Trone v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 15

ORDER AND OPINION entered by Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley on 3/18/2019.IT IS ORDERED: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 10 is GRANTED, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Affirmance 13 is DENIED, and this matter is REMANDED pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for the ALJ to correctly consider the factors set forth in SSR 96-7p, obtain additional testimony from a ME as to the interaction between all three of Dudley's severe impairments, and formulate a new RFC finding, if necessary. SEE FULL WRITTEN ORDER. (SAG, ilcd)

E-FILED

Monday, 18 March, 2019 12:50:54 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
DUDLEY T.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 4:17-cv-04264-JEH

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
Order and Opinion
Now before the Court is the Plaintiff Dudley T.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 10) and the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Affirmance
(Doc. 13). 1 For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, DENIES the Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Affirmance, and REMANDS this matter for proceedings consistent with this
opinion. 2
I
At the age of 63, Dudley T. filed a claim for disability insurance benefits
(DIB), alleged a disability onset date of December 31, 2004, and his date last
insured was December 31, 2009. After a hearing with an Administrative Law
Judge, Dudley’s claim was denied on October 27, 2010. The Appeals Council (AC)
denied review of that claim and Dudley filed a Complaint in this Court on April
18, 2012. This Court remanded Dudley’s claim on July 31, 2013 due to an improper

The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 8, 9).
References to the pages within the Administrative Record will be identified by AR [page number]. The
Administrative Record appears as (Doc. 5) on the docket.
1
2

1

hypothetical question, the use of an improper legal standard, and the failure to
properly consider the disability determination of the Veterans Administration
(VA). The AC then returned the case to the ALJ pursuant to the Court’s order. On
April 28, 2014, a second hearing was held before a different ALJ, Robert H.
Schwartz. ALJ Schwartz denied Dudley’s claim, and Dudley submitted exceptions
to the final decision to the AC. The AC remanded the case back to the ALJ again.
A third hearing was held on October 5, 2015 at which time Dudley was
represented by an attorney, Medical Expert Nathan R. Strahl, M.D. (ME) testified,
and a Vocational Expert (VE) testified. On November 4, 2015, ALJ Schwartz again
denied Dudley’s claim for DIB. Dudley again filed written exceptions, but the AC
refused to assume jurisdiction making the November 4, 2015 Decision final. The
AC ultimately granted Dudley additional time to file the instant case which he did
on September 26, 2017.
II
At the October 5, 2015 hearing, Dudley was a 70-year-old Vietnam veteran.
He originally alleged that the conditions which caused him to be disabled included
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); ulcerative colitis; irritable bowel syndrome
(IBS); and depression. He had previously testified at length about his alleged
conditions at the hearings in June 2010 and April 2014.
At the June 2010 hearing, Dudley testified about the impact of his ulcerative
colitis on his work toward the end of his time at his last job. He testified about the
current impact upon his life due to ulcerative colitis including that he had to use
the bathroom six times a day, but if he were stressed he could go up to 10 times a
day in a 24-hour period. AR 31. He testified that he did not deal with stress well
and that he did not want to leave the house and did not want to drive at night. “I
think that I want to know all about everything everywhere all the time and
everything has to be where it’s supposed to be.” AR 32. He explained he got up
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three to four times every night, he patrolled his house during the night, he looked
around in his driveway and in the street, he checked to ensure all the doors and
windows were locked, and he checked to make sure the water was shut off. Id.
He occasionally saw family, participated in VA group therapy, and attended Bible
study. Dudley testified that he did not like crowds or loud noises. He testified
that changes at work before he left that job made him feel that he could not keep
up. Upon his boss calling him in, Dudley’s stomach would burn, and he would
get diarrhea “immediately.” AR 51. He retired because he did not want to get
fired and jeopardize any benefits he may have otherwise received.
At the April 2014 hearing, Dudley again testified about the issues he had at
his last job, the patrol of his house during the night, and the issues he had with
ulcerative colitis.

He said “the depression, attention, and the stress of me

underperforming was – was still there when I went back to work [after he finally
started treatment for his ulcerative colitis in 1990s].” AR 694. “At 60, I – I could –
I could not do it anymore.” Id. He discussed when he was first diagnosed with
PTSD, and that “they called it a heightened sense of . . . awareness.” AR 697. He
thereafter started to see a therapist at the VA. He testified that his wife and he
spent winter in Texas in 2009.
Finally, at the October 2015 hearing, Dudley testified once again about his
ulcerative colitis symptoms, his exaggerated startle response, and his continued
sense of being on guard during the night.

