Farris v. Kohl et al

Filing 256

ORDER AND OPINION entered by Judge Sue E Myerscough on 9/29/2023. IT IS ORDERED that The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Locke and Snyder (d/e 215 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Judgment shall enter in favor of these Defend ants on Count V of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. The motion is otherwise DENIED. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Brannon, Charron, Ashley, Johnson, Adams, and Gabor (d/e 217 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. J udgment shall enter in favor of these Defendants on Counts V and VI of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. The motion is otherwise DENIED, except that Defendants may renew their motion for summary judgment on Count XIII after trial. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Keane, Funk, and Pasley (d/e 219 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Judgment shall enter in favor of these Defendants on Count V of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. The motion is otherwise DE NIED, except that Defendants may renew their motion for summary judgment on Count XIII after trial. A status conference in this matter is hereby SET for October 12, 2023, at 2:30 p.m. Counsel for all partiesincluding counsel for Defendant Kohlrusshal l participate by videoconference, the instructions for which are attached. Counsel should be prepared to discuss (1) the status of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Kohlrus and (2) new trial settings. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. (Attachments: # 1 Zoom-MYERSCOUGHT Instructions for PC)(HS)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JACQUELINE FARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERIK KOHLRUS, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 17-cv-3279

OPINION AND ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Plaintiff Jacqueline Farris is a former resident of the Logan
Correctional Center, a facility operated by the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC). Less than three weeks after arriving at Logan,
Ms. Farris was sexually assaulted by Defendant Erik Kohlrus, a
correctional officer assigned to Ms. Farris’s housing unit.
After completing her sentence, Ms. Farris sued IDOC and
nineteen of its employees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She
alleges that these Defendants violated the First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments by, among other things, failing to protect
her from a known, serious risk of custodial sexual abuse at Logan.

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This matter comes before the Court on three motions for
summary judgment, each filed by a group of current or former
IDOC employees. See Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., d/e 215; Defs.’ Mot.
Summ. J., d/e 217; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., d/e 219.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Parties
Plaintiff Jacqueline Farris is a former resident of Logan

Correctional Center and Decatur Correctional Center. Ms. Farris
entered Logan in December 2015 and remained there until January
2016, when she was transferred to Decatur. She completed her
term of incarceration in September 2018.
Defendant Angela Locke was a correctional officer at Decatur
and Logan at all relevant times. Major Locke served as Logan’s
acting warden, or chief administrative officer, from October 2013 to
June 2015. In that capacity, Major Locke was responsible for
overseeing day-to-day operations at Logan, including compliance
with the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA); for promulgating
rules, regulations, policies, and procedures to ensure the safety of
the women housed at Logan; and for supervising, training,
assigning, and disciplining Logan’s counselors, correctional officers,
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internal-affairs investigators, and other staff. After completing her
temporary assignment at Logan, Major Locke resumed her service
as a shift supervisor at Decatur.
Defendant Christine Brannon served as Logan’s warden from
August 2015 until February 2016. Warden Brannon was
responsible for overseeing day-to-day operations at Logan, including
compliance with PREA; for promulgating rules, regulations, policies,
and procedures to ensure the safety of the women housed at Logan;
and for supervising, training, assigning, and disciplining Logan’s
correctional officers, internal-affairs investigators, and other staff.
Defendant Clara Charron was Logan’s Assistant Warden of
Programs at all relevant times. Ms. Charron implemented and
oversaw certain policies and practices at Logan, including Logan’s
mental-health, educational, and religious programming. Ms.
Charron also served as Logan’s PREA compliance manager from the
fall of 2013 until November 2015, when she was succeeded by
Defendant Norine Ashley. In that capacity, Ms. Charron was
responsible for ensuring compliance with PREA regulations and
standards and for developing, planning, and overseeing efforts to
address the problem of custodial sexual assault at Logan.
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Defendant Norine Ashley was a staff psychologist at Logan at
all relevant times. Dr. Ashley served as Logan’s PREA compliance
manager beginning in November 2015. Like Ms. Charron, Dr.
Ashley was responsible for Logan’s compliance with PREA
regulations and standards and for developing, planning, and
overseeing programs to address the problem of custodial sexual
assault at Logan. Defendant Lisa Johnson, the head of Logan’s
health-care unit, served as Dr. Ashley and Ms. Charron’s backup
PREA compliance manager through the relevant period.
Defendant Alex Adams was a correctional officer at Logan at
all relevant times. Officer Adams was assigned to the nightshift in
Ms. Farris’s housing unit and was in the unit’s control room when
Ms. Farris was assaulted.
Defendant Trina Snyder was a correctional officer at Decatur,
with the rank of lieutenant, at all relevant times. As head of
Decatur’s internal-affairs office, Lt. Snyder bore principal
responsibility for investigating allegations of staff and prisoner
misconduct at Decatur.
Defendant Jeff Gabor was an external investigator employed
by IDOC at all relevant times. In that capacity, Investigator Gabor
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was responsible for investigating allegations of staff and prisoner
misconduct throughout the Department of Corrections.
Defendant Patrick Keane served as IDOC’s systemwide PREA
coordinator between July 2013 and November 2015, when he was
succeeded by Defendant Michael Funk. Among other duties, Mr.
Keane and Mr. Funk were tasked with ensuring IDOC facilities’
compliance with PREA, facilitating PREA-related staff trainings and
overseeing IDOC’s federally mandated PREA audit.
Defendant Alan Pasley served as Superintendent of Logan’s
Reception & Classification Center (“R&C”) from 2013 to 2017. Mr.
Pasley also served as Mr. Funk’s backup PREA coordinator until
May 2016, when Mr. Pasley replaced Mr. Funk as agency PREA
coordinator.
B.

Facts
The Court draws these facts from the parties’ statements of

undisputed facts and the evidence they submitted. The Court
deems admitted those facts not in dispute or disputed without an
evidentiary basis. See L.R. 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2).
1. Logan Correctional Center.

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Logan Correctional Center is a mixed-security women’s prison
located in Lincoln, Illinois. Logan opened in 1978 as a men’s
facility. By the early 1990s, IDOC had converted Logan into a
mixed-gender facility. Logan reverted to housing only men just a
few years later.
In early 2013, IDOC consolidated “the populations of the
state’s two largest women’s prisons” into Logan. See Pl.’s Resp. ex.
32, d/e 235-32, at 15 (“GIPA Report”). Before the transition, Logan
held around 1,500 medium-security male prisoners. Afterward,
Logan was charged with “manag[ing] a population of 2,000 (or more)
women across all security classifications,” in addition to serving as
the statewide reception and classification center for each of the
2,500 or so women incarcerated in Illinois every year. Id. As the
John Howard Association of Illinois, a nonprofit prison-monitoring
organization, would later report, the Logan conversion was “under[]resourced and ill-conceived.” Id. An IDOC-led study similarly
found that the transition “took place with limited planning, staff
training[,] and efforts to take into account the unique nature and
needs of such a large, complex women’s prison population.” Id.

