Andrews v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 19

OPINION: The Motion of Plaintiff Gregory Christopher Andrews for Summary Judgment (d/e 14 ) is GRANTED. The Motion of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security for Summary Affirmance (d/e 16 ) is DENIED. The Commissioner's Decision Denying P laintiff's application for benefits is Reversed. Pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a Judgment will be entered reversing the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and remanding the case for a rehearing and new Decision. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the Clerk will substitute Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and terminate Andrew Saul as Defendant in this suit. Entered by Senior District Judge Richard Mills on 1/7/2022. (ME)

3:19-cv-03291-RM-TSH # 19

Page 1 of 10

E-FILED

Monday, 10 January, 2022 10:24:11 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

GREGORY CHRISTOPHER ANDREWS, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,
)
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
)
)
Defendant.
)

Case No. 19-3291

OPINION
RICHARD MILLS, United States District Judge:
Gregory Christopher Andrews seeks review of the Administrative Law
Judge’s Decision denying his claim for Disability Insurance Benefits and moves for
summary judgment.
Defendant Commissioner moves for summary affirmance.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Andrews was born in 1977. Andrews filed an application for
Disability Insurance Benefits on December 27, 2016, alleging an onset date of
December 16, 2016. The claims were initially denied and were denied upon
reconsideration. Andrews filed a request for a hearing and a hearing was scheduled.

1

3:19-cv-03291-RM-TSH # 19

Page 2 of 10

On March 4, 2019, ALJ Kathleen Winters issued an unfavorable Decision.
The ALJ found that Andrews had severe impairments of obesity, ischemic heart
disease/chronic heart failure, status post stent; peripheral neuropathy; diabetes
mellitus; depression; posttraumatic stress disorder; and anxiety. The ALJ found that
Andrews did not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed
impairments. The ALJ provided a residual functional capacity to perform light work
which was limited as follows: to occasional push or pull with bilateral lower
extremities; frequently climb stairs or ramps, kneel, crouch or crawl; occasionally
balance; can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; no concentrated exposure to
moving machinery, unprotected heights, and no commercial driving; a sit/stand
option, changing positions no more frequently than every thirty minutes, while
remaining on task; with work that can be learned in thirty days or less, with simpler
routine tasks, routine workplace changes, able to remain on task in two hour
increments; occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors and general public.
The ALJ determined that: (1) the record did not support Plaintiff’s claim that
he had to elevate his legs; (2) Plaintiff reported that he exercised an hour a day even
after experiencing a myocardial infarction; (3) Plaintiff’s cardiac examinations were
typically normal; and (4) Plaintiff was not compliant with his diabetes medication
yet his physical examinations were normal nonetheless. Andrews alleges the ALJ
failed to properly assess his subjective complaints and the case should be remanded.
2

3:19-cv-03291-RM-TSH # 19

Page 3 of 10

The ALJ found that Andrews could not perform his past skilled jobs in the
medical field but could perform other light simple occupations existing in significant
numbers in the national economy, including the jobs of office helper, mail clerk and
labeler and was thus not disabled. Andrews filed a request for review of the
Decision, which was denied on October 17, 2019, resulting in a final administrative
Decision.
Andrews has a date last insured of December 31, 2020 for Disability Insurance
Benefits.
II. DISCUSSION
Legal standard
When, as here, the Appeals Council denies review, the ALJ=s decision stands
as the final decision of the Commissioner. See Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 874
(7th Cir. 2010). The Act specifies that Athe findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.@
42 U.S.C. ' 405(g). ASubstantial evidence@ is defined as Asuch relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.@ Yurt v. Colvin,
758 F.3d 850, 856 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Although the task of a court
is not to re-weigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, the ALJ=s
decision Amust provide enough discussion for [the Court] to afford [the Plaintiff]
3

3:19-cv-03291-RM-TSH # 19

Page 4 of 10

meaningful judicial review and assess the validity of the agency=s ultimate
conclusion.@ Id. at 856-57. The ALJ Amust build a logical bridge from the evidence
to his conclusion, but he need not provide a complete written evaluation of every
piece of testimony and evidence.@ Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir.
2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Courts shall uphold an ALJ’s credibility determination unless the
determination is “patently wrong.” See Stepp v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 711, 720 (7th Cir.
2015).

SSR 16-3p explains factors to consider in evaluating the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of an individual’s symptoms. 2017 WL 5180304
(Oct. 25, 2017); see also 20 C.F.R § 404.1529. Factors to consider in addition to the
objective medical evidence include: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the
location, duration, frequency and intensity of the pain or other symptoms; (3) factors
that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness and
side effects of medication; (5) any treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain
or other symptoms; (6) any measures the claimant uses to relieve the pain or other
symptoms; and (7) any other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations
and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. See SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029
at *7.

ALJs should “focus on whether the evidence establishes a medically

determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the
individual’s symptoms and . . . whether the intensity and persistence of the
4

3:19-cv-03291-RM-TSH # 19

Page 5 of 10

symptoms limit the individual’s ability to perform work-related activities.” Id. at
*11.
Plaintiff’s allegations of disability
Here, the ALJ acknowledged that Andrews’s “medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms.”
However, the ALJ determined that Andrews’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of the symptoms was not consistent with the medical
evidence and other record evidence.
The ALJ stated that nothing in the record supported Andrews’s assertion that
he had to elevate his legs. Andrews alleges that, while no provider recommended
that he elevate his legs, such a limitation appears to be reasonably consistent with a
record that continually documents concerns about a history of cardiac issues and
diabetic neuropathy. Moreover, there is no medical opinion which states that he
does not need to elevate his legs. Andrews further contends it should not be
necessary for everything he alleges to be specifically backed up by the record. The
ALJ did acknowledge that Andrews experienced decreased sensation in his legs and
accommodated that by limiting him to occasional pushing and pulling with his legs,
a sit-stand option and other postural limitations.