At all three hearings a VE was

questioned. At the last hearing, ME Strahl, board certified in psychiatry, testified
after reviewing Exhibits 1A through 9A (previous determinations made on
Dudley’s claim for DIB) and Exhibits 1F to 33F (medical evidence) in Dudley’s file.
He stated his medical opinion that Dudley’s PTSD was a major diagnosis with “a
secondary element relative to PTSD of depressive disorder.” AR 654. Dr. Strahl
gave Dudley a mild deficit rating in activities of daily living, a mild deficit rating
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in terms of socialization, and believed record evidence did not support “any real
deficit in [Dudley’s] ability to concentrate, focus, or persistence [sic] in pace.” AR
657. Dr. Strahl clarified that in rendering his opinion, he did not look at Dudley’s
age, past record of work, or past record of service to the country.
III
In his November 4, 2015 Decision, ALJ Schwartz (ALJ) determined Dudley
had the following severe impairments: ulcerative colitis; depression, and PTSD.
AR 628. The ALJ found none of those impairments met or medically equaled the
severity of a listed impairment. He noted medical records in which Dudley
indicated he found Pepcid very helpful in the management of his ulcerative colitis
flares. The ALJ also pointed out a handful of flares Dudley experienced between
August 2006 and January 2008 and that they resolved on their own. The ALJ noted
instances when Dudley reported no bleeding, was doing well in general, and was
doing fairly well in general. AR 629. To support only a mild restriction in
Dudley’s activities of daily living, the ALJ pointed out that Dudley testified to
reading the newspaper, reading books, paying bills, talking with his wife
regularly, spent winters in Texas, socializing with friends and family while in
Texas, “got a lot of exercise” by bicycling in Texas, walking his dog, attending
church, and singing in the choir with his wife. Id. at 629-30. The ALJ similarly
relied upon many of those activities to find Dudley had no more than moderate
difficulties in social functioning. The ALJ determined Dudley had no more than
moderate difficulty with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace. The ALJ
noted Dudley testified to difficulty concentrating and hypervigilance (particularly
at night). AR 630. He considered both Dr. Strahl’s opinion and the State Agency
sources’ opinions.
The ALJ made the following residual functional capacity (RFC) finding:
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[T]he claimant had the [RFC] to perform medium work as defined in
20 CFR 404.1567(c) with the following non-exertional limitations.
Any work must have allowed for washroom accessibility. Although
he was capable of understanding and remembering complex and/or
detailed instructions, deficits in concentration, persistence, and pace
due to his combination of impairments limited him to performing
simple, routine, and repetitive tasks on a sustained basis with only
routine breaks. He must have avoided more than occasional contact
with the general public and any tasks must not have required closed,
sustained interaction with others. Any work must not have required
more than ordinary or routine changes in work setting or duties.
AR 631. He initially noted that he incorporated by reference the discussion in the
two prior decisions regarding Dudley’s allegations and testimony. From the most
recent hearing in 2015, the ALJ mentioned Dudley’s testimony that he quit
working full-time in December 2004 due to blood in his stool and the resulting
inability to concentrate on work, the urgency to use the bathroom Dudley
“always” had, his constant worry about colitis, his exaggerated startle response,
and his ability to go to church and sing in the choir. The ALJ also noted Dudley’s
comment that on a bad day, he would just not attend choir.