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In March 2015, IDOC commissioned a gender-informed
practice assessment (GIPA) at Logan. See id. at 7. Over a four-day
period in November 2015, the GIPA team surveyed nearly 1,000
Logan prisoners, staff members, and external stakeholders. The
team sought to evaluate Logan’s ability to respond to the needs of
its unique population and to devise and propose “evidence-based”
and “trauma-informed” improvements.
The GIPA team found that Logan’s “divisive facility culture”
had engendered an “unstable environment that undermines the
safety of both the women [prisoners] and staff.” Id. at 18. For
example, although women of color predominated in Logan’s
custodial population, the facility was managed “by a predominantly
white and male staff” with “little, if any, training on cultural
responsivity.” Id. at 21. Staff members, too, “voiced concerns
about being unprepared to work with the Logan population, where
770 women are identified as SMI [seriously mentally ill], 60% are
estimated to be suffering from PTSD, and 75% have been the
victims of sexual abuse.” Id. at 20. Of the 800 prisoners surveyed,
84.4% indicated that Logan staff failed to treat the women in their
custody with respect.
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The study also identified systemic deficiencies in Logan’s
handling of grievances—written requests or complaints submitted
by prisoners. The GIPA team concluded that Logan’s grievance
process “[p]revent[ed] management from [k]nowing about and
[c]orrecting [p]roblems.” Id. at 18. The team’s findings revealed
that grievances were “not being properly tracked, logged, and
returned back to the grievance officer or the warden in a timely
manner and according to departmental policy.” Id. at 18–19. The
team further found that some Logan staff members “intimidate
women and throw grievances out or dismiss them prematurely.” Id.
at 19. Women at Logan reported “losing their job assignments,
being arbitrarily moved, [and otherwise] being mistreated by staff”
for complaining about staff misconduct. Id. And other staff and
supervisors deterred prisoners from filing grievances simply by
telling them that their complaints or allegations would “not be
believed.” Id.
2. Jacqueline Farris’s Incarceration Before December 28,
2015.
On November 30, 2015, Plaintiff Jacqueline Farris pled guilty
in Illinois state court to possessing between one and fifteen grams

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of cocaine, a Class 4 felony. People v. Farris, No. 2015-CF-1602
(Cir. Ct. Champaign Cnty.). The circuit court then sentenced Ms.
Farris to six years in IDOC custody. See Def.’s Mem. ex. B, d/e
214-2, at 2. In issuing its “Impact Incarceration Sentencing Order,”
the circuit court found that Ms. Farris’s offense “was committed as
the result of the use of . . . or addiction to . . . a controlled
substance.” Id. The circuit court further found that Ms. Farris met
“the eligibility requirements for possible placement in the Impact
Incarceration Program.” Id.
The Impact Incarceration Program, or “boot camp,” provides
individuals under Illinois felony sentence with “an alternative to
prison styled after the familiar military basic training program.”
United States v. Gajdik, 292 F.3d 555, 556 (7th Cir. 2002). A
prisoner who completes boot camp is entitled to a reduction in his
sentence to time served. 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1.1(a). If the prisoner “is
not accepted for placement” or “does not successfully complete the
program, his term of imprisonment shall be as set forth by the
court in its sentencing order.” Id.
Participation in boot camp ordinarily follows from a sentencing
judge’s recommendation. See id.; see also 20 Ill. Admin. Code §
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460.20. However, a judicial recommendation satisfies only one of
eight statutory eligibility requirements, and the sentencing judge’s
word is neither sufficient nor necessary. Cf. 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1.1(l)
(enabling IDOC to “identify candidates for participation in the
program that were not previously recommended and formally
submit the names to” the committing state’s attorney); see also
Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 871 n.4 (7th Cir. 2000)
(noting that IDOC previously had rejected prisoners recommended
by sentencing judge). To enroll, a prisoner also must:
1) Be between 17 and 35 years of age;
2) Never have participated in the program before or served
more than one prior sentence of imprisonment for a felony
offense;
3) Not have been convicted of certain serious felonies such as
murder, rape, kidnapping, and arson;
4) Have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eight
years or less;
5) Be physically able to participate in the program;
6) Not have any mental disorder or disability that would
prevent participation; and
7) Consent in writing.
See 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1.1(b)(1–7). However, even if a prisoner
satisfies all the statutory eligibility criteria, IDOC still “may
consider, among other matters, . . . whether [the offender’s]
participation in the impact program may pose a risk to the safety or

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security of any person.” Id. The program’s enabling statute
therefore leaves to IDOC’s discretion the decision whether to admit
a particular candidate.
Certain categories of prisoners are definitionally ineligible for
boot camp, including prisoners who require psychotropic
medication for mental or emotional illness. Before a prisoner may
be admitted to boot camp, he must undergo a mental-health
evaluation “that focuses on ‘current and previous mental health
issues that could compromise the offender’s ability to successfully
complete the rigorous physical requirements or adhere to strict
disciplinary requirements of the program.” Def.’s Mem., d/e 214, at
5 ¶ 30. If IDOC finds “no evidence of current mental disorder that
would compromise [a prisoner’s] participation in the program,”
IDOC categorizes the offender as “Priority #1,” which means that
the offender does “[n]ot have any mental disorder or disability that
would prevent participation.” Id. at 3 ¶ 12. If the offender reports a
“history” of psychological diagnoses or treatment, IDOC categorizes
the offender as “Priority #2” and performs further screening to
determine whether the “chronic or episodic mental health problem .
. . may influence [the offender’s] ability to complete the program.”
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Id. ¶ 13. And if the offender’s “mental health needs require[]
psychotropic medications,” IDOC classifies the offender as “Priority
#3” and deems him ineligible for boot camp. Id. at 5 ¶ 28. IDOC’s
internal directives and policies do not contemplate an exception to
this rule. Instead, IDOC expressly “prohibits . . . deeming a
prisoner on psychotropic medication eligible for the Impact
Incarceration Program.” Id. at 6 ¶ 36.
Ms. Farris was admitted to Logan’s Reception & Classification
Center (“R&C”) for processing and placement on December 4, 2015.
When Ms. Farris began her sentence, she was 31 years old, a firsttime felony offender, a first-time prisoner, and under a six-year
sentence. Cf. 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1.1(b)(1–4). Upon arrival, Ms. Farris
received a grey uniform screen-printed with the words “boot camp.”
She also received a one-page memorandum instructing her not to
“loan [her] IIP [Impact Incarceration Program] clothing to other IIP
inmate [sic].” See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. ex. 9, d/e 223-9, at 1. Ms.
Farris then signed two forms: a release identifying her as “the
undersigned participant in the Impact Incarceration Program,” and
another release bearing the title “Impact Incarceration Form
Consent to Participate.” Id. ex. 10, d/e 223-10, at 1–3; cf. 730 ILCS
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5/5–8–1.1(b)(7) (requiring that boot-camp participants “consent in
writing”). Ms. Farris also was furnished with a copy of Logan’s
orientation handbook. In relevant part, the handbook advised its
newly incarcerated readers that:
Sexual
abuse
and
custodial
misconduct are against the law.

sexual

The Department is committed to your safety
and the safety of staff.
Sexual abuse
compromises everyone’s safety.
The Department has ZERO TOLERANCE of
sexual abuse. That means we are committed
to investigating EVERY allegation, getting
services to EVERY victim, and punishing
EVERY perpetrator. That includes involving
law enforcement and prosecutors.
Pl.’s Resp. ex. 10, d/e 235-10, at 6 (IDOC handbook).
Ms. Farris underwent a first-level mental health screening
later that day. The screening consisted of a brief interview with
Amy Rude, a licensed clinical social worker and IDOC contractor.
Ms. Rude memorialized the screening by checking two boxes on
Logan’s “Mental Health Impact Incarceration” form. One check
designated Ms. Farris as “Priority #1,” indicating that Ms. Rude had
found “no evidence of current mental disorder . . . that may
compromise the offender’s participation.” See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J.
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ex. 11, d/e 223-11, at 1. The other check affirmed that, “[b]ased on
the medical screening above,” Ms. Farris was “[a]pproved to
participate in the Impact Incarceration program.” Id.; cf. 730 ILCS
5/5–8–1.1(b)(6) (requiring that boot-camp participants “not have
any mental disorder or disability that would prevent participation”).
Ms. Farris also underwent a medical screening. Robert
Allison, a physician’s assistant and IDOC contractor, conducted Ms.
Farris’s examination. Like Ms. Rude, Mr. Allison found that Ms.
Farris satisfied IDOC’s physical-health qualifications and was
“[a]pproved to participate in the Impact Incarceration Program.”
See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. ex. 13, d/e 223-13, at 1; see also 730 ILCS
5/5–8–1.1(b)(5) (requiring that boot-camp participants “be
physically able to participate in physical activities”).
On December 21, Logan submitted Ms. Farris’s “Offender
Classification Form” to IDOC’s transfer coordinator. See Pl.’s Mot.
Summ. J. ex. 14, d/e 223-14, at 1. The form indicated that Logan’s
superintendent had approved Ms. Farris for admission to boot
camp. Id. at 4. At Logan’s recommendation, Ms. Farris was to be
placed at “VIENNA: DIXON SPRINGS BOOT.” Id. As of December

