Farris v. Kohl et al
Filing
255
ORDER and OPINION: Plaintiff Jacqueline Farris's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, see d/e 223 , is GRANTED. Defendant IDOC's Motion for Summary Judgment, see d/e 213 , is DENIED. Judgment shall enter in favor of Plaintiff on Counts VIII and IX as to Defendant's liability. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 2/13/2023. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. (HS)
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E-FILED
Monday, 13 February, 2023 08:34:05 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JACQUELINE FARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERIK KOHLRUS, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 17-cv-3279
OPINION AND ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on cross-motions for
summary judgment. See Def.’s Mot., d/e 213; Pl.’s Mot., d/e 223.
Defendant Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) seeks
summary judgment on Count VIII and Count IX of Plaintiff
Jacqueline Farris’s Second Amended Complaint, which comprise
her claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Ms. Farris seeks
summary judgment on those counts only as to liability. With no
material facts in dispute, the Court finds that IDOC’s treatment of
Ms. Farris violated both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Ms.
Farris’s motion is GRANTED, and IDOC’s motion is DENIED.
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I. BACKGROUND
The Court draws the following facts from the parties’
statements of undisputed facts and the evidence they submitted.
The Court deems admitted those facts not in dispute and any facts
disputed without an evidentiary basis. See L.R. 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2).
On November 30, 2015, Plaintiff Jacqueline Farris pled guilty
in Illinois state court to possessing between one and fifteen grams
of cocaine, a Class 4 felony. People v. Farris, No. 2015-CF-1602
(Cir. Ct. Champaign Cnty.). The circuit court then sentenced Ms.
Farris to six years in IDOC custody. See Def.’s Mem. ex. B, d/e
214-2, at 2. In issuing its “Impact Incarceration Sentencing Order,”
the circuit court found that Ms. Farris’s offense “was committed as
the result of the use of . . . or addiction to . . . a controlled
substance.” Id. The circuit court further found that Ms. Farris met
“the eligibility requirements for possible placement in the Impact
Incarceration Program.” Id.
The Impact Incarceration Program, or “boot camp,” provides
individuals under Illinois felony sentence with “an alternative to
prison styled after the familiar military basic training program.”
United States v. Gajdik, 292 F.3d 555, 556 (7th Cir. 2002). An
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offender who completes boot camp is entitled to a reduction in his
sentence to time served. 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1.1(a). If the offender “is
not accepted for placement” or “does not successfully complete the
program, his term of imprisonment shall be as set forth by the
court in its sentencing order.” Id.
Participation in boot camp ordinarily follows from a sentencing
judge’s recommendation. See id.; see also 20 Ill. Admin. Code §
460.20. A judicial recommendation satisfies only one of eight
statutory eligibility requirements, however, and the sentencing
judge’s word is neither sufficient nor necessary. Cf. 730 ILCS 5/5–
8–1.1(l) (enabling IDOC to “identify candidates for participation in
the program that were not previously recommended and formally
submit the names to” the committing state’s attorney); see also
Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 871 n.4 (7th Cir. 2000)
(noting that IDOC previously had rejected offenders recommended
by sentencing judge). To enroll, an offender also must:
1) Be between 17 and 35 years of age;
2) Never have participated in the program before or served
more than one prior sentence of imprisonment for a felony
offense;
3) Not have been convicted of certain serious felonies such as
murder, rape, kidnapping, and arson;
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4) Have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eight
years or less;
5) Be physically able to participate in the program;
6) Not have any mental disorder or disability that would
prevent participation; and
7) Consent in writing.
See 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1.1(b)(1–7). But even if an offender satisfies all
these criteria, IDOC still “may consider, among other matters, . . .
whether [the offender’s] participation in the impact program may
pose a risk to the safety or security of any person.” Id. The
program’s enabling statute therefore leaves to IDOC’s discretion the
decision whether to admit a particular candidate.
IDOC has concluded that certain categories of offenders are
definitionally ineligible for boot camp. This includes offenders who
require psychotropic medication for mental or emotional illness.
