Lozier v. Quincy University Corporation et al
Filing
105
OPINION and ORDER entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 9/26/2022. Plaintiff, Daniel Lozier's Motion for Summary Judgment, d/e 74 is DENIED. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION & ORDER) (MAS)
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E-FILED
Monday, 26 September, 2022 04:01:51 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
DANIEL R. LOZIER, II,
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Plaintiff,
v.
BRIAN HOLZGRAFE,
Defendant.
Case No. 18-3077
OPINION AND ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:
Before the Court is Plaintiff Daniel Lozier’s Motion for
Summary Judgment on Defendant Brian Holzgrafe’s Counterclaims
(d/e 74). Plaintiff has not carried his burden to show the absence
of issues of material fact and his entitlement to judgment as a
matter of law. Plaintiff’s Motion (d/e 74) is, therefore, DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
The Court draws the following facts from the parties’
statements of material facts in the Motion for Summary Judgment
(d/e 74), Defendant’s Response thereto (d/e 82), Plaintiff’s Reply
(d/e 92), Plaintiff’s Supplemental Statement of Facts (d/e 99) and
Defendant’s Response (d/e 103). The Court discusses material
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factual disputes in its analysis. Any fact submitted by any party
that was not supported by a citation to evidence will not be
considered by the Court. See Civ. LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2). Any response
to an allegedly disputed fact unsupported by evidentiary
documentation is deemed admitted. Id.
In April 2017, rumors began circulating within the community
of the Quincy University (“QU”) Men’s and Women’s Tennis Teams.
On April 10, 2017, QU Safety and Security Director Sam Lathrop
learned that a parent of a team member had alleged that Defendant
Holzgrafe, who was Head Tennis Coach at the time, was having a
sexual relationship with a freshman female tennis player, M.K.
Def.’s Resp. (d/e 84) Ex. 2 at p. 2. Another rumor circulating in
that community was that an older female tennis player had left the
team because of inappropriate advances made toward her by
Defendant Holzgrafe. Id.
A parent submitted a complaint to QU Dean of Students
Christine Tracy regarding the rumors. Id. Upon receipt of the
complaint, Director Lanthrop began investigating the rumors. See
generally id. Director Lanthrop interviewed twelve students
including Plaintiff Daniel Lozier. Id. at p. 5. Director Lanthrop
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ultimately ended the investigation after finding that there was no
corroborating evidence to support either the allegation that
Holzgrafe had sex with a student or that Holzgrafe made
inappropriate advances toward another student. Id. at pp. 10–11.
Neither party presents undisputable statements of fact regarding
what happened next. According to the Counterclaims, though, the
rumors continued to spread among the QU community and
Holzgrafe allegedly suffered emotional distress, humiliation, and
damage to his character as a result of the rumors. See Countercl.
(d/e 53) p. 3–7.
Plaintiff Lozier then filed suit against QU, various QU officials,
and Defendant Holzgrafe on April 10, 2018 alleging prohibited
retaliation under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and
various state torts, including defamation, false light, intrusion upon
seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, and negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. Each of Plaintiff’s
claims were eventually dismissed, but Defendant Holzgrafe’s two
Counterclaims remained: defamation and false light against Plaintiff
Lozier. See generally Op. & Order (d/e 96) (recounting procedural
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history). Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment on each of
Defendant’s Counterclaims.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
When moving for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the moving party bears the burden
of showing, based on the materials in the record, “that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) & (c); Hummel
v. St. Joseph Cty Bd. of Comm’rs, 817 F.3d 1010, 1015–16 (7th Cir.
2016). “The moving party has the burden of either: (1) showing that
there is an absence of evidence supporting an essential element of
the non-moving party's claim; or (2) presenting affirmative evidence
that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim.”
Id. But even where there is no dispute as to the basic facts of a
case, summary judgment will not be appropriate “if the parties
disagree on the inferences which may reasonably be drawn from
those undisputed facts.” Cent. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. of Md., 626 F.2d 537, 539–40 (7th Cir. 1980). The facts
and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom are viewed in the
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light most favorable to the non-moving party. Woodruff v. Mason,
542 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2008).
