Paasch v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 8

ORDER entered by Chief Judge Sara Darrow on March 10, 2025. The parties are DIRECTED to, by March 24, 2025, each file a brief addressing whether Plaintiff has standing in this matter, and, if not, whether his mother could be substituted as the plaintiff or if she must file her own suit. (KJC)

E-FILED

Monday, 10 March, 2025 11:17:35 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
BRADY J.P.,
Plaintiff,
v.
LELAND DUDEK, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security, 1
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:25-cv-04004-SLD

ORDER
On January 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, ECF No. 1, asserting a claim related to a
“waiver of overpayment.” Compl. 1. Plaintiff also sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and asked that the Court recruit counsel on his behalf. See generally Mot. Leave Proceed in
Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 2; First Mot. Request Counsel, ECF No. 3. The Court granted
Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis but denied without prejudice his request that the
Court recruit counsel on his behalf because he had not shown that the legal aid organizations that
he contacted had declined to represent him. Jan. 7, 2025 Text Order. Plaintiff subsequently filed
another motion requesting that the Court recruit counsel on his behalf, Second Mot. Request
Counsel, ECF No. 4, including documentation that those organizations had declined to take on
his case, see, e.g., Jan. 14, 2025 Letter from Megan Sorey to Scott Parker, Second Mot. Request
Counsel Ex. 1, ECF No. 4 at 3 (declining to take on Plaintiff’s case).
In lieu of filing an answer, the Commissioner has filed the Certified Administrative
Record (“CAR”) related to Brady’s claim regarding the overpayment. See Not. CAR Filing in

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Leland Dudek is substituted for his predecessor. The Clerk is
directed to update the docket accordingly.

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Lieu of Answer, ECF No. 6; see generally CAR, ECF No. 7. The CAR and Plaintiff’s filings in
this case reveal serious procedural issues related to whether Plaintiff is actually seeking to
vindicate his own interests or if Plaintiff’s mother is the true injured party and she and Plaintiff’s
stepfather are hoping to vindicate their own interests in Plaintiff’s name.
First, Plaintiff is referred to in the third person in all his filings and he has assertedly
limited communication skills. See, e.g., Mot. Leave Proceed in Forma Pauperis 5 (“Brady is
permanently mentally disabled. He is extremely limited on working/earning income due to his
disability from birth.”); Second Mot. Request Counsel 2 (“Brady has limited speech, reading,
and writing [skills.]”). Differences in handwriting suggest that Plaintiff is satisfying Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11’s requirement that filings be signed “by a party personally if the party
is unrepresented,” but it appears his family is preparing their contents on his behalf—in effect,
Plaintiff’s non-attorney family members are representing him, and a non-attorney cannot assert
another non-attorney’s interests on their behalf, see, e.g., Nocula v. UGS Corp., 520 F.3d 719,
725 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[O]ne pro se litigant cannot represent another . . . .” (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654)); Thigpen v. Banas, No. 08 C 4820, 2010 WL 520189, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2010)
(“[A] pro se litigant can not employ the services of another non-attorney to prepare his court
submissions.”). Given Plaintiff’s communication skills and his family’s repeated requests for
counsel, this conduct is understandable, but it remains procedurally improper. If Plaintiff is not
competent, he may lack capacity to sue in his own name. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(1), (c)(1)(A).
Second, the Court’s initial review of the CAR, specifically the at-issue final decision by
the Commissioner, indicates that the Commissioner has waived recovery of the overpayment
from Plaintiff but is still pursuing collection of the overpayment from Plaintiff’s mother as

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Plaintiff’s representative payee. See CAR 18. 2 This raises a question of whether Plaintiff has
standing to seek judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision, which is favorable to
Plaintiff himself but only partially favorable to his mother. “Standing is a threshold
requirement” and the lack of standing may be raised sua sponte as part of a court’s duty to ensure
that its subject-matter jurisdiction is secure. See, e.g., Bazile v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 983
F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 2020). If Plaintiff has not suffered an injury-in-fact or a favorable
decision from the Court cannot redress his injury, then this case cannot proceed and must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016), as
revised (May 24, 2016). Conversely, Plaintiff’s mother, as Plaintiff’s representative payee, may
have standing to pursue a claim against the Commissioner regarding the overpayments. See
Sortland v. Colombel-Singh, No. 1:19-cv-644, 2020 WL 4606933, at *6 (W.D. Mich. July 14,
2020) (“If the [Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)] had denied the waiver, he could have ordered
[the plaintiff] to re-pay the overpayment made to [claimant]. Under this scenario, [the plaintiff],
in his capacity as representative payee, would have standing to appeal the ALJ’s decision to the
federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405[(g)].”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19cv-644, 2020 WL 4597099 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2020).
The parties are DIRECTED to, by March 24, 2025, each file a brief addressing whether
Plaintiff has standing in this matter, and, if not, whether his mother could be substituted as the
plaintiff or if she must file her own suit.

Entered this 10th day of March, 2025.
s/ Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Citations to the CAR utilize the page numbers affixed to the bottom-right corner of each page.

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