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27, Ms. Farris remained approved and eligible for boot camp. See
Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Second Interrogs., d/e 223-15, at ¶ 2.
3. Ms. Farris’s Assault; Aftermath.
Ms. Farris awaited boot camp in the B-Wing of Housing Unit
15, which houses Logan’s Reception & Classification Center. By
day, Ms. Farris “had some freedom of movement within B Wing.”
Defs.’ Reply, d/e 249, at 90. By night, Ms. Farris was confined to
her cell, where she remained until breakfast. A correctional officer
monitored the housing unit’s electronic security systems for any
signs of unauthorized nighttime movement.
Ms. Farris lived under the watchful eye of housing-unit
correctional officers. One of these officers was Defendant Erik
Kohlrus. Officer Kohlrus began working at Logan in 2012, when it
still was a men’s facility. When Ms. Farris arrived, Officer Kohlrus
had just begun a 90-day rotation as the B-Wing’s overnight wing
officer. From 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., Officer Kohlrus walked up
and down the B-Wing, looking for signs of improper activity.
Ms. Farris first met Officer Kohlrus when, about a week after
moving into the B-Wing, Officer Kohlrus “approached her cell and
asked her why she was there.” Id. For the next several weeks, he
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“would approach Plaintiff’s locked cell multiple times during each
shift.” Id. If Ms. Farris “was sleeping, Kohlrus would sometimes
wake her up.” Id. Officer Kohlrus eventually began passing an
increasingly sexually charged series of notes through the slot in Ms.
Farris’s cell door. One evening, just a few days before Christmas,
Officer Kohlrus approached Ms. Kohlrus’s cell and instructed her to
disrobe and “spin in a circle.” Id. Ms. Kohlrus “complied, doing
what she was told.” Id.
Officer Kohlrus worked the last scheduled nightshift of his 90day rotation on December 27. At around 3:30 a.m., he awoke Ms.
Farris and her cellmate and instructed them to distribute breakfast
trays. After the two had finished, Officer Kohlrus ordered Ms.
Farris’s cellmate back into her room and directed Ms. Farris “to stay
behind for extra detail work.” Id. at 92. He then took Ms. Farris
into the B-Wing laundry room, told her to get on her knees, and
pushed her head toward his penis. “While she was performing oral
sex” on Officer Kohlrus, Ms. Farris “began to shake uncontrollably”
and ran out of the laundry room back to her cell. Id. at 93–94.
All of this transpired in full view of the B-Wing’s control
room—known as the “bubble”—in which several officers, including
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Defendant Alex Adams, were monitoring the halls and cells for
improper movement. And while “the lights were off in the laundry
room,” there still was “a ray of light that shone directly . . . where
Plaintiff and Kohlrus were located.” Id. at 93. Officer Kohlrus later
returned to Ms. Farris’s cell and told her that he would “direct her
to return to the laundry room” once it was clear. Id. at 94. He left
Ms. Farris’s cell door unlocked.
Once the laundry room was available, Officer Kohlrus
“motioned for Plaintiff to return.” Id. Ms. Farris again followed
Officer Kohlrus into the laundry room, where he pulled Ms. Farris’s
pants down and began to engage in sexual intercourse. Officer
Kohlrus soon “removed his penis, turned Plaintiff around and to her
knees, pulled Plaintiff’s head forward, and directed Plaintiff to open
her mouth before ejaculating.” Id. at 95. He then ordered Ms.
Farris “to open her mouth again, kissed her, and told her that she
was a ‘good girl.’” Id. Before Ms. Farris left the laundry room,
Officer Kohlrus warned her “that if she told anyone, she would not
go to boot camp and would get in trouble.” Id. All of this transpired

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in full view of the control room. 1 Ms. Farris “returned to her cell,
where she lay on the floor crying.” Id. at 95–96.
Around 9:30 that morning, Ms. Farris told Robert Allison, a
mental-health staffer and IDOC contractor, that a correctional
officer—whom she identified as “Mr. K”—had engaged in several sex
acts with her during his overnight shift. Ms. Farris reported feeling
“anxious” and asked to speak with a psychiatrist. Ms. Farris also
shared that she had “minimized” her history of psychiatric
treatment “because of rumors she’d heard about the advisability of
denying symptoms to get cleared for boot camp.” Def.’s Mem., d/e
214, at 4. Mr. Allison then memorialized Ms. Farris’s account in an
IDOC incident report, see Pl.’s Resp. ex. 62, d/e 235-62, at 2, and
contacted Defendant Lisa Johnson, his supervisor.
The parties agree that Ms. Farris and Officer Kohlrus had sex and
that Ms. Farris promptly reported it. The parties dispute only
whether the sex was consensual. As this Court previously has
found, however, IDOC “prisoners cannot consent to sex with prison
staff under any circumstances. . . . That constitutes staff sexual
misconduct which is against IDOC policy and against the law.” Doe
v. Macleod, No. 18-3191, 2023 WL 2698672, at *11 (C.D. Ill. Mar.
29, 2023) (citing 720 ILCS 5/11-9.2(e) (“A person is deemed
incapable of consent, for purposes of this Section, when he or she is
a probationer, parolee, releasee, inmate in custody of a penal
system or person detained or civilly committed under the Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act, or a person in the custody of a
law enforcement agency or employee.”)).
1

