Tompkins v. Central Laborers
Filing
53
ORDER AND OPINION entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 8/25/11: Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count III of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint Doc. 42 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the only matter still pending before the Court in this action i s Defendants Counterclaim against Plaintiff for the tort of fraudulent concealment Doc. 20 . This matter is set for Final Pretrial Conference on Wednesday October 12, 2011 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom D of the Peoria Courthouse, and for a Bench Trial on November 7, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. in Rock Island. (JV, )
E-FILED
Thursday, 25 August, 2011 02:56:38 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
DONALD J. TOMPKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CENTRAL LABORERS’ PENSION
FUND,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No.
09-cv-4004
ORDER & OPINION
On August 3, 2011 the Court entered an Order and Opinion denying
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and granting in part and deferring in
part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 49). The Court deferred
ruling upon Count III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, which it set for oral
argument on August 22, 2011. (Doc. 49). Prior to the hearing, on August 19, 2011,
Defendant filed a Supplemental Affidavit of Sharon E. West in support of its Motion
for Summary Judgment as to Count III (Doc. 51),1 and Plaintiff filed a Response
thereto (Doc. 52). On August 22, 2011, the parties appeared for oral argument, and
the Court is now ready to rule upon Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as
to Count III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
For the following reasons,
Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
The Supplemental Affidavit was actually filed as an exhibit to a Motion for Leave
to File, placed before the Court on August 16, 2011 (Doc. 50). The Court granted
Defendant leave to do so on August 18. (Text Order of 8/18/2011).
1
DISCUSSION
In Count III of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory
judgment that certain provisions of Defendant’s Plan violate the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq.. (Doc.
19 at 24). Specifically, he alleges that § 7.1 and §3.3(d) of the Plan work a forfeiture
in violation of § 1053(a), and that § 3.3(b), §3.7, and §4.3(b) of the Plan violate the
anti-cutback rule of §1054(g) and work a forfeiture in violation of § 1053(a). (Doc.
19 at 24). However, Plaintiff does not make any allegations to the effect that the
provisions have, in practice, worked as a forfeiture or a cutback to his own benefits,
nor those of any other participant. Nor does Plaintiff assert that Defendant has
violated any fiduciary duty. Instead, he merely asserts that the language of the
Plan is at odds with the requirements of ERISA. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to
have this Court engage in a facial analysis of the Plan and to enjoin Defendant from
applying these provisions in the future. (Doc. 19 at 24).
I.
Standing2
Count III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is distinct from his previously
disposed of claims, insofar as Plaintiff does not allege that any of the plan
Defendants did not raise the issue of standing in their Motion for Summary
Judgment, or Supplemental Affidavit in support of Summary Judgment, however at
oral argument, after the issue was raised by the Court sua sponte, Defense counsel
stated that he did not wish to waive it. Regardless, Plaintiff must establish
standing for each claim he seeks to press, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
332, 352 (2006), and a determination of whether Plaintiff has standing “is an
essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III,”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Therefore, the Court has
an obligation examine the issue of standing to ensure that it has jurisdiction over
Count III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
2
2
provisions at issue in Count III have caused a harm directly to him.3
Rather,
Plaintiff maintains that he brings Count III pursuant to § 1132(a)(3), which
empowers a “participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary” to bring a civil action “to enjoin
any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of
the plan.” (Doc. 19 ¶ 48). According to Plaintiff, § 1132(a)(3) does not require relief
to be directly personal to the “participant.” (Doc. 19 ¶ 49).
It appears that Plaintiff does have statutory standing to bring Count III
pursuant to §1132(a)(3) as he is a participant in Defendant Fund and is seeking to
enjoin Defendant from applying allegedly violative Plan provisions. However, in
addition to satisfying statutory standing, Plaintiff must also have constitutional
standing to bring his cause of action.4 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997);
Kendall v. Employees Retirement Plan of Avon Prods., 561 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir.
2009) (“A plan participant suing under ERISA must establish both statutory
standing and constitutional standing, meaning the plan participant must identify a
statutory endorsement of the action and assert a constitutionally sufficient injury
arising from the breach of a statutorily imposed duty.”). In evaluating Plaintiff’s
For a full background and disposition of Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, see this Court’s Order and Opinion of August 3, 2011. (Doc. 49). In his
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff did not move for judgment as to Count III,
and noted that Count III sought injunctive relief as to specific Plan provisions
unrelated to his other claims for relief. (Doc. 41 at 2). As Plaintiff’s attorney
admitted at oral argument, Count III presents purely legal questions, which
Plaintiff’s attorney represented could be determined based upon the allegations in
his Complaint and the legal arguments made in his Response to West’s
Supplemental Affidavit. (Tr. at 14). Accordingly, the Court questions whether and
in what manner Plaintiff intended to bring Count III to resolution, as the deadline
for filing dispositive motions had passed, and the matter is not one fit for a trial.
