Hurst v. Martinez et al
Filing
22
OPINION: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 17 is GRANTED. This cause is dismissed, with prejudice. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 11/02/2018. (SKN, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 02 November, 2018 09:47:59 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JOSEPH R. HURST,
Plaintiff,
v.
VIRGINIA MARTINEZ,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
18-CV-3041
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Virginia
Martinez’s Motion to Dismiss (d/e 17). Plaintiff Joseph R. Hurst
alleges that the amended version of 730 ILCS 5/3-3-5(f) that allows
the Prisoner Review Board (Board) to, after initially denying an
inmate parole, schedule the next hearing up to five years in the
future, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution. Because the amendment does not create a sufficient
risk of increasing the measure of punishment, Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint fails to state a claim for relief. Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED.
Page 1 of 13
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2018, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The Court conducted a merit review and dismissed
the Complaint with leave to replead. Opinion (d/e 9). On April 16,
2018, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (d/e 11). The Court
allowed Plaintiff’s claim under the Ex Post Facto Clause to proceed
against Martinez in her official capacity as a member of the Illinois
Prisoner Review Board. Opinion (d/e 12). The Court directed
Defendant to answer or otherwise respond to the Amended
Complaint.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 100 to
300 years after being convicted of murdering a Chicago police
officer in May 1967. Am. Compl. ¶ 11; see also People v. Hurst, 42
Ill.2d 217 (1969). He was first eligible parole in June 1977. Am.
Compl. ¶ 14. He was denied parole then and after every parole
hearing since. Id. Plaintiff’s most recent parole hearing occurred
on November 16, 2017. Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Following the denial of
parole in November 2017, the Board continued his next parole
hearing for three years (until November 2020). Id.
Page 2 of 13
Plaintiff alleges that, at the time he committed the offense, the
law in effect permitted only a 12-month continuance following a
parole denial. Id.1 Section 3-3-5 of the Unified Code of Corrections
currently provides that, if the Prisoner Review Board denies parole:
[the Prisoner Review Board] shall provide for a rehearing
not less frequently than once every year, except that the
Board may, after denying parole, schedule a rehearing no
later than 5 years from the date of the parole denial, if
the Board finds that it is not reasonable to expect that
parole would be granted at a hearing prior to the
scheduled rehearing date.
730 ILCS 5/3-3-5(f). Plaintiff asserts that the Board’s imposition of
the three-year continuance in 2017 pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/3-3-5(f)
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, during the interval between
the denial and the next hearing, new Board members often replace
1
The Court has been unable to confirm that, when Plaintiff committed the
offense, the law permitted only a 12-month continuance following a parole
denial. The 1967 statutes do not indicate how often parole hearings must be
held. See Ill. Rev. St. 1967, ch. 38, par. 123-1 (parole and work release); Ill.
Rev. St. 1967, ch. 127, par. 55b (powers and duties of the Parole and Pardon
Board); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 108, par. 204(a) (granting Parole and Pardon
Board authority to make regulations). Neither the Court nor Defendant were
able to locate the 1967 Rules and Regulations of the Parole and Pardon Board.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Jefferson v. Brantley, 44 Ill.2d 31, 33 (1969)
(referencing the Rules and Regulations of the Parole and Pardon Board and
noting that “[t]here is nothing in the statute or rules which would disallow a
continuance for more than nine months”). The Court will assume, for purposes
of the Motion to Dismiss, that when Plaintiff committed the offense the law
permitted only a 12-month continuance following a parole denial.
Page 3 of 13
those who voted for the continuance. Am. Compl. ¶ 27. Those new
Board members are prevented from voting in the inmate’s favor
prior to the expiration of the continuance. Id. According to
Plaintiff, if the new Board members were allowed to vote earlier, he
“would stand to be released earlier.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that,
unless there is reasonable assurance that the same Board members
who imposed a multi-year continuance will be the same members at
the end of the continuance, “there is a distinct possibility that the
imposition of a multi-year continuance retroactively, delaying the
vote of new [Board] members, creates a sufficient risk of increasing
Plaintiff’s measure of punishment.” Id. ¶ 34.
