Nelson v. Horner et al

Filing 38

ORDER denying 20 Defendant Horner's Motion to Strike; denying 22 Defendant SolutionsNMotion, Inc.'s Motion to Strike; and denying 24 Defendant Christensen's Motion to Strike. See written Order. Entered by Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley on 10/31/2017. (KZ, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 31 October, 2017 01:55:12 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
RACHEL NELSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 4:17-cv-04176-SLD-JEH

CASEY HORNER, individually,
SOLUTIONSNMOTION, INC., an
Illinois Corporation, NELS PETER
CHRISTENSEN, individually, and
THOMPSON LEASING, LLC, an
Iowa Limited Liability Company
d/b/a Thompson Idealease,
Defendants.
Order
Now before the Court are Defendant Horner’s (Doc. 20), Defendant
SolutionsNMotion, Inc.’s (Doc. 22), and Defendant Christensen’s (Doc. 24)
Motions to Strike pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) various
paragraphs of Plaintiff Nelson’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 15).

The

Motions are fully briefed, and for the reasons set forth below, the Defendants’
Motions to Strike are DENIED. 1
I
On August 22, 2017, the Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint
under Illinois’s Wrongful Death Act. She included a count against Defendant
Horner, a count against Defendants SolutionsNMotion (Solutions) and
Christensen under a respondeat superior theory, a count for negligent

Each of the Defendant’s Motions to Strike is sufficiently the same as the others to consider them
altogether.

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entrustment against Solutions and Christensen, a count for negligent
supervision/review against Defendants Solutions and Christensen, and a count
for negligent entrustment against Defendant Thompson Idealease. The following
allegations contained therein are those the Defendants challenge in their Motions
to Strike:
1. While being interviewed by the police shortly after the fatal collision,
Defendant Horner expressed concern because he had “smoked some weed
about 3 weeks ago” (which was a violation of his conditions of bond in a
felony prosecution for aggravated sexual assault of a minor, then pending
in Henry County, Illinois). At this time, Defendant Horner further
expressed concern that alcohol he drank the night before the collision
might still be in his system. Count 1, ¶17; Count 2, ¶17.
2. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. §391.25, it was then and there the duty of Defendant
Solutions and Defendant Christensen to also conduct an annual inquiry
and review of Defendant Horner’s overall driving record, his regard for
the public’s safety, involvement in motor vehicle accidents, and violations
of traffic, criminal, and other laws. Count 3, ¶33; Count 4, ¶43.
3. In disregarding the aforesaid duties, Defendant Solutions and Defendant
Christensen, and each of them, were then and there guilty of one or more
of the following negligent acts and omissions and breaches by entrusting a
semi-trailer truck to Defendant Horner, on their behalf, even though they
knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known, that
Defendant Horner was particularly unfit to be entrusted with a semitrailer truck given his habitual disregard for the rule of law, to wit:
a. In 1996, pleading guilty and being convicted in Henry County,
Illinois for driving his motor vehicle 11-14 mph over the posted
speed limit;
b. In 1998, pleading guilty and being convicted in Henry County,
Illinois for driving his motor vehicle 15-20 mph over the posted
speed limit;
c. In 2006, pleading guilty and being convicted in Henry County,
Illinois for operating a motor vehicle without insurance;
d. In 2008, having body attachment issued for failing to pay child
support;
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e. In 2009, being sentenced to 30 days in custody for failing to pay
child support before paying in full on the morning his sentence was
to begin;
f. In 2009, being ticketed in Henry County, Illinois for driving his
motor vehicle 15-20 mph over the speed limit;
g. In 2012, being arrested in Marshall County, Illinois for leaving the
scene of an accident, failing to report property damage, hit and run,
improper lane usage, failure to give notice, and failure to reduce
speed;
h. In 2014, being arrested and charged in Henry County, Illinois with
aggravated sexual assault of a minor; bond set at $50,000 with
various conditions of bond pending trial, which trial was continued
from time to time through the October 11, 2016 fatality at issue here
and was still pending in July 2017 as of the filing of the original
complaint;
i. In August 2015, filing by Petitioner RB of stalking/no contact
petition against Defendant Horner;
j. In October 2015, filing by Petitioner LS of emergency stalking/no
contact petition against Defendant Horner, petition granted, order
entered;
k. In October 2015, filing by Petitioner RB of stalking/no contact
petition against Defendant Horner, petition granted, order entered;
l. In November 2015, filing by State of Illinois of complaint against
Defendant Horner for violating stalking/no contact order, in
proceeding 2015 CM 317;
m. In February 2016, having a bench warrant issued for failing to
appear in Court for alleged violation of stalking/no contact order;
n. In April 2016, filing by Petitioner LS of stalking/no contact petition,
petition granted, order entered;
o. In August 2016, pleading guilty to violation of stalking/no contact
order in November 2015; fines and costs assessed, time served,
conditional discharge for 1 year to expire August 16, 2017; and
p. Being a known user of illegal narcotics, including admitting to police
after the fatal crash of Decedent Daniel Nelson on October 11, 2016
that he had “smoked some weed about 3 weeks ago” (which was a
violation of his conditions of bond in a felony prosecution for the
aggravated sexual assault of a minor, then-pending in Henry
County, Illinois). Count 3, ¶34(a)-(f), (h), (n)-(v); Count 4, ¶44(a)-(f),
(h), (n)-(v).
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The Defendants each essentially argue that the above allegations are immaterial,
impertinent, and scandalous.

In her Combined Response (Doc. 33) to the

Defendants’ Motions to Strike, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendants fail to
show that any of her allegations are immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous as
required by Rule 12(f) and have failed to establish any undue prejudice as
required by Rule 12(f).
II
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that, “The court may strike
from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Motions to strike are generally disfavored
because they potentially serve only to delay. Heller Financial, Inc. v. Midwhey
Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989). Thus, motions to strike are
usually denied “unless the language in the pleading has no possible relation to
the controversy and is clearly prejudicial.” Tektel, Inc. v. Maier, 813 F. Supp. 1331,
1334 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
Here, discovery has not yet commenced and another Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss a count of the Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint remains pending.
The case’s progression through discovery and the dispositive motion stage may
make the dispute over the inclusion of the identified paragraphs and subparagraphs of the Third Amended Complaint entirely moot. Moreover, there are
tools available to the parties (e.g. motions in limine) should they continue to
dispute the particular allegations of the Complaint at a later stage in this case.
Because of the early stage of this case, the Court cannot determine with absolute
certainty whether the identified paragraphs and sub-paragraphs have no
possible relation to the controversy. The early stage of this case also prevents the
Court from concluding that certain of the identified paragraphs and subparagraphs are clearly prejudicial.

Indeed, the Defendants’ concerns about
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“mini-trials,” the risk of confusing the jury, and the revelation of scandalous
allegations that could preclude a fair trial are all premature.
III
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motions to Strike (Docs. 20, 22,
24) are DENIED.
It is so ordered.
Entered on October 31, 2017.

s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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