The ALJ also

summarized Dr. Strahl’s hearing testimony.
The ALJ concluded, “[Dudley’s] claims of extremely limited functional
capacity are not demonstrated by the medical records or reports of activities. The
claimant alleged that problems with colitis and anxiety interfered with his work
before he eventually retired after working for 38 years.” AR 633. The ALJ
observed that treatment notes suggested Dudley’s condition generally responded
well to treatment without debilitating side effects. He noted Dudley’s treating
gastroenterologist, Michael Cassaday, D.O. “specifically stated that the claimant
generally did fairly well on medication and his colitis flares were intermittent and
sporadic[.]” Id.
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The ALJ next addressed the evidence pertaining to Dudley’s PTSD. He
concluded, “[T]he record does not support a finding that [Dudley’s] depressive
disorder or anxiety disorder would have prevented him from performing
relatively ‘low stress’ work consistent with the specific limitations set forth in the
adopted [RFC].” Id. The ALJ relied upon Dudley’s treatment history, clinical
findings, and daily activities before and after his date last insured to support that
assessment. Dr. Strahl’s opinions were given “varying amounts of weight.” AR
634. The ALJ specifically highlighted Dr. Strahl’s testimony that Dudley had
chronic mild depression that was worse when his colitis was worse, but was still
no more than a moderate level of depression. The ALJ gave a State Agency
medical consultant’s opinion “great weight” that Dudley could perform unskilled
work. Id.
The ALJ detailed Dr. Cassaday’s July 2014 letter in which he noted Dudley
did “fairly well” on routine medications and his intermittent flares of colitis only
required additional medications. AR 1400. He noted Dudley’s symptoms of
cramps, discomfort, and bowel movement urgency occurred “sporadically” and
“sometimes” required additional medications or diapers. AR 635, citing AR 1400.
The ALJ concluded Dr. Cassaday was “very vague with respect to the length of
the flares” and “did not specify how they incapacitated [Dudley].” AR 635. He
accordingly gave Dr. Cassaday’s opinion “little weight.” Id. The ALJ also noted
that Dr. Cassady wrote in December 2007 that it was his opinion “that certainly
[PTSD] can contribute to the complexity of the management of the claimant’s
ulcerative colitis as well as issues regarding control of his symptoms and flare of
the disease process.” Id. The ALJ emphasized that Dr. Cassady wrote PTSD “can”
affect colitis, “but not that it actually did in the claimant’s case.” AR 635. The ALJ
found it significant that Dr. Cassady made no mention of PTSD, any mental health
condition, or any mental health symptoms when he provided a short summary of
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Dudley’s colitis symptoms and treatment in July 2014. The ALJ thus decided,
“This suggests that the claimant’s colitis and PTSD were not as intertwined as the
claimant has alleged.” Id.
Finally the ALJ mentioned he considered the VA’s finding that Dudley was
disabled under its guidelines, Dudley’s therapist’s letters written on his behalf,
and Dudley’s GAF scores.
IV
Dudley argues the ALJ’s assessment of his subjective complaints was
patently wrong because: the ALJ erroneously discredited Dudley’s allegations of
disabling colitis symptoms; the ALJ erroneously discredited Dudley’s allegations
of disabling PTSD symptoms; the ALJ mischaracterized Dudley’s daily activities
and relied upon the opinion of an ME who mischaracterized Dudley’s activities;
and the ALJ failed to consider other factors that add to Dudley’s credibility and
failed to address other factors in the decision despite these being raised specifically
at the hearing. Dudley also argues the ALJ erred when assessing his RFC.
The Court's function on review is not to try the case de novo or to supplant
the ALJ's findings with the Court's own assessment of the evidence. See Schmidt v.
Apfel, 201 F.3d 970, 972 (7th Cir. 2000); Pugh v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1989).
Indeed, "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Although great deference is afforded to the determination made by the ALJ, the
Court does not "merely rubber stamp the ALJ's decision." Scott v. Barnhart, 297
F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court's function is to determine whether the
ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper
legal standards were applied. Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986).
Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
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might accept as adequate to support the decision. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 390 (1971), Henderson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 1999).
In order to qualify for disability insurance benefits, an individual must show
that his inability to work is medical in nature and that he is totally disabled.
Economic conditions, personal factors, financial considerations, and attitudes of
the employer are irrelevant in determining whether a plaintiff is eligible for
disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566. The establishment of disability under the Act
is a two-step process.
First, the plaintiff must be suffering from a medically determinable physical
or mental impairment, or combination of impairments, which can be expected to
result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Second, there must be
a factual determination that the impairment renders the plaintiff unable to engage
in any substantial gainful employment. McNeil v. Califano, 614 F.2d 142, 143 (7th
Cir. 1980). The factual determination is made by using a five-step test. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520. In the following order, the ALJ must evaluate whether the
claimant:
1)

currently performs or, during the relevant time period, did
perform any substantial gainful activity;

2)

suffers from an impairment that is severe or whether a
combination of her impairments is severe;

3)

suffers from an impairment which meets or equals any
impairment listed in the appendix and which meets the
duration requirement;

4)

is unable to perform her past relevant work which includes an
assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity; and

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5)

is unable to perform any other work existing in significant
numbers in the national economy.

