People of the State of Illinois v. 3M Company

Filing 23

ORDER entered by Chief Judge Sara Darrow on September 21, 2023. Plaintiff People of the State of Illinois, ex. rel. Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of the State of Illinois's 3 Motion to Remand is GRANTED. This suit is remanded back to the Circuit Court of the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit, Rock Island County. (AAK)

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 1 of 14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
ex. rel. KWAME RAOUL, Attorney General
of the State of Illinois,
Plaintiff,
v.
3M COMPANY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff People of the State of Illinois, ex. rel. Kwame Raoul,
Attorney General of the State of Illinois’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 3. For the following
reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On March 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Illinois state court against Defendant
3M Company. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 5–69. According to the complaint, Defendant is a
manufacturing company which operates throughout the United States. Id. at 10. Since the
1970s, it has operated a manufacturing facility on the banks of the Mississippi River in Cordova,
Illinois (the “Cordova Facility”). Id. Defendant produces numerous chemical products at this
facility, some of which contain perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (“PFAS”). Id. at
11–12.
PFAS are toxic chemicals that are harmful to public health, safety, and welfare, as well as
to the environment. Id. at 3. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“US EPA”)
has established a lifetime health advisory level for certain PFAS compounds. Id. at 12. The
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (“Illinois EPA”) has also established health advisories
1

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 2 of 14

containing health-based guidance levels for several PFAS. Id. Defendant “has detected PFAS in
wastewater at, from, and around the Cordova Facility at levels injurious to public health and
welfare and to the environment.” Id. These levels are “thousands of times higher” than the
levels established by the US EPA and the Illinois EPA. Id. at 13. The US EPA has also detected
levels of PFAS in wastewater from the Cordova Facility that exceed its and the Illinois EPA’s
established levels. Id.
Plaintiff claims that “[o]n information and belief, [Defendant] manufactured and disposed
of PFAS and/or PFAS-containing products at the Cordova Facility in a manner that caused PFAS
to be released into Illinois’ environment.” Id. at 12. Explicitly excluded from the definition of
PFAS as used in the complaint are “any PFAS that have contaminated Illinois’ environment or
natural resources from aqueous film-forming foams (“AFFF”) containing . . . PFAS
compound[s].” Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “negligently operated [the] Cordova
Facility such that it allowed the discharge, emission, placement, disposal, leakage, spillage,
and/or abandonment of PFAS” and that, despite knowing that PFAS are toxic and pose
substantial risks to health and the environment, it “persistently and intentionally hid this
information from Illinois and the public.” Id. at 19. Plaintiff brings claims for violation of the
Illinois Environmental Protection Act, 415 ILCS 5/1–5/58.17 (Counts I, II, III, IV, and V);
violation of the Illinois Fish and Aquatic Life Code, 515 ILCS 5/1-1–5/50-1, and Wildlife Code,
520 ILCS 5/1.1–5/4.4 (Count VI); negligence (Count VII); trespass (Count VIII); common law
public nuisance (Count IX); and common law prohibition on unjust enrichment (Count X).
Compl. 38–60. It seeks compensatory damages for the PFAS contamination and the costs of
remediation; injunctive relief to address past, present, and future PFAS contamination; and
statutory penalties, as well as attorney’s fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. Id. at 61–63.

2

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 3 of 14

On April 21, 2022, Defendant removed this action to the Central District of Illinois. Not.
Removal, ECF No. 1. It cites the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), as the
basis for federal jurisdiction. Id. at 3. As the suit “seeks damages for all Illinois natural
resources allegedly contaminated with PFAS from the Cordova Facility—including downstream
areas of the Mississippi River,” Defendant argues that the alleged contamination for which
Plaintiff alleges Defendant is responsible “plausibly may encompass and overlap with PFAS
contamination” from other sources, specifically, the use, storage, and/or disposal of AFFF
(“MilSpec AFFF”) by the U.S. Military at the Rock Island Arsenal, twenty-five miles
downstream from the Cordova Facility. Id. at 2. Defendant states that because it developed and
sold MilSpec to the U.S. Military, some of which was stored and used at the Rock Island
Arsenal, it intends to assert the federal government contractor defense, entitling it to a federal
forum. Id. at 2, 8, 14.
Plaintiff now moves to remand this case back to state court, arguing that the federal
officer removal statute is not a basis for removal because Plaintiff does not seek to hold
Defendant liable for contamination from any MilSpec AFFF released from the Rock Island
Arsenal but rather only for PFAS discharged specifically from the Cordova Facility. Mem.
Supp. Mot. Remand 1–2, ECF No. 4.
DISCUSSION
I.

