Turner v. State of Illinois et al
Filing
33
OPINION: Plaintiffs Amended Complaint 24 against all Defendants is DISMISSED. The claims against the State of Illinois, DCFS, Milhiser, and Hansel are dismissed with prejudice. The claims against Walker and Rauner, to the extent they are brought in their official capacities, are dismissed with prejudice. The claims against Walker and Rauner in their individual capacities are dismissed without prejudice. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 21 , 25 are GRANTED. Defendants' Motions t o Dismiss filed prior to the Amended Complaint 11 , 14 are DISMISSED AS MOOT. Plaintiff is given 30 days from the date of this Order to file a Second Amended Complaint. The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this Order to the address on file for Plaintiff. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 07/26/2018. (SKN, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 30 July, 2018 01:42:57 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
CICELY TURNER,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 17-cv-3308
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Before the Court are Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint (d/e 21, 25). Defendants argue that the
Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), that
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and that Plaintiff’s
claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed the Initial Complaint on December 26, 2017. On
February 26, 2018, Plaintiff sought leave to file her Amended
Page 1 of 16
Complaint. On March 2, 2018, the Court granted the request and
docketed the Amended Complaint (d/e 24).
The Amended Complaint seeks liability against the State of
Illinois, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS), Governor Bruce Rauner, Assistant State’s Attorney Kendra
Hansel, State’s Attorney John Milhiser, and DCFS Director Beverly
Walker.
The allegations in the Amended Complaint and the reasonable
inferences made therefrom establish that on July 27, 2016,
Defendants removed Plaintiff’s two children, Atalia Turner and
Zimri Turner, from her custody. The Amended Complaint brings
three claims. Claim 1 is for illegal search and seizure by the
Springfield Police Department and DCFS. Claim 2 includes two
claims: violation of Plaintiff’s Due Process rights and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Claim 3 alleges that Defendants
have illegally seized Plaintiff’s property (Atalia and Zimri Turner).
The Amended Complaint seeks equitable relief in the form of return
of the children to Plaintiff’s custody or to that of a relative. Plaintiff
also seeks information as to the whereabouts and contact
information of the children. The Amended Complaint also prays for
Page 2 of 16
monetary relief in the form of damages for pain and suffering and
punitive damages, for a total of $90,000,000.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all
well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and
construes all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff. Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim for relief, the complaint
must provide a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court’s jurisdiction and of the claim showing Plaintiff is entitled to
relief. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1); Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807
F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015).
However, pro se complaints are construed liberally by the
Court and held to a “less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir.
2015); see also Curtis v. Bembenek, 48 F.3d 281, 283 (7th Cir.
1995) (noting that “in reviewing a pro se complaint, we must employ
standards less stringent than if the complaint had been drafted by
counsel”).
Page 3 of 16
Additionally, the Court may consider documents attached as
exhibits to the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Ctrs.
v. Centennial Mortg., Inc., 398 F.3d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 2005); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to
a pleading is part of the pleading for all purposes.”). The Court may
also consider matters of public record in determining whether the
complaint’s allegations are sufficient to meet this standard. Olson
v. Champaign Cnty., Ill., 784 F.3d 1093, 1096 n.1 (7th Cir. 2015).
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
This Court has diversity subject matter jurisdiction over “all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . .
citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Applying this leniency, construing the Amended Complaint
favorably to Plaintiff, and taking all factual allegations in the
Amended Complaint as true, the Court concludes that the Amended
Complaint sufficiently establishes diversity jurisdiction.
The exhibits attached to the Amended Complaint purport that
Plaintiff is a foreign national of the Asiatic Nation of North America,
that she is a sovereign citizen, and that she is a member of other
Page 4 of 16
various international organizations (d/e 24-1, -2, -3, -4). Courts
have rejected such claims as frivolous and “should be rejected
summarily, however they are presented.” United States v. Benabe,
654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011).
The Initial Complaint and its exhibits indicated that Plaintiff is
a citizen of Ohio. Exhibit A to the Initial Complaint (d/e 1-1) is a
photocopy of an Ohio identification card that identifies Plaintiff’s
name and a Port Clinton, Ohio address. The Court notes that the
identification card expired on January 28, 2018. However, it was
valid on the day that Plaintiff filed the Initial Complaint, December
26, 2017, and it is recently expired. Also attached to the Initial
Complaint is a statement of Plaintiff’s food stamp benefits in Ohio
dated August 18, 2017 (d/e 1-2). Although the Amended Complaint
replaced the Initial Complaint, the Court takes judicial notice of the
exhibits attached to the Initial Complaint. Olson, 784 F.3d at 1096
n.1 (a court may take judicial notice of documents in the public
record when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)).
