Lozier v. Quincy University Corporation et al
Filing
94
OPINION AND ORDER : SEE WRITTEN ORDER. Defendant Holzgrafe's two state law counterclaims remain pending before the Court under the supplemental jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Therefore, each of Plaintiff's claims against Quincy University and Holzgrafe are dismissed as requested in Plaintiff's and Quincy University's Motion (d/e 68 ) and Plaintiff's Motion (d/e 85 ) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Furthermore, because no claims remai n against Defendant Holzgrafe, the Motion for Credits and Setoffs (d/e 79 ) is DENIED as MOOT. Finally, because the Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over Defendant Holzgrafe's counterclaims, the Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaims (d/e 89 ) is also DENIED as MOOT. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 4/13/2022. (ME)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 13 April, 2022 09:41:32 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
DANIEL R. LOZIER, II,
Plaintiff,
v.
QUINCY UNIVERSITY CORPORATION
and BRIAN HOLZGRAFE,
Defendants.
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Case No. 18-3077
OPINION AND ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:
Before the Court is a Joint Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims
(d/e 68) submitted by Plaintiff Daniel R. Lozier, II (“Plaintiff”) and
Defendant Quincy University Corporation (“Quincy University”), a
Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims (d/e 85) submitted by only
Plaintiff Lozier, and a Motion for Credits and Setoffs (d/e 79)
submitted by Defendant Brian Holzgrafe. For the following reasons,
Plaintiff’s and the University’s Joint Motion to Dismiss (d/e 68) and
Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss (d/e 85) are GRANTED, while
Defendant’s Motion (d/e 79) is DENIED. Additionally, because the
Court, in its discretion, retains supplemental jurisdiction of
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Defendant Holzgrafe’s counterclaims, Defendant Holzgrafe’s Motion
for Leave to Amend Counterclaims (d/e 89) is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lozier initiated this suit four years ago on April 10,
2018. See Complaint (d/e 1). The general basis for Plaintiff’s suit
stems from alleged retaliation and hostile conduct Plaintiff endured
after participating in an investigation into alleged misconduct by
Defendant Holzgrafe while Holzgrafe was employed as the men’s
tennis coach at Quincy University. The Complaint contained twelve
counts. Some counts alleged violations of state law and others
alleged violations of federal law.
On January 31, 2019, the Court entered an Opinion in which
the Court granted in part and denied in part motions to dismiss
filed by Defendants Quincy University, thereby dismissing some of
Plaintiff’s counts in the Complaint. Specifically, the counts left
remaining after the Opinion was issued were: Count I against
Quincy University alleging unlawful retaliation in violation of Title
IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681; Count II against Quincy University alleging a hostile
educational environment in violation of Title IX; Count III against
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Quincy University and Holzgrafe alleging intentional infliction of
emotional distress; Count V against Quincy University alleging a
breach of contract; Count VI against Quincy University claiming
estoppel and detrimental reliance; Count VIII against Quincy
University and Holzgrafe alleging an unlawful public disclosure of a
private fact; Count IX against Quincy University and Holzgrafe
alleging the unlawful painting of Plaintiff in a false light; Count XI
against Quincy University alleging negligent supervision; and Count
XII against Quincy University alleging negligent retention. Op. (d/e
31) at pp. 39–40. Defendants Quincy University and Holzgrafe,
then, each filed an answer to Plaintiff’s original, albeit paired-back,
Complaint. See (d/e 34 & 35).
On June 27, 2019, the Court allowed Defendant Holzgrafe to
amend his answer so that he could file a counterclaim against
Plaintiff. Holzgrafe did so on July 3, 2019, alleging two counts
based in Illinois state law: defamation and false light. Holzgrafe
asserted that the Court had supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) because
the counterclaims arose from the same transaction or occurrence
which underlies Plaintiff’s claims against Holzgrafe.
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On February 21, 2022, Plaintiff Lozier and Quincy University
filed jointly a Motion to Dismiss Certain Claims (d/e 68) pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) and a settlement
agreement entered into by Lozier and Quincy University.
Specifically, Lozier and Quincy University request that the following
counts be dismissed with prejudice: Count I against Quincy
University, Count II against Quincy University, Count III against
Quincy University only, Count V against Quincy University, Count
VI against Quincy University, Count VIII against Quincy University
only, Count IX against Quincy University and Brian Holzgrafe,
Count XI against Quincy University, and Count XII against Quincy
University.
