Daniels v. Colvin

Filing 20

ORDER and OPINION denying 15 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; and granting 18 the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Affirmance. Civil Case Terminated. Entered by Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley on 9/13/2016. (RK, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 13 September, 2016 01:14:16 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
CHRISTINE BERNICE DANIELS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 4:15-cv-04041-JEH

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

Order and Opinion1
Now before the Court is the Plaintiff’s, Claimant Christine Bernice Daniels,
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 15) and Commissioner of Social Security’s,
Carolyn W. Colvin, Motion for Summary Affirmance (Doc. 18). Plaintiff appeals
from the denial of her application for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits, pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The
Motions are fully briefed, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court denies
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and grants the Commissioner’s Motion
for Summary Affirmance.
I
On July 11, 2012, Daniels filed a Title II application for a period of disability
and disability insurance benefits. (AR 193). In her application, Daniels alleged
disability beginning on July 9, 2012. (AR 194). The claim was denied initially on
October 25, 2012 (AR 102), and upon reconsideration on February 20, 2013 (AR

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The parties have consented to the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 14).

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110). On March 20, 2013, Daniels filed a timely request for hearing concerning her
application for disability insurance benefits. (AR 15). An initial hearing was held
before the Honorable Robert H. Schwartz, administrative law judge (ALJ), on
October 1, 2013 via video, during which time Daniels was represented by Cherie
Pichone, non-attorney representative. (AR 38). Following the hearing, the ALJ
determined that Daniels was not disabled from July 9, 2012 through the date of the
decision. (AR 32). Daniels’ request for review by the Appeals Council was denied
on February 18, 2015 (AR 1), making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. Daniels filed the instant civil action seeking review of the ALJ’s
decision on April 15, 2015. (Doc. 1).
II
At the time she applied for benefits, Christine Daniels was a nearly 46 year
old divorced woman living in East Moline, Illinois. (AR 193). Under the Medical
Vocational Rules, which provide guidelines for finding a claimant disabled, the
Claimant was considered a “younger person” prior to her 50th birthday,
whereupon she would be categorized as “closely approaching advanced age”. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1563(b). Daniels has a 12th grade education with specialized training
in automotive management, communications, sales, inventory control, customer
service, and OSHA. At some point she was certified as an auto parts professional.
(AR 45). On her Form SSA-3368, Daniels provided that she had previously worked
as a parts department worker, key counter worker, and an installer service
specialist. (AR 195). At the hearing before the ALJ, she testified that she had to
leave work several times and go to the emergency room due to back pain. (AR 45).
Daniels testified that at her last job, she was moved to a new location and could
not bring her stool with her, and the standing caused more back pain. (AR 45). She
also told her treating physician that her work-related stress resulted from conflicts
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with her boss and quit her job due to her back pain, even though her boss offered
her shorter shifts in order to accommodate her. (AR 24). She also testified that she
couldn’t find a job because of her lack of computer skills. (AR 46).
Daniels was prescribed medication for several conditions, including
insomnia, chronic back pain, pain, depression, allergies related to working with
auto parts, and anxiety. (AR 197). She testified that her sleep is severely affected
by her condition, and her medication causes her tiredness. (AR 57). According to
Daniels, she still has depression and PTSD. (AR 57. 63). Daniels also stated she can
no longer stand, bend, stoop, or lift for a short amount of time. (AR 24, 59). She has
trouble putting her pants on. (AR 62).
Further, Daniels testified that she had surgery on her left elbow and wrist,
and still feels pain in her elbow as well as a reduced range of motion (AR 46),
although the ALJ noted that she demonstrated a full range of motion and strength
during her consultative medical exams, and she has had no further treatment on
her elbow or wrist since her surgery. (AR 16). Daniels lived by herself, and
prepares her own meals. (AR 43, 206). She says that it is painful to get in and out
of the car and to sit for long periods of time. (AR 43). Although she is capable of
completing some household chores for about three or four hours a day, Daniels
said that it is too painful for her to do more strenuous chores, such as gardening
and vacuuming. (AR 61-62). She cared for her infant granddaughter in the
evenings after work from July 2012 until July 2013. (AR 27). She sometimes swims
to relieve the pressure on her joints. On her function report, she noted that she
does her own shopping and is able to pay her bills. (AR 207).
At the hearing, after listening to Daniels’ testimony, the ALJ posed his
hypothetical questions to the vocational expert (VE), Brian Paprocki. First, the ALJ
asked the VE to consider an individual the Claimant’s age, education, and work
experience, assuming the individual is limited to performing light work, assuming
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the individual has a combination of impairments including pain, side effects from
medication, and a mental impairment that the individual is reasonably limited to
performing simply, routine, or repetitive tasks on a sustained basis. Additionally,
the hypothetical assumed that the work must not require more than usual routine
changes in work settings or duties. (AR 68). The VE testified that under this
hypothetical, Daniels’ could not perform her past work. The VE responded that,
given the aforementioned limitations, the following were representative jobs that
could be performed by such a person: a routing clerk or a collator operator. (AR
68).
The ALJ’s second hypothetical assumed the same restrictions but assumed
the additional limitations: the individual should avoid more than occasional
postural activities, no more than occasional climbing, balancing, kneeling,