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Warden Christine Brannon quickly reported the suspected
assault to IDOC’s Investigations Unit, which assigned the matter to
Defendant Jeff Gabor, an IDOC external investigator. Investigator
Gabor interviewed Ms. Farris that afternoon and provided her with
a rape kit. He warned Ms. Farris that false reporting carried heavy
consequences, including the possibility of spending “way more time”
in prison. Defs.’ Reply, d/e 249, at 98. Once the interview ended,
Investigator Gabor placed Ms. Farris on “investigative status” and
assigned her to Logan’s health-care unit.
Investigator Gabor interviewed Officer Kohlrus on December
30, more than 36 hours after the assault allegedly had transpired.
Officer Kohlrus promptly admitted to “engaging in sexual activity”
with Ms. Farris. Id. at 104. He then resigned.
On December 31, Ms. Farris was evaluated by Dr. Jose
Mathews, a psychiatrist and IDOC contractor. According to Dr.
Mathews, Ms. Farris reported that she had been diagnosed with
and treated for an anxiety disorder before her incarceration. Dr.
Mathews noted that Ms. Farris previously had been prescribed at
least fifteen different psychotropic medications, including the
antidepressants Prozac and Wellbutrin and the anti-anxiety
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medications Ativan and Xanax. Dr. Mathews diagnosed Ms. Farris
with generalized anxiety disorder and prescribed Ms. Farris low
doses of three psychotropic medications: the sleeping aid trazadone
and the anti-anxiety medications hydroxyzine and buspirone.
On January 5, 2016, Ms. Rude completed a second “Mental
Health Impact Incarceration” form on behalf of Ms. Farris. The
form classified Ms. Farris “as a Priority #3, deemed ineligible to
participate in the Impact Incarceration Program because her mental
health needs required psychotropic medications.” Def.’s Mem., d/e
214, at 5 ¶ 28. As a result, Ms. Farris automatically was “denied
acceptance to the Impact Incarceration program because of her
prescription for psychotropic medications.” Id. at 7 ¶ 28. She was
transferred to the Decatur Correctional Center three weeks later.
Ms. Farris discussed the circumstances of her transfer with
several other prisoners and staff members during her first few
weeks at Decatur. At least one of these individuals passed Ms.
Farris’ reports along to Defendant Trina Snyder, Decatur’s lead
internal-affairs officer. On February 5, Lt. Snyder instructed Ms.
Farris to sign a memorandum acknowledging that she would refrain
(with limited exceptions) from talking about her assault. Lt. Snyder
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told Ms. Farris that this arrangement was necessary to preserve the
integrity of IDOC’s ongoing investigation into Officer Kohlrus.
On March 24, Lt. Snyder sent Defendant Angela Locke a
disciplinary report alleging that Ms. Farris had violated a “direct
order during an interview conducted with her on 3/7/16 not to be
discussing the current investigation.” Pl.’s Resp. ex. 99, d/e 23599, at 2. Major Locke then “sign[ed] off on the ticket.” A. Locke
Dep., d/e 235-3, at 171:7–16. Ms. Farris received three months’
relegation to C-grade status—thereby losing all but a few of her
institutional privileges—and a monthlong restriction on telephone
use. See Pl.’s Resp. ex. 100, d/e 235-100, at 2.
Ms. Farris was released from custody in September 2018.
C.

Procedural History
After completing her sentence, Ms. Farris brought this suit

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq., and Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. She twice amended
her complaint. Am. Compl., d/e 14; Second Am. Compl., d/e 170.
In addition to the motions now before the Court, IDOC and
Ms. Farris also sought summary judgment on Ms. Farris’s ADA and
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Rehabilitation Act claims. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. d/e 213; Pl.’s Mot.
Summ. J., d/e 223. On February 13, 2023, this Court granted
partial summary judgment to Ms. Farris on liability and reserved
the question of damages for trial. Op. & Ord., d/e 128.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Ms. Farris brought this civil-rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq., and 29 U.S.C. § 794 et
seq. This Court, therefore, has federal-question jurisdiction over
her claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court also has supplemental
jurisdiction over Ms. Farris’s state-law claims, which share a
common nucleus of operative fact with her federal claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367 (district courts have jurisdiction “over all other claims
that are so related to claims . . . within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy”). Venue is
proper because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Ms.
Farris’s claims occurred within this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no
genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
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The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of
the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the movant
believes demonstrates the absence of any genuine dispute of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A
genuine dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact
could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Carroll v. Lynch, 698
F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). This Court construes all facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Woodruff v. Mason, 542
F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2008).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on six of Ms. Farris’s
thirteen claims.
A. Count III – Failure to Protect
Count III of Ms. Farris’s Second Amended Complaint alleges
that eight of the named Defendants are liable for failing to protect
her from a known, substantial risk of custodial sexual abuse.
In prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishment,” the Eighth
Amendment further requires that prison officials “take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety” of the prisoners in their care.
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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citing Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)). Therefore, to survive
summary judgment on Count III, Ms. Farris must offer evidence
from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendants
were deliberately indifferent to “an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety.” Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 2015)
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
A claim of deliberate indifference comprises two elements.
First, “the harm to which the prisoner was exposed must be an
objectively serious one.” Gevas, 798 F.3d at 480. Second,
considered subjectively, the official must have had “actual, and not
merely constructive, knowledge of the risk” of harm and disregarded
that risk all the same. Id. On this element, “the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. But while “this inquiry
focuses on an official's subjective knowledge, a prisoner need not
present direct evidence of the official's state of mind.” Gevas, 897
F.3d at 480. Rather, “[w]hether a prison official had the requisite
knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to
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demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from
circumstantial evidence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
A general risk of harm is not enough to establish the existence
of a “substantial risk.” See Shields v. Dart, 664 F.3d 178, 181 (7th
Cir. 2011). Still, if a plaintiff presents evidence that a risk of
attacks was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or
expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the
circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had
been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must
have known about it,” then an inference of actual knowledge of a
substantial risk of harm may be permissible. Farmer, 511 U.S. at
843. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, an official’s actual
knowledge of a substantial risk “can be inferred by the trier of fact
from the obviousness of the risk.” Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 641
(7th Cir. 1996) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).
Individual liability under section 1983 requires personal
involvement in the constitutional deprivation. Gonzalez v. McHenry
Cnty., 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022). To establish personal
liability under section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the official
“caused the constitutional deprivation at issue or acquiesced in
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some demonstrable way in the alleged constitutional violation.” Id.
“Each case must be examined individually, with particular focus on
what the officer knew and how he responded.” Dale v. Poston, 548
F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008). As the Seventh Circuit has
explained:
[I]n order to hold an individual defendant liable
under § 1983 for a violation of an inmate’s
constitutional rights, the inmate must show
that the defendant was personally responsible
for that violation. A defendant will be deemed
to have sufficient personal responsibility if he
directed
the
conduct
causing
the
constitutional violation, or if it occurred with
his knowledge or consent.
While the
defendant need not have participated directly
in
the
deprivation
of
the
plaintiff’s
constitutional right to be held liable, he or she
must nonetheless have known about the
conduct, facilitated it, approved it, condoned
it, or turned a blind eye for fear of what they
might see.
Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
Liability under section 1983 “is direct rather than vicarious.”
Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations
omitted). High-ranking officials and supervisors “are responsible
for their own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to
ensure that subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.” Id. But

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an official “responsible for setting prison policy” still may “be held
liable for a constitutional violation if they are aware of a systematic
lapse in enforcement of a policy critical to ensuring inmate safety
yet fail to enforce that policy.” Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412, 423
(7th Cir. 2018) (citing Steidl v. Gramley, 151 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir.
1998)) (cleaned up). “[I]f a plaintiff presents evidence showing that
a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding and pervasive
or noted by prison officials in the past, and a defendant has been
exposed to information regarding the risk, then the evidence could
be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the official in fact
had actual knowledge.” Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934, 938–39
(7th Cir. 2001).
Defendants do not dispute that sexual assault constitutes an
“objectively serious” harm. See J.K.J. v. Polk Cnty., 960 F.3d 367,
376 (7th Cir. 2020) (“To say that sexual assaults [that a guard]
committed against [the plaintiffs] objectively imposed a serious risk
to their safety would be an understatement.”). And Defendants
concede taking no action to prevent Ms. Farris’s assault. To defeat
summary judgment, Ms. Farris must present “enough evidence for
a reasonable jury to conclude that” Defendants actually knew that
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she “faced an ongoing, substantial risk of serious harm.” Balsewicz
v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 658 (7th Cir. 2020).
1. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from
Count III.
Defendants all raise the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity on Count III. Qualified immunity insulates public
employees from liability for money damages if “their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Van den Bosch v.
Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778, 786 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S 223, 231 (2009)). In evaluating a qualifiedimmunity defense, this Court asks two questions: whether “the
facts that a plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a
constitutional right,” and, if so, “whether the right at issue was
clearly established at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.”
See id. (cleaned up). A clearly established right is one that “is
sufficiently clear that any reasonable official would understand that
his or her actions violate that right, meaning that existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

