additionally,
Camacho did not have any active personnel grade, which would have been required
for the position.
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(H)
IDOT claims that, ultimately, it offered and Camacho accepted a position
located in the sign shop. The Plaintiff alleges he was assigned this position by IDOT
and was told it was the only position that he could fill. The sign shop position was
in the pro-technical union and allowed IDOT to pay Camacho the same as what he
was making in the Geologist III position.
IDOT alleges Camacho started in the sign shop position on October 1, 2015,
and IDOT was unaware of any request for a different position until the litigation in
this matter. The Plaintiff disputes this allegation. Camacho further asserts the
District 6 Geologist position remained open at that time, which IDOT disputes.
On August 21, 2015, Prater forwarded Draper a position description for a
quality assurance geologist position in the Bureau of Materials and Physical
Research. Draper never informed Prater or anyone else at IDOT that Camacho
would not accept that position.
On August 28, 2015, Prater sent Draper a position classification for an
engineering technician III position in IDOT’s Central Sign Shop. That was the first
communication Draper ever received from IDOT concerning the sign shop position.
In 2015, Camacho was classified as a Geologist III. It was a position in the
Teamster’s Bargaining Unit. Taylor was asked to look for vacant positions with a
similar pay grade to Camacho’s current pay grade and pass that information along
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to Prater. The database identified open positions. It did not list any open positions
in the Bureau of Operation which included the sign shop. The sign shop position
was not posted to be filled at the time Camacho was assigned to it and no other
people applied for the position.
IDOT claims that a temporary transfer would have been a concern from a
personnel standpoint because there was no provision for a temporary transfer in the
union agreement or personnel code. At that time, moreover, all personnel moves
had to be approved by the court-appointed Special Master. The Plaintiff disputes
these allegations.
The Plaintiff alleges that between August 31, 2015 and October 31, 2015,
there were five open positions posted that Camacho met the qualifications for and
was eligible to hold. IDOT claims this misstates the evidence.
Prater participated in a telephone conversation on September 16, 2015, with
Ramirez and Draper to make the sign shop offer. It was explained to Draper that the
sign shop position was the last option that was available to Camacho. Draper was
informed at that time that IDOT was assigning Camacho to its sign shop. Prater
explained to Draper that the sign shop position was the only one that would be
offered to Camacho. No explanation was given to Draper about why the District 6
geologist position was not being given to Camacho. IDOT claims it remains
undisputed that Camacho was found unable to continue to perform his duties as a
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Geologist and the ADA does not entitle a disabled employee to his accommodation
of choice.
In September 2015, Ramirez informed Draper that IDOT was denying
Camacho’s accommodation request. Although Camacho’s March 2014 request for
accommodation sought a temporary transfer, IDOT could not offer a temporary
transfer in 2015 and the position in the sign shop as an ET III was a permanent
position. The Plaintiff disputes that IDOT could not offer him a temporary transfer.
An ET III is an engineering technician III. It is a lower classification than a
geologist. The upper level of the pay scale for the ET III position is lower than that
of a geologist III.
On September 29, 2015, IDOT sent a letter to Camacho directing him to report
to IDOT’s Central Sign Shop on October 1, 2015. Although it indicates on its face
that the assignment is in response to his request for a reasonable accommodation,
the accommodation he requested was made on March 20, 2014, over 18 months
earlier. The sign shop position was never an accommodation requested by or on
behalf of Camacho. IDOT claims these assertions are irrelevant because Camacho
does not get to determine precisely what accommodation he receives. Camacho
testified he accepted the position because he believes he would have been dismissed
if he had not gone to the sign shop.