stooping, crouching, or crawling; the individual should have the opportunity to
alternate between sitting and standing to relieve pain; and the individual has a
history of allergies and asthma, and the individual should avoid concentrated
exposure to fumes, odors, dust, and gases. The VE responded with the following
jobs: a page in a library or electrical assembler. (AR 69). The ALJ then asked
whether there were any sedentary jobs that the VE could identify under the
hypotheticals, to which the VE responded with the following: envelope addresser,
lampshade assembler, or foundation maker. The VE added that these jobs allow
for sitting or standing at will throughout the day. (AR 70).
In his written Decision, issued three months before the Claimant’s 50th
birthday, the ALJ applied the standard five-step sequential evaluation process and
ultimately found that Daniels was not disabled from July 9, 2012, through March
17, 2014, the date of the Decision. The ALJ determined that Daniels satisfied Step
One because she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period
since her alleged onset date of July 9, 2012. (AR 15). At Step Two, the ALJ found
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that Daniels suffered from the following severe impairments: chronic pain
syndrome with mild degenerative changes to the lumbar spine, rule out
somatoform disorder, hypertension, a history of asthma, an affective disorder, an
anxiety disorder, and rule out substance abuse. (AR 15).
At Step Three, the ALJ found that the medical evidence did not establish
that Daniels’ impairments met or medically equaled the severity of one of the
listed impairments, either individually or in combination. (AR 17). Specifically,
the ALJ did not find that Daniels met Listing 1.02 (Major dysfunction of a joint(s)),
1.04 (Disorders of the spine), or 3.03 (Asthma). Further, the ALJ specified that
Daniels did not meet the mental listings for 12.04 (Affective disorder), or 12.06
(Anxiety-related disorders). (AR 18). Similarly, the ALJ found that the claimant
has no restrictions in activities of daily living. (AR 18). Importantly, the ALJ did
note that Daniels has moderate difficulties with regard to concentration,
persistence, or pace. (AR 19).
The ALJ found that the claimant has the residual functional capacity (RFC)
to perform sedentary work, subject to the following limitations: she can climb,
balance, stoop, crouch, and/or crawl no more than occasionally; must avoid
concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation; and
restricted to simple, routine, repetitive tasks on a sustained basis with no more
than ordinary and routine changes in work setting or duties. (AR 20). The ALJ
specifically referenced Daniels’ own testimony, particular medical records
pertaining to her impairments, records from Daniels’ treating doctors, consultative
examinations, State agency medical consultants, and the Vocation Expert’s
testimony in reaching his decision. The ALJ also noted that although Daniels
claims she has physical complaints of pain, he saw minimal objective evidence,
and her pain management specialist wrote that her spine revealed age appropriate
changes. (AR 21).
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Regarding Daniels’ mental impairments, the ALJ discussed the Claimant’s
limitations regarding reduced concentration, difficulty coping with changes in the
work place, and subjective difficulty with memory. (AR 29). He added that her
psychological pain perception appeared largely affected by the combination of her
mental impairments, noting that he was giving her significant benefit of the doubt
despite the lack of objective or physical evidence on record. (AR 28). The ALJ
determined that his RFC limitation of the performance of simple, routine, and
repetitive tasks would accommodate her mental limitations. (AR 29).
At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Daniels is unable to perform any past
relevant work. (AR 30). The ALJ did not make any determinations of Daniels’
transferability of job skills because the Medical-Vocational Rules supports a
finding of not disabled whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills. (AR
31).
At Step Five, the ALJ determined that Daniels could perform a significant
number of jobs that existed in the national economy. (AR 31).
III
Daniels argues the following: 1) that the ALJ erred by mechanically
applying the age category to Plaintiff when she was on the borderline of the age
category, and 2) the ALJ erred when he failed to properly consider Plaintiff’s
mental limitations in his residual functional capacity (RFC) determination and in
the hypothetical to the vocational expert (VE). (Doc. 16). The Court will address
each argument in turn.
A
The Court's function on review is not to try the case de novo or to supplant
the ALJ's findings with the Court's own assessment of the evidence. See Schmidt v.
Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir. 2000); Pugh v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1989).
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Indeed, "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Although great deference is afforded to the determination made by the ALJ, the
Court does not "merely rubber stamp the ALJ's decision." Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d
589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court's function is to determine whether the ALJ's
findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper legal
standards were applied. Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986).
Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support the decision. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 390 (1971), Henderson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 1999).
In order to qualify for disability insurance benefits, an individual must show
that his inability to work is medical in nature and that he is totally disabled.
Economic conditions, personal factors, financial considerations, and attitudes of
the employer are irrelevant in determining whether a plaintiff is eligible for
disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566 (1986). The establishment of disability under
the Act is a two-step process.
First, the plaintiff must be suffering from a medically determinable physical
or mental impairment, or combination of impairments, which can be expected to
result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Second, there must be
a factual determination that the impairment renders the plaintiff unable to engage
in any substantial gainful employment. McNeil v. Califano, 614 F.2d 142, 143 (7th
Cir. 1980). The factual determination is made by using a five-step test. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520. In the following order, the ALJ must evaluate whether the claimant:
1)
2)