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff has not carried his burden on summary judgment as
to either the defamation or the false light Counterclaim. To prove a
claim of defamation under Illinois law, an alleging party must show
(1) the alleged tortfeasor made a false statement about the alleging
party, (2) the alleged tortfeasor made an unprivileged publication of
the statement to a third party, and (3) the publication caused the
alleging party damages. Dobias v. Oak Park & River Forest High
Sch. Dist. 200, 57 N.E.3d 551, 562 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s defamation Counterclaim
fails because Defendant testified at his deposition that Defendant
had no personal knowledge of Plaintiff making any of the alleged
defamatory statements. Pl.’s Mot. (d/e 71) pp. 3–5. Plaintiff also
points to Defendant’s testimony in which Defendant stated the only
time Defendant was aware of any statement being made by Plaintiff
regarding Defendant’s alleged sexual history was in the QU Title IX
report made after Director Lanthrop’s investigation. Id. p. 5. This,
Plaintiff argues, is “proof that the only instance in which
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[Defendant] believes [Plaintiff] made” any defamatory statement
“was in an absolutely privileged setting.” Id.
Plaintiff’s argument and alleged statement of facts are not
sufficient to carry his burden at this stage. The multiple
statements Plaintiff asserts as fact are disputed by Defendant. For
example, one fact in Plaintiff’s Supplemental Statement of Facts
reads “[Plaintiff] never alleged to his mother that another female
student tennis player left the program because of inappropriate
advances made by [Defendant].” (d/e 99) p. 2. That statement, and
each of the others like it, is disputed by Defendant, who points to
both the Investigation Report and affidavits from other QU Tennis
Team members indicating Plaintiff did make statements like those
alleged by Defendant. Def.’s Resp. (d/e 103) pp. 2–5. Moreover,
Defendant’s admission to not personally knowing about other
instances in which Plaintiff made defamatory statements does not
place Plaintiff’s assertion that Plaintiff never made the statements
beyond dispute. Each of the facts Plaintiff asserts as undisputed
are, in actuality, disputed. They also raise questions the answers to
which could lead a reasonable jury to find in Defendant’s favor.
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The same is true for Defendant’s false light claim. To prove a
claim of false light invasion of privacy, an alleging party must prove
(1) the alleged tortfeasor placed the alleging party in a false light
before the public, (2) the false light in which the alleging party was
placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (3) the
alleged tortfeasor acted with actual malice. Poulos v. Lutheran Soc.
Servs. of Ill., Inc., 312 Ill.App.3d 731, 739 (1st Dist. 2000) (Theis,
J.). Plaintiff’s challenge to Defendant’s false light claim is identical
to the challenge Plaintiff advanced in Plaintiff’s previously denied
Motion to Dismiss (d/e 69). Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s false
light claim fails because Defendant cannot prove Plaintiff made the
allegation of sexual misconduct to the public at large, and so
cannot prove the publicity element of the claim.
However, as stated in the Court’s previous Order, Defendant
may satisfy the publicity element of false light by proving Plaintiff
publicized the false information “to a person or persons with whom
[Defendant] has a special relationship.” (d/e 96) (quoting Poulos,
312 Ill.App.3d at 739–40). Plaintiff’s argument, then, hinges on the
issue of fact regarding what statements Plaintiff made and to whom.
But as stated above, questions of fact abound on that issue, and
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each of Plaintiff’s asserted undisputed facts are disputed by
Defendant with adequate citation to the record. Based on the
evidence Defendant has put forward, a reasonable jury could find
that Plaintiff made statements alleging sexual misconduct to
persons with whom Defendant had a special relationship, i.e.,
students on the Tennis Team and their parents. See Order (d/e 96)
p. 11.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant cannot prove the malice
element of the false light claim. Actual malice, as it is used in the
false light context, is “defined in the familiar way as knowledge of
falsehood or reckless disregard for whether the statements were
true or false.” Pope v. Chronicle Publ’n Co., 95 F.3d 607, 616 (7th
Cir. 1996) (citing Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 154 Ill.2d 1, 17–18
(1992)). Defendant, in response to Plaintiff’s argument, points to
Plaintiff’s own testimony that Plaintiff told another student about
allegations of sexual misconduct by Defendant, knew that such
allegations were serious and could jeopardize a person’s career, and
did not dispute that Plaintiff knew the rumor was “unfounded.”
Def.’s Resp. (d/e 84) Ex. 7 pp. 281–83. Such testimony is sufficient
to create an issue of fact from which a reasonable jury could find
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that Plaintiff made the statements either knowing of the falsehood
or with reckless disregard for the truth. On this issue and the
publicity issue, summary judgment must be denied at this stage as
to Defendant’s false light claim.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not carried his burden to show an absence of
issues of material fact as to either Defendant’s defamation or false
light claim. Instead, Defendant has shown genuine issues of fact
based on the credibility of Defendant’s, Plaintiff’s, and others’
testimony in depositions and affidavits. At summary judgment, the
Court may not “make credibility determinations, weigh the
evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these
are jobs for a factfinder.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th
Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(d/e 74) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: September 26, 2022.
FOR THE COURT
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough____________
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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