4 At oral argument, Plaintiff conceded that he had relied exclusively upon the terms
of the statute to confer standing upon his third cause of action. (Tr. at 4-10).
3
3
standing, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff has alleged “such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court
jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.”
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975). That is, the Court must determine
“whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring th[e] suit.” Raines, 521 U.S. at
818. It is the “burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor
clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is the proper party to invoke judicial
resolution of the dispute.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 11 (1998).
In order to satisfy constitutional standing requirements, Plaintiff must show:
1) that he has suffered an injury in fact; 2) that the injury is fairly traceable to
Defendant’s actions; and 3) that it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Svcs. 528
U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). Generally, to show that he has suffered an injury in fact, a
Plaintiff must demonstrate the “invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
The
“primary inquiry here is whether [Plaintiff] has pled a violation of his ERISAcreated rights sufficient to satisfy Article III’s injury requirement.”
Horvath v.
Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 455 (3rd Cir. 2003).
While the Court has been unable to find any Seventh Circuit opinion which
addresses the issue, several other circuit courts have discussed the manner in which
a plaintiff may establish an injury for the purpose of seeking injunctive relief under
4
ERISA. In Horvath, the Third Circuit held that in order to assert such an injury, a
plaintiff need only allege that his statutory ERISA rights have been violated. 333
F.3d at 456 (plaintiff “need not demonstrate actual harm in order to have standing
to seek injunctive relief requiring [the defendant plan] to satisfy its statutorilycreated disclosure or fiduciary responsibilities”).
The Third Circuit reasoned that
ERISA created certain rights in the plaintiff, including the right to have the
defendant fund act in accordance with its fiduciary duty and make required
disclosures to plan participants. Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff had the right to seek
injunctive relief forcing the defendant to fulfill its obligation. Id.
Two years after the Third Circuit decided Horvath, the Second Circuit
recognized its holding that injunctive relief may be sought under § 1132(a)(3)
without a showing of actual harm. See Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas
Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC, 433 F.3d 181, 199 (2d
Cir. 2005). In Kendall v. Employees Retirement Plan of Avon Prods., 561 F.3d 112,
119-121 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit clarified that a plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief must still allege some injury or deprivation of a specific right
arising from an alleged violation of fiduciary duty, rather than simply asserting a
blanket claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
The Sixth Circuit has also recognized the Third Circuit’s analysis in Horvath
and held that “Plaintiffs need not demonstrate individualized injury to proceed with
their claims for injunctive relief under § 1132(a)(3); they may allege only a violation
of the fiduciary duty owed to them as a participant in and beneficiary of their
5
respective ERISA plans.” Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 505 F.3d
598, 610 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that plaintiffs’ claim that their plan breached a
fiduciary duty with respect to the plans to which they belonged was sufficient to
establish injury-in-fact for purposes of constitutional standing).
Here, Plaintiff’s claim is that Defendant’s Plan is in violation of various
ERISA provisions, specifically the anti-cutback and anti-forfeiture provisions found
in § 1054(g) and § 1053(a). Plaintiff, however, does not allege the violation of any
fiduciary duty owed to him, any harm which he has suffered, or even any benefit
which would be bestowed upon him should the Court find that the provisions are
facially at odds with ERISA. “Article III standing ultimately turns on whether a
plaintiff gets something (other than moral satisfaction) if the plaintiff wins.” Drutis
v. Rand McNally & Co., 499 F.3d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 2007). Should Plaintiff prevail
on Count III, he would receive no benefit whatsoever. At oral argument, Plaintiff’s
attorney characterized his motivation to bring Count III as follows: “[Q]uite frankly,
it was, okay, there are some other things bothering me in the plan, I will add them
to Count III as long as I have got to do an amended complaint anyways or if I choose
to do an amended complaint let’s add those issues too because some of these issues
were motivated, not that these issues don’t exist in this case, they exist elsewhere in
the fund, matters not in litigation.” (Tr. at 5). Although standing requirements are
relaxed when a Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief pursuant to § 1132(a)(3), there still
must be some semblance of an actual case or controversy between the parties.
