Snowden v. Illinois Department of Human Services et al

Filing 29

OPINION and ORDER entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 3/25/2022. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, d/e 19 is GRANTED. Judgment to enter in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff. All remaining deadlines and settings are terminated. Case CLOSED. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION & ORDER) (MAS)

E-FILED

Monday, 28 March, 2022 09:12:53 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ANGELIQUE SNOWDEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES and
RONALD KORZA,
Defendant.

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Case No. 18-3017

OPINION AND ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:
Before the Court is Defendants Illinois Department of Human
Services’ (“DHS”) and Ronald Korza’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (d/e 19). Plaintiff has not shown any dispute of material
fact, while Defendants have shown that Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion (d/e
19) is GRANTED.
I.

FACTS

Plaintiff Angelique Snowden was employed by the Illinois
Department of Human Services from September 2009 until
September 2017. She was employed as a Disability Claims
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Adjudicator in the Bureau of Disability and Determination Services
(“DDS”). In 2014, she was approved to take leave for the birth of a
child under the Family and Medical Leave Act, (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §
2601 et seq. Plaintiff was again approved for FMLA leave between
October 3, 2016 and November 20, 2016 for the same reason.
On October 14, 2016, during her FMLA leave, Plaintiff
interviewed for a new position within DDS for which there were four
openings. Plaintiff was asked the same questions as all other
interviewees, and her FMLA leave was never mentioned during the
interview. DHS did not offer Plaintiff the position, instead selecting
two men and two women for the four available positions. Each of
the four selected employees received the four highest scores from
the scoring sheet used to evaluate each interviewee. Plaintiff scored
twelfth out of the nineteen interviewees.
In the spring of 2017, Frank Gardner, Plaintiff’s Section Chief
notified Ron Korza, Deputy Director of DDS, that a complaint had
been filed regarding one of Plaintiff’s assigned cases. Mr. Gardner
told Mr. Korza that there was a discrepancy between what Plaintiff
had documented as calls to a Social Security applicant and the
logged phone calls listed on the phone bill for Plaintiff’s phone. The
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records showed that calls Plaintiff claimed had been made to
disability applicants had not actually been made, some resulting in
the termination of benefits to the applicants. These discrepancies
prompted further investigation which revealed 29 instances of
falsely documented calls.
In May 2017, while the investigation was being conducted,
Plaintiff met with Mr. Korza, Julie Potter, the Division Administrator
of Axillary Services, and Marcus Sherrod, Plaintiff’s Union
Representative. Mr. Korza told Plaintiff about the investigation and
that the findings could result in discipline. Plaintiff was also
presented with the evidence of the false calls.
Following the investigation, Mr. Korza prepared a
memorandum outlining the charges against Plaintiff and sent the
memorandum to his supervisor, Quinetta Wade, the Director of the
Division of Rehabilitation Services. The memorandum also
contained Mr. Korza’s recommendation that Plaintiff be discharged
from employment at DHS. The final decision to discharge an
employee at DHS is left to the DHS Labor Relations Department
and, ultimately, the Illinois Department of Central Management
Services.
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Mr. Korza notified Plaintiff that a pre-disciplinary meeting was
scheduled for July 19, 2017. At that meeting, at which Mr. Sherrod
was also present, Plaintiff was again presented with evidence and a
statement of the charges and was told that Plaintiff could submit a
rebuttal. Plaintiff did so on July 28, 2017, objecting to the fact that
she did not receive the questions she would be asked at the July 19
meeting prior to the meeting and arguing that the discrepancies
were the result of, in her view, and honest mistake.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff was placed on suspension pending
discharge on August 8, 2017, and she was discharged from
employment effective September 6, 2017. Plaintiff then requested
her union file a grievance on her behalf to contest her discharge.
But on October 24, 2017, Plaintiff, through her union, agreed to
withdraw the grievance and that Plaintiff would resign her position
at DHS on September 7, 2017, rather than be discharged. Plaintiff
did not submit a resignation by the deadline and was subsequently
discharged.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants DHS and Ronald
Korza on January 29, 2018. In the Complaint, Plaintiff claims her
discharge was in violation of the FMLA’s anti-retaliation provisions
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and in violation of her due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Defendants now move for summary judgment on each
of Plaintiff’s claims.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no
genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of
the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the movant
believes demonstrates the absence of any genuine dispute of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
“[S]ummary judgment is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in a
lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would
convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.” Johnson v.
Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003).
On that evidence, the Court must determine whether a
genuine dispute of material facts exists. A genuine dispute of
material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of
the nonmoving party. Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir.
2012). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court
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must construe facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's
favor. Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2008).
III.

