Dickerson v. Ibrahim et al

Filing 103

ORDER denying 96 Motion to withdraw settlement Agreement, denying 97 Motion to remove Attorney from case and denying 100 Second Motion to Remove attorney from case. See written order. Entered by Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley on 7/5/16. (WG, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 05 July, 2016 12:00:41 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
DERRELL DICKERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 4:13-CV-04003-JEH

ROCK ISLAND POLICE OFFICER
IBRAHIM RAMIREZ, CITY OF
ROCK ISLAND, SHERIFF OF ROCK
ISLAND COUNTY and COUNTY
OF ROCK ISLAND,
Defendant.
Order
Before the Court are Plaintiff, Derrell Dickerson’s, Motion to Withdraw
Settlement Agreement (D. 96), Motion to Remove Attorney from Case (D. 97),
and Second Motion to Remove Attorney from Case (D. 100). 1

For the reasons

set forth below, the motions are DENIED.
I
On March 10, 2015, the Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint in which he
alleged that he was “unreasonably arrested” on February 17, 2011, injured by the
arresting officer’s “unreasonable force” used against him during the arrest, and
then placed in the Rock Island County Jail from February 18, 2011 to February 20,
2011. Dickerson alleged that Defendant Officer Ramirez used excessive force
when arresting him and that “[t]his misconduct was undertaken pursuant to the
[Defendant] City of Rock Island’s pervasive, long-standing, practices and
customs relating to its officers’ use of excessive and unreasonable force.” (D. 41 at

1

Citations to the Docket Filing Number are abbreviated as “D. __.”

1

ECF p. 3). He also made three claims against the Sheriff of Rock Island County
(Sheriff) and the County of Rock Island (County) based upon the circumstances
of his detention at the jail: 1) a violation of the Rehabilitation Act (RA); 2) a
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); and 3) a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 2
At the request of the parties, Magistrate Judge Stephen Jackson, Jr. held a
settlement conference with all parties on March 1, 2016. At the conclusion of that
settlement conference, the parties reported that the case was settled as to all
Defendants. The material terms of the settlement agreements were stated on the
record before Magistrate Judge Jackson and Dickerson stated on the record that
he understood the material terms of the agreement, that he agreed to be bound
be the terms of the agreement, and that he had discussed everything with his
attorney. 3
On March 28, 2016, Dickerson filed a Stipulation of Dismissal, dismissing
all claims against the Sherriff and the County, pursuant to the settlement
agreement. (D. 93). However, on May 26, 2016, Dickerson himself, i.e. not
through counsel, filed a Motion to Withdraw Settlement as it relates to Officer
Ibrahim and the City of Rock Island. (D. 96). Most of the motion is gibberish, but
Dickerson does legibly assert that he was “miss led[sic] in this case.” Id. Then, on
May 31, 2016, Dickerson filed a Motion to Remove Attorney from his case. (D.
97). In that motion, he again asserts that his attorney “misled me.” Id. He states
that he did not want to “take this plea,” that he owes Medicaid $27,000, and that
he will only receive $7,000 from the settlement. Id. Dickerson filed a second

The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge in this case. (D. 67).
The facts surrounding the record made before Magistrate Judge Jackson come from the audio recording
made of the hearing, which is part of the record in this case.

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Motion to Withdraw Attorney on June 15, 2016, which is also mostly gibberish,
although he does reassert that he was misled by his attorney. (D. 100).
This Court held a hearing on all pending motions, with Dickerson
personally present, on June 28, 2016. At that hearing, Dickerson made clear that
the basis for all his motions was the existence of a Medicaid lien which,
according to him, would reduce the amount of money he expected to receive
from the settlement. Dickerson’s counsel noted that at the settlement conference,
counsel and Dickerson had agreed upon how the settlement proceeds would be
divided between them. When the existence of the Medicaid lien became known,
Dickerson’s counsel began efforts to negotiate the amount of the lien down, or
away entirely, but those efforts were stopped when Dickerson sought to remove
his counsel.
II
The question of whether to enforce a settlement agreement is question of
state law. Dillard v. Starcon Intern. Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2007). Under
Illinois law, an oral settlement agreement is enforceable if “there is clearly an
offer and acceptance of the compromise and a meeting of the minds as to the
terms of the agreement.” Wilson v. Wilson, 46 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Brewer v. Nat'l R.R. Corp., 256 Ill.App.3d 1083, 194 Ill.Dec. 834, 628
N.E.2d 331, 335 (1993)). The essential terms must be “definite and certain” so that
a court can ascertain the parties' agreement from the stated terms and provisions.
Quinlan v. Stouffe, 355 Ill.App.3d 830, 291 Ill.Dec. 305, 823 N.E.2d 597, 603 (2005).
Whether a “meeting of the minds” occurred depends on the parties' objective
conduct, not their subjective beliefs. Paxton–Buckley–Loda Educ. Ass'n, IEA–NEA
v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 304 Ill.App.3d 343, 237 Ill.Dec. 908, 710 N.E.2d 538,
544 (1999).
3

The record made before Magistrate Judge Jackson clearly demonstrates
that an enforceable agreement was entered into by the parties; Dickerson in fact
does not assert otherwise. Rather, Dickerson’s complaint rests primarily with his
attorney and his understanding of how much of the proceeds from the settlement
he would receive. Nowhere does he assert that he misunderstood the terms of
the agreement he entered into with the Defendants. Nor does he assert that the
Defendants have failed to or intend to fail to perform under the terms of the
agreement.
Accordingly, the Court orders the Defendants to tender payment to
Dickerson’s counsel within 30 days, pursuant to the terms of the settlement
agreement reached. Upon tendering such payment, the Defendants will be
released from any and all claims according to the terms agreed upon in the
settlement agreement. Additionally, upon tendering such payment, the
Defendants shall file a Notice with this Court informing the Court that the
Defendants have fully performed under the settlement agreement, at which time
this Court will dismiss the case with prejudice. Dickerson’s Motion to Withdraw
Settlement is therefore DENIED.
III
There remains the issue of Dickerson’s Motions to remove his counsel due
to his assertion that his counsel “misled” him regarding the apportionment of the
settlement proceeds between him and his counsel. Given that counsel has only
one ministerial task to perform in this case, i.e. provide Dickerson with his share
of the proceeds of the settlement received from the Defendants, the Court
DENIES Dickerson’s motions to remove his counsel. The only task remaining for
counsel is to receive the settlement proceeds from the Defendants and distribute
Dickerson’s share to him.
4

If Dickerson’s counsel believes that he cannot distribute any settlement
proceeds to Dickerson without the Court first resolving any dispute between
Dickerson and counsel on what the agreement for fees is, then Dickerson’s
counsel should file an appropriate motion with this Court asking it to resolve the
fee dispute. See Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72 F. 3d 1294, 1301 (1995)
(federal courts may resolve fee disputes, as such disputes are part of the same
“case or controversy” as the underlying litigation). Any such motion shall be
filed within 14 days of the filing of the Defendants’ notice that they have fully
performed under the terms of the settlement agreement and delivered the
proceeds of the settlement to Dickerson’s counsel.
IV
For the reasons stated herein, Dickerson’s motions are DENIED.
It is so ordered.
Entered on July 5, 2016
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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