Campbell v. Metro Link Bus Company et al

Filing 4

ORDER entered by Judge Sara Darrow on April 4, 2014. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), Plaintiff's 1 Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff's 2 Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and 3 Motion to Request C ounsel are MOOT. Plaintiff has leave to file an amended complaint addressing the deficiencies described in this Order. In light of Plaintiff's transient status and recent hospitalization, the Court will allow Plaintiff an extended period to amend his Complaint: Plaintiff must file any amended complaint by May 2, 2014, or else the case will be closed. Plaintiff may renew his motions for in forma pauperis status and appointment of counsel at that time. (JD, ilcd)

E-FILED

Friday, 04 April, 2014 03:07:43 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
JOHNNIE CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
METROLINK and
DON KRUGER,
Sheriff’s Office Deputy,
Defendants.

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No. 4:14-cv-04010-SLD-JAG

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Johnnie Campbell’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, ECF
No. 2. His motion was submitted under penalty of perjury and sufficiently demonstrates that
Plaintiff should be excused from paying the filing fee in this action. However, Plaintiff's case cannot
proceed because he fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 2, and Motion to Request Counsel, ECF
No. 3, are therefore MOOT. Plaintiff has until May 2, 2014, to file an amended complaint, and may
renew his motions for in forma pauperis status and appointment of counsel at that time.
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff—who is not a prisoner—filed this complaint on January 21, 2014, on a form
designed primarily for pro se prisoners challenging the constitutionality of their confinement. He

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In deciding a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint are taken as true and viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted). Accordingly, unless otherwise noted, the statement of facts in this section is based solely
on allegations in the Complaint. Compl. 1–8, ECF No. 1.

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checked “unknown” in the field asking for “federal legal basis” for the complaint. Plaintiff named
as defendants MetroLINK, the Rock Island County bus service, and Deputy Sheriff Don Kruger,
presumably of the Rock Island Sheriff’s Department.
To the best of the Court’s ability to decipher Plaintiff’s handwritten and frequently-crossedout allegations, Plaintiff alleges the following events. On an unspecified date at a location only
described as the “Quad Cities area,” the Route 55 MetroLINK bus either stopped at the wrong
locations or displayed the incorrect route sign. Whatever the error, Plaintiff almost missed the bus
that day as a result. He managed to catch up with the Route 55 bus at the East Moline station, where
he stopped the bus by standing in the street. When he got on board, he questioned the driver
regarding the bus’s confusing signage. Plaintiff claims she laughed about it with another bus driver
and responded that the sign display changed without her control. Plaintiff argued this point, and
started to call the bus station regarding the incident. He claims this spurred the bus driver to “start
yelling,” to report the incident to her supervisor by radio, and to threaten to throw Plaintiff off the
bus. Plaintiff in return called the bus station and spoke to the sheriff’s office detail for MetroLINK,
and was told to call the sheriff’s office if he encountered any more problems. Plaintiff claimed he
received a “vibe of hatred” from the people on the bus.
On another unspecified date, law enforcement officers removed Plaintiff from the bus based
on what he implies was a false complaint of a dispute between Plaintiff and another bus passenger,
and told Plaintiff that they had to check the bus’s cameras. Plaintiff then called Deputy Sheriff
Kruger, who also said he needed to check the bus-camera footage. Deputy Kruger allegedly then met
Plaintiff at the bus station and, despite Plaintiff’s protest that he was innocent, served a notrespassing order on him. The parameters of this order are not described. The relief plaintiff seeks
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is (1) to be “back on the bus,” (2) to receive monetary compensation for having to walk from Silvis,
Illinois, to Rock Island, Illinois, due to his lack of access to the MetroLINK, and (3) damages for his
resulting mental and emotional distress.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
District courts may screen a complaint prior to service on the defendants and must dismiss
it if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th
Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). “District judges have ample authority to dismiss
frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus save everyone time and legal
expense.” Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003). The plausibility standard
governing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) applies to such
screening. See, e.g., Davit v. Stogsdill, 371 F. App’x 683, 684 (7th Cir. 2010); Wyatt v. Hargadine,
No. 13-3150, 2013 WL 5678508, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2013).

That is, the complaint must

“describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant ‘fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests’” and its factual allegations must “plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has
a right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level.’” EEOC v. Concentra Health
Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)). However, a court must treat all well-pled factual allegations as true, and pro se
pleadings in particular are to be liberally construed. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 864-65 (7th
Cir. 2012).
II. Analysis
Plaintiff’s allegations amount to the claims that (1) he has suffered transportation difficulty
after being prevented from utilizing MetroLINK by law enforcement officers acting in response to
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reports that Plaintiff was causing a disturbance, and (2) the unfriendly attitudes of the bus driver, law
enforcement officers, and other passengers caused him emotional distress. He provides no individual
names of the offending parties, save for Deputy Kruger, and no dates for the occurrences at issue.
Plaintiff makes no reference to applicable federal law, or citizenship of the parties and amount in
controversy, hampering the Court from determining whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32.
Further, Plaintiff does not provide even the barest indication of how the uncomfortable but
otherwise unexceptional behavior he describes entitles him to a remedy under the law. Taking
Plaintiff’s allegations as true and construing them as liberally as possible, see Gomez, 680 F.3d at
864-65, the Court still cannot decipher what Plaintiff’s legal claims for relief may be. If Plaintiff is
seeking compensation from MetroLINK and its driver for intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress, his allegations come nowhere near plausibly asserting, for the former, that the
offensive parties intentionally engaged in “extreme and outrageous” conduct, see Harriston v.
Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 702 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted), or that Plaintiff was in
a zone of danger and his distress manifested itself in physical injury or illness, as required for the
latter, see Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
And if Plaintiff seeks an injunction preventing the Rock Island deputy sheriffs from keeping him off
the bus, presumably pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his complaint provides no hint at what federal
“right, privilege or immunity” has been infringed. See London v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 600 F.3d 742,
745-46 (7th Cir. 2010).
In their bare and mysterious state, Plaintiff’s allegations paint a picture far more consistent
with lawful behavior on the part of Defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567 (holding that
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allegations of conspiracy were insufficient where facts were at least equally consistent with
alternative law-abiding behavior explanation).

In any event, Plaintiff’s allegations provide

Defendants with no fair notice of what his claim against them is, and suggest no cause for relief that
is more than speculative. See Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d at 776. Accordingly, Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 2, and Motion to Request Counsel, ECF No. 3, are
MOOT. Plaintiff has leave to file an amended complaint addressing the deficiencies described
above. In light of Plaintiff’s transient status and recent hospitalization, the Court will allow
Plaintiff an extended period to amend his Complaint: Plaintiff must file any amended complaint
by May 2, 2014, or else the case will be closed. Plaintiff may renew his motions for in forma
pauperis status and appointment of counsel at that time.

Entered this 4th day of April, 2014.
s/ Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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