Hansen v. State of Illinois et al
Filing
20
OPINION entered by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 10 is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part. See written order. Plaintiff's claim for interference with his rights under the FMLA is dismissed with leave to replead. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Bryon Meunch and Deb Harvey for violations of the ADA are dismissed with prejudice. The remainder of the Motion is denied. Plaintiff may proceed with his ADA claims against Defendant CMS and may proceed with his FMLA discrimination and retaliation against all Defendants. (LB, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 12 June, 2018 03:45:39 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
STEWART HANSEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CENTRAL MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, BRYON MEUNCH,
and DEB HARVEY,
Defendants.
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No. 17-cv-3256
OPINION
TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Central
Management Services (CMS), Bryon Meunch, and Deb Harvey’s Motion to
Dismiss (d/e 10) (Motion). The parties consented to proceed before this
Court. Consent to the Exercise of Jurisdiction by a United States
Magistrate Judge and Reference Order entered May 25, 2018 (d/e 16). For
the reasons set forth below, the Motion is ALLOWED in part and DENIED
in part.
Plaintiff Stewart Hansen alleges that Defendants discriminated
against him and retaliated against him in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).
Complaint (d/e 1); 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (FMLA); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (ADA).
Page 1 of 14
Defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For purposes of the Motion, the Court
assumes well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint to be true and draws all
inferences in favor of Hansen. See Franzoni v. Hartmax Corp., 300 F.3d
767, 771 (7th Cir. 2002). The exhibits attached to the Complaint are part of
the Complaint for all purposes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). The Complaint
alleges the following.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hansen worked for CMS from January 1, 1990 to October 14, 2016.
From January 1, 2016 until September 12, 2016, he worked as a systems
analyst in its Department of Innovation and Technology (Department).
CMS is an agency of the State of Illinois. Hansen suffers from bipolar
disorder, depression, and anxiety. Defendant Meunch was Hansen’s
supervisor in the Department, and Defendant Harvey was Meunch’s
supervisor. In late April or early May 2016, Hansen filed FMLA requests for
accommodations due to his mental disorders. Hansen requested
permission to be tardy or absent from work due to his condition and
necessary appointments to treat his condition. CMS approved his requests
for accommodation. Hansen alleges that he was able to perform his job
Page 2 of 14
satisfactorily with these accommodations. See Complaint, at 4 and
Collective Exhibit to the Complaint (Collective Exhibit) at 6-13. 18.1
When Hansen filed the requests, Meunch “stepped out of his office to
the central work area of my unit and to the other employees loudly cursed
at me and proceeded to reprimand me throughout the day.” Complaint, at
4. Hansen complained to his union representative, and Meunch was
disciplined for his behavior. Thereafter, Meunch held Hansen to a higher
standard than his co-workers and “aggressively continued his harassment”
of Hansen. Id.
Hansen was tardy on April 14 and 15, 2016 due to his medical
conditions. The tardy arrivals on those two days were approved as part of
his accommodation. Defendants, however, subjected Hansen to
progressive discipline for these two tardy arrivals. Hansen does not allege
the result of the disciplinary proceeding. Complaint, Collective Exhibit at
14-20.
Hansen alleges that Meunch and Harvey continued to harass him on
a daily basis. Complaint, Collective Exhibit, at 22-23.
1
The Court uses the page numbers assigned by the Court’s CM/ECF system for the Collective Exhibit to
the Complaint.
Page 3 of 14
On or before August 11, 2016, Hansen’s girlfriend dropped him off at
work in a car that Hansen rented. The police stopped the car and searched
the girlfriend’s backpack. The officers found illegal drugs and drug
paraphernalia. The officers also found an empty container for prescription
medication with Hansen’s name on it. Complaint, Collective Exhibit, at 28
of 33.
Officers of the Illinois State Police then came to Hansen’s workplace.
Defendant Harvey directed Hansen to talk to Officers of the Illinois State
Police. The Police Officers found nothing on his person, and questioned
him. When Hansen said he wanted to speak with an attorney, the officers
arrested him and took him to the Sangamon County, Illinois, jail. Hansen
was charged with possession of illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia.
Complaint, Collective Exhibit, at 28 of 33.
CMS suspended Hansen indefinitely on September 12, 2016, for
violation of CMS rules and policies because he possessed illegal drugs and
drug paraphernalia. The suspension was a discharge under Illinois
unemployment law. Complaint, Collective Exhibit, at 28 of 33. Hansen
alleges that Meunch and Harvey concocted the story of drug possession to
harass Hansen because he asserted his rights under the ADA and FMLA.
Complaint, at 5 and Collective Exhibit, at 3. Hansen also alleges that he
Page 4 of 14
left “voluntarily due to the on-going harassment and hostile work
environment, and the loss of wages that were held back from me for
several months.” Complaint, at 5.