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debate.” Zimmerman v. Doran, 807 F.3d 178, 182 (7th Cir. 2015)
(citing Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)).
This Court must “approach the qualified-immunity inquiry by
treating as true the evidence-supported facts and inferences
favoring” Ms. Farris. Balsewicz, 963 F.3d at 657 (citing Orlowski v.
Milwaukee Cnty., 872 F.3d 417, 421–22 (7th Cir. 2017)). Ms. Farris
charges that Defendants knew that she and other women at Logan
faced an acute risk of custodial sexual abuse but failed to take
reasonable steps to mitigate it. Defendants contend that these
allegations fall outside the clearly established scope of the Eighth
Amendment. E.g., Defs.’ Mem., d/e 216, at 23 (arguing, without
citation or elaboration, that “the facts here do not give rise to a
constitutional violation”). The Court disagrees.
In Farmer, the Supreme Court “made clear that being violently
assaulted . . . in prison is a serious harm.” Balsewicz, 963 F.3d at
657 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The Farmer Court “also made
clear what a prison official must do when he learns that an inmate
faces an excessive danger of such a harm: take reasonable
measures to abate the danger.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832–
33). “There can be no debate,” moreover, that prisoners have a
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clearly established right “to be free from deliberate indifference to
rape and assault.” Velez v. Johnson, 395 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.
2005); see also Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir.
2000) (“In the simplest and most absolute of terms, the Eighth
Amendment right of prisoners to be free from sexual abuse was
unquestionably clearly established prior to the time of this alleged
assault [in the mid-1990s], and no reasonable prison guard could
possibly have believed otherwise.”). This right obtains even when
“the specific identity of the ultimate assailant is not known in
advance.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 915 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843). It does not matter whether the official
knew that the prisoner-plaintiff “was especially likely to be
assaulted by the [individual] who eventually committed the
assault.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. Nor does it matter “whether a
prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to
him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Id.
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from Count III.

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2. Defendant Locke is not entitled to summary judgment
on Count III.
Defendant Angela Locke served as Logan’s acting warden from
March 2013, when the facility transitioned into a women’s prison,
until June 2015, just a few months before Ms. Farris’s arrival. Ms.
Farris claims that Major Locke abdicated “her responsibilities to
implement the IDOC’s sexual abuse prevention and intervention
program, even in the face of rampant violations and an environment
where sexual contact between prisoners and staff was a known and
accepted phenomenon,” thereby incarcerating Ms. Farris and others
in a sexually dangerous environment. Pl.’s Resp., d/e 239, at 67.
Major Locke now moves for summary judgment. She argues
that Ms. Farris “is attempting to . . . allege a Monell claim against
[her], and that must fail,” and that in any event her stint at Logan
was too attenuated from Ms. Farris’s to be causally related. Defs.’
Mem., d/e 216, at 16–17. Yet a factfinder could reach the opposite
conclusion. Construing the record in Ms. Farris’s favor, a
reasonable jury could find that Major Locke personally fostered a
sexually dangerous, constitutionally infirm culture at Logan. Her
motion for summary judgment must be denied.

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Major Locke first disputes that she “personally participated in
or caused the unconstitutional actions of Co-Defendant Kohlrus.”
Defs.’ Mem., d/e 216, at 17. But Major Locke’s argument
misapprehends the nature of Ms. Farris’s claim. “Individual
defendants like [Major Locke], who are responsible for setting prison
policy, can be held liable for a constitutional violation if they are
aware of a systematic lapse in enforcement of a policy critical to
ensuring inmate safety yet fail to enforce that policy.” Sinn, 911
F.3d at 423 (citing Steidl, 151 F.3d at 741) (cleaned up). “[I]f a
plaintiff presents evidence showing that a substantial risk of inmate
attacks was longstanding and pervasive or noted by prison officials
in the past, and a defendant has been exposed to information
regarding the risk, then the evidence could be sufficient to permit a
trier of fact to find that the official in fact had actual knowledge.”
Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934, 938–39 (7th Cir. 2001).
Ultimately, then, Major Locke need not have known that Ms. Farris
was particularly susceptible to harm—or that Erik Kohlrus could
have committed custodial sexual abuse—to violate Ms. Farris’s
Eighth Amendment rights.

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Instead, a reasonable jury could find that Major Locke knew
that staff-on-prisoner sexual abuse pervaded Logan. See id. Major
Locke testified that “staff were [not] properly trained to deal with
female offenders” during her tenure. A. Locke Dep., d/e 235-3, at
80:20–25. When asked about a spate of resignations by staff
members accused of sexual misconduct, Major Locke admitted she
“didn’t have to raise any concern” regarding the staff members’
conduct “because everybody -- I mean, everybody knew about it. So
I didn’t have to tell anybody that there’s concern. I think everybody
at that point had concerns.” Id. at 78:22–79:6.
A reasonable jury also could find that Major Locke “was aware
of systematic lapse in enforcement of a policy critical to ensuring
inmate safety yet fail[ed] to enforce that policy.” Sinn, 911 F.3d at
423. As before, Major Locke’s own testimony and statement of
undisputed facts would—standing alone—support such a finding.
Major Locke testified that Logan staff needed “training . . . to be
gender specific to the female so that the staff knew how to deal with
them.” See A. Locke Dep., d/e 235-3, at 81:1–6. She also
acknowledged taking no steps to provide gender-informed training
to an overwhelmingly male staff. See id. at 83:14–16 (“Q: As
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warden, did you have the ability to order additional training for staff
at Logan? A: I could have, yes.”); but see id. at 82:15–20 (“Q: Did
you implement any training during your tenure as acting warden to
account for this issue of staff, as you said, needing additional
training to understand their new population of prisoners? A: I
personally did not.”). Major Locke also received comprehensive
training on IDOC’s PREA-implementing regulations and
administrative directives while at Logan. Id. at 73:15–21. Yet she
“did not participate in any PREA audits, review of the PREA policy,
or the way the PREA policy was implemented while she was Acting
Warden at Logan.” Defs.’ Mem., d/e 216, at 4 (citation omitted).
And the record contains substantial evidence that, under Major
Burke’s watch, Logan failed to monitor prisoners and staff who
reported sexual misconduct for possible retaliation—despite clear
federal and state mandates to do so. All of this would support a
jury finding in line with Ms. Farris’s interpretation of events: that
Warden Locke knew that enforcing PREA-aligned policies was of
utmost importance but failed to do so.
Major Locke lastly contends that her return to Decatur severed
any causal link to “events that occurred months after she left
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Logan.” See Defs.’ Reply, d/e 244, at 42. But the “requisite causal
connection” for constitutional tort liability can be satisfied “if the
defendant set in motion a series of events that the defendant knew
or should reasonably have known would cause others to deprive the
plaintiff of her constitutional rights.” Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d
384, 397 (7th Cir. 1988). The Court has explained how a
reasonable jury could find Major Locke responsible for setting
Logan on a constitutionally deficient course. The same jury could
find that her responsibility—and her liability—were not vitiated by
her departure. See Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 487 (7th
Cir. 2011)).
In short, a reasonable jury could find that Major Locke
fostered a “culture that permitted and condoned violations of
policies that were designed to protect inmates.” Woodward v. Corr.
Med. Servs. of Illinois, Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 929 (7th Cir. 2004). And
a reasonable jury could conclude that Ms. Farris’s assault was an
inevitable byproduct of Major Locke’s leadership. Her motion for
summary judgment on Count III is denied.