Before an offender may be admitted to boot camp, he must undergo
a mental-health evaluation “that focuses on ‘current and previous
mental health issues that could compromise the offender’s ability to
successfully complete the rigorous physical requirements or adhere
to strict disciplinary requirements of the program.” Def.’s Mem.,
d/e 214, at 5 ¶ 30. If IDOC finds “no evidence of current mental
disorder that would compromise [an offender’s] participation in the
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program,” IDOC categorizes the offender as “Priority #1,” which
means that the offender does “[n]ot have any mental disorder or
disability that would prevent participation.” Id. at 3 ¶ 12. If the
offender reports a “history” of psychological diagnoses or treatment,
IDOC categorizes the offender as “Priority #2” and performs further
screening to determine whether the “chronic or episodic mental
health problem . . . may influence [the offender’s] ability to complete
the program.” Id. ¶ 13. And if the offender’s “mental health needs
require[] psychotropic medications,” IDOC classifies the offender as
“Priority #3” and deems him ineligible for boot camp. Id. at 5 ¶ 28.
IDOC’s internal directives and policies do not contemplate an
exception to this rule. Instead, IDOC expressly “prohibits . . .
deeming a prisoner on psychotropic medication eligible for the
Impact Incarceration Program.” Id. at 6 ¶ 36.
Ms. Farris was admitted to the Logan Correctional Center for
processing and placement on December 4, 2015. When Ms. Farris
began her sentence, she was 31 years old, a first-time felony
offender, a first-time prisoner, and under a six-year sentence. Cf.
730 ILCS 5/5–8–1.1(b)(1–4). Upon arrival, Ms. Farris received a
grey uniform screen-printed with the words “boot camp.” She also
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received a one-page memorandum that instructed her not to “loan
[her] IIP [Impact Incarceration Program] clothing to other IIP inmate
[sic].” See Pl.’s Mot. ex. 9, d/e 223-9, at 1. Ms. Farris then signed
two forms: a release identifying her as “the undersigned participant
in the Impact Incarceration Program,” and another release bearing
the title “Impact Incarceration Form Consent to Participate.” Id. ex.
10, d/e 223-10, at 1–3; cf. 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1.1(b)(7) (requiring that
boot-camp participants “consent in writing”).
Ms. Farris underwent a first-level mental health screening
later that day. The screening consisted of a brief interview with
Amy Rude, a licensed clinical social worker employed by Wexford
Health Services, IDOC’s healthcare provider. Ms. Rude
memorialized the screening by checking two boxes on Logan’s
“Mental Health Impact Incarceration” form. One check designated
Ms. Farris as “Priority #1,” indicating that Ms. Rude had found “no
evidence of current mental disorder . . . that may compromise the
offender’s participation.” See Pl.’s Mot. ex. 11, d/e 223-11, at 1.
The other check affirmed that, “[b]ased on the medical screening
above,” Ms. Farris was “[a]pproved to participate in the Impact
Incarceration program.” Id.; cf. 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1.1(b)(6) (requiring
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that boot-camp participants “not have any mental disorder or
disability that would prevent participation”).
Ms. Farris also underwent a medical screening. Robert
Allison, a Wexford physician’s assistant, conducted Ms. Farris’s
examination. Like Ms. Rude, Mr. Allison found that Ms. Farris
satisfied IDOC’s physical-health qualifications and was “[a]pproved
to participate in the Impact Incarceration Program.” See Pl.’s Mot.
ex. 13, d/e 223-13, at 1; see also 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1.1(b)(5)
(requiring that boot-camp participants “be physically able to
participate in physical activities”).
On December 21, 2015, Logan submitted Ms. Farris’s
“Offender Classification Form” to IDOC’s transfer coordinator. See
Pl.’s Mot. ex. 14, d/e 223-14, at 1. The form indicated that Logan’s
superintendent had approved Ms. Farris for admission to boot
camp. Id. at 4. At Logan’s recommendation, Ms. Farris was to be
placed at “VIENNA: DIXON SPRINGS BOOT.” Id. As of December
27, 2015, Ms. Farris remained approved and eligible for boot camp.
See Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Second Interrogs., d/e 223-15, at ¶ 2.
On December 28, 2015, Ms. Farris told a mental-health staffer
that a correctional officer, Defendant Erik Kohlrus, had engaged in
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several sex acts with her earlier that day. The parties agree that
Ms. Farris and Officer Kohlrus had sex and that Ms. Farris
promptly reported it. They dispute only whether the sex was
consensual. But see 720 ILCS 5/11-9.2(e) (“A person is deemed
incapable of consent, for purposes of this Section, when he or she is
a probationer, parolee, releasee, inmate in custody of a penal
system or person detained or civilly committed under the Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act, or a person in the custody of a
law enforcement agency or employee.”). Ms. Farris reported feeling
“anxious” and asked to speak with a psychiatrist. Ms. Farris also
told the staffer that she previously had “minimized” her history of
psychiatric treatment “because of rumors she’d heard about the
advisability of denying symptoms to get cleared for boot camp.”