On January 5, 2017, the Sangamon County, Illinois, State’s Attorney
dropped all charges against Hansen. Complaint, Collective Exhibit at 28 of
33.
After his indefinite suspension, Hansen filed for unemployment
benefits. Representatives of CMS opposed his application for
unemployment benefits. CMS took the position in the unemployment
proceedings that Hansen was fired for cause. CMS contended that
Hansen violated its rules and policies by possessing illegal drugs and drug
paraphernalia. Complaint, at 6, and Collective Exhibit, at 28 of 33. On May
2, 2017, an Illinois Administrative Law Judge determined that CMS did not
have cause to fire Hansen and that he was entitled to unemployment
benefits. Complaint, Collective Exhibit, at 28 of 33.
ANALYSIS
Based on these allegations, Hansen brings claims for discrimination
and retaliation in violation of the ADA and FMLA. Hansen filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
received a Right to Sue Letter. Defendants move to dismiss these claims.
Page 5 of 14
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper
where a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Federal Rules require only “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and
allegations must be “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) &
(d)(1). While a complaint need not contain detailed, specific factual
allegations, it must contain sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). A claim is plausible if the plaintiff “pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). A claim is plausible on its face if it provides the defendant fair
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. George v.
Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 2007). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
appropriate when “the factual detail in a complaint [is] so sketchy that the
complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the
defendant is entitled under Rule 8.” Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT &
T Mobility, LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007).
The FMLA guarantees an employee of a covered employer the right
to take up to 12 workweeks of leave annually because of a serious health
Page 6 of 14
condition. 29 U.S.C. §2612(a)(1)(D). The FMLA prohibits an employer
from interfering with the employee’s exercise of those rights, discharging or
discriminating against the employee for exercising those rights, or
retaliating against the employee for exercising those rights. 29 U.S.C. §
2615(a)(1) and (a)(2). The prohibitions against interference and
discrimination also include a prohibition against retaliation for exercising
rights under the FMLA. See Lewis v. School District No. 70, 523 F.3d 730,
741 (7th Cir. 2008).
To allege an interference claim, Hansen must allege that (1) he was
eligible for FMLA protections; (2) CMS is an employer covered by the
FMLA; (3) he was entitled to the take leave for tardiness and absences
under the FMLA; (4) he provided sufficient notice for the leave; and (5)
CMS denied him the benefits to which he was entitled. Pagel v. TIN Inc.,
695 F.3d 622, 626-27 (7th Cir. 2012). The Complaint fails to allege that the
Defendants interfered with Hansen’s FMLA rights. Hansen alleges he asks
for an accommodation in the form of leave to be tardy and absent as
needed, and the request was granted. He alleges he subsequently was
subjected to progressive discipline procedures because he exercised those
rights, but he does not allege that he was ultimately disciplined. To state
an interference claim, he needs to allege that CMS disciplined him at the
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end of the process. Hansen may replead if Defendants in fact disciplined
him for taking FMLA approved leave. At this point, he fails to state a claim
for interference.
To state a claim for retaliation, Hansen must allege that (1) he
engaged in protected activity under the FMLA; (2) the Defendants took an
adverse employment action against him; and (3) there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action. Pagel, 695 F.3d at 631. The meaning of “adverse employment
action” for purposes of retaliation is broader than for discrimination. A
person suffers an adverse action for purposes of retaliation if the
Defendants took actions against him that would dissuade a reasonable
employee from engaging in protected activity. Burlington Northern and
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006); see Washington v.
Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661-62 (7th Cir. 2005).
Hansen states a claim for retaliation under the FMLA. Hansen
alleges that he exercised his rights under the FMLA by requesting leave as
needed to accommodate his mental condition and that CMS was a covered
employer. Hansen alleges that Meunch cursed him out in front of his coworkers when he filed the request. He alleges that Meunch and Harvey
thereafter harassed him on a daily basis, and ultimately arranged to have
Page 8 of 14
him discharged. When read in the light most favorable to Hansen, he
alleges that Harvey used unsubstantiated drug charges as an opportunity
to suspend him indefinitely and effectively discharge him in retaliation for
exercising his rights under the FMLA. He states a claim.
The Defendants argue that Hansen fails to allege either that he was
discharged or that he suffered any other adverse employment actions. The
Court disagrees. When read in the light most favorable to Hansen, he
alleges that he was discharged when the Defendants suspended him
indefinitely on September 12, 2016. The Defendants claimed in the state
unemployment proceeding that the Defendants discharged him for cause.
Hansen, however, also alleged he left voluntarily. Hansen is proceeding
pro se and may not understand the significance of that statement. When
read favorably to him, he may only mean that he left voluntarily without a
fight when Defendants suspended him. The allegations are sufficient to
show that it is plausible that he was discharged at the time of the
suspension.
