Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Coyle et al

Filing 30

ORDER entered by Judge Sara Darrow on July 19, 2017. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's attorneys' fees, expenses, and court costs are GRANTED and may be added to the final money judgment in the amount of $48,130.12. (RS1, ilcd)

E-FILED

Wednesday, 19 July, 2017 10:36:42 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION
AS RECEIVER FOR VALLEY
BANK,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 4:14-cv-04078-SLD-JEH

v.
FRANCIS J. COYLE JR and
DAWN D. COYLE,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is an Affidavit, ECF No. 27, and a Certificate of Prove Up, ECF No. 29,
to supplement a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs filed by Plaintiff Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation as Receiver for Valley Bank (“FDIC-R”) against Defendants Francis and Dawn
Coyle. For the following reasons, the Court approves Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees and
costs to supplement the Court’s previous grant of partial summary judgment against the Coyles
on March 31, 2017, ECF No. 26.
BACKGROUND
After their failure to make payments on a 2007 Note and Mortgage on their home in Rock
Island, IL, Francis and Dawn Coyle engaged in a long running dispute with the FDIC-R as the
latter sought foreclosure on the home. On March 31, 2017, the Court entered an Order granting
partial summary judgment for the FDIC-R, but denying the motion for attorney fees, costs, and
expenses because the FDIC-R provided no information regarding the reasonableness of the
requested amounts. Mar. 31, 2017 Order 8. The Court requested “an affidavit and/or
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documentation” attesting that information, id. at 9, which the FDIC-R provided in the form of an
affidavit submitted by counsel, including billing rates and itemized billing records. See Joseph
Creen and Michael Koury Aff., ECF No. 27. Additionally, in its March 31 Order, the Court
directed the FDIC-R to submit a proposed order consistent with its ruling, and the FDIC-R
complied. See Notice Proposed J. Foreclosure, ECF No. 28.
DISCUSSION
In the Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 10, the FDIC moved to enforce the terms
of the Note and Mortgage, which provide that the FDIC, as receiver of the bank, may collect
attorneys’ fees for the “costs and expenses in enforcing [the] Note” including “reasonable
attorneys’ fees.” Note, Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A-1, ECF No. 10 at 17. At the direction of the Court,
the FDIC-R supplemented its initial motion for attorneys’ fees with more detailed information,
which the Court now considers.
In determining the reasonableness of fees incurred in a foreclosure action, Illinois
courts consider a variety of factors, including the skill and standing of the attorneys
employed, the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the degree of
responsibility required, the usual and customary charge for the same or similar
services in the community, and whether there is a reasonable connection between the
fees charged and the litigation.
In re McMullen, 273 B.R. 558, 562 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2001)
Attorney’s fees are calculated using a “lodestar” method that allows a court to award “the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”
Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1999). In a petition to seek
attorney’s fees, the fee applicant must produce “satisfactory evidence” that his rates are
reasonably derived from the market rates for similar work done by attorneys in the community.
Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 647 (7th Cir. 2011). If the fee applicant fails

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to present such evidence, “the district court has the authority to make its own determination of a
reasonable rate.” Id. at 640.
The FDIC has moved for an award of attorney’s fees totaling $46,869.25. Aff. ¶ 2. This
foreclosure case took four years to resolve, required work on more complex legal issues than the
average foreclosure due to the FDIC’s receivership of Valley Bank, and involved lengthy
avoidance of discovery and requests for extension of time on the part of the defendants; for those
reasons, the fees at issue here far exceed those of a typical foreclosure case. Counsel’s affidavit
attests that the fees charged are reasonable, customary in the area, and necessary to perform the
services rendered. Id. at ¶ 7. FDIC counsel reports that the attorneys on the case—all partners at
a law firm—billed at a rate of $215 an hour in 2013 and then $250 an hour between 2014 and
2017. Id. at ¶ 2. The affidavit does not contain any information about the comparative
reasonableness in the community of the rates charged by counsel, so the Court must determine
on its own what is deemed a reasonable rate. This Court previously approved a lodestar rate of
$300 per hour, charged by partner-level attorneys in a case of comparable complexity involving
collection on a judgment. See DirecTV, LLC v. Preston, 2017 WL 2192966, at *3 (C.D. Ill. May
18, 2017) (awarding $300 for partner work and $200 for associate work to collect a judgment in
the Central District of Illinois). For this reason, the rates ranging between $215 and $250 per
hour for partner work appear to be reasonable. In counsel’s affidavit, the legal services are
itemized in great detail by the service performed, the attorney providing the service, and the rate
charged, and the Court finds no errant or unreasonable expenditure in its review of the time
entries. The Court awards the requested $46,869.25 in attorneys’ fees.

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The itemized foreclosure costs, including title expenses, court costs, process service, and
other costs, totaling $1,260.87 are reasonable in the eyes of this Court and may be assessed in the
judgment. See In re McMullen, 273 B.R. at 563.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, expenses, and court costs are
GRANTED and may be added to the final money judgment in the amount of $48,130.12.
Entered July 19, 2017.
s/ Sara Darrow
_
SARA DARROW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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