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The construction signs used by IDOT are ordered through the sign shop.
Camacho becomes involved as the signs are leaving the shop. He adds the number
of signs and amount to a spreadsheet. He verifies the orders are complete and
accurate. Camacho also creates and maintains a database and verifies orders from
the districts.
As a Geologist III, Camacho was not at the highest point in his salary scale.
When he went into the sign shop, Camacho’s job classification was lower than a
Geologist III. While his salary was not reduced, he was at the top of the scale in his
new position. Camacho claims he would have received pay increases as a Geologist
III. He would not see pay increases as an ET III. IDOT claims Camacho lacks
foundation for this fact and his own speculation is insufficient to support it.
The work in the sign shop does not require training in geology or geotechnical
engineering. The Plaintiff testified that the work is not professionally fulfilling and
has affected his self-esteem. Camacho further claims the sign shop position hinders
his ability to get a geotechnical position because he has been away from that work
since 2014. IDOT notes that Plaintiff has not applied for any Geologist position.
Camacho further asserts his self-esteem has gone down working in the sign shop.
He states he has become depressed again and is taking medication for health issues.
IDOT object to these assertions to the extent Camacho is attempting to offer an
opinion as to the cause of his symptoms.
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IDOT seeks summary judgment on all of Camacho’s claims.
II. DISCUSSION
IDOT alleges Camacho cannot meet a prima facie case of retaliation because
Camacho has not identified any adverse employment action he suffered while
employed in the Geologist position. Moreover, Camacho was not meeting the
legitimate expectation of his employer as it relates to time and attendance.
Additionally, IDOT did not retaliate against Camacho when it assigned him to the
sign shop as part of a reasonable accommodation request. IDOT seeks summary
judgment on Counts I and III for these reasons. IDOT claims it is entitled to
summary judgment on Count II because it did not discriminate against Plaintiff on
the basis of disability because Camacho was not a qualified individual as a
Geologist, IDOT offered and Camacho accepted a reassignment to a sign shop
position and Camacho failed to engage in the interactive process.
Camacho contends the record contains ample evidence undermining IDOT’s
contentions and summary judgment should be denied on that basis.
Legal standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the motion is properly supported and
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court views the
evidence and construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. See
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Driveline Systems, LLC v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 936 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2019). To
create a genuine factual dispute, however, any such inference must be based on
something more than “speculation or conjecture.” See Harper v. C.R. England, Inc.,
687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “The court does not assess the
credibility of witnesses, choose between competing reasonable inferences, or
balance the relative weight of conflicting evidence.” Driveline Systems, 36 F.3d at
579 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, there must be enough evidence
in favor of the non-movant to permit a jury to return a verdict in its favor. See
Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008).
Retaliation claims
“Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision provides that it is unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against its employee because the employee filed a
complaint or participated in an investigation of an unlawful employment practice.”
Robertson v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). A plaintiff asserting a Title VII retaliation claim “must
produce enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that (1) [he] engaged in
a statutorily protected activity; (2) the [employer] took a materially adverse action
against [him]; and (3) there existed a but-for causal connection between the two.”
Id. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the employer may
point to evidence which, if accepted as true, would permit the conclusion that it had
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a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See id.
If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff can avoid summary judgment by
“produc[ing] evidence that would permit a trier of fact to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer
were not its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination.” Id.
“[A] materially adverse action need not be one that affects the terms and
conditions of employment, but it must be one that a reasonable employee would find
to be materially adverse such that the employee would be dissuaded from engaging
in the protected activity.” Lewis v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 867 (7th Cir. 2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because Title VII does not establish a general
civility code, its “anti-retaliation provision does not protect an employee against
petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all
employees experience.” Id. at 867-68 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
provision protects works from “retaliation that produces an injury or harm.” Id. at
868.
The Plaintiff alleges that an action which might not be materially adverse to a
normal employee could reach that threshold for an employee with specific
vulnerabilities. In Washington v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658 (7th Cir.
2005), for example, the Seventh Circuit determined that while changing an
employee’s work hours from 7:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. would not
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be a materially adverse employment action for the overwhelming majority of
employees, it could be for an individual like the plaintiff who needed flex time in
order to care for her child with a medical condition. See id. at 662-63.
(1)
Camacho first alleges that after he filed his charge of discrimination on
October 23, 2013--wherein he alleged he was treated less favorably than other
employees because of his disability and his Hispanic ancestry—IDOT officials acted
out against him. That conduct aggravated the symptoms of his mental illness to the
point where it was medically determined he was unfit to work.
Camacho asserts that, like the plaintiff in Washington, he was particularly
vulnerable because of his bipolar affective disorder.

His symptoms became

progressively worse between 2012 and July 2014 at which time he suffered panic
attacks. Camacho states that his symptoms were exacerbated when he had nothing
to do. Both William Kramer and Brad Hessing knew that he was sick. Kramer
recommended that IDOT approve Camacho’s accommodation request, noting that
he “is ill and keeping him in this stressful environment is not helping him or us.”
Hessing believed Camacho had a mental illness and his symptoms were getting
worse in 2014.

