Coleman v. Castles et al

Filing 12

MERIT REVIEW OPINION: Case proceeds. The clerk is directed to terminate Defendants Flynn, Dhabalt, Milhiser, Mosher, Sweat, Madonia, Costello, and Harmon. The clerk is directed to enter the standard order granting Plaintiff's in forma pauperis petition and assessing an initial partial filing fee, if not already done, and to attempt service on Defendants Castles and Dowis pursuant to the standard procedures. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Rule 16 Deadline 12/10/2018. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 10/11/2018. (SKN, ilcd)

E-FILED

Thursday, 11 October, 2018 02:03:31 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
STEPHEN COLEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER RIKKI CASTLES, et al.,
Defendants.

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17-CV-3234

MERIT REVIEW OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Plaintiff proceeds pro se from his incarceration in the
Pinckneyville Correctional Center. His Complaint is before the Court
for a merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This section
requires the Court to identify cognizable claims stated by the
Complaint or dismiss claims that are not cognizable.1 In reviewing
the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true,
liberally construing them in Plaintiff's favor and taking Plaintiff’s
pro se status into account. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649

1

 A prisoner  who has had three prior actions dismissed for failure to state a claim or as frivolous or malicious can 
no longer proceed in forma pauperis unless the prisoner is under “imminent danger of serious physical injury.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

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(7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are
insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to "'state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.'" Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d
418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(quoted cite omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that he was a passenger in a vehicle when
Springfield Police Officers Castles and Dowis, without probable
cause, stopped the vehicle, searched the car without the owner’s
consent, and searched Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s consent. Plaintiff
alleges that the search was conducted because Plaintiff is an
African American with a criminal history and the owner/driver was
a Caucasian woman. As a result of the searches, Plaintiff was
criminally charged and ultimately convicted of being an armed
habitual criminal, a sentence he is now serving in the Illinois
Department of Corrections. Illinois v. Coleman, 2015-CF-1036
(Sangamon County Circuit Court). The case is on appeal. No
charges were brought against the Caucasian owner of the vehicle.
Plaintiff contends that Detectives Flynn and Dhabalt acted
unprofessionally by talking about the case to the public and by
harassing and tampering with witnesses. State’s Attorney John
Milhiser and his Assistants Dan Mosher and Jason Sweat allegedly
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pursued the false charges against Plaintiff. Judge Madonia
allegedly denied Plaintiff’s motion to suppress and motion to quash
arrest, knowing that the ruling was contrary to law. Plaintiff also
sues Attorney Michael Costello and Public Defendant Michael
Harmon, apparently for unspecified failings which allegedly played a
part in Plaintiff’s conviction. Plaintiff asks for acquittal and for
Defendants to be fired.
The bulk of Plaintiff’s allegations are challenges to the validity
of his conviction, challenges which must be pursued in Plaintiff’s
appeal of his criminal case, not in a separate civil rights action. See
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)( )(“[A] district court must
dismiss a § 1983 action if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in that
§ 1983 action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal
conviction or sentence.”). Additionally, the prosecutors and Judge
Madonia are absolutely immune from a lawsuit for damages.
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988)(judges are immune
from suit for damages based on judicial acts); Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)("in initiating a prosecution and in
presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil
suit for damages under section 1983."). Damages would be the only
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relief available in this action because this Court cannot intervene in
Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings or have the Defendants fired. See
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)(federal courts must abstain
from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that may
interfere with ongoing state proceedings). Lastly, the attorneys who
represented Plaintiff in his criminal proceedings are not government
actors, and, therefore, their actions do not give rise to constitutional
claims. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)(“a public
defender does not act under color of state law when performing a
lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a
criminal proceeding”).
The Court sees only one claim that might be viable—Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment claim against Officers Castles and Dowis about
the traffic stop, search, and seizure without probable cause.
However, this claim must be stayed until the resolution of the
appeal of Plaintiff’s criminal conviction. If the denial of Plaintiff’s
motion to suppress is upheld on appeal, then the issue of probable
cause likely cannot be relitigated in this action. See Simpson v.
Rowan, 125 Fed.Appx. 720 (7th Cir. 2005)(not published in Federal
Reporter)(state court’s denial of motion to suppress barred Plaintiff
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from relitigating the issue in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
because Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue
in the criminal proceedings). On the other hand, if the denial of the
motion to suppress is reversed, then the Fourth Amendment claim
may arguably proceed in this action. Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d
134, 137 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim for
warrantless search and unlawful arrest should be stayed pending
resolution of criminal proceedings). Officers Castle and Dowis will
be served, and then this case will be stayed and administratively
closed until the resolution of Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1)

Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that Plaintiff states Fourth
Amendment claims against Defendants Castles and Dowis arising
from the traffic stop and subsequent search and seizure on or about
October 7, 2015. This case proceeds solely on the claims identified
in this paragraph. Any additional claims shall not be included in
the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for
good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15.
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2)

The remainder of Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed for the

reasons stated above.
3)

This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before
filing any motions, in order to give Defendants notice and an
opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be
denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the
Court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.
4)

The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing

each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from
the date the waiver is sent to file an Answer. If Defendants have not
filed Answers or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the
entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status
of service. After Defendants have been served, the Court will enter
an order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
5)

With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the

address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant
worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said
Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said
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Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used
only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding
addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be
maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
6)

Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the

date the waiver is sent by the Clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an
answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate under
the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be
to the issues and claims stated in this Opinion. In general, an
answer sets forth Defendants' positions. The Court does not rule
on the merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed by
Defendants. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or
will be considered.
7)

This District uses electronic filing, which means that,

after Defense counsel has filed an appearance, Defense counsel will
automatically receive electronic notice of any motion or other paper
filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to
Defense counsel copies of motions and other papers that Plaintiff
has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery
requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not
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filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and
responses directly to Defendants' counsel. Discovery requests or
responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled, unless they are
attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does
not begin until Defense counsel has filed an appearance and the
Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the
discovery process in more detail.
8)

Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose

Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall
arrange the time for the deposition.
9)

Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of

any change in his mailing address and telephone number.
Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address
or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with
prejudice.
10)

If a Defendants fails to sign and return a waiver of service

to the clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will
take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S.
Marshal's service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant

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to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
11)

Within 10 days of receiving from Defendants' counsel an

authorization to release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign
and return the authorization to Defendants' counsel.
12)

The clerk is directed to terminate Defendants Flynn,

Dhabalt, Milhiser, Mosher, Sweat, Madonia, Costello, and
Harmon.
13)

The clerk is directed to enter the standard order

granting Plaintiff's in forma pauperis petition and assessing an
initial partial filing fee, if not already done, and to attempt
service on Defendants Castles and Dowis pursuant to the
standard procedures.
14)

The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified

protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act.
ENTERED: 10/11/2018
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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