Removal
A. Legal Standard
“The federal officer removal statute permits a defendant to remove to federal court a

state-court action brought against the ‘United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any
person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official

3

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 4 of 14

or individual capacity for any act under color of such office.’” Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.,
551 U.S. 142, 145 (2007) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). A plaintiff may
move to remand the case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time before
final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “The party seeking removal bears the burden of proving
the grounds for its motion.” Ruppel v. CBS Corp., 701 F.3d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir. 2012).
A defendant need not submit evidence in support of its notice of removal under the
federal officer removal statute. Betzner v. Boeing Co., 910 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2018).
Rather, “[j]urisdictional allegations control unless it is legally impossible for them to be true.”
Id. at 1014 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). Courts will review “allegations in
support of removal under the federal pleading standards, asking whether they are facially
plausible.” Baker v. Atl. Richfield Co., 962 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2020).
B. Analysis
The central purpose of the federal officer removal statute is to protect the federal
government and its operations from potential interference by the states through proceedings in
state court. Watson, 551 U.S. at 150. Because such proceedings “may reflect local prejudice
against unpopular federal laws or federal officials” and may deprive federal officials of a federal
forum in which to assert federal immunity defenses, it is important for a federal forum to be
available. Id. (quotation marks omitted). The same considerations apply to a private person who
acts with or for federal officers or agents in executing duties under federal law. Id. at 151.
For a defendant to remove a case pursuant to the statute, it “must show it was a (1)
‘person’ (2) ‘acting under’ the United States, its agencies, or its officers (3) that has been sued
‘for or relating to any act under color of such office,’ and (4) has a colorable federal defense to
the plaintiff’s claim.” Ruppel, 701 F.3d at 1180–81 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)). The statute

4

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 5 of 14

thus operates as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule: whereas an action may
generally only be removed to federal court under federal question jurisdiction if “the federal
question . . . appear[s] on the face of [the] properly pleaded complaint,” under the federal officer
removal statute, “the federal-question element is met if the defense depends on federal law.”
Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 430–31 (1999). At this stage, the court will credit the
removing party’s theory of the case, even if both sides “have reasonable theories.” See Baker,
962 F.3d at 947. The concern is “with who makes the ultimate determination, not what that
determination will be.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court “has made clear that
courts must liberally construe” the statute. Id. at 941 (quotation marks omitted); see also
Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 (1981) (noting that “the policy favoring removal
[under the federal officer removal statute] should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging
interpretation of § 1442(a)(1)” (quotation marks omitted)); Ruppel, 701 F.3d at 1180 (“[T]he
federal officer removal statute is not narrow or limited.” (quotation marks omitted)).
The Court will examine whether Defendant has satisfied each requirement of the statute.
i. Person Within Meaning of Statute
Corporations are persons for purposes of the federal officer removal statute. See Ruppel,
701 F.3d at 1181. Defendant states that it is a corporation, Not. Removal 11; see also Compl. 10
(alleging that Defendant is a corporation), so the person requirement is satisfied.
ii. Acting Under the United States
Courts consider government contractors to be “acting under” the United States, its
agencies, or its officers when they “assist, or . . . help carry out, the duties or tasks of the federal
superior,” Watson, 551 U.S. at 152 (emphases omitted), such as “help[ing] the [g]overnment to
produce an item that it needs,” Baker, 962 F.3d at 942 (quotation marks omitted); see, e.g.,

5

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 6 of 14

Betzner, 910 F.3d at 1015 (finding that the defendant “plausibly alleged that it acted under
federal officers when it contracted to manufacture heavy bomber aircraft for the United States
Air Force, and that it acted under the military’s detailed and ongoing control”). “Acting under”
may include situations in which a defendant “work[s] hand-in-hand with the federal government
to achieve a task that furthers an end of the federal government” or in which “the federal
government uses a private corporation to achieve an end it would have otherwise used its own
agents to complete.” Ruppel, 701 F.3d at 1181. However, mere compliance with the law—even
where compliance is overseen by the government—is not sufficient. Watson, 551 U.S. at 152.
In the notice of removal, Defendant alleges that for over three decades, it manufactured
MilSpec AFFF for sale to the U.S. military. Not. Removal 8. It notes that “MilSpec AFFF is a
mission critical military and aviation safety product that, without the support of private
contractors, the government would have to produce for itself” and that “the military has long
depended upon outside contractors like [Defendant] to manufacture and supply AFFF.” Id. at
12. Moreover, it asserts, “[i]n designing, manufacturing and supplying MilSpec AFFF products,
[Defendant] acted . . . in accordance with detailed specifications, promulgated by Naval Sea
Systems Command, that govern AFFF formulation, performance, testing, storage, inspection,
packaging, and labeling.” Id. at 13. Because Defendant has thus plausibly alleged that it assisted
the federal government in producing a necessary item under the military’s observation and
control, a task the government would otherwise have had to use its own agents to complete, it
has satisfied the “acting under” requirement of the federal officer removal statute. See Nessel v.
Chemguard, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-1080, 2021 WL 744683, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2021) (finding
that the defendants, private contractors, were “acting under” a federal officer by producing

