United States of America v. Hillcrest Report, Inc. et al
Filing
106
ORDER entered by Chief Judge Sara Darrow on November 18, 2019. The United States' 101 objection is SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART and the Court ADOPTS IN PART and REJECTS IN PART the 100 Report and Recommendation. The 105 Motion for Leave to File a Reply is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to file the [105-1] reply on the docket. The Court defers ruling on the 86 Motion to Approve the Marshal's Report and Confirm Judicial Sale and the 96 Motion to Vacate Marshal 39;s Sale. The 102 Motion Requesting an Expedited Ruling is GRANTED. The Court sets the matter for an evidentiary hearing on November 25, 2019 at 10:30 a.m. at the United States Courthouse for the Southern District of Iowa located at 131 E. 4th Street Davenport, Iowa 52801. The parties should be prepared to present evidence regarding the value of the property and the amount of indebtedness still secured by the mortgage. (AK, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 18 November, 2019 03:28:00 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
HILLCREST RESORT, INC., TERRI L.
KOSTH, JAMES R. INGHRAM, AS
TRUSTEE, LYON FINANCIAL
SERVICES, NIKKI KINTZ, LANUM
ELECTRIC, LLC d/b/a RUSSELL
ELECTRIC, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, UNKNOWN
OWNERS, AND NON-RECORD
CLAIMANTS,
Defendants.
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Case No. 4:15-cv-04194-SLD-JEH
ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff United States of America’s Motion to Approve the
Marshal’s Report and Confirm Judicial Sale (“Motion to Confirm Sale”), ECF No. 86,
Defendants Hillcrest Resort, Inc. (“Hillcrest”) and Terri Kosth’s (“Defendants”) Motion to
Vacate Marshal’s Sale, ECF No. 96, Magistrate Judge Jonathan Hawley’s Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”), ECF No. 100, which recommends granting Defendants’ motion and
denying the United States’ motion, and the United States’ objection to the R&R, ECF No. 101.
Also before the Court are the United States’ Motion Requesting an Expedited Ruling, ECF No.
102, and the United States’ Motion for Leave to File a Reply, ECF No. 105. For the reasons that
follow, the objection is SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART, and the R&R is
ADOPTED IN PART and REJECTED IN PART. The Motion Requesting an Expedited Ruling
and the Motion for Leave to File a Reply are GRANTED. The Court defers ruling on the
remaining motions pending an evidentiary hearing.
1
BACKGROUND
On January 12, 1994, Hillcrest borrowed $151,000 from the Small Business
Administration (“SBA”), an agency of the United States Government. See Note, Compl. Ex. A,
ECF No. 1-1 at 1–2. 1 As security, Hillcrest granted the SBA a mortgage on the property.
Mortgage, Compl. Ex. B, ECF No. 1-1 at 3–6. The mortgage was later modified to reflect an
increase in the principal sum on the loan to $190,600. See Mod. Mortgage, Compl. Ex. D, ECF
No. 1-1 at 8–9. After Hillcrest defaulted on the loan, the United States sought foreclosure of the
mortgage. See Compl., ECF No. 1; Am. Compl., ECF No. 43. 2 The Court granted the United
States’ motion for summary judgment against Defendants and entered a judgment of foreclosure.
Sept. 28, 2017 Order, ECF No. 69. The Court ordered that the property be sold by the United
States Marshal for the Central District of Illinois at the Henry County Courthouse. Id. at 11–12.
On March 9, 2018, the United States filed a notice indicating that the Marshal’s sale
would occur on July 10, 2018. 2018 Not. Marshal’s Sale, ECF No. 72. The sale did not occur
on that date. On March 13, 2019, the United States filed a second notice indicating that the
Marshal’s sale would occur on May 7, 2019. 2019 Not. Marshal’s Sale, ECF No. 74. Later, the
United States filed a certificate of publication. See Certificate of Publication, ECF No. 75. An
agent of the Star Courier Newspaper certified that notice of the sale was published in that
newspaper once a week from April 2, 2019 through April 23, 2019. Id. The certificate
contained the contents of the notice published in the newspaper. Id.