currently performs or, during the relevant time period, did
perform any substantial gainful activity;
suffers from an impairment that is severe or whether a
combination of her impairments is severe;
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3)

4)
5)

suffers from an impairment which meets or equals any
impairment listed in the appendix and which meets the
duration requirement;
is unable to perform her past relevant work which includes an
assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity; and
is unable to perform any other work existing in significant
numbers in the national economy.

Id. An affirmative answer at any step leads either to the next step of the test, or at
steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the plaintiff is disabled. A negative answer at any
point, other than at step 3, stops the inquiry and leads to a determination that the
plaintiff is not disabled. Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1984).
The plaintiff has the burdens of production and persuasion on steps 1
through 4. However, once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show ability to engage in some other
type of substantial gainful employment. Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.
1985); Halvorsen v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1984).

B
First, Daniels argues that the evidence supports a liberal application of the
age categories provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 2; and 20 C.F.R. §
404.1563. At the time of the ALJ’s written Decision was issued, Daniels was three
months and nine days shy of her fiftieth birthday. (Doc. 16, p. 3) (Tr. 80). Daniels
argues that agency regulations state that the categories shall not be applied
mechanically in a borderline situation, and the higher age category will result in a
finding of “disabled” if Daniels is found to not have transferable skills. (Doc. 16,
p. 3). (20 C.F.R. § 404.1563). Daniels also adds that the ALJ never made a finding
with respect to transferable job skills. (Doc. 16, p. 4).