Def.’s Mem., d/e 214, at 4 ¶ 17. Ms. Farris was assigned to Logan’s
health-care unit pending a psychiatric evaluation.
On December 31, 2015, Ms. Farris was evaluated by Dr. Jose
Mathews, a Wexford psychiatrist. According to Dr. Mathews, Ms.
Farris reported that she had been diagnosed with and treated for an
anxiety disorder before her incarceration. Dr. Mathews noted that
Ms. Farris previously had been prescribed at least fifteen different
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psychotropic medications, including the antidepressants Prozac and
Wellbutrin and the anti-anxiety medications Ativan and Xanax. Dr.
Mathews diagnosed Ms. Farris with generalized anxiety disorder
and prescribed Ms. Farris low doses of three psychotropic
medications: the sleeping aid trazadone and the anti-anxiety
medications hydroxyzine and buspirone. Dr. Mathews “had heard
of the Impact Incarceration Program, but was not aware that
Plaintiff might be ineligible if she took the psychotropic
medications.” Id. at 9 ¶ 61. Dr. Mathews later opined that Ms.
Farris’s medication regimen would not have impeded her full
participation in boot camp. See Pl.’s Mot., d/e 223, at 8 ¶ 27.
On January 5, 2016, Ms. Rude completed a second “Mental
Health Impact Incarceration” form on behalf of Ms. Farris. The
form classified Ms. Farris “as a Priority #3, deemed ineligible to
participate in the Impact Incarceration Program because her mental
health needs required psychotropic medications.” Def.’s Mem., d/e
214, at 5 ¶ 28. As a result, Ms. Farris automatically was “denied
acceptance to the Impact Incarceration program because of her
prescription for psychotropic medications.” Id. at 7 ¶ 28. Logan
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transferred Ms. Farris to the Decatur Correctional Center two weeks
later. Ms. Farris was released from custody in September 2018.
After completing her sentence, Ms. Farris brought this suit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to her claims against a
dozen or so individual IDOC employees, Ms. Farris contends that,
by promulgating and enforcing a discriminatory boot-camp
selection policy, IDOC itself violated Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq., and Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. See Second Am.
Compl., d/e 170, at 20–21.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Ms. Farris brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq., and 29 U.S.C. § 794 et
seq. This Court, therefore, has federal-question jurisdiction over
her claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). Venue is
proper because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to Ms. Farris’s claims occurred within this District. See 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b).
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III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no
genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of
the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the movant
believes demonstrates the absence of any genuine dispute of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A
genuine dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact
could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Carroll v. Lynch, 698
F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court
construes all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2008). Similarly, in
ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court views “all
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party on each motion.” Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines, 789 F.3d
784, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).
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IV. DISCUSSION
Ms. Farris sues IDOC under two interrelated federal statutes:
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §
12132 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 794a et seq. Both statutes prohibit public entities “from
discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability on
account of that disability.” Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey,
524 U.S. 206, 206 (1998) (cleaned up). The “relief available” to
plaintiffs “under these provisions is coextensive.” Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t
of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that both
statutes incorporate 42 U.S.C. § 200e–5 as source of private right of
action). The only distinction is that the Rehabilitation Act “includes
as an additional element the receipt of federal funds, which all
states accept for their prisons.” Id. at 671 (collecting cases).
Since the ADA and Rehabilitation Act standards are
“functionally identical,” Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592
(7th Cir. 2015), and since a plaintiff “may have but one recovery,”
Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672, the Court will refer to and analyze Ms.
Farris’s claims collectively. See generally Garfield v. Cook Cnty.,
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Ill., 2009 WL 4015553, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2009) (“[C]ourts
generally analyze claims brought under the two statutes similarly.”).
A. Ms. Farris’s Claims Are Not Barred by Sovereign Immunity.
The Court first addresses a threshold question raised by
IDOC’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, IDOC contends
that the “Eleventh Amendment and case law clearly shields IDOC
from suit for monetary damages.” Def.’s Mem., d/e 214, at 22.