The Court notes that the Port Clinton, Ohio address listed on
the identification card does not match the Port Clinton, Ohio
address stated on the benefits statement. Defendants Milhiser and
Page 5 of 16
Hansel argue that the discrepancy between the two addresses
suggests their falsehood. However, given the standard that the
Court must apply at this stage to review factual allegations in favor
of Plaintiff, the Court takes the addresses as true representations of
Plaintiff’s residence(s), which could be explained by having two
homes, a move, or some other circumstance. The State’s Attorney
Defendants also contend that the validity of the address is
challenged by the fact that documents mailed to Plaintiff at the
address listed on the benefits statement were returned. The Court
similarly finds that other circumstances could explain the returned
mail. The Court notes that a summons and a notice of hearing
issued in Sangamon County Circuit Court Case No. 16-JA-97 to
Plaintiff, which the State’s Attorney Defendants attached to their
motion to dismiss (d/e 25), lists the Port Clinton, Ohio address for
Plaintiff found in the identification card. Accordingly, the Court
takes the allegation that Plaintiff is a citizen of Ohio as true.
Because Defendants concede that they are all citizens of
Illinois, the Court finds that diversity of citizenship exists. State’s
Attorneys Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss (d/e 26) at 4.
Page 6 of 16
Additionally, the Amended Complaint prays for monetary relief
in the form of damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages
totaling $90,000,000. Mere prayer for damages above $75,000 is
insufficient to clear the § 1332(a) hurdle. Some justification is
required. However, courts regularly have held that where a plaintiff
alleges serious injuries, the fact that the plaintiff’s damages exceeds
the amount-in-controversy requirement is plain on the face of the
complaint. See, e.g., McCoy v. Gen. Motors Corp., 226 F. Supp.
939, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Plaintiff alleges a serious tort in the
Amended Complaint—that Defendants wrongfully seized custody of
her children. The Amended Complaint seeks recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, violations of Plaintiff’s
civil and constitutional rights, and pain and suffering. Such
damages for emotional and mental injury applies to the amount in
controversy calculation. Shupe v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 566 F.
App’x 476, 479 (6th Cir. 2014) (unspecified amounts of damages
sought for humiliation and embarrassment are counted in tallying
the amount in controversy). Because a court will only dismiss a
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the
amount-in-controversy if it is “legally certain” that the recovery will
Page 7 of 16
be less than the threshold amount, the Court finds that it has
diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a). Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v.
Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 543 (7th Cir. 2006).
IV. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Eleventh Amendment “bars federal jurisdiction over suits
brought against a state, not only by citizens of another state or a
foreign state, but also by its own citizens.” MCI Telecomm. Corp. v.
Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 336 (7th Cir. 2000); see U.S. Const.
amend. XI; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66, 74
(1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate a State’s immunity
when it acts under its Initial Article I authority to regulate
commerce). This jurisdictional bar applies “regardless of the nature
of the relief sought.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
456 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
The immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment extends to
state agencies. Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Ind. Family & Soc.
Servs. Admin., 603 F.3d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 2010) (“If properly
raised, the amendment bars actions in federal court against a state,
state agencies, or state officials acting in their official capacities.”).
In accordance with Illinois state law, DCFS is properly considered a
Page 8 of 16
state department and is thus entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See 20 ILCS 505/1.
Two exceptions apply to state immunity. A state may be sued
in federal court where: 1) Congress has abrogated the state’s
immunity by statute; and 2) a state has expressly waived its
immunity and consented to suit. Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., 603
F.3d at 371.
In this case, Plaintiff does not argue, and there is no
indication, that Congress abrogated Illinois’ immunity from suit or
that Illinois has waived its immunity and consented to suit.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the State of Illinois and DCFS
are clearly barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
A. All of the individual Defendants have immunity from
liability in their official capacities because the Amended
Complaint does not seek prospective relief for an ongoing
violation.
Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit
against a state official seeking prospective relief for an ongoing
violation of federal law. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60
(1908). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the individual
Defendants may survive to the extent that they seek ongoing
Page 9 of 16
equitable relief against the individual Defendants in their official
capacities. Peirick v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. Indianapolis Athletics
Dep’t, 510 F.3d 681, 695 (7th Cir. 2007).
The Amended Complaint does not indicate whether the
individual Defendants are sued in their personal or official
capacities, so the Court addresses both.
When sued in their official capacities, individual defendants
are merely the alter ego of the state and, as such, they enjoy
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (“[A] judgment against a
public servant in his official capacity imposes liability on the entity
that he represents.” (citations omitted)); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (“[O]fficial-capacity suits
generally represent only another way of pleading an action against
an entity of which an officer is an agent . . . .”). The individual
Defendants in this case are agents of the State of Illinois in their
official capacities: Defendant Milhiser (State’s Attorney), Defendant
Hansel (Assistant State’s Attorney), Defendant Rauner (Governor),
and Defendant Walker (DCFS Director). See Richman v. Sheahan,
270 F.3d 430, 439 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[Plaintiff] sued [Defendant, an
Page 10 of 16
Illinois county sheriff,] in his official capacity, and therefore the
claim is against the entity of which he is an agent.”); Nat’l Cas. Co.
v. McFatridge, 604 F.3d 335, 341-42 (7th Cir. 2010) (state’s
attorney is a state employee, not a county employee); Ingemunson
v. Hedges, 549 N.E.2d 1269, 1272 (Ill. 1990) (“[D]rafters of our
present constitution agreed . . . that state’s attorneys should be
classified as state, rather than county officers.”).