6

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 7 of 14

MilSpec AFFF because that “is a product that the [g]overnment would have had to create if [the]
[d]efendants did not exist”).
iii. Colorable Federal Defense
A defendant must also allege a “colorable or plausible federal defense.” See Hammer v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 905 F.3d 517, 528 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks
omitted). Defendant has stated it intends to assert the federal government contractor defense as
to MilSpec AFFF. See Not. Removal 15. This defense “immunizes government contractors
from state tort law when the government had a hand in a defendant’s allegedly defective design.”
Ruppel, 701 F.3d at 1183. It “applies where (1) the federal government approved reasonably
precise specifications, (2) the manufactured equipment conformed to the government’s
specifications, and (3) the contractor warned the federal government about the equipment’s
dangers that were unknown to the government.” Betzner, 910 F.3d at 1016 (citing Boyle v.
United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988)). The defense need only be “colorable,” not
“clearly sustainable.” Ruppel, 701 F.3d at 1182 (quotation marks omitted).
Defendant states that the U.S. government has approved rigorous specifications for the
manufacture and sale of MilSpec AFFF, which were created and administrated by Naval Sea
Systems Command, namely, that,
[a]ll MilSpec AFFF products must be qualified for listing on the applicable
Qualified Products List prior to military procurement. Prior to such listing, a
manufacturer’s products are examined, tested, and approved to be in conformance
with specification requirements. . . . After a product is added to the Qualified
Products List, [c]riteria for retention of qualification are applied on a periodic basis
to ensure continued integrity of the qualification status.
Not. Removal 7 (third alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quotation marks omitted). It
notes that “the current MilSpec expressly contemplates that AFFF formulations will contain
[PFAS compounds].” Id. at 8. Defendant further alleges that the MilSpec AFFF it manufactured
7

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 8 of 14

conformed to the government’s specifications. See id. at 16 (“[Defendant’s] products appeared
on the DOD Qualified Products List, which could have happened only if Naval Sea Systems
Command had first determined that they conformed to the MilSpec [specifications].”). And it
claims that “the government was adequately informed regarding alleged product-related dangers”
of MilSpec AFFF through “testing protocols and requirements for toxicity, chemical oxygen, and
biological demand.” Id. at 17 (quotation marks omitted) (“[I]t is clear that the United States has
long understood that AFFF contain PFAS and may contain or break down into [PFAS
compounds]; that AFFF constituents can migrate through the soil and potentially reach
groundwater; and that it has been reported that this may raise environmental or health issues.”).
Defendant points to government reports from 1980 and 2017 discussing the adverse
environmental effects of AFFF to illustrate that the government was aware of the dangers of
AFFF. Id. at 17–18; see, e.g., Betzner, 910 F.3d at 1015–16 (finding that the defendant had
adequately alleged the federal government contractor defense where it alleged that “the federal
government was independently aware of the potential health hazards related to” the acts alleged
in the complaint).
For damages related to MilSpec AFFF, Defendant has plausibly alleged each of the three
elements of the federal government contractor defense, showing a colorable federal defense.
iv. Under Color of Federal Authority
The outcome of Plaintiff’s motion to remand thus hinges on the “under color of federal
authority” requirement. That a defendant acted generally under a federal directive and would
have a colorable defense for those actions is not sufficient to remove a case; the actions under
federal directive must relate to the claims brought in the suit. See Baker, 962 F.3d at 943; see
Ruppel, 701 F.3d at 1181 (noting that the “under color of federal authority” requirement “is