A federal civil suit against a state is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment unless the state has waived its right of sovereign
immunity. Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2000).
That exception applies here. Illinois long ago “waived its immunity
from suits for damages under the Rehabilitation Act as a condition
of its receipt of federal funds.” Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672 n.5 (citing
Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2000)). The
Eleventh Amendment’s grant of state sovereign immunity, therefore,
does not bar Ms. Farris’s claims against IDOC.
B. Ms. Farris’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
Granted.
Ms. Farris’s claims come under Title II of the ADA and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibit discrimination by
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public entities on the basis of disability. Title II provides, in
relevant part, that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, Section 504 provides that “[n]o
otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29
U.S.C. § 794(a). A public entity includes “any department, agency,
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or
States or local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B). This
definition “unmistakably includes State prisons and prisoners.” Pa.
Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998).
Ms. Farris contends that by denying her access to boot camp
by reason of her supervised use of psychotropic medication, IDOC
violated the ADA. To prevail on her claims, Ms. Farris must prove
that she “(1) is a qualified person (2) with a disability and (3) the
Department of Corrections denied [her] access to a program or
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activity because of [her] disability.” Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672. IDOC
argues that Ms. Farris cannot satisfy any of these elements as a
matter of law. Conversely, Ms. Farris argues that IDOC’s “nopsychotropics” rule—and, therefore, the decision to exclude her
from boot camp—were discriminatory per se.
1. IDOC’s no-psychotropics rule violated the ADA per se.
Ms. Farris argues that IDOC’s no-psychotropics rule “is a
textbook example of ‘per se’ disability discrimination.” Pl.’s Mot.,
d/e 223, at 14. Under her interpretation of the ADA case law, per
se disability discrimination occurs when “a covered entity prevents
a person from participating in a program, service, or activity that
disavows any individualized assessment of the person’s actual
abilities, and instead imposes a blanket policy that precludes such
an assessment.” Id. IDOC disputes both Ms. Farris’s reading of the
ADA and her contention that IDOC’s no-psychotropics rule was
anything other than a permissible “objective criter[ion].” See Def.’s
Resp., d/e 228, at 17.
There is no meaningful disagreement as to the import of
IDOC’s no-psychotropics rule. Any IDOC prisoner with any mental
illness, regardless of severity, who requires any psychotropic
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medication, regardless of dosage or effect, is categorically ineligible
for boot camp. This rule violates the ADA.
The ADA imposes on public entities a “basic requirement that
the need of a disabled person be evaluated on an individual basis.”
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690 (2001); see also Steffen
v. Donahoe, 680 F.3d 738, 742 n.2 (7th Cir. 2012) (observing that
an “individualized evaluation is required by the ADA”). A policy that
“prevents individual assessment,” and so “necessarily operates to
exclude disabled people that are qualified” to participate,
“constitutes a per se violation.” Steffen, 680 F.3d at 748.
The ADA forbids policies under which an individual’s eligibility
rises or falls with his disability. Accordingly, “blanket exclusions
are to be given the utmost scrutiny, and are, as a general rule, to be
discouraged.” Bombrys v. City of Toledo, 849 F.Supp. 1210, 1219–
20 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (finding blanket exclusion of insulin-dependent
diabetics from police force violated ADA); see also Gaus v. Norfolk
Southern Ry. Co., 2011 WL 4527359, at *29 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28,
2011) (finding “blanket ban from working in safety-sensitive and
nonsedentary positions, on all employees who are taking certain
narcotic medications, [to be] contrary to the ADA’s requirement that
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assessments be made on an individualized basis”); Stillwell v.
Kansas City, Mo. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 872 F.Supp. 682, 686–87
(W.D. Mo. 1995) (finding across-the-board exclusion of all onehanded applicants for private security licensure “r[an] afoul” of the
individualized-assessment requirement). This theme repeats in the
implementing regulations promulgated by the Department of
Justice (DOJ). They provide, in relevant part, that:
[a] public entity shall not impose or apply
eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability or any
class of individuals with disabilities from fully
and equally enjoying any service, program, or
activity, unless such criteria can be shown to be
necessary for the provision of the service,
program, or activity being offered.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8).
