Janusz v. Cty of Chgo, et al

Filing 451

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: The parties' motions in limine [407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415 & 416] are granted in part and denied in part. All rulings on motions in limine are without prejudice to raising the issue at trial. See opinion for details. Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 12/13/2013. Mailed notice (ef, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
THOMAS M. JANUSZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, ALAN LUCAS,
PARRIS GEORGE, GINA LIBERTI,
and AMY MUGAVERO LUCAS,
Defendants.

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Case No. 03 C 4402
Judge Joan B. Gottschall

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Thomas Janusz brings claims under § 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable search,
and conspiracy, and under state law for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Before the
court are the parties’ motions in limine.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the
practice has developed pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of
trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984). The court has broad discretion to rule
on evidentiary questions raised in motions in limine. Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d
663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, a court should grant a motion in limine excluding
evidence only when the movant shows that the evidence “is inadmissible on all potential
grounds.” CDX Liquidating Trust ex rel. CDX Liquidating Trustee v. Venrock Assocs., 411 B.R.
591, 597 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (citing Townsend v. Benya, 287 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872 (N.D. Ill. 2003),
and Robenhorst v. Dematic Corp., No. 05 C 3192, 2008 WL 1821519, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22,
2008)). “‘[E]videntiary rulings should [ordinarily] be deferred until trial so that questions of

foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.’” Id. (quoting
Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993)). Rulings
on motions in limine are preliminary; “the district court may adjust a motion in limine during the
course of a trial.” Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust of Chi., 433 F.3d 558, 565 (7th Cir. 2006)
(citing Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42); Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42 (“[A] ruling [in limine] is subject to
change when the case unfolds, particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was
contained in the defendant’s proffer. Indeed even if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the
district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine
ruling.”). Accordingly, the parties may renew their objections at trial as appropriate.
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Number 1: To Bar Evidence or Testimony Regarding His
Possession or Use of Drugs
Janusz moves to bar any evidence that he possessed or used drugs before or after the
night of his arrest. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s use of cocaine is relevant because it “was
known to the Defendants” and supports their assertion that they had probable cause to arrest
Janusz. But Defendants do not explain how they could have known about Janusz’s drug use
before they searched his apartment and found drugs, an event which occurred after Defendants
had already arrested Janusz. Evidence of Janusz’s drug use is irrelevant unless Defendants knew
about it before they arrested him. Unless Defendants can establish at trial that this was the case,
the court will not allow the evidence. Accordingly, the motion is granted.
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Number 2: To Bar Evidence of Prior Arrests
Janusz moves to bar evidence of his prior arrests. Because Defendants state that they “do
not intend to introduce evidence or elicit testimony regarding Plaintiff’s 1999 and 2002 arrests,”
the motion is granted by agreement. If, at trial, Defendants believe that Janusz has opened the
door to evidence of his prior arrests, then they can raise the issue with the court at that time.
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Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine Number 3: To Bar Defendants from Using the Term “Garden
Variety” Emotional Distress
Janusz anticipates that Defendants may argue to the jury that Janusz cannot recover
damages other than damages for “garden variety” emotional distress. Janusz moves to bar
Defendants from using the phrase “garden variety” emotional distress, contending that the phrase
is imprecise and “could be confusing and prejudicial.” Janusz will have an opportunity to cure
any confusion or prejudice during his counsel’s own presentation to the jury, and, as Janusz
acknowledges, the court will ultimately instruct the jury as to the law. The motion is denied.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 1: To Bar Plaintiff from Presenting Evidence,
Testimony, or Argument Relating to Damages for Emotional Injuries or Lost Wages
Defendants previously moved for summary judgment on Janusz’s damages claims,
contending that Janusz was fully compensated in his state court case for his lost wages,
emotional damage from PTSD, exacerbation of his bipolar disorder, and permanent disability.
Defendants conceded, however, that Janusz is entitled to seek damages in this case arising from
his Fourth Amendment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process claims. (Defs.’ Mot. for
Summ. J. 15, ECF No. 344.) They noted that Janusz’s Fourth Amendment claims involve
damages associated with his arrest, the search of his home, and the search of his car. And they
argued that Janusz’s compensable emotional distress is limited to “garden variety” emotional
distress.
In Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, they requested that the court limit the
damages that Janusz may recover to these damages and preclude him from seeking other
damages for which he was already compensated in his state court case. The court granted
Defendants’ motion.
Defendants now move in limine to bar Janusz from “presenting any evidence, testimony,
or argument relating to damages for emotional injuries or lost wages.” Defendants argue that
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introducing such evidence would violate the court’s summary judgment order. They contend, for
example, that Janusz has no reason to call the mental health professionals who treated him
because their testimony is only relevant to establish damages that Janusz has already recovered.
Although Defendants are correct that, consistent with the court’s prior rulings, Janusz
may not recover damages representing the value of past and future lost earnings, mental
suffering, personal humiliation, and the loss of normal life, the relief that Defendants seek—to
bar Janusz from “presenting any evidence, testimony, or argument relating to damages for
emotional injuries or lost wages”—is too broad because it encompasses evidence that is
admissible for other purposes. For example, it encompasses evidence relating to the “garden
variety” emotional injury associated with Janusz’s arrest and prosecution—an injury for which
Defendants concede Janusz may seek damages in this case. Furthermore, evidence of emotional
injury or lost wages may be relevant to establish liability. To succeed on his state law malicious
prosecution claim, for example, Janusz must prove that he suffered an injury. See Kozel v. Vill.
of Dolton, 804 F. Supp. 2d 740, 746 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (citing Aguirre v. City of Chi., 887 N.E.2d
656, 662 (2008)). To the extent that Janusz seeks to offer evidence for either of these two
purposes, the court will not bar the evidence, subject to Rule 403 considerations. With this
understanding, the motion is denied.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 2: To Bar Plaintiff from Seeking Damages for the
Cost of Legal Services Not Actually Incurred and Not Recoverable at Trial
Janusz agrees that he will not seek any legal fees from the criminal case in excess of what
he actually paid. The motion is granted.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 3: To Bar the Testimony of Dr. James Pastor
Defendants move to bar the testimony of Dr. James Pastor. Janusz retained Pastor to
offer expert opinions regarding two issues: (1) whether the Chicago Police Department’s
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(“CPD’s”) disciplinary process and system was adequate to identify problematic police officers,
and (2) whether Defendants’ conduct relating to Janusz’s arrest was in accordance with normal
police procedures and protocols. Because Janusz agrees that the first issue only relates to his
Monell claim—a claim which is no longer part of this case—Janusz agrees not to present any
testimony with respect to that issue. The only dispute concerns whether Pastor may testify that
Defendants’ conduct was not in accordance with normal police procedures and protocols.
Rule 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
govern the admissibility of expert testimony in federal court. See Naem v. McKesson Drug Co.,
444 F.3d 593, 607 (7th Cir. 2006). Rule 702 provides that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
In turn, under Daubert, this court must function as a “gatekeeper” to “ensure the
reliability and relevancy of expert testimony.” Naeem, 444 F.3d at 607 (quoting Kumho Tire
Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)). “To do so, the district court must ascertain
whether the expert is qualified, whether his or her methodology is scientifically reliable, and
whether the testimony will ‘assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue.’” Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Fed. R. Evid. 702). The court must also determine if an expert is offering legal conclusions, as
“experts cannot make those.” See United States v. Diekhoff, 535 F.3d 611, 619 (7th Cir. 2008).

