Hyzy v. The State of Illinois et al
Filing
37
OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 4/23/2019. The Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, d/e 29 filed by Defendants Felicia F Norwood, James T Dimas and Patricia R Bellock is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's off icial capacity claims against these Defendants are dismissed without prejudice as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Pursuant to Local Rule 16.1(B), the Court orders a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins. Parties to contact Judge Schanzle-Haskins' chambers no later than 5/6/2019 with possible dates for the settlement conference. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION) (MAS, ilcd) Modified on 4/23/2019 (MAS, ilcd).
E-FILED
Tuesday, 23 April, 2019 10:02:15 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
MARK HYZY,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
PATRICIA R. “PATTI” BELLOCK, )
Director of the Illinois Dept. of
)
Healthcare and Family Services )
(HFS), in her official and
)
individual capacities; JAMES T. )
DIMAS, Secretary of the Illinois )
Dept. of Human Services (DHS),
)
in his official and individual
)
capacities; TERESA HURSEY,
)
former Interim Director of HFS
)
and Director of Medical Programs )
of HFS, in her official and
)
individual capacities; FELICIA F. )
NORWOOD, former Director of
)
HFS, in her official and individual )
capacities; and DOES 1-10, in
)
their HFS or DHS official and
)
individual capacities,
)
)
Defendants.
)
No. 3:18-CV-3093
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss First
Amended Complaint (d/e 29) filed by Defendants Felicia F.
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Norwood, James T. Dimas, and Patricia R. Bellock (hereinafter,
collectively referred to as Defendants).1 Defendants assert that the
official capacity claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the
individual capacity claims are moot, and that the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim is barred by sovereign
immunity and public official immunity.
The Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The
Court grants the motion to dismiss the official capacity claims and
the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Court
denies the motion to dismiss the individual capacity claims as
moot.
I. JURISDICTION
This Court has federal question jurisdiction over Counts I
through IX because those Counts allege violations of a federal
statute. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1331. The Court has supplemental
jurisdiction over Count X, which alleges violations of state law
arising from the same general set of facts. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1367(a).
The docket reflects that a request for waiver of service was sent to Defendant
Teresa Hursey on January 30, 2019, but Hursey has not waived service. On
April 11, 2019, Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins entered a text order
directing the Clerk to issue a summons.
1
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Venue is proper because a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred within the judicial
district of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1391(b)(2) (a civil action may
be brought in Aa judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred@).
II. BACKGROUND
On April 25, 2018, Plaintiff Mark Hyzy, pro se, filed a
Complaint and, on January 30, 2019, filed a First Amended
Complaint Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988 for Declaratory and
Other Relief. Plaintiff names as Defendants Patricia R. “Patti”
Bellock, the Director of the Illinois Department of Healthcare and
Family Services (HFS); James T. Dimas, Secretary of the Illinois
Department of Human Services (DHS); Teresa Hursey, the Interim
Director of HFS from June 15, 2018 until July 11, 2018 and the
Medicaid Director for HFS since 2013, effective July 11, 2018;
Felicia F. Norwood, former Director of HFS; and Does 1-10. The
claims against the defendants are brought in their individual and
official capacities. Plaintiff asserts that HFS is legally responsible
for administering Medicaid while DHS operates the Medicaid
program for HFS.
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The following facts come from the Complaint and are
accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage. Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
In 2013, Plaintiff submitted two applications for Medicaid
benefits. Plaintiff’s applications were approved but later closed,
with one of the cases being closed because Plaintiff did not meet
the spenddown requirements. Plaintiff appealed the closure of
both Medicaid cases. In 2015, corrections were made regarding
both cases, making Plaintiff eligible to be retroactively reimbursed
by DHS for Plaintiff’s out-of-pocket medical expenses totaling
$2,388. Plaintiff submitted a C-13 Vendor Payment Form seeking
said reimbursement. Plaintiff never received approval, denial, or
reimbursement from DHS. In February 2018, Plaintiff resubmitted
the Form seeking reimbursement.
