Walker v. Blunt et al

Filing 86

OPINION: The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (d/e 79 ) filed by Defendants Lori Baker, Patricia Eddington, and Doris Miller is DENIED. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 08/26/2019. (SKN, ilcd)

E-FILED

Monday, 26 August, 2019 01:02:23 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
TIFFANY WALKER, as
Independent Administrator, of
the Estate of JAVON WALKER,
Deceased,

)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,
)
INC., a Florida Corporation doing )
business in the State of Illinois, )
et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 17-cv-03208

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings (d/e 79) filed by Defendants Lori Baker, Patricia
Eddington, and Doris Miller. For the following reasons, the motion
is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 22, 2017, Plaintiff Tiffany Walker, the
Independent Administrator of the Estate of Javon Walker, filed a
21-count Complaint at Law (d/e 1). Among the claims asserted in
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the Complaint at Law are wrongful death claims pursuant to 740
ILCS 180/2 against Defendants Lori Baker, Patricia Eddington,
and Doris Miller (formerly Doris Blunt) in their individual
capacities (Counts VIII, XIII, and XVIII) and survival actions
pursuant to 755 ILCS 5/27-6 against Miller, Eddington, and Baker
(hereinafter, Defendants) in their individual capacities (Counts X,
XV, and XX).1
On September 21, 2018, Defendants filed their Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, asking the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s
wrongful death claims and survival actions against them.
Defendants assert that Counts VIII, X, XIII, XV, XVIII, and XX of
Plaintiff’s Complaint at Law fail to state claims upon which relief
can be granted. Motion (d/e 79), at 1. Defendants contend that
the duty they owed to Javon Walker emanated from their
employment with the State of Illinois. Id. at 4-5. The result,
according to Defendants, is that Plaintiff’s wrongful death claims

The other claims asserted in Plaintiff’s Complaint at Law are Eighth
Amendment claims against Defendants, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and
Francis Kayira, MD; wrongful death claims against Wexford and Dr. Kayira;
survival actions against Wexford and Dr. Kayira; and a Monell claim against
Wexford. The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings does not seek the
dismissal of any of these claims.
1

