Steward v. Dredge et al
Filing
6
MERIT REVIEW OPINION entered by Chief Judge James E. Shadid on 10/14/2015: IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Further, The Clerk is directed to attempt service on Defendants pursuant to the standard procedures. SEE FULL WRITTEN MERIT REVIEW OPINION. (Rule 16 Deadline 12/14/2015.) (JRK, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 14 October, 2015 03:16:21 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
STEVEN STEWARD,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEVE DREDGE, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
15-CV-4099
MERIT REVIEW OPINION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and detained in the Rushville
Treatment and Detention Center, seeks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.
The "privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and
fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who,
within the District Court's sound discretion, would remain without
legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them." Brewster
v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972).
Additionally, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma
pauperis "at any time" if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been paid. 28 U.S.C.
1
§ 1915(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court grants leave to proceed in
forma pauperis only if the complaint states a federal claim.
In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual
allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff's favor.
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However,
conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts
must be provided to "'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.'" Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(quoted
cite omitted).
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff practices the Muslim faith, which requires daily
community prayer. The facility permits only weekly gatherings for
prayer, which are allegedly cancelled arbitrarily at times by
Defendant Billingsley (the religious coordinator) and other
personnel.
Plaintiff’s faith prohibits him from eating any pork or pork
products or from coming into contact with anything that has
touched pork or pork products. For example, Plaintiff’s faith
prohibits his food from being fried in grease that has been
contaminated with pork or pork product. His food needs to be
2
prepared with utensils and cookware that is kept separate from the
utensils and cookware which touch pork. Additionally, Plaintiff’s
meat must be slaughtered in a specific way like kosher foods for
those of the Jewish faith.
Defendant Dredge and the other kitchen supervisors allegedly
refuse to follow these practices, interfering with Plaintiff’s ability to
adhere to his religious diet. Plaintiff has informed Director Scott,
Assistant Director Kunkel, and Officer Billingsley to no avail.
Defendants have also restricted Plaintiff’s ability to adhere to
the annual Ramadan, which lasts about one month and requires
praying communally five times per day, fasting from sunrise to
sunset, and feasting for three days at the conclusion of Ramadan.
The facility does not allow daily communal prayers and allows only
one day of feasting at the end of Ramadan.
The Ramadan feast in August of 2013 was cut short, and
Defendant Billingsley refused to allow the Ramadan celebrants to
take their left-overs from the feast to share with others, as their
faith allegedly requires. The residents had been allowed to take the
left-overs to their units at prior Ramadan feasts. The residents
began to protest and one resident refused Billingsley’s instruction
3
to leave, whereupon Billingsley called for assistance. When the
situation began to further deteriorate, Plaintiff stepped in and
brokered a solution with Officer Clayton and Defendant Bierman.
As a result, the residents were permitted to finish their allotted time
for celebration and to take left over food back to their rooms.
Clayton, however, informed Plaintiff that everyone would be
receiving disciplinary reports for insolence.
That evening, Sergeant Kulhan and Captain Parsons escorted
Plaintiff to an allegedly filthy segregation cell where Plaintiff stayed
for five days, purportedly on the charge of creating a disturbance.
For over six hours, Plaintiff had no mattress, blanket, pillow, or
snacks, even though Plaintiff is diabetic and he felt light-headed.
During the entire five days, Plaintiff was not allowed any toilet
paper, prayer rug, Quran, phone calls, recreation, communication,
writing materials, shower, hygiene items, or legal documents.
At Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing on the charge, behavioral
committee members included persons who had been involved in the
incident. Plaintiff was not allowed to call any witnesses, and he was
found guilty and punished with 5 days on “close” status. Close
status meant a continuation of the deprivations he had been
4
experiencing and also having to wear a “black box” on transports
outside the facility. Plaintiff had a doctor’s order prohibiting the
use of the black box, but he was required to wear it anyway.
