Mitchell v. Trame

Filing 38

OPINION: Because Plaintiff Michell's only remaining claims are for prospective injunctive relief against harms that are unlikely to re-occur, the Court finds that he no longer has any legally cognizable interest in the outcome of this case. Acc ordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Mootness 12 is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 20 is DENIED. Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction. See written Opinion. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 11/16/2020. (SKN, ilcd)

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E-FILED

Monday, 16 November, 2020 10:32:48 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
BLAIR BYRON MITCHELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
JESSICA TRAME,
In her official capacity as
Chief of the Firearms
Services Bureau of the
Illinois State Police
Defendant.

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No. 18-cv-3274

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Before the Court are Defendant Jessica Trame’s Motion for
Summary Judgment on the Issue of Mootness (d/e 12) and Plaintiff
Blair Mitchell’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 20).
Because Plaintiff’s only remaining claims are for prospective
injunctive relief against harms that are unlikely to re-occur, the
Court finds that he no longer has any legally cognizable interest in
the outcome of this case. Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion (d/e 20) is
therefore DENIED, while Defendant’s Motion (d/e 12) is GRANTED.

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I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Blair Byron Mitchell brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
lawsuit against Jessica Trame in her official capacity as Chief of the
Firearms Services Bureau of the Illinois State Police (“ISP”). Plaintiff
claims that Defendant Trame deprived him of his Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms by revoking his Firearms
Owner Identification Card (“FOID card”) and denying his application
for an Illinois Concealed Carry License.
Since Plaintiff filed his complaint, Defendant has
acknowledged that Plaintiff is not prohibited from possessing the
licenses previously denied to him and has issued Plaintiff both a
valid FOID card and a Concealed Carry License. Defendant has
also moved for summary judgment on the issue of mootness,
arguing that the issuance of these licenses has resolved the only
ongoing controversy present in this case, and has mooted Plaintiff’s
claims. Plaintiff disagrees and argues that his requests for
prospective injunctive relief still present a live controversy because
Defendant may again revoke his licenses, on the same grounds as

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before, if she is not prospectively enjoined from doing so. Plaintiff
has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the merits.
II. JURISDICTION
This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims, if they present a genuine case or controversy,
because they arise under the United States Constitution and are
brought pursuant to a federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”). Thus, the only jurisdictional issue currently before the
court is that of mootness.
The actions of Defendant that gave rise to Plaintiff’s claims
were executed in Sangamon County, Illinois, which is located in the
Central District of Illinois. Venue is therefore proper in this
district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (stating that a civil action may
be brought in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”).
III. FACTS
The relevant material facts in this case are largely undisputed.
In 2008, Plaintiff was convicted of “disorderly conduct” in Douglas
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County, Wisconsin, in violation of a municipal ordinance. See
Complaint (d/e 1), at 2. On January 3, 2018, Plaintiff applied to
Defendant for a FOID card and concealed carry license, Defendant
issued a FOID card to Plaintiff on January 23, 2018. On May 2,
2018, ISP revoked Plaintiff’s FOID card and denied his application
for a concealed carry license. See Memo (d/e 30), at 2. ISP revoked
Plaintiff’s FOID card on the basis of its determinations that: (1)
Plaintiff’s 2008 ordinance violation conviction was a conviction for
“domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, or a substantially
similar offense” under 430 ILCS 65/8(l); (2) that the same was a
conviction for a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9); and (3) that Plaintiff was therefore prohibited
from possessing a FOID Card under state and federal law. See
Revocation Letter (d/e 13 exh. 2), at 1. ISP denied Plaintiff’s
concealed carry application because he was ineligible for a FOID
card and a FOID card is a requirement for obtaining a concealed
carry license under Illinois law. See Denial Letter (d/e 13 exh. 3),
at 1.
Plaintiff filed suit on October 23, 2018. See Complaint (d/e 1).
On February 6, 2019, ISP issued Plaintiff a new FOID card after
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revisiting its earlier determinations and concluding upon review
that neither 430 ILCS 65/8(l), 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), nor any other
state or federal statute prohibited Plaintiff from possessing a FOID
card on the basis of his 2008 conviction. See Defendant’s Motion
(d/e 13), at 5. On February 21, 2019, ISP issued an Illinois
Concealed Carry License to Plaintiff, and, on September 12, 2019,
ISP re-issued Plaintiff’s Concealed Carry License. See Concealed
Carry Abstract (d/e 26 exh. 1); Concealed Carry License (d/e 28
exh. 1).
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no
genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of
the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the movant
believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A genuine
dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could find
in favor of the nonmoving party. Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561,
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564 (7th Cir. 2012). When ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court must consider the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences
in the nonmoving party's favor. Egan Marine Corp. v. Great Am.
Ins. Co. of New York, 665 F.3d 800, 811 (7th Cir. 2011).
V. ANALYSIS
A. Mootness
Mootness is a jurisdictional issue, and as such it must be
addressed before the Court can reach the issue of the
constitutionality of Defendant’s actions. See Germeraad v. Powers,
826 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2016); Fed'n of Advert. Indus.
Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 326 F.3d 924, 928 (7th Cir.
2003) (Granting cross-motion for summary judgment on mootness
without reaching constitutionality of challenged ordinance).
Because the Court concludes that this case must be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, no decision on the merits of Plaintiff’s § 1983
claim is rendered.
Because Defendant Trame has corrected the allegedly
wrongful action that gave rise to this case by issuing a new FOID
card and Concealed Carry License to Plaintiff Mitchell, the
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injunctive relief that Plaintiff originally sued for is no longer
available to him even should he succeed on the merits of his claim.
The only relief still requested by Plaintiff at this stage consists of an
injunction to prevent Defendant from re-revoking Plaintiff’s firearms
licenses in the future, as well as an award of attorney’s feees.
According to well-established Seventh Circuit precedent, such
claims for injunctive relief against the re-occurrence of a past
alleged wrong do not constitute a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome of a case and Plaintiff’s claims must therefore be dismissed
as moot.
(1) To Avoid Dismissal for Mootness, Plaintiff Must Show
He Retains a Legally Cognizable Interest in the
Outcome of This Case.
Under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution, “cases that do not
involve ‘actual, ongoing controversies' are moot and must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v.
Schober, 366 F.3d 485, 490–91 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed’n of
Advert. Representatives, 326 F.3d at 929). Accordingly, a plaintiff
seeking to litigate in federal court “must demonstrate that he
possesses a legally cognizable interest, or ‘personal stake,’ in the
outcome of the action.” Wright v. Calumet City, Illinois, 848 F.3d
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814, 816 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v.
Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013)). If any “intervening
circumstance” eliminates the plaintiff’s stake in the outcome of the
lawsuit “at any point during the litigation, the action can no longer
proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Id. at 817 (quoting
Campbell–Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 160–61 (2016)). In
other words, “to avoid dismissal based on mootness,” a plaintiff
must demonstrate that there remains “some form of meaningful
relief” that a court could provide in the event that the plaintiff is
successful on the merits. Pakovich v. Verizon LTD Plan, 653 F.3d
488, 492 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Cornucopia Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of
Agric., 560 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir.2009).
(2) Plaintiff Does Not Assert Any Cognizable Interest
Other Than Claims for Prospective Injunctive Relief
Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s only legally cognizable
interest in this lawsuit was his interest in injunctive relief to reverse
the revocation of his FOID card and the denial of his concealed
carry license application. See Defendant’s Memorandum (d/e 13),
at 4–6; Supplemental Reply (d/e 26). According to this view of the
case, Defendant’s decision to issue Plaintiff a new FOID card and a

