Eilenfeldt v. United CUSD 304 Board of Education et al

Filing 57

ORDER granting 50 the Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery. See Written Order. Entered by Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley on 9/4/2015. (KZ, ilcd)

E-FILED

Friday, 04 September, 2015 12:33:12 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
PAMELA EILENFELDT,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 4:12-cv-04029-SLD-JEH

UNITED C.U.S.D. #304 BOARD OF
EDUCATION, Political Subdivision
of the State of Illinois, et al,
Defendants.
Order
Now before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc.
50). The Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 55) and for the reasons set forth below,
the Motion is GRANTED.
I
On March 20, 2012, the Plaintiff, Pamela Eilenfeldt, filed her Complaint on
behalf of her minor child J.M. alleging nine separate causes of action against
various individuals and entities associated with the United Community Unit
School District #304. The Defendants’ first Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was
granted on March 25, 2013, and the Plaintiff was given leave to amend the
remaining counts of her Complaint.

The Plaintiff filed her First Amended

Complaint to include eight causes of action. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
the First Amended Complaint was granted and the Plaintiff was given leave to
amend her complaint consistent with the Court’s Order granting the Defendants’
second Motion to Dismiss.

The Plaintiff then filed her Second Amended

Complaint alleging four causes of action, but after the Court granted in part and
denied in part the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended
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Complaint, only Count II (42 USC § 1983 Monell claim) and Count III (Section
1983 substantive due process claim) remained.

On July 10, 2015, the six

individual Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified
Immunity (Doc. 48).

In that Motion, they argue:

1) the allegations in the

Complaint do not establish a constitutional substantive due process right because
no “fundamental” interest is implicated; and 2) the substantive due process right
alleged was not clearly established. The Motion for Summary Judgment remains
pending.
Thereafter, the Defendants filed their Motion to Stay Discovery in this
matter until the Court rules on the pending Motion for Summary Judgment.
They argue that the entry of a discovery stay would limit disruption to not only
governing the school district but also in providing instruction and guidance to
the students for which the individual Defendants are responsible.
II
Considering the defense of qualified immunity, the United States Supreme
Court in Harlow v Fitzgerald explained, “Reliance on the objective reasonableness
of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law,
should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of
many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.” 457 US 800, 818 (1982). The
Harlow court went on to say that, “Until this threshold immunity question is
resolved, discovery should not be allowed.” Id. See Anderson v Creighton, 483 US
635, 646 n 6 (1987) (highlighting that one purpose of the Harlow qualified
immunity standard is “to protect public officials from the broad-ranging
discovery that can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government”) (internal
quotations omitted).

The Supreme Court has made clear that, “Unless the

plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a
defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the
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commencement of discovery.” McGrath v Gillis, 44 F3d 567, 569 (7th Cir 1995),
quoting Mitchell v Forsyth, 472 US 511, 526 (1985).
Here, the Plaintiff opposes a stay of discovery, arguing that it has already
been established that the individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity at this stage in the litigation, based upon the rulings on the Motions to
Dismiss. To illustrate her argument, the Plaintiff cites to the Court’s findings in
its Orders ruling on the Defendants’ previous Motions to Dismiss filed in this
case. The Plaintiff highlights the following findings from the Court’s Orders: a
substantive due process violation can occur even when no fundamental right is
involved; “Eilenfeldt has adequately alleged that Defendants acted arbitrarily
and that their actions were not rationally related to a legitimate government
interest;” whether conduct “shocks the conscience” is a fact-bound inquiry that
in this case is not appropriately decided at the motion-to-dismiss stage; and a
government failure to act is “actionable” if a special relationship has been created
between government and victim, or if the state created the danger that now
threatens the victim.
The motion to dismiss standard is different from the summary judgment
standard. See Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp v
Twombly, 550 US 544, 570 (2007); compare FRCP 56(a) (“The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”).
The Court was not previously tasked with addressing the pointed question of
whether, as a matter of law, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in
this case.

The Plaintiff’s argument that discovery should not be stayed

presupposes that it will prevail on the pending summary judgment motion. That
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presupposition is erroneous; the rulings on the Motions to Dismiss do not
preclude the Court from finding qualified immunity at the summary judgment
stage. Now that the question is squarely before the Court, and in light of the
Supreme Court’s clear holdings on the issue of qualified immunity and the
reasons to preclude discovery before the issue is resolved in a case, discovery is
stayed in this case.
III
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc.
50) is GRANTED. Discovery is STAYED in this matter until the Court rules on
the pending Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity (Doc.
48).
It is so ordered.
Entered on September 4, 2015.

s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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