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3. Defendant Brannon is not entitled to summary
judgment on Count III.
Defendant Christine Brannon succeeded Major Locke as
Logan’s warden in June 2015. She ended her term the following
February. Ms. Farris alleges that Warden Brannon left Ms. Farris
and other women at Logan exposed to an acute risk of custodial
sexual abuse. Like Major Locke, Warden Brannon disputes that
she had any involvement in depriving Ms. Farris of her Eighth
Amendment rights. A reasonable factfinder could disagree.
First, Warden Brannon’s argument confuses vicarious liability,
which is not cognizable under Section 1983, for policymaker
liability, which is. See generally Sinn, 911 F.3d at 423 (citing
Steidl, 151 F.3d at 741) (“Individual defendants . . . who are
responsible for setting prison policy . . . can be held liable for a
constitutional violation if they are aware of a systematic lapse in
enforcement of a policy critical to ensuring inmate safety yet fail to
enforce that policy.”). Her argument also belies an overwhelming
mass of contrary record evidence, which suggests that Warden
Brannon neglected, or at best misunderstood, all of her obligations.
In fact, Warden Brannon’s deposition testimony—standing alone—

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creates a genuine dispute of material fact on each element of Ms.
Farris’s deliberate indifference claim.
As Judge Scudder has keenly observed, the “confinement
setting is a tinderbox for sexual abuse.” J.K.J., 960 F.3d at 382.
Warden Brannon, however, could demonstrate only a slight grasp of
that proposition:
• “Q: Do you believe that . . . sexual harassment or sexual
misconduct are a problem in prisons? A: I think there are -I’m sure there may be cases of this, but I don’t think it’s a
longstanding, widespread issue.” C. Brannon Dep., d/e 2186, at 24:8–24.
• “Q: Do you believe that sexual assault and sexual harassment
were a problem at Logan Correctional Center? A: No, I do not.”
Id. at 48:1–4.
• “Q: Do you recall making any specific inquiries [after becoming
Warden] about whether sexual assault or sexual harassment
were a problem at Logan? A: No, I do not.” Id. at 26:1–4.
This testimony does not disprove Warden Brannon’s
knowledge of custodial sexual abuse at Logan. A correctional
officer’s “own testimony that he was subjectively unaware of a
substantial risk of serious harm is not enough for summary
judgment if a jury could find otherwise from the evidence in the
record.” Boyd v. Pork, No. 01-cv-7957, 2003 WL 21011805, at *4
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(N.D. Ill. May 2, 2003) (citing Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616,
621 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding correctional officer’s deposition
testimony, which suggested that officer had ignored obvious risks of
harm, “not enough to eliminate a genuine issue of fact”)). Further,
Warden Brannon’s testimony belies both the recollections of her
codefendants and the substantial evidence in the record of staff-onprisoner sexual misconduct. Regardless of whether she appreciated
the risk of sexual abuse at Logan, a reasonable jury could discredit
her pleas of ignorance and find that risk too obvious to ignore.
The same must be said of Warden Brannon’s testimony on her
statutorily and internally mandated PREA obligations. Warden
Brannon’s chief responsibility was “to ensure the safety of the staff
and offenders” at Logan. Defs.’ Mem., d/e 218, at 14. As for
IDOC’s PREA program, Warden Brannon “was responsible for
ensuring compliance with PREA postings and guidelines, that the
PREA Compliance Manager had the appropriate training and held
required meetings, and that the proper notifications were made if a
PREA complaint was made.” Id. at 32. She also bore “the ultimate
responsibility to make sure [PREA] retaliation monitoring was done
at Logan.” Id. at 14. Warden Brannon testified both that she could
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not recall much, if anything, about her PREA-related work and that
she followed IDOC’s administrative directives to the letter. See C.
Brannon Dep., d/e 218-6, at 162:17–24 (“Q: And do you think there
was still difficulties with getting the word out [on] PREA policies
when you were warden at Logan? A: I don’t recall. Q: You don’t
recall any problems with getting the word out? A: I don’t -- I don’t
recall. I just don’t really recall. I don’t recall.”); but see id. at
247:21–248:9 (“Q: So again, did you do anything to investigate the
number of substantiated allegations of sexual abuse against guards
at Logan? A: No, I did not. Q: Did you take any steps to try to
reduce the number of sexual assaults that were occurring or sexual
abuse that was being committed by guards at Logan? A: I just
ensur[ed] that the PREA protocol was followed and staff was
following the procedures. Q: I know you already discussed that. Is
there anything else we haven’t already discussed? A: Nothing
additional.”). A jury must resolve these factual discrepancies.
Warden Brannon’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

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4. Defendants Charron, Ashley, and Johnson are not
entitled to summary judgment on Count III.
Defendant Clara Charron served as Logan’s PREA compliance
manager from 2013 until December 2015, when she was replaced
by Defendant Norine Ashley. Their backup PREA compliance
manager was Defendant Lisa Johnson, the head of Logan’s healthcare unit. As PREA compliance managers, these Defendants were
charged with ensuring “that the PREA Guidelines were initiated,”
with overseeing Logan’s annual PREA compliance audit, and with
monitoring PREA complainants for retaliation. See Defs.’ Mem., d/e
217, at 9–11. In Count III, Ms. Farris alleges that their enforcement
of IDOC’s PREA standards was constitutionally deficient. Assistant
Warden Charron, Dr. Ashley, and Ms. Johnson all move for
summary judgment. However, several triable issues of material fact
remain as to whether any of these Defendants satisfied their PREAcompliance obligations—or if they did anything more than complete
the occasional round of paperwork.
Take retaliation monitoring, which Warden Brannon testified
was “always done” during her tenure. C. Brannon Dep., d/e 218-6,
at 84:23–85:1. Neither Dr. Ashley nor Assistant Warden Charron

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testified to doing it. In fact, while Dr. Ashley claimed that
retaliation monitoring was within Assistant Warden Charron’s
remit, Assistant Warden Charron could not recall “taking any
actions to monitor retaliation”—or whether PREA prohibited
retaliation in the first place. Compare N. Ashley Dep., d/e 235-4, at
76:5–80:4 (testifying to “not doing the retaliation monitoring,”
because “that was being done by AWP [Assistant Warden of
Programs] Charron”) with C. Charron Dep., d/e 235-8, at 159:15–
163:24 (“A: I can’t remember who monitored [retaliation].”). Ms.
Johnson admitted to having borne responsibility for retaliation
monitoring; she further testified to overseeing some retaliation
monitoring after instances of inmate-on-inmate sexual misconduct.
see A. Johnson Dep., d/e 218-4, at 51:2–20. But Ms. Johnson, too,
could not recall doing retaliation monitoring herself. Id. at 50:22–
51:14. Whether these three Defendants ever conducted retaliation
monitoring must be decided by a jury.
The Court locates another triable issue of material fact in the
gap between Defendants’ actions and IDOC’s policies. To illustrate,
Dr. Ashley testified that her role as PREA compliance manager was
a “very important job,” and that it “should be more than just an
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accounting process.” N. Ashley Dep., d/e 235-4, at 61:19–62:2.
Yet Dr. Ashley also testified that “accounting”—“making sure that
paperwork was done, that we could pass the audit”—was precisely
the expected scope of her portfolio. See id. Assistant Warden
Charron’s recollections aligned with those of Dr. Ashley. See C.
Charron Dep., d/e 218-5, at 91:22–92:5 (“Q: Do you recall any
aspects of your position as PREA Compliance Manager as you sit
here today? A: Just to ensure that the process was followed if
reported and documented and then passed through the process.”).
Construing the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Farris, a
jury reasonably could find that these Defendants left Ms. Farris
with no procedural guardrails to protect her from custodial sexual
abuse. Their motion for summary judgment on Count III is denied.
5. Defendants Keane, Funk, and Pasley are not entitled to
summary judgment on Count III.
Defendant Patrick Keane was IDOC’s systemwide PREA
coordinator between July 2013 and November 2015, when he was
succeeded by Defendant Michael Funk. Defendant Alan Pasley,
Logan’s R&C Superintendent, served as a backup systemwide PREA
coordinator at all relevant times. These Defendants primarily were