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Camacho alleges that he could better deal with his symptoms when he was
busy at work. He could focus on work and not think about things which elevated his
stress—like being idle.
Camacho claims he was threatened by Hessing’s January 2014 “assault,”
when Camacho alleges Hessing berated him and pointed a finger in his face when
Hessing was upset because he believed that Camacho had not called to advise he
would be late. This was a particular stressor for Camacho because of his condition.
Camacho also asserts IDOT’s indifference to his requests for accommodation
may have been the most harmful acts on its part. In December 2013, Attorney Carl
Draper on Camacho’s behalf requested as an accommodation that he be placed on a
flex schedule. Camacho’s tardiness problem was attributed to his illness. Camacho
stated that he had difficulty getting out of bed in the morning due to his anxiety. A
flexible work schedule would help address Camacho’s tardiness problem. It took
IDOT more than 100 days to respond to that request. Camacho alleges that during
this period, his symptoms were getting worse and he was exposed to more stress
because of the increasing scrutiny to his tardiness.
Camacho further claims that IDOT’s failure to respond or even acknowledge
his March 20, 2014 accommodation request caused him real harm. Camacho wanted
to be removed temporarily from the stress of his work environment while attempting

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to bring the symptoms of his mental illness under control. At the time, Hessing
thought Camacho’s symptoms were getting worse. Kramer also thought Camacho
was ill. He believed Camacho was angered by IDOT’s failure to grant his request
and felt he was being persecuted and treated unfairly. More than 130 days after
making the request, Camacho was placed on administrative leave without IDOT
responding to his accommodation request and he was later determined to be
medically unfit to work. Camacho was placed on disability leave status wherein he
effectively received one-half of the income he would have received had he remained
on the job.
Camacho alleges that a reasonable jury could believe that if IDOT had timely
responded to his request and temporarily placed him in another position while he
was attempting to bring the symptoms of his illness under control, the decision to
remove him from work would not have been made.
It is undisputed that Camacho engaged in statutorily protected activity by
filing a charge of discrimination in October 2013. To the extent that Camacho
alleges the failure to act on his March 2014 request for a reasonable accommodation
constituted a materially adverse action, the Court disagrees. Even if the collective
bargaining agreement did not restrict IDOT from making a temporary transfer of an
employee, Michael Prater testified that a temporary assignment was generally not
done because that process had previously been abused. Carlos Ramirez also testified
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that temporary transfers were not being given in 2015. While it is unclear why IDOT
did not act on the request within 30 days, the Court is unable to find that the failure
to do so was a materially adverse action when IDOT was simply acting consistently
with its normal procedures.

Additionally, an employee is not entitled to the

reasonable accommodation of his choice. See Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d
1009, 1014 (7th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, IDOT’s failure to act on Camacho’s
request was not a materially adverse action.
As for the January 2014 incident with Hessing, it appears Hessing erroneously
believed Camacho failed to call to advise he would be late and Hessing acted in an
inappropriately confrontational manner. The Court is unable to conclude that this
altercation between two employees constituted a materially adverse action.
The Court recognizes that Camacho was frustrated by the failure of IDOT to
quickly act on Carl Draper’s December 2013 accommodation request. However, the
request for a flex schedule was granted even if it was not done expeditiously.
Accordingly, this is not a materially adverse action. Before Camacho’s statutorily
protected activity in October 2013, IDOT had approved him in August 2013 for
FMLA leave to cover intermittent absences, appointments and flare-ups. The fact
that the December 2013 accommodation request was also eventually allowed
suggests that he was not treated any differently regarding accommodation requests
after he engaged in protected activity.
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To the extent Camacho alleges there is a factual dispute regarding whether the
decision to remove him from work would have been made if IDOT had timely
responded to his March 20, 2014 accommodation request and temporarily placed
him in another position while he attempted to bring his symptoms under control, the
Court is unable to agree. The statement is based on speculation. It is undisputed
that Camacho was determined to be unable to perform his duties as a Geologist at
the time he was placed on disability leave.
Based on the allegations contained in Count I, the Court is unable to conclude
that a materially adverse action was taken against Camacho after he engaged in
statutorily protected activity. Accordingly, the Court concludes that a reasonable
jury could not find that IDOT engaged in workplace retaliation against Camacho
after he filed his charge of discrimination. IDOT is entitled to summary judgment
on Count I.
(2)
In Count III, the Plaintiff alleges a retaliation claim based on adverse
employment action.