ANALYSIS

Defendant first moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
FMLA retaliation claim. The FMLA prohibits employers from
retaliating against an employee for exercising, or attempting to
exercise, his rights under the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(2) &
(b); Nicholson v. Pulte Homes Corp., 690 F.3d 819, 825 (7th Cir.
2012). In addition to proving entitlement to FMLA protections, a
plaintiff claiming FMLA retaliation must also prove discriminatory
or retaliatory intent. Id. (citing Goelzer v. Sheboygan County, Wis.,
604 F.3d 987, 995 (7th Cir. 2010)). To survive a motion for
summary judgment on a retaliation claim under the FMLA, a
plaintiff must submit evidence showing that employer took an
adverse employment action against her because she took FMLA
leave to which he was entitled. Preddie, 799 F.3d at 819 (citing
Lucas v. PyraMax Bank, FSB, 539 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a causal
connection between Defendants’ decision to discharge Plaintiff and
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Plaintiff’s previous approved FMLA leaves. Plaintiff, in response,
concedes that “she can not present sufficient evidence of causation
on [the FMLA] claims and does not challenge DHS’ motion for
summary judgment as to Count I.” Pl.’s Resp. (d/e 24) p. 1.
Because there is no issue of material fact as to DHS’ non-liability on
Count I, Defendants’ Motion (d/e 19) is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s
FMLA claim.
Defendants also seek summary judgment on Count II of
Plaintiff’s Complaint. That Count, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights to due process
under the Fourth Amendment when Defendants terminated her
employment.
In the context of a government employer discharging an
employee, “[d]ue process requires that the government employer
provide a pretermination hearing in which the employee receives
notice of the reasons for the prospective termination and has the
opportunity to respond to the charges.” Greer v. Amesqua, 212
F.3d 358, 367 (7th Cir. 2000). The hearing “need not be elaborate.”
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). All
that is required is “[t]he opportunity to present reasons, either in
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person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken” in
addition to “oral or written notice of the charges against [her], an
explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to
present [her] side of the story.” Id. at 546. “To require more than
this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on
the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory
employee.” Id.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s pre-disciplinary meeting
satisfied the requirement to afford Plaintiff due process. Plaintiff, in
response, argues that she was denied due process in the meeting
because, in her view, Mr. Korza was not an impartial decision
maker because Mr. Korza had already submitted a recommendation
that Plaintiff be discharged prior to the pre-disciplinary meeting.
Here, Plaintiff received two pre-disciplinary meetings. At the
first in May 2017, Plaintiff was presented with a statement of the
charges against her and supporting evidence. She was then told
that further investigation would continue and could lead to
discipline. Plaintiff was again presented with a statement of
charges and supporting evidence in July 2017. While Plaintiff
argues that Mr. Korza’s presence at the meeting resulted in a biased
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decisionmaker, Plaintiff concedes that Mr. Korza did not make the
final decision to discharge Plaintiff, he only made a
recommendation which would be considered in light of Plaintiff’s
written rebuttal. The final decision was left to the DHS Labor
Relations Department in consultation with the Department of
Central Management Services. Plaintiff was given notice of the
charges against her and an opportunity to state her reasons why
the recommended discharge should not take place, which she took
advantage of. That the ultimate decisionmaker did not agree with
her and instead affirmed Mr. Korza’s recommendation does not
result in a deprivation of due process.
IV.

CONCLUSION

On the undisputed material facts, the Court finds that Plaintiff
was not denied due process when DHS discharged Plaintiff and that
DHS did not retaliate against her for taking FMLA leave.
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both
Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (d/e 19) is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED
to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All

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remaining deadlines and settings are terminated. This case is
closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: March 25, 2022.
FOR THE COURT
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough____________
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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