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the amended
statute creates a sufficient risk that the term of Plaintiff’s
imprisonment will be increased and, therefore, violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff does not seek to
invalidate the prior parole proceedings or obtain immediate release.
He only seeks annual parole hearings.
III. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Page 4 of 13
12(b)(6). Defendant asserts that (1) the amended statute does not
create a sufficient risk of increasing the punishment attached to the
crime; (2) the Board retains authority under the amended statute to
tailor the frequency of hearings depending on the circumstances of
each prisoner; (3) Plaintiff’s requested relief would create an
unreasonable burden on the Board and would undermine its
authority; (4) Defendant is entitled to absolute immunity for
requests for monetary relief; and (5) Defendant lacks authority to
effectuate Plaintiff’s requested relief and, if the motion to dismiss is
denied, the Chairperson of the Board should be substituted as the
proper party for carrying out prospective injunctive relief.
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint. Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 458
(7th Cir. 2007). To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff need only
provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing she is
entitled to relief and giving the defendants fair notice of the claims.
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the
Page 5 of 13
plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and
construing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Id.
However, the complaint must set forth facts that plausibly
demonstrate a claim for relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A plausible claim is one that alleges factual
content from which the Court can reasonably infer that the
defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Merely reciting the elements of a cause
of action or supporting claims with conclusory statements is
insufficient to state a cause of action. Id.
V. ANALYSIS
The United State Constitution prohibits states from passing
any ex post facto law. U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 10. A law violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause if the law retroactively increases the
punishment for a crime after the crime was committed. Garner v.
Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 259 (2000) (noting that “[r]etroactive changes
in laws governing parole of prisoners” may violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause in some instances). A statutory change that increases the
time between parole hearings violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if
the change “produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of
Page 6 of 13
punishment attached to the covered crimes.” Ca. Dep’t of
Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509, 514 (1995) (finding that
the legislative amendment authorizing the Board of Prison Terms to
defer subsequent suitability hearings for up to three years for
prisoners convicted of certain offenses if the Board found it
unreasonable to expect that parole would be granted at an earlier
hearing did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause).
In Morales, the United States Supreme Court, while not
adopting a single formula for identifying which amendments survive
an ex post facto challenge, considered that the amendment applied
to a class of prisoners for whom the likelihood of parole was remote,
that the parole board’s authority under the amendment was
carefully tailored to relieve the board of scheduling parole hearings
for prisoners who have no chance of being released, and that the
parole board retained the authority to tailor the frequency of
subsequent hearings. Morales, 514 U.S. at 510-511. The Court
concluded that, “[i]n light of the particularized findings required
under the amendment and the broad discretion given to the board,
the narrow class of prisoners covered by the amendment cannot
reasonably expect that their prospects for early release on parole
Page 7 of 13
would be enhanced by the opportunity of annual hearings.” Id. at
512.
Here, while the amendment applies to all prisoners, the
amendment is carefully tailored and the Board retains the authority
to tailor the frequency of the hearings for each prisoner. The Court
finds the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Fletcher v. Williams,
179 Ill. 2d 225 (1997) analyzing an earlier amendment to the same
statute persuasive in this regard.
In Fletcher, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
statutory amendment that replaced the requirement of annual
parole hearings by allowing the Prisoner Review Board to schedule a
prisoner’s next parole hearing at intervals of up to three years did
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal or state
constitutions. Fletcher 179 Ill. 2d 225, 226 (1997); see also Hill v.
Walker, 241 Ill. 2d 479, 494 (2011) (holding that “there is no
question that section 3-3-5(f) on its face, or in its operation
pursuant to its binding regulation . . . does not create a significant
risk of increasing Hill’s incarceration”). (As noted above, the statute
now provides for intervals of up to five years.)
First, the court
found that the amended statute did not have the effect of increasing
Page 8 of 13
punishment because the statute did “not enhance the range of
available prison terms or the substantive criteria for determining a
prisoner’s eligibility or suitability for parole.” Id. at 237.