Id. An affirmative answer at any step leads either to the next step of the test, or at
steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the plaintiff is disabled. A negative answer at any
point, other than at step 3, stops the inquiry and leads to a determination that the
plaintiff is not disabled. Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1984).
The plaintiff has the burdens of production and persuasion on steps 1
through 4. However, once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show ability to engage in some other
type of substantial gainful employment. Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.
1985); Halvorsen v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1984).
In the instant case, Dudley claims error on the ALJ’s part at Step Four.
A
In support of his argument that the ALJ erred in discrediting his allegations
of disabling colitis symptoms, Dudley makes clear he does not claim he could not
work while he was working; he claims that despite years of attempting to work
with his symptoms, he finally reached a point where he was unable to function in
a work setting. He contends the ALJ erred by mischaracterizing the evidence after
the alleged onset date, assumed if Dudley’s colitis symptoms were stable they
were minimal, failed to properly consider the waxing and waning nature of his
colitis, and failed to consider how anxiety exacerbated his symptoms such that his
combined impairments led him to reduce his activities.

The Commissioner

counters that the ALJ did not minimize Dudley’s symptoms but rather established
that the medical record provided his symptoms did not always wax and wane, the
ALJ considered his symptoms did wax and wane (when he noted Dr. Cassady said
Dudley’s colitis flares were “intermittent” and “sporadic”), and recognized and
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eliminated Dudley’s worry about the location of the closest bathroom where the
ALJ found that any job Dudley could perform must include washroom access. The
Commissioner also argues that a claimant’s daily activities are a regulatory factor
for an ALJ to consider, and the ALJ’s analysis otherwise followed the subjective
symptom evaluation provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vi).
In her Memorandum, the Commissioner points out, verbatim, what the ALJ
listed as Dudley’s daily activities. She argues, consequently, the ALJ fulfilled his
obligation to consider Dudley’s daily activities.

However, her argument is

unresponsive to Dudley’s contention that the ALJ mischaracterized the evidence
of record and it overlooks relevant case law. SSR 96–7p 3 instructs that when
“determining the credibility of the individual's statements, the adjudicator must
consider the entire case record,” and that a credibility determination “must contain
specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the
case record.” SR 96-7p at *2. An ALJ should consider elements such as objective
medical evidence of the claimant's impairments, the daily activities, allegations of
pain and other aggravating factors, “functional limitations,” and treatment
(including medication). Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 2004); Rice v.
Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 371 (7th Cir. 2004).

A credibility finding “must be

supported by the evidence and must be specific enough to enable the claimant and
a reviewing body to understand the reasoning.” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 678
(7th Cir. 2008).
As the relevant case law makes clear, it is not enough for an ALJ to simply
consider a claimant’s activities of daily living. The ALJ must properly consider
those activities. See Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2013) (“although it