5

3:19-cv-03291-RM-TSH # 19

Page 6 of 10

Based on the entire record, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s determination
that Andrews did not have to elevate his legs was a reasonable inference.
Next, the ALJ noted that Andrews exercised close to an hour per day after his
infarction and stenting. Andrews reported doing this on December 1, 2016, which
was two weeks prior to his alleged onset date. It is also not clear what type of
exercise Andrews performed. The Seventh Circuit has noted that “activities such as
walking in the mall and swimming are not necessarily transferrable to the work
setting with regard to the impact of pain.” Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751,
756 (7th Cir. 2004). Moreover, the remainder of the record supports a more limited
daily routine with no indications of regular exercise, but rather consistent complaints
of malaise and fatigue, along with a loss of interest in doing anything. During a
stress test in January of 2018, Andrews failed the protocol after just 11 minutes due
to findings suggestive of myocardial ischemia.
While it was not unreasonable for the ALJ to cite the amount that Andrews
exercised two weeks before his alleged onset date as evidence that he was not as
physically limited as he alleged, the ALJ should have made further inquiry as to the
nature of the exercise. Unspecified exercise prior to the alleged date of disability is
not necessarily inconsistent with Andrews’s claim. The Court concludes that the
ALJ had a duty to further analyze this claim.

6

3:19-cv-03291-RM-TSH # 19

Page 7 of 10

While Andrews failed the January 2018 stress test, the Commissioner claims
that he passed other stress tests after he was disabled. However, it appears that each
of the record citations is to the same stress test performed on January 16, 2018. That
test was stopped after 11 minutes due to exercise-induced apical hypokinesis,
suggesting exercise-induced myocardial ischemia. The consulting doctor noted
Andrews did not pass the stress test. The Court concludes that the ALJ’s reliance
on a vague report of exercise prior to Andrews’s alleged onset date instead of an
objective stress test during the relevant period that established difficulty walking for
11 minutes was error.
The ALJ further found that the evidence as to Andrews’s mental impairments
was not consistent with his alleged severity of symptoms. Specifically, Andrews’s
mental examinations showed an anxious mood but were otherwise “typically noted
to be intact.” Andrews notes that the ALJ focused on the normal objective evidence
regarding his chest pain when seen during emergency department stays. While the
ALJ properly observes the cardiac findings were generally normal, Andrews alleges
the ALJ fails to acknowledge that these normal findings in the context of multiple
emergency room visits were evidence of Andrews’s anxiety. Andrews notes that he
went to the emergency department on multiple occasions with complaints that
resulted in repeated angiograms and catheterizations. Andrews testified at the
hearing that these visits resulted from anxiety, which he says is consistent with the
7

3:19-cv-03291-RM-TSH # 19

Page 8 of 10

reports in the record. Andrews contends the ALJ all but ignores the fact that his
anxiety was so severe that he felt like he was having a heart attack. These attacks
were occurring even though Andrews was not experiencing the added stressor of
employment. Andrews asserts that the ALJ’s failure to properly address these
emergency department visits demonstrates that the ALJ misunderstands this
fundamental aspect of his impairment.
The ALJ noted that Andrews had severe anxiety and that his mental status
examinations reflected an “anxious, depressed and irritable mood.” The ALJ further
observed that few objective findings supported severe limitations. It appears that
the ALJ may not have found Andrews’s testimony to be credible. However, that is
not clear from the record. Accordingly, the ALJ did not build logical bridge between
the evidence and the conclusion.
Next, the ALJ observed that while Andrews’s diabetes was uncontrolled, his
physical examinations were generally normal, showing a normal gait with only
occasional mention of decreased sensation in his feet. The ALJ made this finding
while noting that Andrews was not compliant with his diabetes medication. The
Commissioner notes the ALJ accommodated Andrews’s anxiety and depression with
work limitations. Andrews states that his treatment provider observed that his
noncompliance in treating his diabetes was likely due to his depression and
symptoms of apathy.

The ALJ did not address this evidence.
8

As with the

3:19-cv-03291-RM-TSH # 19

Page 9 of 10

relationship between Andrews’s emergency department visits and his anxiety, the
ALJ did not build a logical bridge between the evidence and conclusion with respect
to his noncompliance.
The ALJ acknowledged Andrews’s physical and mental health treatment in
her Decision. Ultimately, the ALJ determined that Andrews was not precluded from
all work. Because of the failure to address some of the factors that may support
Andrews’s claim, however, the Court is unable to conclude that the ALJ’s Decision
is supported by substantial evidence.
Ergo, the Motion of Plaintiff Gregory Christopher Andrews for Summary
Judgment [d/e 14] is GRANTED.
The Motion of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security for Summary
Affirmance [d/e 16] is DENIED.
The Commissioner’s Decision Denying Plaintiff’s application for benefits is
Reversed.
Pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a Judgment will be
entered reversing the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and
remanding the case for a rehearing and new Decision.

9

3:19-cv-03291-RM-TSH # 19

Page 10 of 10

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the Clerk will substitute
Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and terminate Andrew
Saul as Defendant in this suit.
ENTER: January 7, 2022
FOR THE COURT:
/s/ Richard Mills
Richard Mills
United States District Judge

10