The sale occurred as planned on May 7, 2019. On July 22, 2019, the United States filed a
certificate of purchase signed by the Marshal, which indicated that Daniel Roach had purchased
1
The United States filed an Amended Complaint, ECF No. 43, but did not reattach the exhibits, instead citing to the
exhibits attached to the Complaint when necessary.
2
The Complaint and Amended Complaint list additional Defendants who have interests in the property, but they are
not at issue in this order.
2
the property for $285,000 at the sale. Certificate of Purchase, ECF No. 83. The same day, the
United States filed the Marshal’s report of sale, which again indicated the purchaser and amount
for which the property sold. Report of Sale, ECF No. 84. It also listed “[t]he total amount of
indebtedness secured by the mortgage foreclosed herein and the Judgment of Foreclosure entered
herein.” Id. ¶ 4. The Marshal reported that notice was given in accordance with 735 ILCS 5/151507(c), that the terms of the sale were fair, that the sale was conducted fairly and without fraud,
and that justice was done by the sale. Id. ¶ 5. On July 25, 2019, the United States filed its
Motion to Confirm Sale. Defendants obtained new counsel in early August and were granted an
extension of time to file a response to the motion. 3 See Aug. 8, 2019 Text Order. On August 30,
2019, Defendants filed both a response to the motion, Resp. Mot. Confirm Sale, ECF No. 95, and
their Motion to Vacate Marshal’s Sale. The Court referred the motions to Judge Hawley for a
recommended disposition. He filed his R&R on October 9, 2019, recommending granting
Defendants’ motion and denying the United States’ motion. The United States objects to the
R&R.
DISCUSSION
I.
Motion for Leave to File a Reply
“No reply to [a] response is permitted without leave of Court.” CDIL-LR 7.1(B)(3). The
United States argues that it seeks leave to file a reply in support of its objection to address issues
raised for the first time in Defendants’ response: whether it can cite to unpublished state court
opinions and whether the case should be remanded to Judge Hawley for further proceedings.
Mot. Leave File Reply 1. The motion is GRANTED and the Clerk is directed to file the
3
Defendants’ former counsel moved to withdraw in June 2019, Mot. Withdraw, ECF No. 77, but the motion was
denied without prejudice with leave to renew once Defendants had obtained new counsel. See June 25, 2019 Minute
Entry. The United States opposed withdrawal, arguing that it was “an improper attempt to further delay a case that
has been pending since November 2015.” Objection Mot. Withdraw 1, ECF No. 79.
3
proposed reply, ECF No. 105-1, on the docket. The Court agrees with the United States that
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23, which provides, in part, that non-precedential orders “may not
be cited by any party except to support contentions of double jeopardy, res judicata, collateral
estoppel or law of the case,” Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 23(e)(1), is not binding on federal courts. But the
Court cannot give an unpublished case precedential effect, so where the Court cites to
unpublished Illinois cases, it does so only for their persuasive value. Cf., e.g., Mandelstein v.
Rukin, No. 17-cv-9216, 2019 WL 3857886, at *7 n.7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2019); Netherlands Ins.
Co. v. Knight, No. 4:10-cv-04043-SLD-JEH, 2014 WL 3376873, at *2 (C.D. Ill. July 10, 2014).
II.
Report and Recommendation
a. Legal Standard
When a magistrate judge considers a pretrial matter dispositive of a party’s claim or
defense, he must enter a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). Parties may object
within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the recommended disposition. Id. 72(b)(2).