Hansen also alleges enough facts to show that it is plausible that
Harvey and Meunch harassed him on a daily basis from March 2016 until
his suspension, and that their harassment was sufficiently severe to
constitute retaliation under the Supreme Court decision in White.
Page 9 of 14
Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. Hansen states
a claim for retaliation for this harassment under the FMLA.
The ADA protects qualified individuals with disability from
discrimination and retaliation in employment. A person has a disability if
the person has a mental or physical impairment that limits his ability to
engage in one or more major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102. Hansen
alleges that he has a disability due to his mental condition of bipolar
disorder, depression, and anxiety. He alleges that his condition interferes
with his major life activities of sleeping. Complaint, at 4 and Collective
Exhibit, at 13-20; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (sleeping is a major life
activity). He alleges that he is an individual with a disability.
An individual with a disability is a qualified individual if he can perform
the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable
accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Hansen alleges that he performed
the essential functions of his job with the reasonable accommodation of
allowing him to be tardy or absent on occasion as needed. See Complaint,
Collective Exhibit, at 18. He alleges he is a qualified individual with a
disability.
To allege a claim for discrimination under the ADA, Hansen must
allege that he is a qualified individual with a disability and he suffered an
Page 10 of 14
adverse employment action on the basis of his disability. See Monroe v.
Indiana Department of Transportation, 871 F.3d 495, 503-04 (7th Cir. 2016);
see 42 U.S.C. § 12112. When read favorably to Hansen, he alleges that
Harvey and Meunch harassed him and arranged to have him fired because
of his disability. He states a claim for ADA discriminatory discharge.
To state a claim for retaliation under the ADA, Hansen must allege he
engaged in protected activity, he suffered an adverse employment action,
and there exists a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action. Freelain v. Village of Oak Park, 888 F.3d 895,
901 (7th Cir. 2018). Again, the meaning of adverse employment action is
broader in the retaliation context. An adverse employment action in
retaliation is any action that that would dissuade a reasonable employee
from engaging in protected activity. White, 548 U.S. at 68; see Freelain,
888 F.3d at 901. Hansen alleges that he asked for and received a
reasonable accommodation to be tardy or absent on an as-needed basis.
He alleges that Harvey and Meunch harassed him daily and ultimately
arranged to get him fired because he secured an accommodation. He
states a claim.
The Defendants also ask the Court to dismiss Hansen’s claims
against Meunch and Harvey. The Defendants argue that Hansen may only
Page 11 of 14
sue his employer CMS for violations of the ADA and FMLA. The
Defendants are correct that the ADA only provides relief against the
employer. U.S. E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276,
1282 (7th Cir. 1995). Hansen’s claims against Meunch and Harvey for
violating the ADA are dismissed with prejudice.
The language of the FMLA, however, differs from the ADA. The ADA
definition of “employer” tracked the definition in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The meaning
of employer in those acts was limited to the actual employer. The meaning
of employer was similarly limited to the meaning of the term in Title VII and
the ADEA. See U.S. E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at
1282
The FMLA contains a different, broader definition of employer. The
definition includes “any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the
interests of any employer to any of the employees of such employer.” 29
U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I). Based on this broader definition, individuals who
were not the actual employer may be liable under the FMLA if the
individuals had supervisory authority of the plaintiff and if the individuals
were at least partly responsible for the violations. See Horwitz v. Board of
Educ. Of Avoca School Dist. No. 37, 260 F.3d 602, 610 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2001);
Page 12 of 14
Eppinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 682 Fed. Appx., 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2017);
Patrick v. Cowen, 2016 WL 1460333, at *6 (N.D. Ind. April 13, 2016);
Ruckebeil v. Cancer Treatment Centers of America, Inc., 2016 WL 878585,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. March 8, 2016); Baier v. Rohr-Mont Motors, Inc., 2014 WL
6434584, at *8 (N. D. Ill. November 17, 2014). See also Goelzer v.
Sheboygan County, Wis., 604 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2010) (Seventh Circuit
considered on the merits whether plaintiff established his claim at summary
judgment against the plaintiff’s supervisor, as well as the employer);
Nicholson v. Pulte Homes Corp., 690 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2012) (same);
Simpson v. Office of Chief Judge of Circuit Court of Will County, 559 F.3d
706 (7th Cir. 2009) (same); Daugherty v. Wabash Center, Inc., 577 F.3d
747 (7th Cir. 2009) (same). Hansen may proceed against Harvey and
Meunch on his FMLA claims.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(d/e 10) is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s claim for
interference with his rights under the FMLA is dismissed with leave to
replead. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Bryon Meunch and Deb
Harvey for violations of the ADA are dismissed with prejudice. The
remainder of the Motion is denied. Plaintiff may proceed with his ADA
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claims against Defendant CMS and may proceed with his FMLA
discrimination and retaliation against all Defendants.
ENTER: June 12, 2018
s/
Tom Schanzle-Haskins
TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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