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concealed carry license is an intervening circumstance that
eliminated the only effectual relief that a court could have granted,
thereby mooting this case.
In his Complaint (d/e 1) Plaintiff Mitchell requested that the
Court enjoin Defendant Trame from revoking, suspending, or failing
to renew or approve any firearms license to him on the basis of his
2008 Wisconsin conviction, and for attorney’s fees. Complaint (d/e
1), at 3. A potential award of attorney’s fees “does not create a
justiciable controversy if nothing else is at stake in the litigation,”
Portalatin v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 900 F.3d
377, 383 (7th Cir. 2018), and Plaintiff does not claim that any
potential fee award is a cognizable legal interest in this case.
In later filings, Plaintiff initially argued that his claims
remained ripe for adjudication because Defendant’s 2018 denial of
his application for a Concealed Carry License had created an
ongoing harm for which a judicial remedy (i.e. an injunction
ordering Defendant to consider and/or grant Plaintiff’s license
application) was available. See Cross-Motion (d/e 20), at 5.
Currently, Plaintiff concedes that Defendant has issued him a
Concealed Carry License, but claims to retain a legally cognizable
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interest in the case because the Court can prospectively enjoin
Defendant from revoking Plaintiff’s firearms licenses on the basis of
his 2008 conviction in the future. See Memo (d/e 30), at 5.
(3) Plaintiff’s Claims for Prospective Injunctive Relief Do
Not Give Rise to Any Cognizable Legal Interest,
Because No Reasonable Expectation That Defendant
Will Again Revoke Plaintiff’s Licenses Based on the
2008 Conviction Exists
Generally, prospective injunctive relief is available only where
there exists a “continuing violation of federal law to enjoin.” Green
v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). There is an exception to this
general rule, however, that sometimes applies when the alleged
violation ceases because of the voluntary action of a party. In such
cases, “mere cessation of the conduct sought to be enjoined does
not moot a suit to enjoin the conduct,” because dismissal might
leave the defendant “free to resume the conduct the next day.”
Chicago United Indus., Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 445 F.3d 940, 947
(7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189
(2000); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632–33
(1953); Kikumura v. Turner, 28 F.3d 592, 597 (7th Cir.1994).
Plaintiff argues that, in the absence of an injunction, Defendant will
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be free to “flip-flop” and revoke Plaintiff’s firearms licenses again in
the future and that his claims for prospective injunctive relief as
legally cognizable interests. See Memo (d/e 30), at 5–6.
Plaintiff’s argument fails because the doctrine of voluntary
cessation does not prevent dismissal for mootness when the ceasing
party demonstrates that “there is no reasonable expectation that
the wrong will be repeated.” Chicago United Indus., 445 F.3d at
947. Moreover, where the ceasing party is a government official,
Seventh Circuit precedent indicates that a court should assume
that acts of self-correction are undertaken in good faith and apply
the voluntary-cessation doctrine only in cases “where there is
evidence that the repeal was not genuine.” 1 Fed’n of Advert.
1 The most government-friendly precedents in this area involve repealed or amended laws or
rules general applicability rather than individualized administrative actions like the granting or
revocation of a single license. See Fed’n of Advert. Representatives, 326 F.3d at 930 (framing
more lenient standard as applicable in situations where a challenge to government action is
“mooted by passage of legislation”) Chicago United Indus., 445 F.3d at 947 (applying
“rebuttable presumption that the objectionable behavior will not recur” where municipality
passed new prospective municipal rule addressing plaintiff’s civil rights complaints).
Many of the justifications for a strong presumption that legislation is not undertaken in bad
faith do not apply to official government actions affecting only individual rights. See Fed’n of
Advert. Representatives, 326 F.3d at 930 n.7 (citing D.C. Circuit opinions justifying
presumption on grounds of respect for the legislative role, democratic considerations, cost and
difficulty of coordinating the passage and repeal of generally applicable legislation in bad faith);
But see Chicago United Indus., 445 F.3d at 947 (emphasizing importance of comity between
federal and state governments and respect for state and local government processes). Still, the
general rule is that “injunctive claims become moot after the challenged government
misconduct has ceased or has been corrected,” unless there is some reason to suspect a return
to the challenged conduct. Smith v. City of Chicago, 143 F. Supp. 3d 741, 750 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
(quoting Kliegman v. County of Humboldt, No. 09 CV 0006 NJV, 2010 WL 2382445, at *3
(N.D.Cal. June 10, 2010)).