The district judge considers de novo the portions of the recommended disposition that were
properly objected to, and may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition, or return it
to the magistrate judge for further proceedings. Id. 72(b)(3). If no objection, or only partial
objection, is made the district judge reviews the unobjected to portions of the recommendation
for clear error only. Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). But the
district judge may “reconsider sua sponte any matter determined by a magistrate judge” even if
no party objects. Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2009).
b. Analysis
Judge Hawley recommends granting Defendants’ Motion to Vacate the Marshal’s Sale on
the basis that the United States did not give proper public notice of the sale. R&R 6–9. The
4
United States objects to this finding on multiple grounds. See Objection 2. The Court addresses
this issue de novo.
i. What Law Applies
The United States raises a question as to what law applies, see id. at 3, so the Court
addresses this issue first. The United States brought this mortgage foreclosure action under 28
U.S.C § 1345, which provides district courts with original jurisdiction over “all civil actions,
suits or proceedings commenced by the United States.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 1. Section 1345,
however, does not dictate what law the court should apply.
“‘[F]ederal law governs questions involving the rights of the United States arising under
nationwide federal programs,’ [but] state law supplies the content of federal law unless Congress
has established distinctively federal rules.” United States v. Einum, 992 F.2d 761, 761–62 (7th
Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979)). The Court,
therefore, generally applies the substance of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (“IMFL”),
735 ILCS 5/15-1101–1706. See United States v. Torres, 142 F.3d 962, 966–67 (7th Cir. 1998)
(applying the IMFL in a foreclosure action brought by a government agency), overruled on other
grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. LaSalle
Nat’l Tr., 807 F. Supp. 1371, 1371 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (same). Even if federal law applied, federal
law requires that a court-ordered sale of real estate “be upon such terms and conditions as the
court directs.” 28 U.S.C. § 2001(a). The terms of the Court’s September 28, 2017 Order, which
were proposed by the United States, largely track the IMFL’s requirements.
ii. Confirmation of Judicial Sale
After a property is sold pursuant to a court-ordered sale, the plaintiff must move the court
to confirm the sale. 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b). Illinois law intends to “provide stability and
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permanency to judicial sales.” First Bank & Tr. Co. of O’Fallon, Ill. v. King, 726 N.E.2d 621,
625 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). Therefore, “[u]nless the court finds that (i) a notice required in
accordance with subsection (c) of Section 15-1507 was not given, (ii) the terms of sale were
unconscionable, (iii) the sale was conducted fraudulently, or (iv) justice was otherwise not
done,” the court must confirm the judicial sale. 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b). The United States
moves to confirm the sale held in this case. Defendants move the Court to vacate the sale,
arguing that there were deficiencies with the required notice, that the terms of the sale were
unconscionable, and that justice was not done by the sale. Judge Hawley addressed the notice
issue only, finding the remainder of the arguments moot.
1. Notice
The IMFL provides that, “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c) of Section 15-1508,
[which allows a party to the foreclosure suit to have the sale set aside if it was not notified of the
sale as required,] no sale under this Article shall be held invalid or be set aside because of any
defect in the notice thereof or in the publication of the same . . . except upon good cause shown
in a hearing.” Id. at 5/15-1508(d). This means that a court cannot vacate a sale based on
deficiencies in notice to the public unless the party seeking vacatur also makes a showing of
good cause for setting aside the sale. See Cragin Fed. Bank for Sav. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co.
of Chi., 633 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“Under the clear language of section 151508(d), therefore, the Hermans cannot establish that the sale was invalid merely by showing
that the notice was not published on the third consecutive week. They must show ‘good cause’
for setting aside the sale.”).
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a. Defect 4
The IMFL requires that a public notice include, at least:
(A) the name, address and telephone number of the person to contact for
information regarding the real estate;
(B) the common address and other common description (other than legal
description), if any, of the real estate;
(C) a legal description of the real estate sufficient to identify it with reasonable
certainty;
(D) a description of the improvements on the real estate;
(E) the times specified in the judgment, if any, when the real estate may be
inspected prior to sale;
(F) the time and place of the sale;
(G) the terms of the sale; [and]
(H) the case title, case number and the court in which the foreclosure was filed.
735 ILCS 5/15-1507(c)(1); see also Sept. 28, 2017 Order 12–13.
Defendants argue that the public notice was deficient because it did not include a
description of the improvements on the property. Mot. Vacate Marshal’s Sale ¶¶ 23–29. The
United States does not deny that the notice published in the Star Courier Newspaper did not
contain a statement about the improvements on the property. See Certificate of Publication.