Although Plaintiff seeks equitable relief in the form of the
return of her children, the Amended Complaint does not seek the
type of prospective injunctive relief for protection against future civil
rights violations required for the Ex Parte Young exception to
sovereign immunity to apply. See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
Therefore, the sovereign immunity of the State of Illinois bars suit
against Defendants in their official capacities.
B. Defendants Milhiser and Hansel have immunity from
liability in their individual capacities under prosecutorial
immunity.
In their personal capacities, Defendants Milhiser and Hansel,
as prosecutors, enjoy absolute immunity from civil suit for their
conduct during the performance of their function in the judicial
phase of the criminal process. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
Page 11 of 16
430-31 (1976); Benson v. Safford, 13 Fed. App’x 405, 407 (7th Cir.
2001). A prosecutor’s absolute immunity in the judicial phase
applies even where she is alleged to have acted “with an improper
state of mind or improper motive.” Burns v. Reed, 894 F.2d 949,
955 (7th Cir. 1990), vacated in part on other grounds and rev’d in
part on other grounds, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) and 958 F.2d 374 (7th
Cir. 1992).
This immunity extends to a prosecutor’s actions during a civil
proceeding involving termination of parental rights or child
protection because the prosecutor is acting in a functionally
comparable role to their criminal duties. Thomason v. SCAN
Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1996).
Defendant Hansel’s representation of the State during any
juvenile abuse and neglect case in Sangamon County Circuit Court
relating to the allegations of the Amended Complaint falls within the
judicial process for which prosecutors receive absolute immunity.
The nature of a juvenile abuse and neglect proceeding, while not
criminal, require duties of the state’s attorney that are intimately
associated with the judicial process. Burns, 894 F.2d at 955
(“Whenever duties of a judicial nature are imposed upon a public
Page 12 of 16
officer, the due execution of which depends upon his judgment, he
is exempt from all responsibility by action for the motives which
influence him and the manner in which said duties are
performed.”). As such, Defendant Hansel’s actions during her
involvement in these proceedings, and any similar involvement of
Defendant Milhiser, are entitled to absolute immunity.
Because Defendant Hansel’s actions as alleged in the
Amended Complaint entitle her to absolute prosecutorial immunity,
the claims against her must be dismissed. Similarly, Defendant
Milhiser must be dismissed as a defendant.
C. The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for relief
against Milhiser, Rauner, and Walker in their individual
capacities.
Defendants also seek dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim for relief. The caption of the Amended
Complaint lists Rauner, Walker, and Milhiser as defendants, but
none of them are mentioned anywhere in the body of the Amended
Complaint. The Amended Complaint alleges no facts to connect
Rauner, Walker, and Milhiser to the complained-of incident.
A complaint must provide the defendants with notice of the
plausible claims against them. Shah v. Littelfuse, Inc., 2013 WL
Page 13 of 16
1828926 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2013), citing EEOC v. Concentra
Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). To survive a
motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege that each defendant
was personally involved in the purported wrongdoing. Colbert v.
City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017). For example,
the complaint may assert claims against a supervisor of another
defendant, but it must set forth specific allegations of either the
supervisor’s personal involvement or his knowledge and
acquiescence in the wrongful conduct. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d
143, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 554 (2009). Personal involvement can be
inferred where the supervisor had day-to-day involvement and
decision-making authority over the alleged misconduct. See
Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 1981).
Here, the Amended Complaint alleges no supervisory
involvement by Defendants Walker, Rauner, or Milhiser as to their
respective offices. Further, it is doubtful that they would be directly
involved in a juvenile or family law proceeding as alleged in the
Amended Complaint. A complaint that lists a supervisor as a
defendant merely on the basis of respondeat superior does not state
Page 14 of 16
a claim for relief. Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435 (2d Cir.
2003). Therefore, Defendants Rauner, Walker, and Milhiser must
be dismissed as the Amended Complaint fails to state any claims for
relief against them.
V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s claims against the State of Illinois and DCFS must
be dismissed pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. The claims
against the individual Defendants in their official capacities also
must be dismissed due to sovereign immunity. Defendants Milhiser
and Hansel have prosecutorial immunity from the claims against
them. Finally, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for
relief against Defendants Rauner, Milhiser, and Walker. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (d/e 24) against all Defendants is
DISMISSED. The claims against the State of Illinois, DCFS,
Milhiser, and Hansel are dismissed with prejudice. The claims
against Walker and Rauner, to the extent they are brought in their
official capacities, are dismissed with prejudice. The claims against
Walker and Rauner in their individual capacities are dismissed
without prejudice. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (d/e 21, 25) are
Page 15 of 16
GRANTED. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss filed prior to the
Amended Complaint (d/e 11, 14) are DISMISSED AS MOOT.
Plaintiff is given 30 days from the date of this Order to file a
Second Amended Complaint. The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of
this Order to the address on file for Plaintiff.
ENTER: July 26, 2018
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Page 16 of 16
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?