Lozier v. Quincy University Corporation et al
Filing
96
OPINION AND ORDER: SEE Written Opinion and Oder. The Court finds that each of Defendant's defamation and false light invasion of privacy Counterclaims state claims on which relief may be granted. Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss (d/e 69 ) is, therefore, denied. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 8/5/2022. (ME)
E-FILED
Monday, 08 August, 2022 01:56:54 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
DANIEL R. LOZIER, II,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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QUINCY UNIVERSITY CORPORATION )
and BRIAN HOLZGRAFE,
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Defendants.
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_________________________________________ )
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BRIAN HOLZGRAFE,
)
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Counter-Plaintiff,
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v.
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DANIEL R. LOZIER, II,
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Counter-Defendant.
)
Case No. 18-3077
OPINION AND ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:
Before the Court is Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Daniel
Lozier’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Dismiss Defendant and CounterPlaintiff Brian Holzgrafe’s (“Defendant”) Counterclaims (d/e 69).
Because each of Defendant’s Counterclaims sufficiently state claims
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upon which relief may be granted, Plaintiff’s Motion (d/e 69) is
DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
a. Procedural History
Plaintiff Daniel Lozier initiated this suit against Defendant
Brian Holzgrafe and others four years ago on April 10, 2018. See
Complaint (d/e 1). The Complaint contained twelve Counts, some
of which alleged violations of federal law while others alleged
violations of state law. Defendant Holzgrafe filed an Answer on
March 8, 2019 (d/e 34).
On June 27, 2019, the Court allowed Defendant Holzgrafe to
amend his answer so that he could file a Counterclaim against
Plaintiff. Holzgrafe did so on July 3, 2019, alleging two
Counterclaims based in Illinois state law: defamation and false light
invasion of privacy. The Court had supplemental jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
13(a) because the Counterclaims arose from the same transaction
or occurrence which formed the basis of Plaintiff’s original claims
against Holzgrafe.
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All Plaintiff’s claims were eventually dismissed, however,
through multiple orders on motions to dismiss. See Text Order
07/24/2018; (d/e 31 & 94). The result is that the only claims
remaining in this case are Defendant Holzgrafe’s Counterclaims
against Plaintiff over which the Court has retained, in its discretion,
supplemental jurisdiction. (d/e 94). Now before the Court is
Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Counterclaims (d/e 69).
b. Facts
Plaintiff has filed his Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c). Mot. (d/e 69). “A motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
governed by the same standards as a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Adams v. City of Indianapolis,
742 F.3d 720, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the Court takes
the following facts from Defendant’s Counterclaims (d/e 53),
accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and construing all
reasonable inferences in Defendant’s favor. Tamayo v. Blagojevich,
526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
Defendant Holzgrafe was the Head Tennis Coach for the Men’s
and Women’s Tennis Program at Quincy University at all times
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relevant to the Counterclaims. Countercl. (d/e 53) at ¶ 4. Plaintiff
Lozier was a member of the Men’s Team. Id. ¶ 5.
Defendant claims that Plaintiff “knowingly and intentionally
made false allegations” about Defendant to Plaintiff’s mother and at
least two other student-athletes at Quincy in early April 2017. Id. ¶
7. The substance of the allegedly false allegations was that
Defendant had a history of sexual misconduct with members of the
Women’s Tennis Team, including having had sex with a female
tennis player and causing another to leave the team because of
inappropriate advances made by Defendant to that student-athlete.
Id.
Shortly after Plaintiff made these statements, Plaintiff’s mother
repeated these allegations to one or more parents of other studentathletes and to the student athletes themselves. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff’s
mother also stated that Defendant “would be out as Head Tennis
Coach within two weeks.” Id.
Defendant claims that these statements “were made for the
purpose of damaging [Defendant’s] character, reputation, and
career, and to have him removed as Head Tennis Coach.” Id. ¶ 9.
The statements also resulted in Defendant suffering “emotional
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distress, humiliation, and damage to his character and reputation.”
Id. ¶ 10. Defendant also claims that such statements “placed
[Defendant] in a false light in the public and his profession as an
adulterer and a predator of young women” which “would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.” Id. ¶ 13–14. Plaintiff Lozier now
moves to dismiss Defendant’s Counterclaims under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c).
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “a
party may move for judgment on the pleadings” after the pleadings
have been filed but “early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c). And as previously stated, a motion under Rule 12(c) is
analyzed under the same standard as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).