However, Plaintiff alleges absolutely no injury, nor any deprivation of his statutory
6
rights. Plaintiff is simply stating that there “are provisions here that violate . . .
ERISA and I would like a declaratory resolution of that matter. . . . It seems to
make perfect sense if we are into this plan, let’s deal with a couple other provisions
in the plan and have a declaratory action.” (Tr. at 7; 9).
As all Plaintiff asks is for a judgment that the Plan as written is facially at
odds with ERISA, the Court finds the matter of standing here should be determined
in accordance with a case brought as one for declaratory judgment. “In the context
of cases in which, as here, declaratory relief is sought, the traditional test of
justiciability has been whether there is a substantial controversy, between parties
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of declaratory judgment.” Vickers v. Henry County Savings & Loan Ass’n,
827 F.2d 228, 231 (7th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted).
“In order to
demonstrate standing for a declaratory judgment, [Plaintiff] must show an actual
controversy, that is, that [he] has sustained, or is in immediate danger of
sustaining, a direct injury as a result of the [Defendant’s]” allegedly illegal plan
provision. Foster v. Center Township of Laporte County, 798 F.2d 237, 242 (7th Cir.
1986).
Here, Plaintiff has not shown the risk of any such injury or danger to
himself. (Tr. at 7 “Count III . . . clearly . . . has no direct impact on [Plaintiff] . . .
this isn’t personal.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have “such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of
federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on
his behalf.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975).
7
While the Court does not believe Plaintiff has standing to present Count III,
out of an abundance of caution, and in recognition of the fact that the Seventh
Circuit has not spoken on this issue in this context, it will proceed to analyze the
merits of Plaintiff’s claims.
II.
Section 7.1
Plaintiff’s first challenge is to Section 7.1 of Defendant’s 1999 Restated Plan.
Section 7.1 states that: “A pension must be applied for in writing with the Trustees
in advance of the date pension payments commence . . . no retroactive payments for
months prior to the submission of an application shall be made.” (Doc. 19 ¶ 51
(citing §7.1 of the 1999 Restated Plan)). In paragraphs 50 – 53 of his Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that § 7.1 violates ERISA’s anti-forfeiture rule, found at
29 U.S.C. § 1053(a).
(Doc. 19 ¶¶ 50-53).
Section 1053(a) provides that “each
pension plan shall provide that an employee’s right to his normal retirement benefit
is nonforfeitable upon the attainment of normal retirement age.”
According to
Plaintiff, if payments of a Regular or Service Only Pension do not commence
retroactively to the date the payments should have commenced under the Plan,
rather than the date of application, the Plan works a forfeiture of pre-application
benefits, unless an actuarial adjustment is made for the months that have been lost.
(Doc. 19 ¶ 53).
In her Supplemental Affidavit, Sharon E. West, the Department Director of
Defendant Fund, states that such an actuarial adjustment is in fact made to
account for the date that any pension commences after a participant’s normal
8
retirement date. (Doc. 51 ¶ 11). Ms. West points to § 7.7(c)(4)(i) of the Plan, which
provides that “if the Annuity Starting Date is after the Participant’s Normal
Retirement Age, the monthly benefit will be the Accrued Pension at Normal
Retirement Age, actuarially increased for each complete calendar month between
Normal Retirement Age and the Annuity Starting Date . . . and then converted as of
the Annuity Stating Date to the benefit payment form elected in the pension
application.” (Doc. 51 ¶ 11). Accordingly, Defendant maintains that § 7.1 works no
forfeiture in terms of its Regular Pension.
Plaintiff acknowledges this fact in its Response to Ms. West’s Supplemental
Affidavit (Doc. 52), however he claims that while there is no forfeiture in terms of
the Regular Pension, a forfeiture still occurs under the terms of the Plan when a
participant applies for a Service-Only Pension more than one-month after he
becomes eligible to do so under the terms of the Plan. (Doc. 52 ¶ 2). However, the
Court does not find Plaintiff’s argument to be availing. As previously mentioned,
the ERISA anti-forfeiture provision, § 1053(a), provides that a pension benefit
becomes non-forfeitable upon a participant’s attainment of his “normal retirement
age.” See Contilli v. Local 705 Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters Pension Fund, 559
F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the anti-forfeiture provision does not
apply to pension benefits which begin prior to the normal retirement age, and any
such Service-Only Pension benefits are not subject to its terms.5 Therefore, the
Court finds that §7.1 of the 1999 Restated Plan does not violate § 1053(a).