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The Commissioner counters that the Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law
Manual (HALLEX), used by the agency to interpret the regulations and provide
procedural guidance, does not require an ALJ to explain why the older age
category was not used. (Doc. 19, p. 3). Commissioner adds that even if ALJ
considered a borderline age situation, he was not required to discuss it. (Doc. 19,
p. 4). Further, Commissioner argues that it was the Claimant’s burden to show that
the ALJ’s erroneous ruling resulted in prejudice. (Doc. 19, p. 5).
The Social Security Administration (SSA) publishes the Medical Vocational
Rules as a guide for adjudicators in determining whether a claimant is disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b). A claimant’s chronological age is one vocational factor
considered along with the record and the ALJ’s findings. The age categories are:
younger person (under age 50), person closely approaching advanced age (50-54),
and person of advanced age (age 55 or older). Id.
When a claimant is close to reaching a higher age category, and age would
be a determining factor in a finding of disability, there is a borderline age situation.
The regulations provide:
(b) How we apply the age categories. When we make a finding about
your ability to do other work under § 404.1520(f)(1), we will use the
age categories in paragraphs (c) through (e) of this section. We will
use each of the age categories that applies to you during the period
for which we must determine if you are disabled. We will not apply
the age categories mechanically in a borderline situation. If you are
within a few days to a few months of reaching an older age category,
and using the older age category would result in a determination or
decision that you are disabled, we will consider whether to use the
older age category after evaluating the overall impact of all the factors
of your case.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b).

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The SSA’s internal Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual
(HALLEX)2 at I-2-2-42 and I-3-3-25 states that a borderline age situation does not
exist unless using the higher age category affects the outcome of the decision.
Further, the ALJ is not to automatically use the higher age category, but instead
evaluates the overall impact of all the factors in the claimant’s ability to adjust to
doing other work. See also 20 CFR §§ 404.1563, 416.963, and 404, Subpt. P, App. 2;
see also Program Operations Manual System (POMS) DI 25015.006. While
HALLEX does not require an ALJ to explain use of the claimant’s chronological
age, the ALJ’s decision can only be sustained if supported by substantial evidence.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
In his decision, the ALJ included no discussion as to his application of the
age categories. The ALJ did not identify that Daniel’s age category was three
months from the higher age category, “closely approaching advanced age.” 20
C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 2. Neither did the ALJ address the question of whether
Daniels had transferable work skills, because the Medical-Vocational Rules
supported a finding of not disabled whether or not the claimant had transferable
job skills. (AR 31). After considering all of the medical and non-medical evidence
and all of the testimony, the ALJ concluded that Daniels was not disabled, whether
or not her skills were transferable. (AR 19).
The Court does not find a remand is necessary for two reasons. First, the
ALJ did not find a borderline age situation existed, and therefore was not required
to discuss it. The Claimant alleges her disability began on July 9, 2012, when she
was 48 years old. The hearing before the ALJ occurred on October 1, 2013, when
the Claimant was 49. The ALJ’s Decision was issued on March 17, 2014, when the

The HALLEX “is a policy manual written to convey ‘guiding principles, procedural guidance and
information to the Office of Hearing and Appeals Staff.’” DiRosa v Astrue, 2012 WL 2885112, *5 (ND Ill),
quoting HALLEX, Chapter I-1-001.
2

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Claimant was three months shy of turning 50. It is evident, however, from the
ALJ’s detailed analysis in Step Three (AR 20-30), that he carefully considered the
evidence and testimony from the time period before a borderline age period can
be considered.3 According to the record, no additional medical evidence was
submitted to the ALJ after the hearing, so the evidence remained the same. Further,
the Claimant did not present any evidence that her age affected her alleged
impairments. Therefore, the Court does not find that the age category was
mechanically applied.
Second, and more importantly, the ALJ’s decision is supported by the
weight of the evidence; because the higher age category would not have resulted
in a different outcome, he was not required to discuss his use of the Claimant’s
chronological age. See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2003) (“an ALJ
must build a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion, but he need not
provide a complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence”)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
According to the Medical-Vocation Rules, if the ALJ had placed Daniels in
the higher age category, there is a possibility that she would have been found
disabled. If the ALJ determined a borderline situation existed, he still retained the
discretion to use the Claimant’s chronological age. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b). The ALJ
is required to discuss why he used the Claimant’s chronological age only if the
higher age category affects the outcome of the Decision.
In the instant case, the higher age category would not affect the outcome of
the ALJ Decision, because the ALJ relied upon the VE’s testimony that Daniels
would be able to perform the requirements of representative unskilled sedentary
occupations such as an envelope addressor or assembly work. (AR 31).