Second, the statute was “tailored to the determination of the
likelihood that a prisoner would be released sooner than an
extended parole hearing date.” Id. at 237. That is, the amended
statute did not affect the date of the initial parole hearing but only
affected the timing of subsequent hearings once the Board has
concluded, after a hearing, that a prisoner is not suitable for parole
and that “‘it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be
granted at a hearing prior to the scheduled rehearing date.’” Id.
(quoting 730 ILCS 5/3-3-5(f) (West 1996)).
Third, the Fletcher court found that the Board retained the
authority under the amended statute to tailor the frequency of the
hearings depending on the particular circumstances of each
prisoner. Id. at 237. The statute provided that if the Board finds
that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted
sooner, the Board can schedule the hearing no later than three
years after the parole denial. Id. at 237-38.
Page 9 of 13
Finally, the court noted that a prisoner could seek a parole
hearing at any time based on new facts or extraordinary
circumstances pursuant to 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 1610.100(a)(2).
Id. at 238. Based on all of these factors, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that “we cannot say that the amended Corrections Code
section 3-3-5(f) will have any constitutionally significant effect on
any prisoner’s actual term of confinement.” Id. at 238; see also Hill,
241 Ill. 2d at 494 (reaffirming the holding of Fletcher).
All of the factors considered in Fletcher remain applicable to
the statute in its current form. The amendment does not apply to
the initial hearing but only to subsequent hearings. The default is
an annual hearing unless the Board specifically finds that it is not
reasonable to expect that parole would be granted earlier. The
Board has the discretion to set the hearing following a parole denial
within one to five years. Moreover, if new facts or extraordinary
circumstances arise, Plaintiff can request a hearing sooner. 20 Ill.
Adm. Code § 1610.100(a)(2); see also Adams v. Meloy, 287 F. App’x
531 (7th Cir 2008) (unpublished disposition finding that Indiana’s
policy changing the frequency of parole hearings to once every five
years did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause).
Page 10 of 13
Plaintiff argues that none of the prior cases deciding the ex
post facto issue in this context considered that members of the
Board might change between the time parole is denied and the date
the next parole hearing is scheduled. Plaintiff points to an earlier
hearing of his where a Board member raised this concern and the
motion to impose a multi-year continuance was withdrawn. Am.
Compl. ¶ 30 (alleging that a Board member asserted that the
incoming board members should be given the opportunity to judge
for themselves). Plaintiff argues that there is a sufficient risk of
increasing the measure of punishment “whenever new Board
members replace outgoing members who leave before the expiration
of the multi-year continuance that they imposed, which prevents
new Board members from voting earlier.” Resp. at 9 (d/e 20).
However, in Morales, the United States Supreme Court
described changes to a parole board’s membership as “innocuous
adjustments” with only a speculative risk of affecting prisoner’s
term of confinement. Morales, 514 U.S. at 509 (“Under
respondent’s approach, the judiciary would be charged under the
Ex Post Facto Clause with the micromanagement of an endless
array of legislative adjustments to parole and sentencing
Page 11 of 13
procedures, including such innocuous adjustments as changes to
the members of the Board”); see also Garner, 529 U.S. 259 (noting
that the “Ex Post Facto Clause gives respondent no cause to
complain that the Board in place at the time of his offense has been
replaced by a new, tough-on-crime Board”) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part in the judgment). Moreover, Plaintiff’s reference to his earlier
hearing at which the motion to impose a multi-year continuance
was withdrawn demonstrates that the Board retains and exercises
the authority to tailor the frequency of the hearings to the
particular circumstance of the individual prisoner. See Morales,
514 U.S. at 511 (considering this as one of the factors when
deciding whether the amendment violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause).
Moreover, the risk of increased punishment in this case is
entirely speculative. Because the amendment permitting the Board
to schedule the next parole hearing up to five years in the future
does not create a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of
punishment, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for
relief. See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 60 F. 3d 1266, 1271 (7th
Cir. 1995) (finding that statute mandating imprisonment for
Page 12 of 13
violation of supervised release terms did not violate the Ex Post
Facto clause where the risk of increased punishment was
speculative).
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (d/e 17)
is GRANTED. This cause is dismissed, with prejudice. The Clerk is
DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant.
FOR THE COURT: November 2, 2018
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Page 13 of 13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?