The Court notes that this same analysis applies to Plaintiff’s challenge of § 3.3(d)
of the Plan, which only provides for 36 months worth of retroactive disability
5
9
III.
Provisions Enacted by Amendment No. 5 to the 1999 Restated
Plan
Plaintiff next challenges several Plan provisions which were placed into effect
via Amendment No. 5 to the 1999 Restated Plan. (Doc. 19 ¶¶ 54-55). The relevant
provisions are incorporated into the 1999 Restated Plan at § 3.3(d), § 1.31(b), §
3.3(b), and § 4.3(b), which deal with the creation and application of a new
“Occupational Disability Benefit.” Plaintiff contends that these provisions violate
both the previously discussed anti-forfeiture provision of § 1053(a), as well as the
ERISA anti-cutback provision found in § 1054(g). Section 1054(g) provides that “the
accured benefit of a participant under a plan may not be decreased by an
amendment of the plan.”
However, it is undisputed that both § 1053(a) and § 1054(g) apply only to
pension benefits, not to welfare benefits.
29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (stating that the
provisions apply to any employee benefit plan other than, inter alia, an employee
welfare benefit plan); Arndt v. Security Bank S.S.B. Employees’ Pension Plan, 182
F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the parties’ arguments center upon whether
or not the Plan’s Disability Pension and Occupational Disability Benefit are
properly characterized as pension or welfare benefits.
Plaintiff argues that both the Disability Pension and the Occupation
Disability Benefit are pension benefits, and therefore must comply with the
benefits. As will be discussed below, Plaintiff’s challenge to § 3.3(d) also fails
because disability benefits are not subject to the anti-forfeiture provision found in §
1053(a).
10
relevant ERISA provisions. (Doc. 52). The Court will look at each separately to
determine their proper characterization.
A. Disability Pension6
With respect to the Disability Pension, Plaintiff claims that the fact that 1)
its amount is based upon the same earned and accrued Pension Credits as a
Regular Pension and 2) it is listed along with other regular pension benefits
provided by the Plan, indicate that it is truly a pension benefit. (Doc. 52 ¶¶ 4-5).
The Court disagrees. Section 1002 of Title 29 of the United States Code defines a
“welfare benefit plan” as any plan, “to the extent that such plan . . . was established
or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants . . . benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment.” (emphases added).
Accordingly, any benefits that are triggered by a disability constitute a welfare
benefit, even if they are otherwise part of a pension plan. Anderson v. Suburban
Teamsters of Northern Illinois Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees, 588 F.3d 641, 651 (9th
Cir. 2009) (“The ‘to the extent’ language evidences Congress’s intent that the
definition encompass any portion of a plan in which the employee’s disability
triggers the right to the benefit.”); Green v. Holland, 480 F.3d 1216, 1228 (11th Cir.
2007); Robinson v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund, 441 F.Supp.2d 405,
417-18 (D.Conn. 2006) aff’d in part, dismissed in part, 515 F.3d 93 (2d. Cir. 2008);
Rombach v. Nestle USA, Inc., 211 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Arndt, 182 F.3d
The characterization of the Disability Pension is relevant to an analysis of
whether §3.3(d) violates the anti-forfeiture provision, as well as to whether the
creation of the new Occupational Disability Benefit reduced any previous pension
benefits.
6
11
at 543 (“Viewed from this angle, the benefit is a disability benefit. The disability is
the reason for the benefit.”). The location of the benefit in a master pension plan is
not to the contrary, Nestle, 211 F.3d at 194 (“In our view, it does not matter that
Nestle called the disability retirement pension portion of its plan a ‘pension benefit’
and made it part of its master ‘pension plan’”), nor is the fact that the amount of the
benefit is calculated in the same manner as a regular pension benefit, see id.
Accordingly, the Disability Pension is properly characterized as a welfare benefit,
and the requirements of the anti-forfeiture and anti-cutback rules are inapplicable.
B. Occupational Disability Benefits
With respect to the Occupational Disability Benefit created by Amendment
No. 5 to the 1999 Restated Plan, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s labeling of it as a
disability benefit that is not protected by the applicable provisions is not dispositive.
