Carter v. Caraway et al
Filing
61
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION: Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 58 is DENIED. Defendants' Motion for Sanctions 59 is GRANTED. Defendants Caraway, Reid, and Simpson are dismissed with prejudice. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 54 is GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions not addressed below are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 9/18/2017. (MJC, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 19 September, 2017 04:40:36 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
EMMANUEL CARTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHARLENE CARAWAY, et al.
Defendants.
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15-4127
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently civilly committed at
Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, brought the present
lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. The matter comes before this Court for
ruling on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc.
54). The motion is granted.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Doc. 58)
Plaintiff’s motion appears to request a court order directing
Defendants to provide Plaintiff with a copy of his deposition. The
Court previously advised Plaintiff that he is not entitled to a free
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copy of his deposition. See (Doc. 22 at 9, ¶ 21). At any rate,
Plaintiff filed this motion after Defendants Scott, Hankins,
Biermann, Heller, Lay, Orrill, and Pennock filed their motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiff’s deposition transcript was attached
to that motion, and Plaintiff should now have a copy.
To the extent that Plaintiff is alleging the Defendants have
failed to provide him a copy of the transcript for his review, Plaintiff
waived his signature at the conclusion of the deposition. Pl.’s Dep.
110:5-10. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 59)
Defendants Caraway, Reid, and Simpson filed a Motion for
Sanctions (Doc. 59) seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for failure
to comply with the Court’s discovery orders. Plaintiff has not
responded to the motion or requested additional time to do so.
Defendants sent interrogatories and requests to produce
documents to Plaintiff on February 22, 2016. (Doc. 33-1). Plaintiff
attempted to send responses to these discovery requests to the
Court in violation of the Court’s Scheduling Order and local rule.
See (Doc. 22 at 8, ¶ 18) (“Discovery requests and responses are not
filed with the court. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests
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directly to Defendants’ counsel and not file the requests with the
Court or the Clerk.”); CDIL L.R. 26.3(A) (stating same). The clerk
entered a remark on the docket indicating that these responses
would not be filed with the Court. See Remark entered May 2,
2016.
The Court denied Defendants’ first motion to compel responses
to these discovery requests given that Plaintiff had attempted to
send the responses to the Court. See (Doc. 35 at 3, ¶ 5). The Court
granted Defendants leave to renew their motion to compel if the
responses were not received within 30 days of that Order. Id.
Defendants’ renewed their motion to compel on August 19,
2016. (Doc. 39). The Court granted the motion and directed
Plaintiff to send his discovery responses to the Defendants within
30 days. See Text Order entered September 22, 2016. Plaintiff
again failed to send his responses, and Defendants filed a motion
for sanctions.
In their Motion for Sanctions, Defendants sought dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claims for failure to comply with the Court’s discovery
orders. (Doc. 48). The Court granted the motion, but denied the
request for dismissal. Instead, the Court stayed the discovery
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deadlines pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(iv) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure until Plaintiff complied with the Court’s previous
orders. See (Doc. 57 at 3). Plaintiff was directed to tender his
discovery responses within 30 days. Id. The Court specifically
warned Plaintiff that if he “fails to comply with this Order, the Court
will construe his failure to do so as willful,” and that the Court
would consider dismissal of his claims as a sanction if requested in
a properly raised motion. Id.
Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ assertions that he has
failed to tender the relevant discovery responses. The Court
previously admonished Plaintiff that it would construe his failure to
comply as willful, and the Court has given Plaintiff several
opportunities over more than one year to send his discovery
responses.
Given Plaintiff’s willful failure to comply with the Court’s
discovery orders, the Court finds that dismissal is an appropriate
sanction. See Ramirez v. T&H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 776 (7th
Cir. 2016) (Before imposing dismissal as a sanction for discovery
violations, the Court must “find that the responsible party acted or
failed to act with a degree of culpability that exceeds simple
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inadvertence or mistake….”); McInnis v. Duncan, 697 F.3d 661, 665
(7th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven those who are pro se must follow court rules
and directives.”); see also De Falco v. Oak Lawn Pub. Library, 25 F.