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Defendants specifically challenge Pastor’s opinions that (1) he does not believe that the
anonymous call led to the surveillance which resulted in the arrest; (2) the release of the female
passenger in Mr. Janusz’s vehicle, Paula Siragusa, was both legally questionable and
procedurally improper; and (3) the failure to detect and correct problematic behavior ultimately
led to the unconstitutional arrest of Janusz.
Janusz does not say whether he intends to offer these opinions at trial. He says that he
intends to offer testimony from Pastor “consistent with the opinions in his deposition, report and
supplemental report.” According to Janusz, such opinions include:
(a) what is and is not proper and normal police procedure for handling an
anonymous tip;
(b) what an EDGE mission is and what proper procedure is for an EDGE mission;
(c) whether Defendants acted outside the scope of normal police procedure with
respect to their handling of Siragusa;
(d) the significance of the CPD’s “attendance and assignment” record;
(e) the significance of a Chicago Police Officer making an arrest in another
jurisdiction; and
(f) the significance of Lucas failing to include certain information in the arrest report.
Janusz contends that Pastor’s experience in the field as a tactical police officer qualifies him to
testify as an expert about CPD procedure and protocol. He claims that evidence that Defendants
deviated from such procedures and protocols on the night in question supports his claim that
Defendants conspired to unlawfully arrest him.
Before addressing the admissibility of each challenged opinion, the court first considers
Pastor’s qualifications. According to his report, Pastor worked as a tactical police officer in the
CPD, where he was involved in thousands of traffic and street stops and approximately 100
search warrants. He later worked as an Assistant Department Advocate for the CPD, where he
regularly dealt with legal and policy matters relating to discipline of department members. In
that capacity, he reviewed thousands of complaints. He holds a Ph.D. in Public Policy Analysis
from the University of Illinois at Chicago, a J.D. from John Marshall Law School, an M.A. in
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Criminal Justice from the University of Illinois at Chicago, and a B.S. in Law Enforcement
Administration and in Sociology from Western Illinois University. He is an Associate Professor
of Public Safety at Calumet College of St. Joseph.
The court finds that, based on his education and experience, Pastor is qualified to offer
opinions concerning what the applicable CPD policies and procedures are and whether such
policies and procedures were followed in this case. See Sommerfield v. City of Chi., 254 F.R.D.
317, 320 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (finding Pastor qualified to give opinions regarding police policies and
procedures). Janusz must disclose any such opinions to Defendants, as well as the bases and
reasons for them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i). Specifically, Janusz must disclose the CPD
policies and procedures on which Pastor relied to conclude that Defendants failed to act in
accordance with such procedures.

Furthermore, Pastor may not testify that he believes

Defendants “set up” Janusz, or that the Defendants’ account of the events is unreasonable. The
jury is just as capable of drawing such inferences. See Sommerfield, 254 F.R.D. at 329 (“[N]o
expert testimony is needed when the subject matter of the testimony is clearly within the average
person’s grasp.”).
With these principles in mind, the court addresses each of the challenged opinions in turn.
1. “I do not believe that the ‘anonymous call’ led to the surveillance which resulted
in the arrest.”
In his report, Pastor states several reasons why he believes that the anonymous call did
not lead to Janusz’s arrest. Pastor notes that the caller gave only basic information about the
pending drug deal, did not describe the occupants of the vehicle, did not say how the caller
obtained the information, and did not provide any identifying information. He concludes that
“[n]o reasonable police officer would chase around such empty information.”

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Janusz cites Trevino v. City of Rock Island Police Department, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1206
(C.D. Ill. 2000) for the proposition that:
It is not uncommon for experienced police officers to appear and give expert
testimony based on specialized knowledge gained through their years on the job,
[and] such testimony is generally derived from the frame of reference that these
officers develop as a result of their repeated involvement in the situations forming
the basis for their testimony.
For example, the Trevino court noted that courts routinely allow expert testimony from police
officers involved in the investigation of drug trafficking to offer opinions on the issue of whether
narcotics are accompanied by the indicia of possession for distribution as opposed to personal
use. Id. “By virtue of the officers’ participation in and observations made during the course of
numerous drug investigations over time, courts have recognized that these officers are uniquely
qualified to describe the various indicators that routinely accompany drugs intended for
distribution . . . .” Id.
Here, by contrast, nothing in Pastor’s experience suggests that he is uniquely qualified to
determine whether Defendants were responding to an anonymous tip or were part of a conspiracy
to set up Janusz. “Testimony of a witness is inadmissible if it ‘consists of nothing more than
drawing inferences from the evidence that [the alleged expert] was no more qualified than the
jury to draw.’” Dean ex rel. Williams v. Watson, No. 93 C 1846, 1995 WL 692020, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 16, 1995) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir.
1991)). The fact that Pastor was himself a police officer does not make him any more qualified
than the jury to draw the common-sense inference that an anonymous caller who provides
limited information about a possible crime should be treated with some skepticism, and that it
would be unusual for a police officer to take extraordinary steps to investigate such a call.
Accordingly, the court will not allow this opinion.

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2. “The release of the female passenger in Mr. Janusz’s vehicle was both legally
questionable and procedurally improper.”
Pastor claims that it is “clearly violative of department policy to simply allow a fact
witness, not to mention a potential offender, to leave the scene without mentioning her
presence.” He states that CPD policies and procedures provide that the police should have noted
the identity of the woman, Paula Siragusa, the reasons for her release, and that the police should
have conducted a background check on her. Because Defendants failed to take these steps,
Pastor concludes that their actions were legally questionable and procedurally improper.
Unlike his opinion that the anonymous call did not lead to Janusz’s arrest, Pastor’s
experience as a police officer who is familiar with CPD policies and procedures renders him
uniquely qualified to conclude whether the release of Siragusa was consistent with the law and
CPD policies and procedures.