That is, the Court asks “whether the pleadings state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.” Andy Mohr Truck Ctr., Inc. v.
Volvo Trucks N. Am., 869 F.3d 598, 609 (7th Cir. 2017). The Court
considers only the pleadings—in this case, Defendant’s
Counterclaims, Plaintiff’s Answer, and any written instruments
attached as exhibits. N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of
S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998). From these
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documents, the Court accepts the facts as true and accepts all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant, only rejecting
those facts couched as legal conclusions. Wagner v. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc., 840 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2016).
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff has moved to dismiss each of Defendant’s two
Counterclaims. Those Counterclaims allege that the above-recited
facts amounted to two violations of Illinois state law, namely,
defamation and false light invasion of privacy.
a. Defendant’s defamation Counterclaim is sufficiently pled.
Defendant’s first Counterclaim is for defamation. “[T]he
Seventh Circuit has made clear that when a [party] files a claim in
federal court asserting defamation per se under Illinois law, such a
claim is governed by the federal notice pleading rule, not the Illinois
pleading rule.” Marshall v. Vill. of Island Lake, Ill., 2019 WL
3801863, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2019) (citing Muzikowski v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 322 F.3d 918, 926 (7th Cir. 2003)).
That means that Defendant need only provide “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that [Defendant] is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Relevant here, Defendant’s Counterclaim
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must provide fair notice as to the three elements of defamation: (1)
Plaintiff made a false statement about Defendant; (2) Plaintiff made
an unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party; and
(3) the publication caused damages. Bianchi v. McQueen, 58
N.E.3d 680, 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (citing Solaia Tech., LLC v.
Specialty Publ'g Co., 852 N.E.2d 825, 839 (Ill. 2006)).
Defendant’s Counterclaim does so. Defendant alleges (1) that
Plaintiff made false statements alleging sexual misconduct by
Defendant (2) to Plaintiff’s mother and two other student athletes
that (3) caused Defendant emotional distress, humiliation, and
damage to his reputation. And while Plaintiff argues that
Defendant’s defamation claim must be dismissed for failing to state
precisely what Plaintiff said to each individual, such specificity is
not required on the pleadings. See Emery v. Ne. Ill. Reg'l Commuter
R.R. Corp., 2003 WL 22176077, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2003)
(noting that defamation plaintiffs are not required to specifically
allege “the time, place, content, speaker, and listener of the alleged
defamatory matter” in the pleadings.) The facts alleged in
Defendant’s Counterclaim are sufficient to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.
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b. Defendant’s false light invasion of privacy Counterclaim is
also sufficiently pled.
Plaintiff next challenges the sufficiency of Defendants false
light Counterclaim. To state a claim of false light in Illinois, the
alleging party must establish “(1) that [the alleged tortfeasor] placed
[the alleging party] in a false light before the public, (2) that the
false light in which [the alleging party] was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (3) that [the alleged tortfeasor]
acted with actual malice.” Poulos v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Ill.,
Inc., 312 Ill.App.3d 731, 739 (1st Dist. 2000) (Theis, J.) (citing
Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 154 Ill.2d 1, 17–18 (Ill. 1992)); see
also Lovgren v. Citizens First National Bank, 126 Ill. 2d 411, 418
(Ill. 1989) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977)).
Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of Defendant’s Counterclaim as
to the publicity and malice elements of Defendant’s false light claim.
i. Publicity
Plaintiff first argues that, because the false light Counterclaim
states that Plaintiff made the statements alleging Defendant
committed sexual misconduct to “[Plaintiff’s] mother, Cindy Lozier,
and at least two student athletes, one male and one female,” the
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Counterclaim does not sufficiently allege the publicity element of
false light. Plaintiff’s argument is, essentially, that Defendant’s
false light Counterclaim is insufficient because it does not allege the
statements of misconduct were made to a broad enough audience to
constitute placing Defendant in a false light “before the public.”
Poulos, 312 Ill.App.3d at 739. The Court disagrees.
The publicity element of false light claims is generally governed
by Comment a to § 625D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Frobose v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Danville, 152 F.3d 602, 617–18
(7th Cir. 1998) (citing Restatement § 652D, comment a, at 384, and
§ 652E, comment a, at 394); Silk v. City of Chicago, No. 95 C 0143,
1997 WL 790598, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 1997) (same); Zechman
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359,
1372 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (same). Section 625D states “[p]ublicity . . .
means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the
public at large, or to so many people that the matter must be
regarded as substantially certain to become of public knowledge.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, comment a (1977).