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tasked with ensuring IDOC facilities’ compliance with PREA,
facilitating PREA-related staff trainings and overseeing IDOC’s
federally mandated PREA audit. Ms. Farris alleges that these
Defendants knew of an ongoing, acute risk of sexual abuse at Logan
and “abjectly disregarded their responsibilities” nonetheless. Pl.’s
Resp., d/e 240, at 107.
A reasonable factfinder, construing the record in Ms. Farris’s
favor, could agree. All three men readily acknowledged the gravity
of their obligations and the consequences of poor compliance and
oversight. See, e.g., P. Keane Dep., d/e 235-14, at 169:21–170:8
(“Q: Do you think you owed a responsibility to the women at Logan
Correctional Center to do your best job to protect them from sexual
abuse by male staff? A: I owed it to every inmate of the Illinois
Department of Corrections. I owed it to every -- staff of the Illinois
Department of Corrections to do the job -- to do my job as best as I
knew how, which is exactly what I did.”). These Defendants further
acknowledged that they had fallen well short. According to Mr.
Funk, Mr. Keane summarized his two-plus years as PREA
coordinator as involving database management and developing a
single course of compliance training. M. Funk. Dep., d/e 235-15,
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at 253:20–254:6. And when asked if he believed that his tenure as
“agency-wide PREA Coordinator was a success,” Mr. Keane said
that he did, because he “didn’t get fired.” P. Keane Dep., d/e 23514, at 251:1–5. A reasonable jury could evaluate these Defendants’
job performances far more harshly. Their motion for summary
judgment is denied.
B. Failure to Intervene (Count IV)
Defendant Alex Adams, a Logan correctional officer, was
stationed in Housing Unit 15’s control room at the time of Ms.
Farris’s assault. From there, Officer Adams could monitor
electronically any movement in the B-Wing. He also had a window
directly into the housing unit’s laundry room. In Count IV, Ms.
Farris alleges that Officer Adams “could see or had the opportunity
to see the harm occurring to Plaintiff as she was raped, or knew the
rape was going to occur,” but consciously failed to intervene on Ms.
Farris’s behalf. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 70–77, d/e 170.
Contending that the record contains “no evidence, save Plaintiff’s
speculation,” of his awareness of the assault, Officer Adams now
seeks summary judgment. Defs.’ Mem., d/e 218, at 36.

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A correctional officer “who fails to intervene to try to prevent
known cruel or unusual force, despite a reasonable opportunity to
do so, may be held liable under § 1983.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d
998, 1007 (7th Cir. 2018). To succeed on her claim for failure to
intervene, Ms. Farris must prove that Officer Adams “(1) knew that
a constitutional violation was committed; and (2) had a realistic
opportunity to prevent it.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335,
342 (7th Cir. 2017). “Whether an officer had sufficient time to
intervene or was capable of preventing the harm caused by the
other officer is generally an issue for the trier of fact unless,
considering all the evidence, a reasonable jury could not possibly
conclude otherwise.” Lanigan v. Vill. of E. Hazel Crest, Ill., 110
F.3d 467, 478 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Abdullahi v. City of Madison,
423 F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2005) (characterizing Lanigan’s
formulation as a “stringent standard”).
The undisputed record shows that Officer Adams was well
positioned—and obligated—to see Ms. Farris’s assault as it
occurred. As a control officer, Officer Adams was “the eyes for the
housing unit.” A. Adams Dep., d/e 235-5, at 88:8–10. Officer
Adams testified that “if there were prisoners outside of their cell on
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the 11 to 7 unit, . . . [he had the] responsibility to notice that and
take action in response.” Id. at 88:14–19. And from his vantage
point in the control room, as Alan Pasley and others testified,
Officer Adams had a “clear view” of the laundry room and its
occupants. A. Pasley Dep., d/e 235-6, at 268:17–23.
Whether Officer Adams saw (or could see) Officer Kohlrus or
Ms. Farris remains unanswered. Officer Adams testified that he
could not “recall that day one way or the other.” See A. Adams
Dep., d/e 235-5, at 86:2–87:6. Yet Robert Allison’s incident report,
completed just six hours after Ms. Farris’s assault, quotes Ms.
Farris as expressing concern for “everyone else in the bubble
[control room] who was watching out for” Erik Kohlrus. Pl.’s Resp.
ex. 62, d/e 235-62, at 2. Construing all this evidence in the light
most favorable to Ms. Farris, a reasonable jury could find that
Officer Adams saw what was occurring in the laundry room and did
nothing. His motion for summary judgment on Count IV is denied.
C. Section 1983 Conspiracy (Count V)
In Count V, Ms. Farris alleges that nearly all the Defendants
involved here—Locke, Snyder, Brannon, Charron, Ashley, Johnson,
Gabor, Adams, Keane, Funk, and Pasley—engaged in two discrete
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conspiracies to deprive her of her constitutional rights. See Second
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 70–77, d/e 170. In the first, Officer Adams and Erik
Kohlrus (along with a third, since-dismissed correctional officer)
conspired to facilitate and then cover up Kohlrus’s sexual abuse of
Ms. Farris. Id. ¶¶ 71–74. In the second, the remaining Defendants
conspired to “deprive Plaintiff and other prisoners” of their First,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and to “protect one
another” from any potential liability. Id. ¶¶ 75–77. These
Defendants now move for summary judgment on Count V.
A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons
acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, “the principal element
of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong
against or injury upon another, and an overt act that results in
damage.” Cooney v. Casady, 735 F.3d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 2013). An
express agreement between the conspirators is unnecessary; the
participants simply must share the same general conspiratorial
objective. Id. Direct proof of such an agreement is rarely available,
of course, since conspiracies are by their nature secretive
endeavors. See Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 511 (7th Cir.
2015). Even still, although a conspiracy “certainly may be
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established by circumstantial evidence, . . . such evidence cannot
be speculative.” Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 785 (7th Cir.
2003). To survive summary judgment, Ms. Farris must identify
facts from which a reasonable jury could find “(1) an express or
implied agreement among defendants to deprive plaintiff of . . . her
constitutional rights and (2) actual deprivations of those rights in
the form of overt acts in furtherance of the agreement.” Scherer v.
Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1988).
Defendants argue that Ms. Farris’s conspiracy claims rest on
speculation rather than evidence. The Court agrees. As in most
conspiracies, the record here does not contain evidence of an overt
agreement between any of these Defendants. Cf. Amundsen v.
Chicago Park Dist., 218 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff
must show that defendants “directed themselves toward an
unconstitutional action by virtue of a mutual understanding” with
evidence suggesting a “meeting of the minds”). Nor does the record
contain sufficient evidence from which an inference of an implicit
agreement could be drawn. Construed in the light most favorable
to Ms. Farris, the record instead reflects an endemic indifference
toward an obvious risk of custodial sexual abuse. That may well be
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the sort of systemic pattern or practice cognizable under Monell.
Cf. Woodward, 368 F.3d at 929 (affirming Monell jury verdict “based
on repeated failures to ensure [prisoner’s] safety . . . as well as a
culture that permitted and condoned violations of policies that were
designed to protect inmates like [him]”). But it is not a civil
conspiracy. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
Count V.
D. Deprivation of Procedural Due Process (Count VI)
Count VI alleges that Defendants Brannon, Charron, Ashley,
Johnson, and Gabor revoked Ms. Farris’ boot-camp eligibility
without notice or a hearing. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 78–84, d/e
170. As Ms. Farris does not contest these Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on Count VI, see Pl.’s Resp., d/e 241, at 147
n.8, that motion is granted.
E. First Amendment Retaliation (Count VII)
In Count VII, Ms. Farris alleges that seven of the named
Defendants retaliated against her after she made “statements about
her sexual assault to prisoners and prison staff.” See Second Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 85–92, d/e 170. The First Amendment “protects
speakers from threats of punishment that are designed to
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discourage future speech.” Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525
(7th Cir. 2009). To survive summary judgment, Ms. Farris must
identify evidence from which a jury could find (1) that she engaged
in protected First Amendment activity, (2) that she suffered a
deprivation likely to deter future protected speech, and (3) that her
protected speech was “at least a motivating factor” in Defendants’
decision to take the retaliatory action. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d
541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).
1. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from
Count VII.
Before proceeding to the merits, the Court must address
Defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity. As with Count III,
Defendants offer only a brief, generalized argument toward that
end. See Defs.’ Mem., d/e 216, at 23 (“As thoroughly discussed
supra, the facts here do not give rise to a constitutional violation by
Defendants Locke and Snyder and, for the forgoing reasons, they
are entitled to qualified immunity to the respective claims.”). A
prisoner’s “right to tell the officers his account of events” without
consequence, however, has long been clearly established First
Amendment law. McKinley v. Schoenbeck, 731 F. App’x 511, 514