While the Social Security Administration published SSR 16-3p (effective March 28, 2016) which
rescinded and superseded SSR 96-7p, SSR 96-7p was still in effect at the time of the ALJ’s November 2015
Decision.
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is appropriate for an ALJ to consider a claimant's daily activities when evaluating
their credibility, SSR 96–7p, at *3, this must be done with care”). The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly cautioned that a person’s ability to
perform daily activities, especially if that can be done only with significant
limitations, does not necessarily translate into an ability to work full-time.” Id.
(citing cases).
Here, the ALJ ignored several statements Dudley made at his three hearings
which shed light on his limitations in daily activities. At the first hearing, Dudley
testified he could cough or sneeze and he would fill his pants. AR 30. He wore
diapers. Id. His ulcerative colitis caused him cramps “at any time and half a dozen
bathroom visits every day, loss of sleep from getting up in the middle of the night
to go to the bathroom and not wanting to leave the house until I can find another
toilet and another toilet.” AR 30. He wore diapers “[e]very time [he] had to go
anywhere, whether it’s to church or –“ for ten years off and on. AR 30-31.
At the second hearing, Dudley testified that he had diarrhea every day and
that it was uncontrollable. AR 701. He stated he previously bought a mountain
bike to become more active, but it sat on a hook in his garage and he had not
touched it for five years. “[T]here’s no enjoyment with – with that.” AR 700. He
“sometimes” had cramps. AR 701. He testified his colitis symptoms would come
on so fast that he would have to pull his car over if he were driving. He said, “I
lead a guarded life about where I’m going go [sic] with . . . how tolerate [sic] today.
The last thing that I’ve eaten is two pieces of toast on Saturday morning [two days
before the hearing].” AR 703. He did not eat in public because he was worried he
would have an exacerbation after a meal. He testified that a combination of his
PTSD and colitis caused him unpredictable bowel movements, exhaustion, and
agitation. AR 704. As for his trips to Texas for the winters, the car trip took three
days. During that trip, Dudley limited himself to one meal per day, toward the
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middle part of the day. “And then there’s always Imodium to try and control
diarrhea. And the – there’s two chair pads that – that I put over the car – the car
seat. And I’ve pulled over off of the side of the road, and look – look for some
bushes and – a few times.” AR 705. He continued that he and his wife would have
to stop for two hours at a time on the trip. His cramps prevented him from doing
anything as he experienced them and, at times, Dudley would switch driving with
his wife so that he could put his passenger seat back to recline a bit. AR 707.
Dudley explained that helped his symptoms. At his third and last hearing, Dudley
testified:
[E]ven today, I was looking for – looking for a bathroom. There’s –
there’s always that urgency. And you – you – it – you can’t relax. You
can’t calm down. You – you can’t stand down, because you don’t
know when you’re going to get cramps, and [he would] make – with
another run to the bathroom.
AR 668. Even when he was not having colitis flares he worried about them. He
explained that if he were having a bad day due to a colitis flare or he was too
stressed out, Dudley would just not go to choir if he did not want to do so. AR
670.
Nowhere in the ALJ’s Decision does he discuss the extent to which Dudley
testified his symptoms caused limitations in daily living in general or in his
specifically identified daily activities in particular. There was a passing reference
in the ALJ’s Decision to Dudley’s testimony that he would not attend choir if he
had a bad day. That is not enough to satisfy the ALJ’s obligation to properly
consider Dudley’s daily activities. As Dudley argues, the ALJ mischaracterized
evidence of Dudley’s activities of daily living in the Decision.

The “critical

differences between activities of daily living and activities in a full-time job” are
made even more critical when an ALJ fails to accurately present a claimant’s
limitations in completing his daily activities. See Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640,
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647 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that the critical differences between the two are that “a
person has more flexibility in scheduling the former than the latter, can get help
from other persons . . . and is not held to a minimum standard of performance, as
she would be by an employer”).