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and survival actions against Defendants are actually claims
against the State, meaning that sovereign immunity deprives the
Court of jurisdiction over the claims. Id. at 5.
On December 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(d/e 82). Plaintiff asserts that “Defendants’ duty is not derived
from their employment as a contractor for IDOC but rather [the
duty emanates from] their status as medical professionals” and
that “when a defendant’s duty is derived independently from their
employment with the State then the cause of action is not
considered one against the State and the defendant cannot claim
sovereign immunity.” Memorandum (d/e 82), at 2.
The following facts come from Plaintiff’s Complaint at Law.
The Court accepts these facts as true in ruling on the motion for
judgment on the pleadings. See Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742
F.3d 720, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2014).
Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (Wexford), is a Florida
corporation contracted by the State of Illinois to provide medical
care to persons incarcerated in the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC). Complaint (d/e 1), ¶ 7. Defendants are
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nurses licensed and registered in the State of Illinois and employed
by Wexford or the State. Id. ¶¶ 8-10.
On September 23, 2015, Javon Walker (Walker) died,
suffering extreme pain and discomfort leading up to his death. Id.
¶¶ 39, 40. Prior to his death, Walker had been diagnosed with
peritonitis and had experienced a continuous decrease in blood
pressure. Id. ¶¶ 27, 33. At the time of Walker’s death, Walker was
incarcerated in IDOC at Graham Correctional Center in Hillsboro,
Illinois. Id. ¶ 13. Defendants were Walker’s registered nurses,
treating him and measuring his blood pressure. Id. ¶¶ 28, 44.
However, Defendants failed to screen, diagnose, or treat Walker’s
sepsis. Id. ¶ 36.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a party may
move for judgment on the pleadings after the filing of the complaint
and answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d 694,
698 (7th Cir. 2007). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is governed
by the same standards as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Adams, 742 F.3d at 727–28.
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A complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Factual allegations are accepted
as true at the pleading stage, but allegations in the form of legal
conclusions are insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”
Adams, 742 F.3d at 728 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
In re marchFIRST Inc., 589 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2009).
III. ANALYSIS
The Illinois Court of Claims possesses sole jurisdiction over
tort claims made against the State. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868,
885 (7th Cir. 2009). In determining whether or not a claim is
made against the State, the issues raised and relief sought must
be examined. Currie v. Lao, 592 N.E.2d 977, 980 (Ill. 1992). A
claim will be found to be against the State if “a judgment for the
plaintiff could operate to control the actions of the State or subject
it to liability.” Id.
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Actions are deemed to be against the State if (1) there are no
allegations that a State employee acted outside of the scope of his
employment, (2) the duty purportedly breached was not owed to
the public independent of State employment, and (3) the actions
involved were “within that employee’s normal and official functions
of the State.” Healy v. Vaupel, 549 N.E.2d 1240, 1247 (Ill. 1990).
Accordingly, if a State employee is charged with negligence arising
from the breach of a duty imposed “solely by virtue of his State
employment,” sovereign immunity will shield the employee and
prevent the case from being heard outside the Illinois Court of
Claims. Currie, 592 N.E.2d at 980. However, if the employee is
charged with breaching a duty imposed upon her independent of
her State employment, sovereign immunity will not apply. Id.
Sovereign immunity does not bar all actions against medical
professionals employed by the State. See Jinkins v. Lee, 807
N.E.2d 411 (Ill. 2004). In Jinkins, the Illinois Supreme Court
allowed claims to proceed against State-employed doctors for
failure to diagnose a mental illness. See id. at 412-13. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the doctors owed a duty that arose from
the doctor-patient relationship and that the relief sought by the
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plaintiff would not force the State to take any particular action or
subject the State to liability. Id. at 421-22.
Also, in Madden v. Kuehn, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Second District held that sovereign immunity did not prevent a
medical malpractice action against a State-employed doctor who
failed to diagnose an inmate with a hereditary disease. 372 N.E.2d
1131, 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). As the source of the doctor’s duty
arose from the physician-patient relationship rather than the scope
of his employment and the relief sought did not “control the action
of the State or subject it to liability,” sovereign immunity did not
shield the doctor from claims made against him. Id. at 1134-35.
Further, in Watson v. St. Annes Hospital, the Illinois
Appellate Court for the First District held that a suit could be
maintained against two State-employed doctors because of their
failure to diagnose certain illnesses that resulted in death. 386
N.E.2d 885, 890 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). Not only did each doctor owe
a duty to the individual independent of their State employment,
the recovery sought against the doctors’ personal assets or
insurance would not have compelled the State in any way. Id. at
889.
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In the instant case, each Defendant was a licensed medical
professional. The source of the duty Defendants owed to Walker
was their status as medical professionals, not their employment
with the State. Therefore, the wrongful death claims and survival
actions against Defendants are not claims against the State.
Sovereign immunity does not bar these claims from proceeding.
Plaintiff also seeks damages not subject to a sovereign
immunity defense. The compensatory damages, punitive damages,
and reasonable attorney’s fees sought by Plaintiff are to be
assessed against each individual Defendant, not the State. See,
e.g., Complaint, at 25. Therefore, awarding Plaintiff these damages
and fees would not compel the State to take any action or subject
the State to liability.
In arguing for the application of sovereign immunity to the
aforementioned wrongful death claims and survival actions,
Defendants primarily rely on Hogle v. Baldwin, a case that involved
a wrongful death claim stemming from the suicide of an inmate.
2018 WL 2465468, *1 (C.D. Ill. June 1, 2018). The case was filed
against, among others, IDOC director John Baldwin. Id. The court
held that “Baldwin’s duty to provide constitutionally adequate
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medical care was not owed to the public generally independent of
his employment.” Id. at *4. However, while Hogle dealt with the
inadequacy of medical care provided to an inmate, the wrongful
death claim in that case was brought against Baldwin, an IDOC
director, and not a medical professional. See id.
None of the other cases cited by Defendants involved medical
care or claims made against medical professionals. Rather, these
cases involved State-employed administrative officials. The
relevant duties of those officials emanated from the scope of their
State employment, as opposed to the duties a medical professional
owes to a patient independent of their State employment.
For instance, in Ingram v. Illinois Department of Corrections,
a wrongful death claim and survival action were brought against
the warden of Menard Correctional Center after an inmate died
from hyperthermia as a result of being isolated in an overheated
cell. 2011 WL 1519623, *1 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2011). The district
court there held that “the sole source of the dut[y] [the warden] is
alleged to have breached”—monitoring the condition of prisoners in
isolation and ensuring such prisoners are afforded medical care—
was “[the warden]’s employment by the State of Illinois.” Id. at *4.
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The warden did not owe this duty to the general public
independent of his employment. See id.
Medical professionals, however, owe a general duty to the
public, one arising from the physician-patient relationship and the
duty of care owed a patient, not the scope of any State
employment. See Jenkins, 807 N.E.2d at 328. Therefore, the
cases cited by Defendants do not persuade the Court that the
wrongful death claims and survival actions against Defendants
must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (d/e 79) filed by Defendants Lori Baker, Patricia
Eddington, and Doris Miller is DENIED.

ENTER: August 26, 2019
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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