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(7th Cir. 2018) (citing Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551); see also Hughes v.
Farris, 809 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Allegations of retaliation
for complaining about abuse support a claim under the First
Amendment.”). And “the First Amendment protects against
retaliation even if the retaliatory action itself does not amount to an
independent constitutional violation.” Holleman v. Zatecky, 951
F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2020). Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity from Count VII.
2. Defendants Charron, Ashley, and Johnson are entitled
to summary judgment on Count VII.
Ms. Farris “does not contest summary judgment on her
retaliation claims against Charron, Ashley, and Johnson.” Pl.’s
Resp., d/e 239, at 180 n.19. Their motion for summary judgment
on Count VII is, therefore, granted.
3. Defendants Brannon, Gabor, Locke, and Snyder are not
entitled to summary judgment on Count VII.
Ms. Farris first claims that Warden Brannon and Investigator
Gabor committed unlawful retaliation when, immediately after Ms.
Farris reported her assault, they confined her to Logan’s healthcare unit for more than a week and required her to sign an

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agreement not to discuss her assault. A prison transfer—whether
to a particular cell or a different facility—can be retaliatory if it
would “deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in
protected activity.” Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 881 (7th
Cir. 2020). “[A] transfer initiated to punish a prisoner for engaging
in protected activity would satisfy the causation element of
retaliation, but a transfer initiated as a rational, justifiable response
to the substance of the prisoner’s complaint would not.” Id. at 879.
This Court must give considerable “deference to prison
officials’ decisions when . . . maintaining order in a volatile
environment, and [to] the justifications offered for those decisions.”
Id. at 880 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)). That
deference requires the Court not to become too “enmeshed in the
minutiae of prison operations.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 562. Still, the
Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that Investigator Gabor’s
interview tactics were lawfully coercive. Nor can the Court conclude
that a weeklong stint in segregation was intended to protect Ms.
Farris rather than punish her. Investigator Gabor and Warden
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The same must be said of Major Locke and Lt. Snyder’s
liability on Count VII. Ms. Farris claims that these Defendants
unlawfully punished her “for allegedly discussing the assault . . .
while incarcerated at Decatur Correctional Center,” nearly four
months after Erik Kohlrus’s resignation and several months after
IDOC had concluded its internal investigation. Second Am. Compl.
¶ 91, d/e 170. A reasonable jury could agree.
There can be no dispute that the subject of Ms. Farris’s
speech—her sexual abuse at the hands of a correctional officer—
was protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Hughes, 809 F.3d
at 334. Yet Major Locke and Lt. Snyder maintain that their
prosecution of Ms. Farris was justified by valid penological
concerns. They say that Ms. Farris’s actions could have
“compromised” the “integrity of the ongoing investigation of
Plaintiff’s sexual assault” and posed a “safety risk” to her and
others. Defs.’ Mem., d/e 216, at 22.
Major Locke and Lt. Snyder’s liability cannot be resolved at
summary judgment. The record indicates that IDOC “had no policy
against sexual assault victims speaking to others about their sexual
assaults, even if there is an ongoing investigation.” Pl.’s Resp., d/e
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239, at 81; see also A. Pasley Dep., d/e 235-6, at 248:5–10 (“Q:
There’s no policy requiring [prisoners] not to talk about their sexual
assault, correct? A: Not to my knowledge, no. Q: Was there a
policy that required them not to talk about open investigations? A:
Not to my knowledge.”). Moreover, Investigator Gabor ended his
investigation as early as January 28 and no later than March 7. Lt.
Snyder filed her disciplinary report weeks—if not months—
afterward. So even if Lt. Snyder and Major Locke would have had a
reasonable justification for charging Ms. Farris with insolence
during the investigation’s active period, that justification evaporated
upon the investigation’s conclusion. Their motion for summary
judgment on Count VII is denied.
F. State-Law Negligent Spoliation (Count XIII)
Count XIII alleges that Defendants Brannon, Charron,
Johnson, Ashley, Gabor, Keane, Funk, and Pasley negligently failed
to preserve photographic and video evidence of Ms. Farris’s rape.
Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 117–121, d/e 170. These Defendants now
move for summary judgment on Count XIII.
The Court finds that summary judgment on Count XIII is
premature. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, a claim of
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spoliation of evidence “is connected to the merits of the underlying
suit.” Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 477 F.3d 502, 510
(7th Cir. 2007). If Ms. Farris “cannot prevail in the underlying suit
even with the allegedly lost or destroyed evidence, then [her] claim
for spoliation will fail because [she] cannot prove damages.” Id.
Seeing as this claim “might not need to be tried at all based on the
jury’s verdicts on the other claims,” the Court will deny Defendants’
motions for summary judgment on Count XIII, though with leave to
refile “once all other claims have been resolved.” Duran v. Town of
Cicero, 653 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2011).
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment are resolved as follows:
1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Locke and Snyder (d/e 215) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Judgment shall enter in favor of these
Defendants on Count V of Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint. The motion is otherwise DENIED.

2.

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Brannon, Charron, Ashley, Johnson, Adams, and Gabor
(d/e 217) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

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Judgment shall enter in favor of these Defendants on
Counts V and VI of Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint. The motion is otherwise DENIED, except that
Defendants may renew their motion for summary
judgment on Count XIII after trial.
3.

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Keane, Funk, and Pasley (d/e 219) is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART. Judgment shall enter in favor of
these Defendants on Count V of Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint. The motion is otherwise DENIED,
except that Defendants may renew their motion for
summary judgment on Count XIII after trial.

4.

A status conference in this matter is hereby SET for
October 12, 2023, at 2:30 p.m. Counsel for all parties—
including counsel for Defendant Kohlrus—shall
participate by videoconference, the instructions for which
are attached. Counsel should be prepared to discuss (1)
the status of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Kohlrus
and (2) new trial settings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: SEPTEMBER 29, 2023
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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