Young v. United States of America
Filing
5
OPINION: Petitioner Javon A. Young's Motion to Vacate Sentence and Dismiss the Indictment (d/e 1 ) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is SUMMARILY DISMISSED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to notify Petitioner of the dismissal. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. All pending motions are DENIED as MOOT. This case is CLOSED. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 01/21/2020. (SKN, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 21 January, 2020 03:07:48 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JAVON A. YOUNG,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
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Case No. 17-cv-03314
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
This cause is before the Court on Petitioner Javon A. Young’s
Motion to Vacate Sentence and Dismiss the Indictment (d/e 1) filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Court must dismiss the motion
if it appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record
of prior proceedings that Petitioner is not entitled to relief. See
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States
District Courts, Rule 4(b). A preliminary review of Petitioner’s §
2255 motion and the record of prior proceedings establishes that
the motion must be dismissed because Petitioner is not entitled to
relief.
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I. BACKGROUND
On August 2, 2016, Petitioner was charged in a two-count
Indictment. Both counts of the Indictment charged Petitioner with
committing Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
United States v. Young, Case No. 16-cr-30039 (hereinafter, Crim.),
Indictment (d/e 1). On October 20, 2016, Petitioner pleaded guilty
to both counts pursuant to a written plea agreement.
In the plea agreement, Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence and convictions
in any manner, including a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255. The waiver does not apply to claims that Petitioner’s
sentence exceeds the maximum provided in the statute of
conviction, claims relating directly to the negotiation of the waiver,
or claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
On February 17, 2017, the Court sentenced Petitioner to 51
months’ imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release on each
count, with the sentences on each count to be served concurrently.
Crim., Judgment (d/e 29), at 2-3. Petitioner did not appeal.
In December 2017, Petitioner filed his Motion to Vacate
Sentence and Dismiss the Indictment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255.
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In May 2018, Petitioner filed a supplement to his § 2255 motion,
seeking to add one additional claim. As Petitioner was entitled to
amend his § 2255 motion as a matter of course under Rule 15 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court indicated that it
would consider Petitioner’s additional claim.
II. ANALYSIS
A prisoner claiming that his sentence violates the Constitution
may move for the Court “to vacate, set aside, or correct [his]
sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Relief under § 2255 is an
extraordinary remedy because a § 2255 petitioner has already had
“an opportunity for full process.” Almonacid v. United States, 476
F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007).
A § 2255 motion is timely if it is filed within one year of “the
date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(f). The judgment in Petitioner’s criminal case was entered
on February 23, 2017. See Crim., Judgment, at 1. Petitioner filed
his § 2255 motion in December 2017. Therefore, Petitioner’s
motion is timely under § 2255(f)(1).
Having established that Petitioner’s § 2255 motion is timely,
the Court now turns to Petitioner’s claims. The Court construes
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Petitioner’s pro se § 2255 motion liberally, as required. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, liberal
construction of the motion does not inure to Petitioner’s benefit to
the extent that the motion is not understandable. See Hudson v.
McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1998).
Petitioner’s § 2255 motion is verbose, repetitive, and, in some
places, unintelligible. Nevertheless, the Court has been able to
decipher several claims made by Petitioner. Petitioner’s primary
claim—that the Court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him—includes
an attack on the sufficiency of the Indictment in his criminal case.
Petitioner also claims that he was deprived of due process because
he did not have notice of the investigation conducted by the grand
jury or the opportunity to challenge the grand jurors who indicted
him. Motion (d/e 1), at 21-22. Petitioner’s final claim is that his
conviction and sentence relating to a § 924(c) offense violates due
process because the predicate offense is not a crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).1 Supplement (d/e 3), at 1-2.
Petitioner’s § 2255 motion refers to several statutes and provisions of the
United States Constitution, including the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth
Amendments. See Motion, at 17, 20-21. However, the motion, even construed
liberally, cannot be read to assert any claims distinct from those listed above.
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Petitioner’s claims are barred by his collateral attack waiver.
Petitioner’s plea agreement contains a valid and enforceable waiver
of Petitioner’s right to collaterally attack his sentence and
convictions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The waiver has three
exceptions: (1) claims that Petitioner’s sentence exceeds the
maximum provided in the statute of conviction; (2) claims relating
directly to the negotiation of the waive; and (3) claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. However, none of Petitioner’s claims assert
that his sentence exceeds the applicable statutory maximum or that
Petitioner received ineffective assistance from defense counsel. Nor
do any of Petitioner’s claims relate directly to the negotiation of
Petitioner’s collateral attack waiver. Accordingly, the waiver bars all
of Petitioner’s § 2255 claims in this case. See Dowell v. United
States, 694 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that a voluntary
and knowing waiver is valid and must be enforced).
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
If Petitioner seeks to appeal this decision, he must first obtain
a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (providing that
an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final
order in a § 2255 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues
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a certificate of appealability). “When the district court denies a
habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim,” a certificate of
appealability should issue only when the prisoner shows both “that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states
a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists
of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.; see also Jimenez v.
Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 n.3 (2009). The Court concludes
that jurists of reason would not find the Court’s procedural ruling
debatable. Therefore, the Court declines to issue a certificate of
appealability.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Petitioner Javon A. Young’s Motion to
Vacate Sentence and Dismiss the Indictment (d/e 1) filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is SUMMARILY DISMISSED. The Clerk is
DIRECTED to notify Petitioner of the dismissal. The Court declines
to issue a certificate of appealability. All pending motions are
DENIED as MOOT. This case is CLOSED.
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ENTER: January 21, 2020
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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