Instead, it argues that such an omission was immaterial. Resp. Mot. Vacate 4–5, ECF No. 97;
Objection 5–7. The Court disagrees. The United States cites to no Illinois case law finding that
omitting a description of a property’s improvements is immaterial. It cites to Deutsche Bank
National Trust v. Paige, No. 1-12-0715, 2013 WL 3379592, at *6 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013), for that
4
The only distinct federal law appears to be that four weeks of public notice is required, 28 U.S.C. § 2002, whereas
Illinois law requires only three weeks of public notice, 735 ILCS 5/15-1507(c)(2). Four weeks was given here. See
Certificate of Publication.
7
proposition. In Paige, however, there was not a wholesale omission of a description, but rather
mere inconsistencies in how the improvements were described—a single family home versus a
two-flat building. Id. The remainder of the cases cited by the United States involve different
types of deficiencies: omission of a legal description of the property (despite inclusion of a
common description), errors in the legal description, or errors in the address. See Objection 5–6
(citing cases). The Court is not persuaded that these cases are analogous.
The United States also argues that omissions “are only material if they negatively
impacted the high bidder and value of the property,” citing to City of Chicago v. Central
National Bank, 479 N.E.2d 1040, 1046 (1st Dist. 1985). Id. at 7. In Central National Bank, 479
N.E.2d at 1045, the court held, in the context of the sale of property foreclosed under a
demolition lien, that “a defective or insufficient notice does not render the sale void, or even
voidable, unless the purchaser has notice of the irregularity.” The United States’ interpretation
of this case—that it stands for the proposition that any omission in notice is material only if it
negatively impacts the purchaser—is a stretch. Moreover, Central National Bank involved a
different statutory scheme, 735 ILCS 5/12-115–116, so it is not clear that it has any relevance to
this mortgage foreclosure action, which is governed by the IMFL. The Court adopts the R&R’s
finding that omission of this description was not immaterial. 5
5
The United States also makes arguments about the R&R that the Court finds unwarranted. Despite the de novo
review, the Court briefly addresses these for clarity. For instance, the United States argues that the R&R imposes a
requirement that the notice inform the public of the unique character of the property, which it argues is a “nebulous
and unenforceable standard.” See Objection 8. The R&R does not impose such a requirement; it merely agrees with
Defendants’ argument that the notice did not so inform the public in this case. See R&R 7. The United States also
argues that the R&R holds that specific detailed language should have been included in the notice. See Objection
10–11. But the R&R does not state what information should have been included. Instead, it finds that the United
States’ notice included no “description whatsoever of the improvements on the real estate.” R&R 7. It then conveys
what Defendants suggest are the improvements. Id. But nowhere does it require the notice to include that precise
description. How much specificity is required in a notice is not before the Court because, in this case, the United
States included no description at all.
8
2. Good Cause
The United States also objects to the R&R’s finding that Defendants have shown good
cause to set aside the sale, as required by 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(d). Objection 3–5. That the
property sold “for substantially less than its actual value could constitute ‘good cause’ for setting
aside the sale when coupled with the lack of complete compliance with the notice provisions.”
Cragin, 633 N.E.2d at 1015. But it is the party opposing the sale’s burden to prove that
sufficient grounds exist to set aside the sale. CitiMortgage Inc. v. Lewis, 25 N.E.3d 64, 71 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2014). Mere speculation that the property was sold for less than its actual value is not
sufficient. GMB Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Marzano, 899 N.E.2d 298, 314–15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014),
overruled on other grounds by BAC Home Loans Serv., LP v. Mitchell, 6 N.E.3d 162 (Ill. 2014).
The parties have introduced conflicting evidence regarding the value of the property.