The undisputed record establishes that IDOC’s rule is a
blanket ban. As IDOC admits, its eligibility policies “require that
the Mental Health Professional check a box deeming the prisoner
ineligible for the Impact Incarceration Program if the prisoner
requires psychotropic medications.” Def.’s Mem., d/e 214, at 6 ¶
36. Moreover, in IDOC’s own words, departmental policy “prohibits
a Mental Health Professional from deeming a prisoner on
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psychotropic medication eligible for the Impact Incarceration
Program.” Id. ¶ 37. These policies forbid individualized
consideration, leaving no room for consideration of an applicant’s
“personal circumstances.” See PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 688. Title II
demands otherwise.
IDOC’s no-psychotropics rule also violates the ADA’s
prohibition on “screen-out” tests. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8). The
rule applies only to prisoners who take psychotropic medications.
Logically, then, the rule applies only to prisoners with mental
disabilities, for only they would require treatment with psychotropic
medications. The rule therefore “screens out” prisoners with mental
disabilities by targeting their treatment methods rather than their
underlying conditions. That is impermissible under the ADA. See,
e.g., Krocka v. Bransfield, 969 F.Supp. 1073 (N.D. Ill. 1997), aff’d
on other grounds, Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507 (7th Cir.
2000) (finding that police department policy of “placing all officers
taking Prozac into a disciplinary program” violated the ADA).
IDOC argues that Title II imposes no such demands. By
IDOC’s reading, PGA Tour and its individualized-inquiry
requirement apply only to claims brought under Title III. But
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“Congress clearly did not intend to give public entities more latitude
than private parties to discriminate against the disabled.” Theriault
v. Flynn, 162 F.3d 46, 53 n.10 (1st Cir. 1998). In fact, the enacting
House Committee on Education and Labor expressly intended that
Title II's prohibitions and protections would be “identical to those
set out in the applicable provisions of titles I and III.” H.R.Rep. No.
101–485(II), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367.
IDOC’s attempt to evade this “basic requirement,” PGA Tour, 532
U.S. at 690, is unavailing.
IDOC also contends that its blanket policy is justified by an
overriding concern for institutional safety. See Def.’s Mem., d/e
214, at 21. To be sure, prisons receive “substantial discretion to
devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face, particularly
when safety and security interests are at stake.” Mays v. Dart, 974
F.3d 810, 820 (7th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up); see also Love v.
Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Security
concerns, safety concerns, and administrative exigencies would all
be important considerations to take into account.”). Federal
regulations likewise leave IDOC free to impose “legitimate safety
requirements necessary for the safe operation of its services,
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programs, or activities” without violating the ADA. 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(h). Yet IDOC still must base such requirements “on actual
risks,” not “mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about
individuals with disabilities.” Id.
IDOC offers no evidence to suggest that its categorical rule is
“based on actual risks.” Doug Stephens—whom IDOC authorized,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), to speak on the
department’s behalf—testified that he was “not aware” of any
evidence for IDOC’s proffered rationale. See Pl.’s Mot. ex. B, d/e
223-2, at 47:24–48:7 (“Q: ‘The IDOC has no evidence that all
psychotropic medications regardless of dosage, underlying mental
health condition, or anything else renders the person taking them
inappropriate—unable to perform satisfactorily in a boot camp
setting, correct?’ . . . A: ‘I’m not aware of any of that, no.’”). Instead,
in the absence of objective, factual support, IDOC relies on rote
invocations of “safety and security.” For instance, IDOC claims that
it “has made the determination that an inmate is deemed ineligible
for the Impact Incarceration Program if she requires psychotropic
medications.” Def.’s Resp., d/e 228, at 18. But whether IDOC has
made such a determination is irrelevant to whether that policy is
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lawful. Cf. Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 345, 349
(4th Cir. 1991) (finding, in an ADA action, that state’s tautological
claims of necessity were not evidence of necessity). Similarly, IDOC
claims that its rule is “legitimately related to the Department’s need
to preserve good order and discipline.” Def.’s Resp., d/e 228, at 18.
But a bare assertion of relevance does not suffice under the ADA.
In sum, IDOC categorically excludes from boot camp all
prisoners whose mental disabilities require psychotropic medication
and permits no consideration or accommodation of a prisoner’s
particular circumstances. This rule violates the ADA per se.
2. Ms. Farris was a “disabled person.”
Still, for Ms. Farris to survive IDOC’s motion for summary
judgment or prevail on her own, establishing that IDOC’s policy
violated the ADA per se is not enough. “In order to have standing to
sue . . . for a per se violation of the ADA or Rehab Act, one still has
to meet the definition of ‘disabled person’ under those statutes.”
