Grant v. Hankins et al

Filing 113

ORDER denying 109 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law; denying 111 Motion for Sanctions. Entered by Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley on 01/30/2020. (Hawley, Jonathan)

E-FILED

Thursday, 30 January, 2020 11:49:52 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
CARL LEE GRANT,

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Plaintiff,
v.
GARY KULHAN,
WANDA PENNOCK,
KEITH ROSE, and
JEREMIE SEYMOUR,
Defendants.

4:17-cv-04019-JEH

Order and Opinion
Before the Court are Defendants Kuhlhan, Pennock, and Rose’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 (D.
109) and Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions (also titled “Motion of Objection to
Defendants Renewed”) (D. 111). For the reasons stated, infra, both motions are
denied.
The jury in this case returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff on his claim
that Defendants Kuhlhan, Pennock, and Rose violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right to be free from excessive force as it related to their use of
handcuffs on him. The Defendants now renew their motion made at trial,
wherein they argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to the
Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendants handcuffed him with smaller cuffs despite a
medical order for large cuffs.

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A public official defendant is entitled to qualified immunity unless two
disqualifying criteria are met. First, the evidence construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff must support a finding that the defendant violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional right. Second, that right must have been clearly
established at the time of the violation. Stainback v. Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 770 (7th
Cir. 2009). Courts may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the
two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light
of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236 (2009). “A clearly established right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that
every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates
that right.’” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (emphasis added).
Prior to trial, this Court rejected the Defendants’ qualified immunity
claims, stating:
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified
immunity. Defendants cite to Stainback v. Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 773
(7th Cir. 2009), where the Seventh Circuit stated that
[h]ad the [o]fficers known of a preexisting injury or
medical condition that would have been aggravated by
handcuffing [the plaintiff], or had [the plaintiff]
communicated to the [o]fficers that he suffered from
such an infirmity, the [o]fficers certainly would have
been obligated to consider that information, together
with the other relevant circumstances, in determining
whether it was appropriate to handcuff [the plaintiff].
Drawing attention to the last half of this quotation, Defendants
argue that they considered Plaintiff’s wrists in combination with the
fact that Plaintiff “had been accused of threatening to harm someone
else, . . . was agitated and upset by the room search, and was being
taken to a different part of the facility on a special status.” (Defs.’
Mot. Summ. J. 18.)
The holding in Stainback was that the officers’ use of handcuffs
was reasonable because the officers “did not use handcuffs in a
manner that would clearly injure or harm a typical arrestee,”
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because “it was not objectively clear to the [o]fficers that [the
plaintiff] suffered from any infirmities,” and because the plaintiff
did not “inform the [o]fficers that he had a preexisting injury or
condition that would be aggravated if he were handcuffed.” 569
F.3d at 773.
Here, unlike in Stainback, it was objectively clear to
Defendants that Plaintiff had had wrist surgery, and Plaintiff told
Defendants the small handcuffs would aggravate his wrists. A
doctor had also ordered that large handcuffs be used on Plaintiff
because of his medical condition.
In Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 780 (7th Cir. 2003), the
Seventh Circuit held that an officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity for applying tight handcuffs that caused numbness and
pain where the plaintiff “posed no danger” to the officer, “did not
resist arrest,” and “was alleged to have committed a very minor,
non-violent crime.” Although in the present case Plaintiff is alleged
to have threatened to commit a violent crime, Defendants knew this
fact before they searched Plaintiff’s cell. Plaintiff also had an
ongoing order for large handcuffs. Thus, Defendants could have
brought large handcuffs with them when they came to Plaintiff’s cell
a second time to transport Plaintiff to Fox Unit.
In addition, Plaintiff’s testimony does not support a
conclusion that he posed a danger to Defendants or that he resisted
arrest. Hearsay statements in the incident reports provide some
support for such a conclusion, but the Court cannot consider that
evidence on summary judgment.
The Court concludes that Stainback and Payne clearly
establish that under Plaintiff’s version of events, Defendants’ use of
the small handcuffs was not objectively reasonable. Therefore,
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Furthermore,
based on the evidence presented by Plaintiff, the Court concludes
that a reasonable jury could find that Defendants Kulhan, Rose, and
Pennock’s knowing use of the small handcuffs on Plaintiff when he
posed no danger to Defendants, had a large handcuff permit, and
had swollen, post-surgical wrists was objectively unreasonable.
(D. 68 at ECF pp. 24-27).

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Nothing that happened at trial alters this analysis. The jury apparently
credited the Plaintiff’s version of events, which, consistent with the Court’s
previous analysis when considering the Defendants’ qualified immunity claims
and the Plaintiff’s testimony at trial, support a conclusion that “Defendants
Kulhan, Rose, and Pennock’s knowing use of the small handcuffs on Plaintiff
when he posed no danger to Defendants, had a large handcuff permit, and had
swollen, post-surgical wrists was objectively unreasonable.” Id at ECF p. 27.
Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion is denied.
Regarding the Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and other relief, he argues
the Defendants should be sanctioned because of the delay precipitated by their
motion for judgment as a matter of law. However, the Defendants filed their
motion within the time period set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and they are entitled to file such a motion. There is nothing sanctionable in their
conduct. Finally, the Plaintiff appears to argue that the damages awarded to him
by the jury were too low. However, the amount of damages was a matter for the
jury to decide based upon the evidence presented at trail, and there is no reason
to upset its determination. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s motion is denied as well.
It is so ordered.
Entered on January 30, 2020
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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