8

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 9 of 14

distinct from the ‘acting under’ requirement in the same way a bona fide federal officer could not
remove a trespass suit that occurred while he was taking out the garbage”). To satisfy this
requirement, a defendant must plausibly allege that the action is “connected or associated[] with
acts under color of federal office.” Baker, 962 F.3d at 943–44 (emphases omitted) (quotation
marks omitted) (noting that this requirement is more inclusive than the previous requirement that
there be a “causal connection” between the suit and acts done under governmental authority).
A removing defendant need not claim that the alleged harm arose entirely from acts done
under federal authority; all that is needed is an allegation that “at least some of the [alleged
harm] arose from the federal acts.” Id. at 945; see also id. (“[R]emoval need not be justified as
to all claims asserted in the plaintiffs’ complaint; rather, the defense need only apply to one
claim to remove the case.” (quotation marks omitted)). Nor must the defendant prove
conclusively that such a connection or association exists; provided that the allegations are
sufficient, “whether the challenged act was outside the scope of [the] [d]efendants’ official
duties, or whether it was specifically directed by the federal [g]overnment, is [a question] for the
federal—not state—courts to answer.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); see Acker, 527 U.S. at 432
(finding that “demanding an airtight case on the merits in order to show the required . . .
connection” would “defeat the purpose of the removal statute”).
In the complaint, Plaintiff seeks to recover for PFAS contamination to Illinois’
environment and natural resources, including to the Mississippi River, caused by Defendant. See
Compl. 1, 38–45, 51–54, 57–58. Defendant now alleges that this suit is connected to the
MilSpec AFFF it manufactured for the U.S. military and which was stored at the Rock Island
Arsenal—despite Plaintiff’s explicit exemption of AFFF from the suit, id. at 8—because the
alleged contamination to the Mississippi River for which Plaintiff is seeking damages “plausibly

9

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 10 of 14

may encompass and overlap with PFAS contamination from the use, storage, and discharge of
MilSpec AFFF at the Rock Island Arsenal.” Not. Removal 2. Thus, Defendant argues, this suit
is connected or associated with its actions as a federal contractor. Plaintiff counters that the
supposed release of MilSpec AFFF from the Rock Island Arsenal “has nothing to do with a
single allegation” in its complaint, as it “seek[s] relief exclusively” for non-AFFF PFAS
contamination from Defendant’s Cordova Facility. Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand 1–2 (“This case
only concerns [Defendant’s] release of pollutants from a specific . . . facility . . . .”).
“[C]ourts have consistently granted motions to remand where the plaintiff expressly
disclaimed the claims upon which federal officer removal was based.” Reinbold v. Advanced
Auto Parts, Inc., Case No. 18-CV-605-SMY-DGW, 2018 WL 3036026, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 19,
2018) (collecting cases finding remand appropriate because the plaintiff expressly disclaimed
claims for asbestos exposure from military or other federal government locations). By
renouncing all claims stemming from a contractor’s work for the federal government, it no
longer becomes necessary to assert the federal government contractor defense. Plaintiff only
seeks relief for PFAS contamination from the Cordova Facility, not for PFAS contamination
from other locations. See Compl. 1. It expressly defines PFAS as non-AFFF PFAS, id. at 8, and
Defendant does not assert in its notice of removal that it produced MilSpec AFFF at the Cordova
Facility. See Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand 3 (“[Defendant] does not contend that it produced or
used MilSpec AFFF at its Cordova Facility.” (emphasis omitted)). This indicates that Plaintiff
has expressly disclaimed claims for PFAS contamination stemming from anywhere other than
the Cordova Facility—including the Rock Island Arsenal—and Defendant cannot be held liable
for PFAS contamination from anywhere other than the Cordova Facility.