On September 13, 2018 (after Plaintiff originally filed this
lawsuit but before he filed his First Amended Complaint), Plaintiff
received partial payment of his reimbursement. On September 21,
2018, Plaintiff received the remainder of his reimbursement.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants illegally denied or caused
to be denied, without notice or a meaningful opportunity to be
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heard, Plaintiff’s 2015 reimbursement requests until September
2018. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint contains the following
causes of action:
Count 1: Violation of the Fifth Amendment right to due
process before taking property
Count 2: Violation of Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights for failure to provide constitutionally
adequate notice before denying medical expense
reimbursement
Count 3: Violation of Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights for failure to provide constitutionally
adequate opportunity to be heard before denying
medical expense reimbursement
Count 4: Violation of Fourteenth Amendment right to
due process under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for
failure to promptly make corrective payments
Count 5: Violation of Social Security Act under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for failure to provide medical
assistance when eligible
Count 6: Violation of Social Security Act under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for failure to promptly make
corrective payments
Count 7: Violation of Social Security Act under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for failure to provide
comparable services
Count 8: Violation of Social Security Act under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for failure to provide timely
written notice before denying or reducing benefits
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Count 9: Violation of Social Security Act under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for failure to provide written
notice of decision and notice of right to hearing after
denying or reducing benefits
Count 10: State law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress
The original complaint sought reimbursement of the $2,388,
in addition to other relief. Because Plaintiff has now received the
reimbursement, Plaintiff seeks, in the First Amended Complaint, a
declaratory judgment as to Counts 1 through 10 finding the
Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights; compensatory damages,
including interest on the $2,388 paid by Defendants and payment
for emotional distress/mental anguish in the amount of $50,000;
punitive damages; court costs, attorney’s fees (if Plaintiff is later
represented by counsel), and such other relief the Court may find
just and proper.
On February 13, 2019, Defendants Bellock, Dimas, and
Norwood filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint. Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 458
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(7th Cir. 2007). To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff need only
provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing she is
entitled to relief and giving the defendants fair notice of the claims.
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and
construing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Id.
However, the complaint must set forth facts that plausibly
demonstrate a claim for relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A plausible claim is one that alleges facts
from which the Court can reasonably infer that the defendants are
liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). Merely reciting the elements of a cause of action or
supporting claims with conclusory statements is insufficient to
state a cause of action. Id.
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s claims against them in
their official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Plaintiff concedes that that official capacity claims for declaratory
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relief are barred by the Eleventh Amendment because he does not
allege an ongoing violation of federal law and the State has not
waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court accepts Plaintiff’s concession and dismisses the
claims against all of the Defendants in their official capacity.
Defendants next seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against
them in their individual capacity as moot because Plaintiff’s claim
for reimbursement has been paid.
An action must be dismissed as moot if an intervening
circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the
outcome of the lawsuit. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct.
663, 669 (2016) (holding that “an unaccepted settlement offer or
offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff’s case”). A case is moot
if it is impossible for the court to grant effectual relief. See Knox v.
Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012).
The case is not moot, however, if the parties have a concrete
interest in the outcome of the litigation, no matter how small.
Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013).
Defendants contend that the case is moot because Plaintiff
has been paid the reimbursement Plaintiff originally sought. While
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recognizing that Plaintiff seeks “compensatory interest or punitive
damages,” (Reply at 3 (d/e 33)), Defendants argue that Plaintiff has
not shown a statutory or other basis for such relief against
Defendant in their individual capacity. However, the party
asserting mootness bears the burden of persuasion, and
Defendants have not cited to any authority that Plaintiff is not
entitled, as a matter of law, to the relief he seeks. See Wis. Right
to Life, Inc. v. Schober, 366 F.3d 485, 491 (7th Cir. 2004) (burden
of persuasion is on the party asserting mootness). Because
Plaintiff has a concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation, the
case is not moot.
