Lozier v. Quincy University Corporation et al
Filing
32
OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 1/31/2019. The Defendants' Motion to Strike, d/e 19 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION) (MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Thursday, 31 January, 2019 03:03:55 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
DANIEL R. LOZIER, II,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
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QUINCY UNIVERSITY
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CORPORATION, CHRISTINE )
TRACY, SAM LATHROP,
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MARK BELL, and
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BRIAN HOLZGRAFE,
)
)
Defendants.
)
No. 3:18-cv-3077
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the Motion to Strike (d/e 19)
filed by Defendants Quincy University Corporation, Christine Tracy,
Sam Lathrop, Mark Bell, and Brian Holzgrafe. Defendants have
also filed motions to dismiss which are addressed by separate
order. The Motion to Strike is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
Pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court may strike from a pleading “an insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). The Court has considerable discretion under
Rule 12(f). Delta Consulting Group, Inc. v. R. Randle Construction
Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009). Motions to strike are
generally disfavored because such motions often only delay the
proceedings. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883
F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989). However, if a motion to strike
removes unnecessary clutter from the case, then the motion serves
to expedite, not delay, the proceedings. Id.
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s
fees on his tort claims (Counts III, IV, and VII through XII), the
breach of contract claim (Count V), and the promissory estoppel
claim (Count VI). Plaintiff does not dispute that he is not entitled to
attorney’s fees on these claims but argues that the Court need not
strike the request because each prayer for relief specifically states
“… plus attorneys’ fees (if applicable).” Because attorney’s fees are
not applicable on these counts, the Court STRIKES the request for
attorney’s fees on the remaining state court claims, Counts III, V,
VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XII.1
For sake of clarity, the Court notes that Counts IV, VII, and X have been
dismissed in the separate order entered on Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
1
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Defendants next argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive
damages for the Title IX claims (Counts I and II), the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim (Count III), the negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim (Count IV), and the negligent
supervision claim (Count XI). Because the Court has dismissed the
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim by separate order,
the Court will not address the request for punitive damages in that
Count. With regard to the negligent supervision claim, Defendant
argues that Plaintiff has not alleged that the conduct was willful
and wanton or done with malice or recklessness.
Plaintiff concedes that punitive damages are not available
under Counts I, II, and III. Therefore, the Court STRIKES the
request for punitive damages in those Counts.
The Court will not strike the request for punitive damages in
the negligent supervision count. Punitive damages may generally
be recovered where the act in question is “characterized by
wantonness, malice, oppression or circumstances of aggravation.”
Knierim v, Izzo, 22 Ill.2d 73, 87 (1961). Plaintiff alleges conduct by
Holzgrafe that could rise to this level. See Compl. ¶ 24 (detailing
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the reckless driving and the hit-and-run accident); ¶ 163
(incorporating paragraphs 1 through 162 into Count XI).
Defendants next argue that the negligent supervision and
negligent retention Counts are redundant and that the Court
should strike one of the Counts. The Illinois Supreme Court has
not explicitly held whether negligent retention and negligent
supervision are independent torts but did appear to treat the claims
as one in Van Horne v. Muller, 185 Ill. 2d 299 (1998) (wherein the
plaintiff alleged negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; on
review the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff
stated a claim for negligent hiring and negligent retention). In any
event, although Plaintiff will only be entitled to one recovery unless
separate acts of negligence result in distinct injuries, the Court will
not dismiss either Count at this time. See Volling v. Antioch Rescue
Squad, 999 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (refusing to
dismiss either the negligent supervision or negligent retention as
duplicative at the pleading stage because a plaintiff is not required
to set forth any legal theory and the plaintiff pled plausible claims).
Finally, Defendants move to strike the allegation in Plaintiff’s
false light claim that states: “Defendant Lathrop also prepared an
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investigative report in the course of the Title IX Investigation that is
misleading, inaccurate, and discredits Plaintiff.” The Court
STRIKES paragraph 149 because the Court has dismissed the false
light claim against Lathrop. Therefore, this allegation is immaterial.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
(1) Defendants’ Motion to Strike (d/e 19) is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART.
(2) The Court STRIKES the request for attorney’s fees in
Counts III, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XII.
(3) The Court STRIKES the request for punitive damages in
Counts I, II, and III.
(4) The Court STRIKES paragraph 149 of the Complaint as
immaterial.
ENTERED: January 31, 2019
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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