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Representatives, 326 F.3d at 929–930; see Ozinga v. Price, 855 F.3d
730, 734 (7th Cir. 2017); Wisconsin Right to Life, 366 F.3d at 492.
Here, Defendant has adequately established that there is no
reasonable expectation that Defendant will again revoke Plaintiff’s
licenses because of his 2008 conviction. In cases involving a
constitutional challenge to a generally applicable law or regulation,
the incentives for a government agency to restore its preferred
policy after dismissal are obvious. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's
Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982) (declining to dismiss for
mootness, where municipal defendant announced intention to
reinstate popular but unconstitutional policy upon dismissal). In
this case, by contrast, the government actions at issue arose from
legal determinations that Defendant has now admitted were
incorrect and which Defendant has disavowed and corrected.
Plaintiff has not suggested any reason why, having discovered and
admitted its error, Defendant would intentionally expose her agency
to further litigation by violating the same individual’s rights in the
same way after stating under oath that she had no intent to do so.
Instead, Plaintiff insists that the case is not moot because
Defendant “could” wrongfully deprive him of his rights again in the
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future, as there is “nothing stop[ping]” her from doing so. See
Memo (d/e 30), at 5.
This argument stems from a misapprehension of the
applicable rule. Even where the ceasing party is not a government
official, what matters is not whether he or she “could” resume the
offensive conduct in the future, but whether there is any reasonable
expectation that he or she will in fact reoffend. See Fed’n of Advert.
Representatives, 326 F.3d at 930. Given that Defendant Trame is,
in fact, a government official entitled to a presumption of good faith,
the Court finds that Defendant’s sworn statement of intent
sufficiently demonstrates the absence of any reasonable probability
of the re-revocation on the same grounds of Plaintiff’s licenses. See
Wisconsin Right to Life, 366 F.3d at 491 (holding that “private and
public assurances” by government that allegedly unconstitutional
statute would not be enforced mooted suit to enjoin enforcement of
statue).
B. Plaintiff is not entitled to Attorney’s Fees under § 1988.
Plaintiff also moves for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
which provides that a “prevailing party” in a civil rights action like
this one may be awarded reasonable attorneys fees. Under the rule
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set forth in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't.
of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001), a voluntary
cessation by the government of the challenged conduct does not
make a Plaintiff a “prevailing party” under § 1988. Rather, a
“judicially sanctioned change” in the legal relationship of the
parties, such as a judgment on the merits, is required. As the Court
does not reach the merits of this case, Plaintiff is not a “prevailing
party” under § 1988 and cannot recover attorney’s fees.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff Mitchell’s only remaining claims are for
prospective injunctive relief against harms that are unlikely to reoccur, the Court finds that he no longer has any legally cognizable
interest in the outcome of this case. Accordingly, Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Mootness (d/e 12) is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
(d/e 20) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction.

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ENTERED: November 16, 2020
FOR THE COURT:

s/Sue E. Myerscough___
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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