Alvesteffer v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 24

ORDER entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 9/25/2019. Plaintiff Amber Alvesteffer's Objection to Report and Recommendation (d/e 23 ) is SUSTAINED. The Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins (d/e 22 ) is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED, subject to the modification and clarification on the scope of remand discussed above. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 14 ) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendant's Motion for Summary Affirmance (d/e 19 ) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) sentence four. This Case is CLOSED. (SEE WRITTEN ORDER) (MAS, ilcd)

E-FILED

Thursday, 26 September, 2019 04:56:28 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
AMBER ELIZABETH ALVESTEFFER,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW SAUL,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 18-cv-03027

ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on the Report and
Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Tom SchanzleHaskins (d/e 22). Magistrate Judge Schanzle-Haskins recommends
that this Court: (1) grant in part and deny in part Plaintiff Amber
Alvesteffer’s Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 14); (2) grant in
part and deny in part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Affirmance
(d/e 19); and (3) affirm in part and reverse and remand in part—
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) sentence four—the decision of the
Commissioner. On July 29, 2019, Plaintiff filed her Objections to
the Report and Recommendation (d/e 23).

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For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s objections are
SUSTAINED. The Court ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation with one modification for
clarity. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 14) and
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Affirmance (d/e 19) are GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The decision of the Commissioner
is REVERSED AND REMANDED pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
sentence four.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
When a magistrate judge proposes factual findings and
recommendations, the district court “may accept, reject, or modify,
in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court may
also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions. Id. The district court reviews
de novo any part of a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation to which a specific written objection has been
made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
In conducting this de novo review, the Court reviews the
decision of the ALJ to determine whether the decision is supported
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by substantial evidence. See Overman v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 456, 462
(7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). If the decision has such support,
the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See
id. (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is only such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Nelson v. Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1234 (7th Cir.
1997).
II. BACKGROUND
The Court adopts the facts as presented by Magistrate Judge
Schanzle-Haskins in the Report and Recommendation. The Court
sets forth below only those facts necessary to resolve Plaintiff’s
objections to the Report and Recommendation.
Plaintiff’s first application to receive Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) was filed on Plaintiff’s behalf by her parent when she
was seventeen years old. The application alleged Plaintiff became
disabled on June 15, 2005, when she was 12. Plaintiff also filed an
application for childhood disability benefits for the period from June
15, 2005, when she alleged she became disabled, until her 18th
birthday. The claims were denied initially and on reconsideration.
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision denying the
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claims. A District Court in Florida, where Plaintiff lived at the time,
later reversed and remanded the ALJ’s decision. A second
evidentiary hearing was held and an ALJ again issued a decision
denying both claims. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Complaint, d/e
1, seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff ultimately
filed a motion for summary judgment, d/e 14, and Defendant filed a
cross-motion for summary affirmance, d/e 19.
Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins issued a Report and
Recommendation, d/e 22, regarding the ALJ’s decision and the
parties’ motions for summary judgment on July 24, 2019.
Magistrate Judge Schanzle-Haskins determined that Plaintiff
forfeited any claim of error on issues related to her claim for
Childhood Disability Benefits, and therefore, the ALJ’s decision
denying Childhood Disability Benefits should be affirmed.
Magistrate Judge Schanzle-Haskins also determined that the ALJ’s
denial of Supplemental Security Income, however, should be
reversed and remanded, as the ALJ made a clearly reversible error
that is not supported by substantial evidence.

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III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts only one objection to the Report and
Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Schanzle-Haskins.
Plaintiff notes that she filed for benefits under two Social Security
programs: SSI under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, and
Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Act. The
latter of these programs pays benefits based on a parent’s earnings
to both those under the age of eighteen who have a disability, as
well as those over the age of eighteen who have a disability that
began before the age of twenty-two. 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a)(5).
Plaintiff’s arguments in her motion concerned the adult disability
criteria, rather than the different standard applied to the evaluation
of claims for claimants under the age of eighteen. In a footnote,
Defendant notes that Plaintiff’s brief did not “discuss or contest the
ALJ’s findings that she was not disabled prior to age 18.” Def.’s
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. Affirmance 3 n.2. Defendant then limited
his discussion to “Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the ALJ’s findings
when she was 18 and older.” Id.
“Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion
of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment
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of a known right.’” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733
(1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (other
citations omitted)). Having reviewed the record and considered the
arguments of the parties, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has, at
most, waived her right to appeal the denial of Disability Insurance
Benefits for the period prior to when she turned eighteen. Indeed,
Plaintiff does not dispute that in her objection. See Objections to
Report and Recommendation 2, d/e 23. Plaintiff has not, however,
forfeited the entirety of her appeal of the denial of benefits under
Title II, which as previously noted may be paid in the case of a
disability that begins before a claimant turns twenty-two. Plaintiff
could then show that she became disabled at some point between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-two and therefore still qualify for
benefits under Title II. Plaintiff’s brief in support of her Motion for
Summary Judgment cites to the Title II regulations, in addition to
the Title XVI regulations. See, Pl.’s Br. Supp. Reversing the
Decision of the Comm’r 1, 21, d/e 15. That does not indicate
forfeiture to the Court. Moreover, Magistrate Judge SchanzleHaskins’ Report and Recommendation cites the same Title II and
Title XVI regulations. See Report and Recommendation 1, 7. The
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Court clarifies then that the remand shall include reconsideration
of both Plaintiff’s claim for SSI under Title XVI and Plaintiff’s claim
for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II, but only from the
date on which Plaintiff turned eighteen.
Additionally, after reviewing Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and Brief in Support, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Affirmance and Memorandum in Support, the Report and
Recommendation, the factual record, and the applicable law, this
Court finds no clear error with respect to any other portion of
Magistrate Judge Schanzle-Haskins’ Report and Recommendation.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1)

Plaintiff Amber Alvesteffer’s Objection to Report and

Recommendation (d/e 23) is SUSTAINED.
(2)

The Report and Recommendation of United States

Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins (d/e 22) is ACCEPTED
and ADOPTED, subject to the modification and clarification on
the scope of remand discussed above.
(3)

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 14) is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
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(4)

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Affirmance (d/e 19)

is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
(5)

The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and

REMANDED pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) sentence four.
(6)

THIS CASE IS CLOSED.

ENTER: September 25, 2019
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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