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim (Count X) is barred by sovereign
immunity and public official immunity.
Under Illinois law, the State of Illinois cannot be made a party
to a lawsuit except as provided under certain specified Acts,
including the Court of Claims Act. See 745 ILCS 5/1 (State
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Lawsuit Immunity Act)2. The Court of Claims Act provides that the
Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear certain matters,
including “[a]ll claims against the State for damages in cases
sounding in tort, if a like cause of action would lie against a private
person or corporation in a civil suit[.]” 705 ILCS 505/8(d).
Under certain circumstances, sovereign immunity applies to
claims against state employees. See Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d
653, 658 (7th Cir. 2016) (a plaintiff cannot evade sovereign
immunity by naming state employees as defendants when the real
claim is against the State of Illinois), aff’d 138 S. Ct. 784 (2018)
(pertaining to attorney’s fee issue). Whether the cause of action is
actually one against the State depends on the issues involved and
the relief sought. Leetaru v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 2015 IL
117485, ¶ 45 (2015). Specifically, a claim against a state employee
is considered a claim against the state when “‘there are (1) no
allegations that an agent or employee of the State acted beyond the
scope of his authority through wrongful acts; (2) the duty alleged to
The other specified Acts are the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, the State
Officials and Employees Ethics Act, and Section 1.5 of the State Lawsuit
Immunity Act. See 745 ILCS 5/1.
2
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have been breached was not owed to the public generally
independent of the fact of State employment; and (3) where the
complained-of actions involve matters ordinarily within the
employee’s normal and official functions of the State.’” Healy v.
Vaupel, 133 Ill.2d 295, 309 (1990) (quoting Robb v. Sutton, 147 Ill.
App. 3d 710, 716 (1986)).
Here, Plaintiff’s claim is in fact a claim against the State. In
Count X, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants owed a duty to “obey the
Social Security Act and its implementing regulations as persons
administering the Act under authority of Illinois law,” (Compl.
¶ 75); breached their legal duty by failing to timely reimbursement
Plaintiff (Compl. ¶ 76); and that the breach was extreme and
outrageous conduct, outside the law, where Defendants had sole
control over the funds necessary to pay the reimbursement and
their conduct was not a legitimate exercise of their authority
(Compl. ¶ 77). Plaintiff does not allege, however, that Defendants
were acting outside the scope of their authority, that they owed
Plaintiff a duty independent of their employment with the State, or
that Defendants’ acts of processing claims were not within their
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normal and official functions. Plaintiff’s claim is essentially one
against the State and is barred by sovereign immunity.
Plaintiff argues that sovereign immunity offers no protection if
the plaintiff alleges that the state employee violated statutory or
constitutional law. See Murphy, 844 F.3d at 658-59. This
exception is premised on the principle that illegal acts performed
by state officers are not regarded as acts of the State itself and,
therefore, such claims may be brought against the state officer
“without running afoul of sovereign immunity principles.” Leetaru,
2015 IL 117485, ¶ 45. However, in Parmar v. Madigan, 2018 IL
122265, ¶ 24 (2018), the Illinois Supreme Court held that this
exception applies when the plaintiff seeks to enjoin future conduct,
not when the plaintiff seeks damages. Plaintiff does not seek to
enjoin a past wrong here.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint (d/e 29) filed by Defendants Felicia F. Norwood, James
T. Dimas, and Patricia R. Bellock is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against these
Defendants are dismissed without prejudice as barred by the
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Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim is also dismissed without prejudice as barred by
sovereign immunity. The motion to dismiss the individual capacity
claims as moot is denied.
Pursuant to Local Rule 16.1(B), the Court orders a settlement
conference before Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins. The
parties shall confer and agree on several possible dates for the
settlement conference and then contact Judge Schanzle-Haskins’
chambers no later than May 6, 2019.
ENTERED: April 23, 2019
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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