Floyd v. Aramark Correctional Services et al

Filing 88

OPINION BY SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge: Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. (d/e 62 .) Defendants' motions for summary judgment are denied with leave to renew by December 31, 2018. (d/e's 66 , 69 .) Plai ntiff's motion for default judgment (d/e 86 ) is actually a motion to compel compliance with Magistrate Judge Schanzle-Haskins' 8/22/18 order, which directed Defendants to provide Plaintiff certain information. The motion is denied (d/e [ 86]) because Defendants maintain that they have complied with the order. Plaintiff's motion for the Court to try to recruit pro bono counsel is denied. (d/e 84 .) SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins on 11/27/2018. (MJC, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 27 November, 2018 02:15:02 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SEBRON FLOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.
ARAMARK, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

17-CV-4045

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff, a resident of the
Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, has a life-threatening
allergy to turkey. Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendants have
taken steps to ensure that Plaintiff receives a turkey-free diet, but
Plaintiff maintains that those steps did not prevent him from
receiving meals with turkey since 2015, particularly before Plaintiff
began receiving prepackaged kosher meals in the Fall of 2016.
Plaintiff argues that the basic problem is a lack of supervision over
the residents who prepare and distribute the meals. The Court
found that Plaintiff stated as claim that “he was or is being provided

Page 1 of 6

meals that are constitutionally inadequate or unsafe.” (3/17/17
Order.)
Defendants move for summary judgment, presenting evidence
that they have taken reasonable steps to try to ensure that Plaintiff
receives no turkey meals and to quickly rectify mistakes when they
occur. Plaintiff does not dispute that he has not actually eaten any
turkey and that he receives a substitute meal upon notifying
someone when a mistake is made. Plaintiff has not had an allergic
reaction though he fears he will if he accidentally eats turkey.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants have been negligent, but
negligence or even gross negligence does not violate the U.S.
Constitution. Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353 (7th
Cir. 2018). Defendants argue that deliberate indifference is the
standard, but the Court is not so sure in light of the Seventh
Circuit’s recent opinion in Miranda. Miranda jettisoned the
deliberate indifference standard for detainees regarding claims for
lack of medical care. Instead, at least for constitutional medical
claims, a detainee must show that: (1) “the medical defendants
acted purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly when
they considered the consequences of their” treatment decisions;
Page 2 of 6

and, (2) that those actions were objectively unreasonable. The
standard is “more than negligence but less than subjective intent,
something akin to reckless disregard.’” Id. (quoting Gordon v.
County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2018)). When conduct
crosses the line from negligence into objective unreasonableness
depends on the facts of each case, just like the deliberate
indifference standard.
The record here is missing important facts about the
frequency of the problem, particularly before Plaintiff began
receiving prepackaged kosher meals. For example, if Plaintiff was
served turkey nearly every day and complained to Defendants
nearly every day, an inference of something more than negligence
might arise. Relevant evidence would include the number of
grievances Plaintiff filed (with copies of those grievances provided to
the Court), whether Defendants were aware of those grievances,
and, if so, their responses to those grievances. Without facts on the
frequency of the mistakes and Defendants’ knowledge of that
frequency, summary judgment is inappropriate.
On a separate matter, Plaintiff has renewed his motion for
counsel. Plaintiff asserts that he found an attorney to accept pro
Page 3 of 6

bono appointment but that the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion. The
Court does not see a letter from that attorney in the record, but if
an attorney is willing to accept pro bono appointment in this case,
the Court will gladly appoint that attorney. The Court cannot
require an attorney to accept pro bono appointment in a civil case
like this. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 2007).
On this record, Plaintiff appears competent to proceed pro se.
The question is “whether the difficulty of the case—factually and
legally—exceeds the particular plaintiff's capacity as a layperson to
coherently present it to the judge or jury himself.” Pruitt, 503 F.3d
at 655 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s claim is relatively simple, and
most of the relevant facts are undisputed. Defendants do not
dispute Plaintiff’s turkey allergy, and Plaintiff does not dispute
Defendants’ efforts to accommodate that allergy. Plaintiff has some
federal litigation experience, and his filings demonstrate some
knowledge of civil procedure and the law. Also, Plaintiff has taken
two years of college classes. (Pl.’s Dep. 86.) Plaintiff contends that
he has not been able to obtain relevant evidence, but Plaintiff’s prior
motion to compel was granted in part, and Plaintiff has not
identified what relevant evidence he is missing. Plaintiff also
Page 4 of 6

asserts that he has not been able to depose Defendants, but he
does not identify any information that he would be able to obtain
through a deposition that he could not obtain in written discovery.
On this record, Plaintiff appears able to continue proceeding pro se.
IT IS ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied. (d/e
62.) This motion is actually a motion to compel Defendant
Blaesing to respond differently to Plaintiff’s discovery
requests. The Court has reviewed Defendant Blaesing’s
answers and objections and finds them appropriate and
responsive.
2) Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are denied with
leave to renew by December 31, 2018. (d/e’s 66, 69.)
3) Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (d/e 86) is actually a
motion to compel compliance with Magistrate Judge
Schanzle-Haskins’ 8/22/18 order, which directed
Defendants to provide Plaintiff certain information. The
motion is denied (d/e 86) because Defendants maintain that
they have complied with the order. Plaintiff may renew his
motion to compel by December 17, 2018, attaching the
Page 5 of 6

documents Defendants provided to Plaintiff in response to
Magistrate Schanzle-Haskins’ order and explaining what is
missing.
4) Plaintiff’s motion for the Court to try to recruit pro bono
counsel is denied. (d/e 84.) However, if Plaintiff provides
the name of the attorney who offered to accept pro bono
appointment in this case, the Court will contact that
attorney.
ENTERED: November 27, 2018
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 6 of 6