Specifically, IDOT retaliated against Camacho when it

permanently assigned him to its sign shop in a clerical position which did not require
him to use the education and experience he had acquired as a geologist with a
master’s degree in that field. Camacho advances two separate claims because of the

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reassignment.

Page 38 of 45

He asserts IDOT’s reassignment was another act of retaliation

because of the October 2013 charge of employment discrimination he had earlier
filed with IDOT. Camacho also alleges in Count II that this reassignment did not
reasonably accommodate his disability in violation of the ADA.
Camacho claims that although he incurred no immediate financial loss, his
reassignment did implicate the financial terms of his employment. The sign shop
position was in a lower salary grade than his geologist position. At the time of the
reassignment, Camacho was at the top of the salary scale and could advance no
further. As a geologist, however, he was not at the top of the salary scale and could
look to future salary increases.
Additionally, Camacho’s education and work experience was in the
professional field of geotechnical engineering. He had a master’s degree and over
10 years of work experience in that profession.

Following the reassignment,

Camacho was a clerk in the sign shop. He was not able to use the skills he developed
as a geologist. This would result in those skills eroding. Inevitably, Camacho’s
prospects in either geology or geotechnical engineering would significantly decline.
There is at least a question of fact regarding whether the reassignment was an
adverse action.

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Camacho acknowledges 23 months elapsed between the date that he engaged
in protected activity and the sign shop assignment. When the adverse employment
action occurs more than a year after the charge of discrimination, the timing does
not suggest that the employment decision occurred because of the protected activity.
See Nehan v. Tootsie Roll Industries, 621 F. App’x 847, 852 (7th Cir. 2015); see
also McGuire v. City of Springfield, 280 F.3d 794, 796 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]iming
may offer a clue to causation (or its absence) when an employee charges retaliation:
a short gap may suggest a causal link, while a long one undercuts an inference of
causation”).
Camacho contends that two considerations explain this length of time. First,
during over 14 months of that 23-month period, Camacho was away from work and
IDOT had no opportunity to act out against him.

In McGuire, the adverse

employment action occurred more than a decade after the plaintiff’s charge of
discrimination. See McGuire, 280 F.3d at 796. The lengthy delay alone did not
defeat plaintiff’s claim because it had taken the state 10 years to direct the city to
place her in its training program. See id.
Second, Camacho alleges that between December 2013 (less than two months
after the charge was filed) and the beginning of his administrative leave, IDOT
through a number of acts and omissions acted out against Camacho—as noted in

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discussing the retaliation claim alleged in Count I. Camacho claims, therefore, that
the sign shop assignment was merely a continuation of other things done to him.
Upon viewing the record in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court
agrees that the reassignment occurred nine months in actual working time after
Camacho’s charge of discrimination. The fact that it occurred nearly two years in
real time after the protected activity does not defeat Camacho’s claim. The Court
concludes that the amount of time that elapsed neither suggests nor undercuts an
inference of causation.
Camacho further asserts IDOT has never explained the process leading to the
selection of the sign shop position. The database IDOT used in finding a position
for Camacho identified five positions which Camacho was eligible to hold and were
open. He was not offered any of them. Rather, IDOT informed Attorney Draper
that the sign job position was the only one that would be offered.
Additionally, Camacho claims that the Geologist position in IDOT’s District
III was a position in his bargaining unit that would have been a good fit for him. The
position was vacant in the late summer of 2015. Camacho alleges that when Michael
Prater informed Carl Draper of the position on August 20, 2015, it was explained to
Attorney Draper that the only contingency was to secure the approval of the Special

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Master and Prater did not believe that would be an obstacle. Prater did not explain
to Draper why the position was off the table.
IDOT now claims that the position would not have been a good fit for
Camacho because it had some supervisory responsibilities. Prater testified that once
the job description was obtained, it was determined that the Geologist III would
supervise five or six individuals. According to Prater, the general consensus was
that it would not have been a good fit for Camacho. When the facts are viewed in a
light most favorable to Camacho, however, the Court concludes that there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether that is the reason as to why Camacho
was not offered the Geologist III position. It appears that the first time IDOT
claimed that Camacho was not suited for the position was in defense of this lawsuit.
In his affidavit, Carl Draper states that on August 20, 2015, Michael Prater advised
him that he had located a position as a geologist in IDOT’s District 6. Prater did not
believe that securing final permission would be a problem. Draper states that neither
Prater nor any other IDOT official advised that the District 6 position was
unavailable or that Camacho was not suited for the position. When Draper was
informed that Camacho would be assigned to the sign shop, no explanation was
given as to why the District 6 geologist position was not being offered.
IDOT’s alleged reason for why the job was not offered to Camacho is
certainly plausible. Based on Draper’s discussions with Prater in August 2015,
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however, it appeared it was a mere formality that Camacho would be offered the
Geologist 6 position. IDOT did not offer its current explanation until this litigation.
Moreover, IDOT has not explained what the supervisory responsibilities were. The
Court concludes that a reasonable jury could reject IDOT’s explanation.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes there are genuine issues of
material fact which preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of IDOT on
Count III.
ADA failure to accommodate claim
In Count II, Camacho alleges IDOT failed to reasonably accommodate his
disability by assigning him to a position in the sign shop when a vacant geologist
position was available that he was capable of filling.