App'x 455, 457–58 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[P]ro se litigants do not enjoy
unbridled license to disregard clearly communicated court orders
and are not entitled to a general dispensation from the rules of
procedure or court-imposed deadlines.”). Accordingly, Defendants’
Motion for Sanctions is granted. Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Caraway, Reid, and Simpson will be dismissed with
prejudice.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
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more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
FACTS1
Plaintiff is civilly committed at Rushville Treatment and
Detention Facility (“Rushville” or “TDF”). Defendants were all
employed at the facility in the following capacities: Defendant Scott
was the Program Director; Defendant Hankins was the Public
Service Administrator; and, Defendants Biermann, Heller, Lay,
Orrill, and Pennock were Security Therapy Aides (“STA”).
On February 3, 2014, Plaintiff and Defendant Orrill disagreed
about whether Plaintiff’s headwear complied with TDF rules. The
incident, witnessed by Defendant Heller, resulted in Plaintiff’s
placement on temporary special management status (“temp
special”). TDF policy permits placement on temp special status
Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment despite receiving
notice of the consequences for failure to do so. See (Doc. 56). Therefore, the Court will
consider the Defendants’ assertions of fact as undisputed for purposes of ruling on the motion.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
1
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when a resident “presents an immediate threat to the safety and
security of the facility….” (Doc. 55-1 at 33). If, in the opinion of
security staff, the resident “can be more effectively managed by
placement in a Special Management Status,” the resident is moved
to a pre-designated area. Id. at 33-34.
Defendants Pennock and Lay escorted Plaintiff to a room in
Rushville’s special management unit, pending an investigation.
According to Plaintiff, the room had “concrete floors, walls, ceiling,
and an iron bunk,” and the room was otherwise empty. Pl.’s Dep.
23:23-24:1.
Defendants provided an affidavit from Rushville’s Chief
Engineer, stating that the room’s temperature was set at 72 degrees
during the six (6) hours Plaintiff was initially confined in the room.
(Doc. 55-2 at 21-22). Plaintiff testified that he was wearing
sweatpants and a t-shirt, and that he did not ask any of the
Defendants for additional clothing, a blanket, or for the heat to be
adjusted in the room. Pl.’s Dep. 26:1-27:4. Records indicate that
Plaintiff also refused food during this time. (Doc. 55-1 at 42).
At approximately 7 p.m., Plaintiff fell and was taken to the
hospital. Medical records disclose that Plaintiff was diagnosed with
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physical exhaustion, mild dehydration, and relative hypoglycemia,
and that he did not suffer any serious injury (broken bones, etc.).
The medical notes indicate that Plaintiff reported he had not eaten
for more than a day. (Doc. 55-2 at 12). Plaintiff also testified that
hospital physicians opined that he was overmedicated for his
thyroid condition. Pl.’s Dep. 33:10-13.
The Behavioral Committee found Plaintiff guilty of the
disciplinary infractions arising from the February 3, 2014 incident
two days later. Plaintiff was placed on closed management status
as a result. Pl.’s Dep. 81:5-9.
ANALYSIS
As a civil detainee, Plaintiff’s claim arises under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, not the Eighth
Amendment. Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 784 (7th Cir. 2015)
(citing Pittman v. Cnty. of Madison, 746 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir.
2014)). Despite this distinction, the protection afforded Plaintiff is
“functionally indistinguishable from the Eighth Amendment’s
protection for convicted prisoners.” Smego v. Mitchell, 723 F.3d
752, 756 (7th Cir. 2013).
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To succeed on a claim of inhumane conditions of confinement,
Plaintiff must show that he suffered a sufficiently serious
deprivation and that TDF officials were deliberately indifferent to a
serious risk of harm. Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 893-94 (7th Cir.
2008). An official acts with deliberate indifference when “the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to [detainee] health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was denied food and
subjected to cold temperatures over a period of six (6) hours while
housed in the Special Management unit. In determining whether
these conditions were sufficiently serious, the Court must examine
the severity and duration of the alleged deprivations. See Reed v.
McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1999) (a court “must assess
the amount and duration of the deprivation” in order to determine
whether the denial of food implicates constitutional concerns);
Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1997) (courts should
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examine several factors in assessing claims based on low cell
temperature, such as the severity of the cold; its duration; the
availability and adequacy of alternatives to protect from cold, and
other uncomfortable conditions).