The ALJ clearly failed to recognize these

differences and such failure amounted to a “deplorable” feature of his Decision.
See id. This is especially true in this case where there was evidence of how Dudley
performed in his job while he experienced the limiting symptoms caused by
ulcerative colitis shortly before he retired in 2004. Dudley insists that he finally
reached a point where he was unable to function in a work setting despite years of
attempting to work with his symptoms.
Dudley testified at his first hearing in 2010 that he left his last job because
he could not do it anymore as he spent a lot of time in the bathroom. AR 28. “[He]
would have cramps and [he] would have bloody diarrhea and explosive diarrhea
and black diarrhea and it took away from my ability to do my job and I couldn’t
concentrate.” Id. He testified further that he was called into his boss’s office and
the latter would tell him his speed and accuracy were not what they should be and
he could be replaced. Dudley explained that his cramps caused him to go to the
bathroom, sometimes for 20 minutes, and he would lay on the floor and then
return to work to “see if I could pick up where I left off[.]” AR 29. He wore diapers
the last few years that he worked. AR 50. At his second hearing in 2014, Dudley
testified that he decided to stop working in 2004 for several reasons including
sleep loss during the night, supervisors reminded him to do a better job, he had
headaches and became frustrated, and he was exhausted and then his stomach
began to give him problems (diarrhea). AR 688-89. He said his health problems
continued to his then-current state where “there’s blood in my stool, and if you
see blood in your stool, you’re not going to get much done.” AR 689. He went on:
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There was a time where there was six years that I did not get a raise.
And the – the – the bloody diarrhea had – had stomach cramps, and I
was on the floor in – in my cubicle for 10 minutes, 15 minutes, 20
minutes waiting for the gas cramps to try and pass. And then if – at
that time, I had diarrhea, then I’d have to go to the bathroom, then I’d
have to clean it up, so I had a bag that I would take with me. I’d had
diapers and it’d have change of pants and it’d have towels. And tums
and Rolaids and Pepto-Bismol and Imodium and that was how – how
I lived my life, and it did not get any better.
AR 690. He also stated that he soiled his office chair at work which caused him to
get a chair pad. AR 699. He explained that his bathroom issues and accidents
caused him to be away from his work terminal for a half hour at a time. AR 70001. At the last hearing in 2015, Dudley testified again about the distraction at work
caused by his bloody stool. He explained he would not get much work done as he
was distracted by his bloody stool. The work he did complete he would have to
review it the next day because “it wouldn’t – not be my best work.” AR 668.
Once again, nowhere in the ALJ’s Decision did he discuss Dudley’s
testimony regarding the extent to which he found himself affected by colitis
symptoms at work before he left in 2004. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(3) (“We will
consider all evidence in your case record when we make a determination or
decision whether you are disabled”) (emphasis added). The ALJ went only so far
as to summarize that Dudley testified he quit full-time work in 2004 “due to blood
in his stool and the resulting inability to concentrate on work.” AR 632. Later, the
ALJ determined that while Dudley alleged his “problems with colitis and anxiety
interfered with his work before he eventually retired after working for 38 years . .
. he managed to work a relatively stressful job steadily despite that condition and
despite the stress he has alleged.” AR 633.
Determinations of credibility made by the ALJ will not be overturned unless
the findings are patently wrong. Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310-11 (7th Cir.
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2012).

“Patently wrong” means an ALJ’s decision lacks any explanation or

support. Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014). The ALJ in this case
made a patently wrong credibility determination because it lacks support in the
record given the erroneous way in which the ALJ represented relevant evidence.
It is true the ALJ also pointed to Dudley’s objective medical evidence, a listed
factor to consider, to support his conclusions about the latter’s limitations.
However, the ALJ relied heavily upon Dudley’s daily activities to reduce the
significance of medical findings which showed ongoing issues with Dudley’s
ulcerative colitis. Thus, the ALJ’s SSR 96-7p analysis was fatally flawed. This
matter must be remanded.
B
The Commissioner argues that Dudley’s RFC finding argument is simply an
extension of his subjective symptom evaluation claim. The Court agrees and
therefore finds there is no need to separately address the ALJ’s RFC finding where
the Court has already determined the ALJ made a fatal error in his consideration
of Dudley’s subjective symptoms. The RFC finding must accordingly be revisited
upon remand.
This case presents a close question as to whether Dudley is entitled to a
remand with instructions for the Commissioner to calculate and award benefits to
him. “An award of benefits is appropriate, however, only if all factual issues
involved in the entitlement determination have been resolved and the resulting
record supports only one conclusion – that the applicant qualifies for disability
benefits.” Allord v. Astrue, 631 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2011). Ultimately, the
interplay of Dudley’s ulcerative colitis, depression, and PTSD is beyond the
Court’s power to say, unequivocally, all factual issues involved in his entitlement
determination have been resolved and the resulting record supports only that he
is disabled. This is particularly so where the ME’s testified-to opinion was that
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Dudley was a “very high functioning – to his benefit – high functioning
individual” insofar as his PTSD was concerned. AR 658. The Court expects that
on remand, any ME that may be called upon to opine as to Dudley’s limitations
will be provided a complete, accurate picture of Dudley’s daily activities as set
forth in all the evidence of record (including Dudley’s own subjective statements),
and the ME will be called upon to opine as to all of Dudley’s severe impairments.
V
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 10) is GRANTED, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Affirmance (Doc.
13) is DENIED, and this matter is REMANDED pursuant to Sentence Four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) for the ALJ to correctly consider the factors set forth in SSR 96-7p,
obtain additional testimony from a ME as to the interaction between all three of
Dudley’s severe impairments, and formulate a new RFC finding, if necessary.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment as follows: IT IS ORDERED
AND ADJUDGED that this case is remanded to the Commissioner of Social
Security for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), Sentence Four.
It is so ordered.
Entered on March 18, 2019.
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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