There is, however, an exception to the general rule. The
publicity element of false light claims may also be satisfied by
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“establishing that false and highly offensive information was
disclosed to a person or persons with whom [the alleged false light
victim] has a special relationship.” Poulos, 312 Ill.App.3d at 740
(Theis, J.). This general rule and the “special relationship”
exception for false light claims have been adopted by Illinois’ First
and Second Appellate Districts in published opinions along with the
Third Appellate District in an unpublished opinion. See Id.;
Duncan v. Peterson, 359 Ill.App.3d 1034, 1049 (2d Dist. 2005);
Konicki v. Rathbun, Appeal No. 3-17-0822, 2019 WL 4307866, at
*3 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2019) (filed under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 23(e)(1)). No Illinois court has held differently. Accordingly,
Defendant in the present case need only allege facts that show the
alleged false information was publicized either “to the public at
large, or to so many people that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become of public knowledge,” or “to a
person or persons with whom [Defendant] has a special
relationship.” Poulos, 312 Ill.App.3d at 739–40.1
1 Illinois courts adopted this “special relationship” exception to the tort of false light invasion of
privacy from other privacy-centered torts, namely, public disclosure of private facts. See
Poulos, 312 Ill.App.3d at 739. However, while Illinois courts have held that the “special
relationship” exception does not apply in cases claiming the public disclosure of private facts
where a party has a “natural and proper interest” in learning the disclosed information, Illinois
courts have stated that limitation does not apply in false light cases. Id. at n.1.
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Defendant has done so here. Defendant’s Counterclaim
alleges that Plaintiff “knowingly and intentionally made false
allegations . . . to [Plaintiff’s] mother . . . and at least two other
student athletes” that Defendant had sex with one female tennis
player, made inappropriate advances towards another, and had a
history of sexual misconduct with female tennis players. Countercl.
¶ 7. Defendant further alleges that Plaintiff’s actions placed
Defendant “in a false light in the public and his profession as an
adulterer and a predator of young women under his charge [as]
Head Tennis Coach at Quincy University.” Id. ¶ 13. These
statements sufficiently allege that Plaintiff’s statements were
substantially certain to become public knowledge by way of rumors
within the tennis team or, more broadly, Quincy University as a
whole. The allegations also sufficiently allege that the statements
were disclosed to persons with whom Defendant had a special
relationship, i.e., women under Defendant’s charge as Head Tennis
Coach. That is all that is required at this stage.
ii. Actual malice
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s false light Counterclaim
fails at the pleading stage because, in Plaintiff’s view, Defendant
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has inadequately pled the actual malice element of false light. A
false light plaintiff must allege that the alleged tortfeasor “acted
with actual malice.” Poulos, 312 Ill.App.3d at 739 (citing Kolegas,
154 Ill.2d at 17–18). In other words, the party alleging false light
must sufficiently state in his pleading that the alleged tortfeasor
made “false statements with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless
disregard for their truth or falsity.” Kolegas, 154 Ill.2d at 211.
“States of mind,” such as malice in false light cases, “may be
pleaded generally, but [an alleging party] must point to details
sufficient to render a claim possible.” Pippen v. NBCUniversal
Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2013).
Defendant’s Counterclaim alleges that Plaintiff “knowingly and
intentionally made false allegations against [Defendant]” and that
Plaintiff “acted with malice” when making the alleged false
allegations. Countercl. ¶ 7 & 15. When read alone, these
allegations would amount to mere legal conclusions insufficient to
state a claim. However, the Counterclaim also alleges that Plaintiff
made the sexual misconduct allegations, which Plaintiff does not
contest would be highly offensive to a reasonable person “for the
purpose of damaging [Defendant’s] character, reputation, and
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career and to have [Defendant] removed as Head Tennis Coach.” Id.
¶ 9. When read together, the allegations within Defendant’s
Counterclaim are sufficient to render the malice element of
Defendant’s false light Counterclaim possible. Defendant’s
Counterclaim sufficiently states a claim of false light invasion of
privacy.
IV.
CONCLUSION
When accepting the allegations of Defendant’s Counterclaims
as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Defendant
as the nonmoving party, the Court finds that each of Defendant’s
defamation and false light invasion of privacy Counterclaims state
claims on which relief may be granted. Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss
(d/e 69) is, therefore, denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: August 5, 2022.
FOR THE COURT
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough____________
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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