3

The SSA defines a “few months” as “a period not to exceed six months.” HALLEX I-2-2-42(B)(1).

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To illustrate, Claimant argues that the Medical-Vocational Rules, which the
ALJ used as a framework in his Decision, indicate that transferability of the
Claimant’s skills is relevant because it could support a finding of not disabled. 20
C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 2. Specifically, whether or not the Claimant’s skills are
transferrable and whether or not her education and training provides for direct
entry into skilled work could result in a determination other than not disabled. 20
C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 (R. 201.21; 201.22; 201.14; 201.16). However, the VE
identified several unskilled jobs that Daniels could perform, even without her
education and training. The hypotheticals posed to the VE included the Claimant’s
severe impairments. The transferability and training would not change the
outcome of the instant case, and the ALJ would find the Claimant not disabled.
Accordingly, a remand is not appropriate because the Court is convinced that the
ALJ will reach the same result. McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir 2011)
C
Second, Daniels argues that the ALJ’s mental RFC finding does not
adequately account for her mental impairments. The ALJ found that Daniels’
affective disorder and anxiety disorder were severe impairments, and moderate
difficulties with maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (AR 15, 19).
Daniels posits that the ALJ was also obligated to present all limitations associated
with her mental impairments to the hypothetical to the VE. The Commissioner
argues that the Plaintiff does not challenge the weight afforded to the medical
opinions, identify evidence in the record contrary to the findings, or maintain that
the ALJ’s RFC determination materially conflicts with these opinions. (Doc. 19, at
6).