The ADA prohibits

discrimination against a qualified individual on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a). The term “qualified individual” means:
an individual who, with or without a reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires. For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given
to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if
an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or
interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered
evidence of the essential functions of the job.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
To prevail on a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) he
was a qualified individual with a disability, (2) his employer was aware of his

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disability; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate his disability.”
Youngman v. Peoria County, 947 F.3d 1037, 1042 (7th Cir. 2020). If a qualified
employee has requested an accommodation, “the ADA requires both parties to
engage in an informal interactive process to identify an appropriate
accommodation.” Id. Based on Camacho’s bipolar affective disorder, the Court
concludes that he was disabled.
The Plaintiff had been placed on administrative leave with pay on July 31,
2014. He was determined not fit for duty after an August 14, 2014 examination. On
October 31, 2014, Dr. Killian found that Camacho was “currently suffering from
severe depressive and anxiety symptoms which are clearly severe enough to interfere
with his capacity to adequately perform the duties of his position.” He further
recommended that Camacho when able to return work in a different bureau at IDOT.
In August and September 2015, Camacho had been away from work for over
12 months. By then, both his care provider and IDOT’s evaluator concurred that his
condition had significantly improved to the point that he was capable of returning to
work though not to the Unit. For most of the 12 years he worked at IDOT, Camacho
had performed his duties as a geologist in a satisfactory manner. The problems with
his work and attendance arose after his illness was diagnosed.

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Upon viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court
finds there is a legitimate factual question as to whether Camacho would be qualified
for the Geologist III position in District 6 upon returning to work. Significantly,
IDOT apparently believed Camacho was qualified for that position in August 2015
before determining he was not. As the Court previously noted, IDOT at the time did
not provide Attorney Draper with an explanation as to why that apparently changed.
The presence of supervisory responsibilities was not mentioned until this litigation.
Based on those circumstances, the Court concludes there is factual dispute regarding
whether Camacho was a qualified individual with a disability.
The reassignment to a vacant position is an acceptable form of a reasonable
accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). “A demotion can be a reasonable
accommodation when the employer cannot accommodate the disabled employee in
her current or prior jobs or an equivalent position.” Ford v. Marion County Sheriff’s
Office, 942 F.3d 839, 855 (7th Cir. 2019). An employer may reassign an employee
to a lower grade position, but only if there are no vacant equivalent positions for
which the individual is qualified. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(o).
Both parties accuse the other of failing to engage in the interactive process.
However, a jury could find that on August 20, 2015, Michael Prater informed Carl
Draper that he had located a geologist position for Camacho, contingent upon the
permission of the Special Master that political considerations were not involved.
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The parties may have believed that engaging in an interactive process would have
been pointless given that a position for Camacho had apparently been secured.
Attorney Draper was not given an explanation for why Camacho was no longer
considered for the geologist position. Because IDOT would have been the only party
with knowledge of this information, there is at least a factual question regarding
whether IDOT should have initiated the interactive process whenever it determined
that Camacho was no longer a candidate for the geologist position.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that a jury could find that
Camacho was assigned to a lower grade position when there was an available vacant
and equivalent position for which he was qualified. There is a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether IDOT reasonably accommodated Camacho’s
disability. The summary judgment motion will be denied as to Count II.
Ergo, the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant The Illinois
Department of Transportation [d/e 26] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The Motion is GRANTED as to Count I and DENIED as to Counts II and III.
ENTER: October 8, 2020

FOR THE COURT:
/s/ Richard Mills
Richard Mills
United States District Judge

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