Defendants have provided a broker opinion of value from NAI Ruhl Commercial Company,
which estimates that the property is worth between $625,000 and $700,000. Broker Opinion of
Value 4, Mot. Vacate Marshal’s Sale Ex. C-4, ECF No. 96-7. The United States points to a
sworn statement that Daniel Kosth, Hillcrest’s president, made in Hillcrest’s bankruptcy suit
about the property’s value. Based on an appraisal, he valued the property at $425,000. See
Schedule A/B: Assets – Real & Personal Property 4, Resp. Mot. Vacate Ex. 2, ECF No. 97-2.
Illinois courts have held that an evidentiary hearing should be held “if there is an
allegation of a current appraisal or other current indicia of value which is so measurably different
than the sales price as to be unconscionable.” Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Holtzman, 618 N.E.2d
418, 425–26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). Here, the parties need only show that the property sold for
substantially less than its value, but the Court applies the same principle. Defendants have
presented a current indicia of value which would show that the property sold for substantially
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less than its value and, therefore, an evidentiary hearing is warranted to further develop the facts.
See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Fankhauser, 890 N.E.2d 592, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (finding
that an evidentiary hearing was necessary because the party opposing the sale provided a
broker’s opinion as to the value of the property, which was drastically higher than the sale price).
The Court rejects the R&R to the extent that it recommends finding good cause established
without an evidentiary hearing.
iii. Other Arguments for Vacating the Sale
1. Notice to Non-Defaulted Parties
The Court briefly addresses Defendants’ other arguments for vacating the sale. First,
Defendants argue that they did not receive notice as required by the IMFL. Mot. Vacate
Marshal’s Sale ¶¶ 13–19. The IMFL provides:
If any sale is held without compliance with subsection (c) of Section 15-1507 of
this Article, any party entitled to the notice provided for in paragraph (3) of that
subsection (c) who was not so notified may, by motion supported by affidavit
made prior to confirmation of such sale, ask the court . . . to set aside the sale.
735 ILCS 5/15-1508(c). Subsection (3) of section 15-1507(c) requires the party giving public
notice of the sale to also “give notice to all parties in the action who have appeared and have not
theretofore been found by the court to be in default for failure to plead.” “Such notice shall be
given in the manner provided in the applicable rules of court for service of papers other than
process and complaint, not more than 45 days nor less than 7 days prior to the day of sale.” Id.;
see also Sept. 28, 2017 Order 13. Any party asking the court to set aside the sale because it did
not receive notice “shall guarantee or secure by bond a bid equal to the successful bid at the prior
sale.” 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(c).
Defendants argue that they were not provided notice within the required time period
because the notice of sale was filed fifty-five days prior to the judicial sale. The United States
10
argues that the certificate of publication, which was filed within the requisite time period, was
sufficient to give Defendants the required notice. See Resp. Mot. Vacate 3. Defendants
disagree, arguing that it is obvious the certificate of publication “was not intended to” serve as
notice to the parties. Defs.’ Reply ¶ 10, ECF No. 99. They do not cite any law to support their
position that the certificate of publication—which includes the full notice of sale—cannot serve
as the required notice. All the law requires is that the party giving notice give notice to nondefaulting parties in the manner provided for by court rules. See 735 ILCS 5/15-1507(c)(3). The
law also requires that a copy of the notice be filed with the court “together with a certificate of
counsel or other proof that notice has been served in compliance with this section.” Id.
Although no certificate of counsel was filed with the certificate of publication, the Court’s notice
of electronic filing provides the Court with sufficient proof that the notice was served upon
Defendants’ counsel electronically, which is allowed under the Court’s Local Rules. See CDILLR 5.3(A). The Court finds that notice was given to Defendants in compliance with the IMFL.
Even if the Court were to find that proper notice was not given, the law requires that the
party entitled to notice guarantee a bid equal to the successful bid at the prior sale. Defendant
Kosth purports to provide a guaranty, see Kosth Guaranty, Mot. Vacate Ex. B, ECF No. 96-2,
but the Court finds it ineffective. The guaranty states that Kosth agrees to pay a maximum
amount of $285,000, provided that certain conditions are met. See id. at 1–2. One condition is
that “[t]he Court in the Litigation enters a ruling that that [sic] the Notice did comply with the
requirements of § 15-1507.” Id. at 2. If this condition were met, then Kosth would not be
entitled to have the sale set aside and the guaranty would not be necessary.