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i
“Ordinarily, an ALJ's hypothetical questions to a VE must include all
limitations supported by medical evidence in the record.” Simila v. Astrue, 573
F.3d 503, 520 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). In other words, an ALJ
must orient the VE to the totality of the claimant’s limitations, including those
pertaining to deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace. O’Connor-Spinner
v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2010). Also, “limiting a hypothetical to simple,
repetitive work does not necessarily address deficiencies of concentration,
persistence and pace.” Id. at 620. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
has explained that it is not necessary that the ALJ use the “precise terminology” of
“concentration, persistence and pace.” Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir.
2014).
In the instant case, the ALJ carefully considered the Claimant’s mental
impairments when he made the RFC determination. The Court can accordingly
trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning in formulating the mental RFC. See Carlson
v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that an ALJ must “sufficiently
articulate [her] assessment of the evidence to assure us that the ALJ considered the
important evidence . . . and to enable us to trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning”).
The detailed descriptions of each record supporting an alleged impairment
demonstrate that the ALJ considered Daniels’ mental limitations. Substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC finding.
In the RFC determination, the ALJ discussed Daniels’ objective clinical
evidence and her psychological perception of pain, and he indicated there was a
lack of physical evidence of her pain. (AR 21-22). The ALJ described her past
mental health, including her depression. (AR 23). The ALJ also noted that there
was a lack of records concerning her mental health care. Specifically, the Claimant
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did not receive consistent medical management of her psychological impairments
between October 2012 and July 2013.
The ALJ also discussed an incident in July 2013 where the Claimant had
become intoxicated and depressed, and sought help at an emergency department.
The Claimant testified that she drank alcohol to relieve her back pain, but it
worsened her depression so she sought help. (AR 54-55). The ALJ noted that this
is the only instance of seeking mental health care while intoxicated and claimant
testified that she no longer drinks. (AR 24). The ALJ later reasoned that Daniels
admitted she lied about her depression and suicidal thoughts in order to be
admitted for pain treatment. (AR 25). Significantly, the ALJ gave details about her
mood and appearance in his conclusion that this was the only period of
exacerbated symptoms in the record. (AR 25-26).
Moreover, the ALJ explained why he was limiting the Claimant to the
performance of simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. Specifically, her treating
physician’s records state that more than ordinary workplace stressors and changes
in routine affected her symptoms. (AR 29, 30). The ALJ also added the limitations
of work with no more than occasional changes in work setting or duties, due to
Daniels’ decreased concentration and subjective difficulty with memory. (AR 29).
The ALJ added that Daniels consistently reported pain throughout her records,
and elaborated on which evidence supported the conclusion that her perceived
pain was a result of her combination of mental impairments. (AR 28).
Consequently, he limited her RFC to sedentary work. (AR 28).
The ALJ also indicated that the visit with Dr. Sujatha Govindaiah was the
only visit under the period of review. In this visit, Daniels mentioned that she
experiences mild anxiety attacks. Dr. Govindaiah noted that she appeared to have
significant mental functioning, was well groomed and active, made eye contact,
and had an average demeanor and full affect. (AR 24). The ALJ stated that Daniels
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reported she was not taking her prescribed medication for anxiety and depression.
(AR 24).
The ALJ found that Daniels demonstrated significant mental functioning
during her consultative psychological exam, reporting depression and anxiety.
(AR 24). During her mental status examination, the examiner found her attention
to be adequate, though she had a limited ability to concentrate and had mild
depression. (AR 25). He also found that she showed intact recent and remote
memory capacity. (AR 25).
ii
Further, the hypothetical posed to the VE properly included the Claimant’s
mental impairments. The ALJ added the following limitations to the first
hypothetical (AR 67):
I'd like you to assume this individual is due to a combination of
impairments including pain, side effects from medication and a
mental impairment that this individual is reasonably limited to
performing simple, routine or repetitive tasks on a sustained basis. I'd
also like you to assume that any work must not require more than
usual routine changes in work setting or duties.
Although the ALJ found that the Claimant had a moderate limitation on her ability
to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace (AR 28), the ALJ did not pose those
limitations verbatim to the VE. However, the verbiage that was used here does not
require a remand.
“Only if the record shows that a doctor used particular descriptive language
to describe what work a claimant can perform in spite of his limitations can the
ALJ use that language in the RFC or hypothetical question to the VE.” Conley v.
Astrue, 692 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (C.D. Ill. 2010).

15

The ALJ reasonably relied upon Dr. Govandiaiah’s records that the
Claimant demonstrated increased mental health symptoms in response to more
than ordinary workplace stressors and changes in routine. (AR 29). In the
hypothetical, the ALJ referred to these limitations as “routine” and “repetitive.”
The ALJ limited the Claimant to “simple, routine, repetitive tasks” due to her
decreased concentration and subjective difficulty with memory. (AR 29). The ALJ
also limited her to “no more than occasional changes in work setting or duties” to
accommodate her decreased concentration. (AR 29). See Johansen v. Barnhart, 314
F.3d 283, 289 (7th Cir 2002) (concluding that doctor’s opinion of claimant’s mental
RFC as “moderately limited,” translated by the doctor into “low-stress, repetitive
work” was reasonably relied upon by the ALJ in formulating the hypothetical
presented to the VE which included the limitation of “low-stress, repetitive
work”). Therefore, the Claimant’s limitations were accounted for in the
hypothetical.
The hypothetical was in conformity with the ALJ’s determinations as to
disability, and the VE’s testimony was in conformity with the hypothetical
presented to her. The limitations the ALJ presented to the VE did orient the VE to
the totality of Daniels’ limitations in those areas supported by the record. The ALJ
built an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusions as
articulated in the RFC finding and questions to the VE to enable the Court to assess
the ALJ’s ultimate finding of non-disability. Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595
(7th Cir 2002). Substantial evidence supports those conclusions.

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IV
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the Commissioner’s
Motion for Summary Affirmance (Doc. 18) and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 15). This matter is now terminated.
It is so recommended.
Entered on September 13, 2016.
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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