Steffen, 680 F.3d at 748. So the next question is whether Ms.
Farris had or was “regarded as having” a “disability,” as those terms
are defined by the ADA. See Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12102[1]). IDOC argues that because Ms. Farris “was not
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substantially limited by her mental health conditions,” she cannot
satisfy this requirement. See Def.’s Mem., d/e 214, at 20. In
response, Ms. Farris contends that by classifying her based on her
treatment of a mental-health condition, IDOC “regarded [her] as
having a mental or psychological disorder that impaired her
functioning,” regardless of the actual degree of impairment. See
Pl.’s Mot., d/e 223, at 16.
Under the ADA, a disability is a “(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §
12102(1). Ms. Farris’s claims focus on the third prong. In her view,
the undisputed facts establish that IDOC “believed—correctly or
incorrectly—that [Ms. Farris] has a qualifying physical or mental
impairment and subjected [her] to adverse action based on that
belief.” Pl.’s Mot., d/e 223, at 14 (citing Miller v. Ill. Dep’t of
Transp., 643 F.3d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 2011).
There is no dispute that IDOC believed that Ms. Farris had
“mental health needs . . . requiring any psychotropic medication.”
Def.’s Mem., d/e 214, at 4 ¶ 17. There is no dispute, either, that
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IDOC excluded Ms. Farris from boot camp because she had “mental
health needs . . . requiring any psychotropic medication.” See Def.’s
Resp., d/e 228, at 18 (“[A]n inmate is deemed ineligible for the
Impact Incarceration Program if she requires psychotropic
medications.”); see also Miller, 643 F.3d at 195. IDOC regarded Ms.
Farris’s mental-health needs as disqualifying, and so IDOC
regarded Ms. Farris as disabled. No reasonable factfinder could
find otherwise.
IDOC, however, never addresses Ms. Farris’s regarded-as
claim on the merits. Rather, IDOC maintains that “there is no
evidence Plaintiff was ‘substantially impaired’” by her condition.
Def.’s Mem., d/e 214, at 19. This argument relies on Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), in which the Supreme
Court first addressed the regarded-as prong. As the Sutton Court
read it, the ADA required a “regarded-as” claimant to prove that a
discriminatory act “was based on a physical or mental impairment,
real or imagined,” which the actor “regarded as substantially
limiting a major life activity.” Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
IDOC’s reliance is misplaced. In 2008, “Congress amended
the ADA to make clear an individual can be ‘regarded as’ having an
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impairment ‘whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to
limit a major life activity.’” Richardson v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
926 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A));
see generally ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2009) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq.). The amended ADA therefore “reject[s] the Supreme Court’s
reasoning” in Sutton. Id. at § 2(b)(3). “Whether an individual’s
impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity” is now
irrelevant “to coverage under . . . the ‘regarded as’ prong.” See 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). Instead, the amended ADA requires that
courts take a “broad view of the third prong of the definition of
handicap.” See id. at § 2(b)(3) (citing School Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)).
As the parties agree, IDOC conditioned Ms. Farris’s
participation in a state-run program on the way she treated a
diagnosed mental illness. The Court, therefore, finds that IDOC
regarded Ms. Farris as disabled as a matter of law. And by
satisfying both elements of her per se discrimination claim, Ms.
Farris has established IDOC’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act liability.
She is entitled to partial summary judgment on Counts VIII and IX.
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C. Ms. Farris’s Damages Claims Will Proceed to Trial.
The question remains whether IDOC owes Ms. Farris
compensatory damages. To answer that question, a factfinder must
determine whether IDOC discriminated intentionally or else with
“deliberate indifference.” See, e.g., Lacy v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 897 F.3d
847, 863 (7th Cir. 2018). In the interest of judicial economy, the
Court shall enter a scheduling order and set Ms. Farris’s damages
claims for trial after the parties’ remaining summary judgment
motions have been resolved.
VI. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Plaintiff Jacqueline Farris’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, see d/e 223, is GRANTED. Defendant
IDOC’s Motion for Summary Judgment, see d/e 213, is DENIED.
Judgment shall enter in favor of Plaintiff on Counts VIII and IX as
to Defendant’s liability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: FEBRUARY 13, 2023
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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