(Doc. 52 ¶¶ 8-10). While the Court agrees that the label a party gives a provision is
not dispositive as to its proper characterization, it nevertheless finds that the
Occupational Disability Benefit is, indeed, a welfare benefit. Like the Disability
Pension, the Occupational Disability Benefit is triggered by a disability.7
Accordingly, this welfare benefit is not subject to either the anti-forfeiture or antiThe Court notes that a participant receiving the Occupational Disability Benefit
may instead choose to receive any other type of pension for which he qualifies. See §
3.3(e)(2)(A) (“The last payment of an Occupational Disability Benefit shall be made
on the earliest of: the first day of the month preceding the Annuity Starting Date of
his Regular, Early Retirement, Disability, or Service Pension.”). Accordingly, even
if the anti-cutback provision applied, the Benefit would likely be found not to cutback any previous benefits because rather than alter the criteria for any previously
existing benefit, it has created an entirely new benefit which never before existed:
namely, a disability-type benefit for participants who can no longer engage in
laborer or other building trades crafts employment due to a disability, but (unlike
the Disability Pension) can engage in full-time non-industry employment.
7
12
cutback provisions, and Plaintiff’s claims as to the invalidity of the provisions
enacted by Amendment No. 5 are therefore without merit.
IV.
Section 3.7
Finally, Plaintiff claims that § 3.7 of the 1999 Restated Plan, entitled
“Application of Benefit Increases,” violates the Treasury Regulation at 26 C.F.R. §
1.411(d)-3, as well as ERISA’s anti-cutback and anti-forfeiture provisions. (Doc. 19
¶ 56). The relevant portion of § 3.7 provides as follows: “The pension amount to
which a Participant is entitled shall be determined under the terms of the Plan as
in effect at the time the Participant separates from Covered Employment.” Plaintiff
makes no argument with regard to how §3.7 is defective except to state that he
“simply observes an inconsistency between the plan language and the regulation.”
(Doc. 52 at 7). Presumably, Plaintiff objects to the language because the relevant
language in Treasury Regulation 1.411(d)-3 states that the ERISA anti-cutback
provision applies to a participant’s entire accrued benefit, regardless of whether a
portion of it “was the result of an increase . . . pursuant to a plan amendment
adopted after the participant’s severance from employment.” In her Supplemental
Affidavit, Ms. West states that Defendant “has never interpreted nor applied the
first paragraph of said § 3.7 of the Plan to decrease or cutback any accrued benefit
of a participant.
That paragraph, which does not address subsequent benefit
improvements by Plan amendments, has been consistently interpreted and applied
in conjunction with ERISA, including the ‘anti-cutback’ rule.” (Doc. 51 ¶ 8).
13
Ms. West also points to § 9.1 of the 1999 Restated Plan, which provides that
any amendments to the Plan must be in compliance with the requirements of
ERISA. (Doc. 51 ¶ 8). Section 9.1 provides that “This Plan may be amended at any
time by the Trustees, consistent with the provisions of the Trust Agreement.
However, no amendment may decrease the Accrued Pension of any Participant,
except: (a) As necessary to establish or maintain the qualification of the Plan or
Trust Fund under the Internal Revenue Code and to maintain compliance of the
Plan with the requirements of ERISA.” Based upon a facial analysis of these three
provisions, the Court does not find there to be any conflict between the terms of the
Plan and the controlling regulations. Notably, Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. §
1.411(d)-3 does not state that a plan must increase a participant’s accrued benefit
based upon a subsequent plan amendment, only that if it does so increase the
benefit, it then becomes protected by the anti-cutback rule. Therefore, the Plan is
not in violation of the § 1.411(d)-3 simply by choosing not to increase accrued
benefits in this manner.
Moreover, if the Plan did increase the benefits, § 9.1
indicates that they could not later be reduced by a subsequent amendment, because
the Plan must be administered in accordance with the anti-cutback provision.
Therefore, there is no conflict, and Plaintiff’s final claim is also without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Count III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 42) is GRANTED. Plaintiff does
not have standing to raise the claims alleged in Count III, and, even if he did have
14
such standing, his claims fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the only matter still
pending before the Court in this action is Defendant’s Counterclaim against
Plaintiff for the tort of fraudulent concealment (Doc. 20). This matter is set for
Final Pretrial Conference on Wednesday October 12, 2011 at 1:30 p.m. in
Courtroom D of the Peoria Courthouse, and for a Bench Trial on November 7, 2011
at 9:00 a.m. in Rock Island. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Entered this 25th day of August, 2011.
s/ Joe B. McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
United States Senior District Judge
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?