On March 9, 2022, Defendant Holzgrafe filed a Motion for
Credits and Setoffs (d/e 79) in response to Lozier’s and Quincy
University’s motion and in which Holzgrafe requests the Court order
Plaintiff and Quincy to disclose the amount of the settlement
agreement so that any future award against Holzgrafe may be
discounted by the amount of the settlement agreement.
On March 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed another Motion to Dismiss
Certain Claims (d/e 85). In this motion, also brought pursuant to
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), Plaintiff requests Counts III
and VIII against Holzgrafe be dismissed without prejudice.
The combination of the requests by each of the parties as
stated in their motions would result in no claims brought by
Plaintiff against Defendants Quincy University and/or Holzgrafe
remaining, leaving only Defendant Holzgrafe’s state-law-based
counterclaims. Noting this predicament, Defendant Holzgrafe then
filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaims (d/e 89) in which
Holzgrafe seeks to amend the counterclaims to adequately allege
and invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction over the state law
claims under 28 U.S.C. 1332.
II.
ANALYSIS
Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that
“an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court
order, on terms that the court considers proper. If a defendant has
pleaded a counterclaim before being served with the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss, the action may be dismissed over the defendant's
objection only if the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication.” In this case, as stated above, Defendant
Holzgrafe has pleaded two state-law-based counterclaims against
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Plaintiff: defamation and false light. Therefore, the Court will only
grant the Motion’s to Dismiss (d/e 68 & 85) if those counterclaims
can remain pending.
Holzgrafe’s counterclaims can remain pending for independent
adjudication without Plaintiff’s claims against Quincy University
and Holzgrafe. Generally, federal courts have original jurisdiction
“of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, federal courts
may exercise jurisdiction over state law claims under supplemental
jurisdiction, as governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1367 states
“in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy.” That language “permits district courts to
maintain supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims, whether
compulsory or permissive, so long as the counterclaims ‘are so
related to’ the original claims that they form the same case or
controversy.” Rotham v. Emory Univ., 123 F.3d 446, 454 (7th Cir.
1997); Sellars v. City of Gary, 453 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2006).
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This continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims in cases where the federal questions have been adjudicated
is discretionary and should be exercised after weighing “the factors
of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity in deciding
whether to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims.”
Sellars, 453 F.3d at 852 (quoting Wright v. Assoc. Ins. Cos., Inc., 29
F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Here, the factors weigh in favor of continued jurisdiction of
Holzgrafe’s state law counterclaims. Extensive discovery has
already taken place in this four-year-old lawsuit. Requiring the
parties to begin this suit anew in a different court would not be in
the interest of judicial economy and would be unfair. The
convenience of adjudicating counterclaims this Court is already
familiar with and the complexity of which this Court has already
grasped also weighs in favor of maintaining jurisdiction over
Holzgrafe’s state law counterclaims. Finally, Holzgrafe’s
counterclaims of defamation and false light do not involve “any
difficult issues of state law,” Wright, 29 F.3d at 1252, as this Court
is well-aware of the elements required to prove such claims in
Illinois, so comity also weighs in favor of retaining jurisdiction. See
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Stapleton v. Mathew, Case No. 3:19-cv-03095, 2019 WL 3719396,
at *3 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2019, Myerscough, Judge) (dismissing
defamation claims brought under Illinois state law). Therefore, the
Court, in its discretion, finds that each of Defendant Holzgrafe’s
state law counterclaims can remain pending under the Court’s
supplemental jurisdiction. Because the Court retains jurisdiction
over Defendant Holzgrafe’s counterclaims, the Court finds that
dismissal of Plaintiff’s remaining claims in Counts I, II, III, V, VI,
VIII, IX, XI, and XII of the Complaint as requested in Plaintiff’s
Motions (d/e 68 & 85) is appropriate. Furthermore, and for the
same reasons the Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over
Defendant Holzgrafe’s counterclaims, the Court dismisses Counts I,
II, III, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XII with prejudice.
III.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Holzgrafe’s two state law counterclaims remain
pending before the Court under the supplemental jurisdiction
conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Therefore, each of Plaintiff’s claims
against Quincy University and Holzgrafe are dismissed as requested
in Plaintiff’s and Quincy University’s Motion (d/e 68) and Plaintiff’s
Motion (d/e 85) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2).
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Furthermore, because no claims remain against Defendant
Holzgrafe, the Motion for Credits and Setoffs (d/e 79) is DENIED as
MOOT. Finally, because the Court retains supplemental
jurisdiction over Defendant Holzgrafe’s counterclaims, the Motion
for Leave to Amend Counterclaims (d/e 89) is also DENIED as
MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: April 13, 2022.
FOR THE COURT
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough____________
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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