10

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 11 of 14

Defendant points to Nessel in support of its argument that it is entitled to raise “the
production of MilSpec AFFF as a defense or an alternate theory’ of causation” and then assert
the federal government contractor defense as to contamination resulting from MilSpec AFFF.
See Not. Removal 2 (quoting Nessel, 2021 WL 744683, at *3). The complaint in Nessel was
brought to remedy contamination from commercially available AFFF only; a separate case
against the same defendants involved MilSpec AFFF. Nessel, 2021 WL 744683, at *1. The
defendants removed the suit to federal court, arguing that the injuries from commercially
available AFFF and MilSpec were “indivisible,” and so they intended to assert the federal
government contractor defense. Id. The court found that removal was proper because the
plaintiffs had failed to show that the injuries from the two sources would be “distinguishable”
and that “[i]t [wa]s entirely possible that [the] [p]laintiffs’ injuries occurred from actions taken
while [the] [d]efendants were acting under color of federal office: namely, MilSpec AFFF.” Id.
at *3. It disregarded the plaintiffs’ argument that they did not seek resolution of any claims
related to MilSpec AFFF because they could not “decide what defense [the] [d]efendants might
present.” Id. The court elaborated:
Consider, for example, a tort case: a plaintiff can allege that a defendant and only
that defendant caused his injury, but a plaintiff cannot prevent a defendant from
presenting an alternate theory of causation. Thus, while [the] [p]laintiffs attempt
to surgically divide their complaints between [c]ommercial and MilSpec AFFF,
they cannot prevent [the] [d]efendants from raising the production of MilSpec
AFFF as a defense or an alternate theory, particularly when [the] [p]laintiffs admit
that [the] [d]efendants produced MilSpec AFFF and that PFAS from AFFF spread
contamination throughout the state.
Id. (emphases omitted).
This Court does not disagree that Defendant could point to PFAS contamination from the
use and storage of MilSpec AFFF at the Rock Island Arsenal as an alternate source of the
contamination that is the basis of this suit. But even without asserting the federal government
11

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 12 of 14

contractor defense as to that source of contamination, Defendant cannot be held liable for
contamination from the Rock Island Arsenal. In other words, once Defendant shows that a
certain portion of the contamination stemmed from MilSpec AFFF released from the Rock Island
Arsenal, that contamination is eliminated from the case, whether or not that MilSpec AFFF was
produced according to rigorous military specifications and the government was warned of any
dangers of which it was unaware. See supra Section I(B)(iii); see also New Hampshire v. 3M
Co., Civil No. 22-cv-145-LM, 2023 WL 2691376, at *8 (D.N.H. Mar. 29, 2023) (finding that the
court lacked removal jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute in a suit brought for
PFAS contamination where the plaintiff had “consistently disclaimed any recovery for
contamination resulting from [the defendant’s] production of AFFF” because the disclaimer
eliminated the connection between the claims and the defendant’s production of MilSpec AFFF
for the U.S. military). Likewise, Defendant could point to another private company releasing
PFAS into the Mississippi River from another facility as an alternate source of the contamination
and be released from liability for that contamination, regardless of that company’s status as a
federal contractor.
Permitting Defendant to remove this suit under the federal officer removal statute when
the federal government contractor defense is irrelevant to the eventual resolution of the case and
any PFAS it produced as a military contractor is explicitly excluded from this suit would defeat
the purpose of the statute. It is thus impossible for Defendant to be held liable for damages
stemming from its actions under federal authority, and so the requisite connection or association
is missing. Because the “under color of federal authority” requirement has not been met, federal
jurisdiction is not proper. Plaintiff’s motion to remand this case to state court is granted.

12

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

II.

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 13 of 14

Attorney’s Fees
In the event that the Court granted its motion to remand, Plaintiff requests that Defendant

be ordered to pay the attorney’s fees Plaintiff incurred as a result of the removal. Mem. Supp.
Mot. Remand 16. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) permits an award of attorney’s fees upon remand. The
Supreme Court has held that there is no strong presumption in favor of a fee award. Martin v.
Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 137 (2005). “[C]ourts may award attorney’s fees under
§ 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking
removal.” Id. at 141. “Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be
denied.” Id. “[D]istrict courts retain discretion to consider whether unusual circumstances
warrant a departure from the rule in a given case.” Id.
The Court declines to use its discretion to order an award of fees in Plaintiff’s favor.
Unlike removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which “should be construed narrowly and against
removal,” People of State of Ill. v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 576 (7th Cir. 1982),
the Supreme Court has made clear that “the policy favoring removal [under § 1442(a)(1)] should
not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging interpretation of” the statute, Manypenny, 451 U.S. at
242 (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, it appears that Defendant has successfully removed
cases involving PFAS and/or AFFF under the federal officer removal statute on a number of
other occasions. See, e.g., Not. Removal 6 (collecting cases); Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand 1–2 n.1
(same). Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is therefore denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff People of the State of Illinois, ex. rel. Kwame Raoul,
Attorney General of the State of Illinois’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 3, is GRANTED. This

13

4:22-cv-04075-SLD-JEH # 23

Filed: 09/21/23

Page 14 of 14

suit is remanded back to the Circuit Court of the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit, Rock Island
County.
Entered this 21st day of September, 2023.
s/ Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14