11
2. Price was Grossly Inadequate
Defendants also argue that the sale price of $285,000 is grossly inadequate and that this
provides sufficient grounds for vacating the sale even without considering the defects in notice.
Mot. Vacate Marshal’s Sale ¶ 39. The Court will address this argument after the evidentiary
hearing.
3. Justice Was Not Done
Lastly, Defendants argue that justice was not done because the United States moved
ahead with a judicial sale in violation of an agreement between the parties. Id. ¶¶ 44–54. The
provision which allows a court to set aside a sale if justice was not done “codif[ies] the longstanding discretion of the courts of equity to refuse to confirm a judicial sale.” Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. v. McCluskey, 999 N.E.2d 321, 327 (Ill. 2013) (referring to 735 ILCS 5/151508(b)(iv)). Courts have “the power to vacate a sale where unfairness is shown that is
prejudicial to an interested party.” Id. Generally, courts require that the unfairness be caused by
the lender, rather than the party seeking to vacate the sale. Id.
Defendants provide email documentation between their former counsel and counsel for
the United States which shows that, in June 2018, the parties came to an agreement that the
United States would delay the sale date until March 1, 2019 or later if certain conditions were
met, including that Defendants pay property taxes as due, pay the cost of publication for the
upcoming sale that would be postponed, and make specified payments toward the loan. See
Emails, Mot. Vacate Ex. C-1, ECF No. 96-4. Specifically, the agreement required Defendants to
“[p]ay the SBA $1,250 per month, by the 5th of each month, beginning on 10 5 18 through Feb
2019 or until the judgment is paid in full.” Id. at 2. The agreement also required Defendants to
notify the United States of any offers on the Kosths’ home, to accept any offers of $260,000 or
12
more, and to use any proceeds from such a sale to pay the judgment in this case. Defendants
argue that they complied with all conditions, even paying $1,250 in March 2019, which the
United States accepted, and that the United States therefore breached the agreement by moving
forward with the sale.
The Court is not persuaded. Defendants suggest that the inclusion of “or until the
judgment is paid in full” means that the United States’ “intent was that this agreement could
continue, literally, for years after February 28, 2019 since the judgment balance was close to
$200,000.” Mot. Vacate ¶ 51. This is belied by the fact that the United States only agreed to
delay the sale until March 1, 2019 or after. The “until the judgment is paid in full” language
clearly addresses the situation that would arise if Defendants paid off the judgment prior to the
last payment being due in February 2019, either by paying more than $1,250 monthly or by
applying the proceeds from selling the Kosths’ home to the judgment. The Court will not read
Defendants’ suggested absurdity into the agreement. See Foxfield Realty, Inc. v. Kubala, 678
N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (“Courts will construe a contract reasonably to avoid
absurd results.”). The United States did not hold the sale prior to March 1, 2019, so it did not
breach the parties’ agreement. This does not provide a reason to vacate the sale.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the United States’ objection, ECF No. 101, is SUSTAINED IN PART and
OVERRULED IN PART and the Court ADOPTS IN PART and REJECTS IN PART the Report
and Recommendation, ECF No. 100. The Motion for Leave to File a Reply, ECF No. 105, is
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to file the reply, ECF No. 105-1, on the docket. The Court
defers ruling on the Motion to Approve the Marshal’s Report and Confirm Judicial Sale, ECF
No. 86, and the Motion to Vacate Marshal’s Sale, ECF No. 96. The Motion Requesting an
13
Expedited Ruling, ECF No. 102, is GRANTED. The Court sets the matter for an evidentiary
hearing on November 25, 2019 at 10:30 a.m. at the United State Courthouse for the Southern
District of Iowa located at 131 E. 4th Street Davenport, Iowa 52801. The parties should be
prepared to present evidence regarding the value of the property and the amount of indebtedness
still secured by the mortgage.
Entered this 18th day of November, 2019.
s/ Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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