Johnson v. Jung, et al

Filing 495

MOTION by Defendant General Board of Pension & Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church for judgment as a matter of law (RENEWED) (Rozycki, Carla)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MERDELIN V. JOHNSON
Plaintiff,
v.
GENERAL BOARD OF PENSION
AND HEALTH BENEFITS
OF THE UNITED METHODIST
CHURCH,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 02 C 5221
04 C 6158
(CONSOLIDATED)

Hon. Judge Charles R. Norgle Sr.
Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole

DEFENDANT’S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant General Board of
Pension and Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church (“General Board”), by its attorneys,
respectfully renews its requests that this Court enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the
General Board at the close of all of the evidence for the following reasons:
A.

There is no evidence that the individuals who made the 2001 promotion decision

knew of a complaint of discrimination by Plaintiff at the time of the decision. Poer v. Astrue,
606 F.3d 433, 440 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that decision-maker’s lack of knowledge generally
bars a retaliation claim).
B.

There is no causal connection between any complaint of discrimination by

Plaintiff and the 2001 or 2003 promotion decisions. Mellenthin v. SBC-Ameritech, No. 05 C
3688, 2008 WL 4442590, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008) (“[I]t is well established that temporal
proximity, standing alone, is almost always insufficient to show a ‘causal connection.’”);
Anderson v. The Foster Group, 521 F. Supp. 2d 758, 788-89 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (holding that

employee was not terminated in response to his protected activity because termination was more
plausibly explained by employee’s own insubordination).
C.

There is no evidence of any other materially adverse action that would discourage

a reasonable person from complaining of discrimination. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2006) (“[A] plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would
have found the challenged action materially adverse . . . .”); De la Rama v. Ill. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 541 F.3d 681, 685-686 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that employer’s recording of
unauthorized absences was not materially adverse); Ribando v. United Airlines, 200 F.3d 507,
511 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that employer’s placement of letter in employee’s personnel file
was not materially adverse); Trimble v. Alliance-DeKalb/Rock-Tenn Co., No. 10 C 5489, 2011
WL 3510862, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011) (finding that alleged excessive monitoring of an
employee did not constitute retaliation where “she has presented no evidence pertaining to how
being subjected to ‘more scrutiny than usual’ harmed her—or would harm a reasonable
employee in her situation—in any way.”); Kindle v. Waukegan Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. 60, No.
07-C-4643, 2009 WL 4043384, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2009) (“Reprimands and letters placed
in an employee’s personnel file with no accompanying disciplinary action, demotion, or loss of
pay do not constitute ‘materially adverse action’ under Title VII or section 1981.”); Weigel v.
J.W. Hicks, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-735, 2007 WL 2076033, at *8-9 (N.D. Ind. Jul. 18, 2007) (holding
that employer’s close monitoring of employee’s work was not a materially adverse action).
D.

In any event, there is no causal connection between any complaint of

discrimination by the Plaintiff and any asserted materially adverse action. Pugh v. City Of
Attica, Ind., 259 F.3d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that employee’s protected activity was
not a “substantial or motivating factor” in the decision to terminate him, but rather termination

2

was done in response to employee’s misappropriation of funds); Contreras v. Suncast Corp., 237
F.3d 756, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that employee’s termination was done in response to his
unexcused absences and insubordination).
E.

Additionally, there is no evidence of any harm to the Plaintiff. Under Seventh

Circuit precedent, a claim for retaliation must prove “some action on the employer’s part that
causes [the employee] to suffer a real harm.” Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892,
902 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Schobert v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 734 (7th Cir. 2002)
(holding that a retaliation claim “requires a showing of harm”). For example, in one case, the
Seventh Circuit held as a matter of law that “unfair reprimands or negative performance
evaluations, unaccompanied by some tangible job consequence, do not constitute adverse
employment actions.” Grube v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 729-30 (7th Cir. 2001).
Applying this rule, the court held that the plaintiff was not harmed by a manager’s criticism of
her absenteeism and negative comments about the department the employee supervised. Id. In
another case, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff had suffered no real harm where the
employer gave him a negative performance evaluation containing “a laundry list of complaints”
about his work, failed to provide him a back brace after he suffered a work-related injury, and
enforced against him a pre-existing rule that certain prescription medicines could not be taken
during work. Johnson, 325 F.3d at 902.

3

WHEREFORE, for these reasons, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to grant this
motion and enter judgment as a matter of law at the close of all of the evidence in its favor.

Dated: December 13, 2011

Respectfully Submitted,
GENERAL BOARD OF PENSION & HEALTH
BENEFITS OF THE UNITED METHODIST
CHURCH, INCORPORATED IN ILLINOIS

By:

s/ Carla J. Rozycki
Carla J. Rozycki,
One of Its Attorneys

4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Carla J. Rozycki, an attorney, hereby certify that I caused copies of the foregoing
Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law to be handed to the Court and to
Plaintiff Merdelin V. Johnson on December 13, 2011.

s/ Carla J. Rozycki
Carla J. Rozycki

Carla J. Rozycki (02409526)
Emma J. Sullivan (6269456)
Jenner & Block LLP
353 N. Clark St.
Chicago, IL 60654
[phone]

5