Plaintiff does not dispute that the temperature in the room
was 72 degrees during his initial confinement. Plaintiff testified
that he had eaten breakfast on February 3, 2014, Pl.’s Dep. 12:1011, but, given the timing of his incident with Defendant Orrill, he
missed regular lunch service in his housing pod. Viewed in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record supports an inference
that Plaintiff missed two consecutive meals on February 3, 2014.
Plaintiff did not allege that he was denied food upon his return from
the hospital.
At worst, Plaintiff was forced to endure a 72-degree room
without food for approximately six (6) hours. Neither Plaintiff’s
general discomfort, nor the short-term deprivation of food permits
an inference that Plaintiff suffered the type of extreme deprivation
necessary to implicate constitutional concerns. See Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (pretrial detainees do not have a
fundamental liberty interest to be “free from discomfort.”); Dixon,
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114 F.3d at 644 (prisoner subjected to temperatures so cold that ice
formed on the walls for several winters); Del Raine v. Williford, 32
F.3d 1024, 1035 (7th Cir. 1994) (inmate’s cell temperature was 40to-50 degrees); Wade v. Haida, 2013 WL 4505990, at *9 (S.D. Ill,
filed Aug. 23, 2013) (deprivation of food for one day, on its own, did
not raise constitutional concerns).
Furthermore, the record does not suggest that Plaintiff
suffered adverse health consequences as a result of these
conditions. The hospital records disclose that Plaintiff was not
experiencing chills when he arrived at the hospital and his body
temperature was 98.7 degrees. (Doc. 55-2 at 11). Plaintiff testified
that the emergency room doctors opined that the cause of his
symptoms was overmedication for his thyroid condition. Pl.’s Dep.
33:10-13. Plaintiff had been prescribed levothyroxine, and the
symptoms of an overdose for this particular drug are consistent
with the symptoms Plaintiff experienced: cold, clammy skin;
lightheadedness; sudden loss of coordination; disorientation; and, a
change or loss in consciousness. Levothyroxine, Side Effects,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/levothyroxine-oralroute/side-effects/drg-20072133 (last accessed Sept. 14, 2017).
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Even if Plaintiff could show the requisite deprivation, he
cannot show that the Defendants were personally responsible for
the actions he alleges or that they acted with deliberate indifference.
“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability
and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the
individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional
deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted).
Plaintiff testified that Defendants Orrill and Heller had no
involvement past the initial altercation while any involvement on
the parts of Defendants Pennock and Lay ceased after Plaintiff was
escorted to the Special Management unit. Pl.’s Dep. 61:17-18;
91:8-23. These Defendants could not have known that Plaintiff
would later feel cold or that he would be denied food at the time
their respective involvements ended. Plaintiff testified that he did
not ask for additional clothing while in the room, nor did he request
a blanket, or a temperature adjustment. Therefore, any Defendant
who had contact with Plaintiff during the six-hour period in
question could not have appreciated any discomfort Plaintiff felt.
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As to Defendants Scott, Hankins, and Biermann, Plaintiff
testified that he sued these individuals solely by reason of their
supervisory positions at the TDF. Pl’s Dep. 90:14-17 (“Q. So you’re
suing [Defendants Scott, Hankins, and Biermann] because they are
in charge, they have higher roles? A. Yes.”). A government official
may not be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat
superior, that is, for the unconstitutional acts of his or her
subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Plaintiff
does not assert that these Defendants personally participated in
any of the alleged events. Pl.’s Dep. 90:24-91:7 (Defendants Scott,
Hankins, and Biermann were not present during the events in
question).
Accordingly, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could
conclude that the Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel [58] is DENIED.
2) Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions [59] is GRANTED.
Defendants Caraway, Reid, and Simpson are dismissed with
prejudice.
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3) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [54] is
GRANTED.
4) The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor
of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions not
addressed below are denied as moot, and this case is
terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs.
5) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry
of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to
appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues the
Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164 F.3d
396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given an
opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a reasonable
assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker v. O’Brien,
216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that a good faith
appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person could
suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective). If
Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the
appeal.
ENTERED:
September 18, 2017.
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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