Wearing the black box on a transport to Cook County caused
substantial pain, swelling and numbness in Plaintiff’s hands,
wrists, and arms. Plaintiff was also unable to eat with the black
box on, which made him sick due to his diabetes. Additionally, no
restroom stops were made. Instead, Plaintiff had to urinate publicly
in a “piss bottle” shared by all the residents.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff has a First Amendment right to reasonable
opportunities to practice his religion, subject to the legitimate
interests of the facility. See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709 (7th Cir.
2011); Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2009). The
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) also
protects an inmate's right to practice his religion, forbidding a
substantial burden on that exercise unless the burden furthers a
compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Only injunctive
relief is available under RLUIPA, not damages. Grayson v. Schuler,
5
666 F.3d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012)(RLUIPA does not create a cause
of action against state employees in their personal capacity, but
injunctive relief is available).
Plaintiff states an arguable claim for injunctive relief under
RLUIPA. He alleges that his ability to follow his religious tenets
have been obstructed or hampered by Defendants, and he seeks an
injunction to allow him to fully practice his religion. Whether the
facility’s rules and practices are the least restrictive way to achieve
a compelling governmental interest cannot be determined without a
fully developed factual record. See Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362
(7th Cir. 2015)(RLUIPA “‘requires the [prison] not merely to explain
why it denied the exemption but to prove that denying the
exemption is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental interest.’”)(quoting Holt v. Gobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 864
(2015)). For the same reasons, Plaintiff states a claim under the
First Amendment for the violation of his right to practice his
religion. A more developed record may show a legitimate reason for
the restrictions, but that determination would be premature.
A procedural due process claim cannot be ruled out at this
point, based on Plaintiff’s placement in what is described as a
6
segregation cell without an opportunity to call witnesses in his
defense or have unbiased decision makers. See Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 563–64 (1974)(procedural due process includes an
opportunity to submit evidence and impartial decision makers);
Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2002)(pretrial detainee
cannot be placed in segregation without notice and an opportunity
to be heard, unless placement was for non-punitive reasons).
Plaintiff may also state a claim that the conditions he experienced
in segregation were inhumane, in light of his allegations of no toilet
paper, no shower, no hygiene products, and a filthy cell. The Court
also cannot rule out a claim that the application of the black box to
Plaintiff in light of his medical condition states a claim for deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, though what these
Defendants knew about the alleged medical prohibition on the black
box for Plaintiff is unclear.
IT IS ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff's petition to proceed in forma pauperis is granted
(3). Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that
Plaintiff states the following federal constitutional claims: First
Amendment and RLUIPA claims based on the violation of Plaintiff’s
7
right to practice his religion; procedural due process claim based on
Plaintiff’s placement in segregation without an opportunity to call
witnesses and have unbiased decision makers; Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim based on the alleged inhumane
conditions in segregation; and, Fourteenth Amendment due process
claim based on deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical
need to avoid use of the black box. This case proceeds solely on the
claims identified in this paragraph. Any additional claims shall not
be included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion
by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15.
2.
This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is
advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before
filing any motions, in order to give Defendants notice and an
opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be
denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the
Court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.
3.
The Court will attempt service on Defendants by sending
each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from
8
the date the waiver of service is sent to file an Answer. If
Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel
within 90 days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion
requesting the status of service. After counsel has appeared for
Defendants, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting
deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.
4.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the
address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant
worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said
Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said
Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used
only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding
addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be
maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
5.
Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the day
the waiver of service is sent by the Clerk. A motion to dismiss is
not an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate
under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings
shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Opinion.
9
6.
Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff
need not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that
Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff's document
electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense
counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on
Defendants pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on
Defendants is not available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed
accordingly.
7.
Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose
Plaintiff at Plaintiff's place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants
shall arrange the time for the deposition.
8.
Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of
any change in his mailing address and telephone number.
Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address
or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with
prejudice.
9.
If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service
to the clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will
take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S.
Marshal's service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant
10
to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
10. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified
protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act.
11. The Clerk is directed to attempt service on Defendants
pursuant to the standard procedures.
ENTERED:
10/14/2015
FOR THE COURT:
s/James E. Shadid
JAMES E. SHADID
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?