Such an opinion would help the jury understand whether

Defendants acted unusually on the night in question, which is relevant to Janusz’s conspiracy
claim.
Defendants object to Pastor’s opinion because he does not state specifically which
policies and procedures of the CPD form the basis of his opinion. The court agrees that this
information should have been disclosed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B),
which requires that the expert report include “a complete statement of all opinions the witness
will express and the basis and reasons for them . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i). If Janusz
intends to elicit expert opinions from Pastor concerning this topic, Janusz must disclose the
specific policies and procedures that form the basis of his opinion.
Defendants also challenge the conclusion that the release of Siragusa was “legally
questionable,” claiming that it is an impermissible legal conclusion. Expert witnesses may not
offer “opinions about legal issues that . . . determine the outcome of the case.” Naeem, 444 F.3d
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at 610 (citing United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757-58 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996)). But here, the
opinion that releasing Siragusa was legally questionable does not determine the outcome of the
case; rather, it is only a piece of evidence regarding whether the Defendants conspired to
unlawfully arrest Janusz. See Naeem, 444 F.3d at 610 (allowing expert to offer legal conclusion
that did not determine the outcome of the case). If Janusz discloses the basis and reasons for this
opinion, the court will not bar it simply because it is a legal conclusion.
3. “The failure to detect and correct problematic behavior ultimately led to the
unconstitutional arrest of Janusz.”
Because the Monell claim is no longer part of this case, this opinion is irrelevant. The
opinion that Janusz’s arrest is “unconstitutional” is inadmissible because it is a legal conclusion
that determines the outcome of the case. Id.
4. “What is and Is Not Proper and Normal Police Procedure for Handling an
Anonymous Tip”
Janusz states that he intends to offer testimony from Pastor regarding “what is and is not
proper and normal police procedure for handling an anonymous tip.” The problem with this
“opinion,” as Defendants point out, is that Pastor’s expert report does not disclose any opinions
about this topic. Instead, Pastor merely recites the facts of this case and then concludes that
Defendants actions were “unreasonable” and that their explanation of what happened is
“absurd.” As discussed above, these opinions are inadmissible because Pastor is no more
qualified than the jury to draw these inferences.
If Janusz intends to elicit expert opinions from Pastor concerning what is proper and
normal police procedure for handling an anonymous tip, he must disclose those opinions.
5. “What an EDGE mission is and what proper procedure is for an EDGE mission”
Janusz must also disclose Pastor’s opinions concerning proper procedure for an EDGE
mission if he wishes to elicit such opinions at trial. The only opinion that Pastor discloses in his
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report concerning this topic is that “a number of reports and related statistics were to be
completed for an EDGE mission . . . . .” Furthermore, Pastor may not testify that he “question[s]
whether an EDGE mission actually took place on December 6, 2011” because he is no more
qualified than the jury to draw this inference and because “[t]here is nothing helpful about this
subjective and imprecise assessment . . . .” Sommerfield, 254 F.R.D. at 333.
6. “Procedure with Respect to Siragusa”
As discussed above, Pastor may testify that Defendants did not follow CPD procedures
by releasing Siragusa, so long as Janusz discloses which specific policies and procedures form
the basis of this opinion.
7. “The Significance of the CPD’s ‘Attendance and Assignment’ Record”
Pastor opines that “[s]ince the A & A Sheets show Officer Liberti in another car with
other officers, her presence with Lucas and George is problematic—and is violative of
department policy.” As with Pastor’s other opinions regarding compliance with CPD policies,
Janusz must disclose which specific policies and procedures form the basis of this opinion in
order for the opinion to be allowable at trial.
8. “The Significance of a Chicago Police Officer Making an Arrest in Another
Jurisdiction”
Pastor opines that “if one believes that [Defendants] had information of a pending
narcotics transaction in Cicero, they should have notified the Cicero Police Department.” At his
deposition, Pastor testified that this opinion is based on a police custom that an officer from
another jurisdiction will contact a local police department, as a courtesy, before making an arrest
in the local police department’s jurisidiction. Because Janusz has disclosed the basis for this
opinion, the court will allow it.

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9. “The Significance of [Defendant] Lucas Failing to Include Certain Information in
the Arrest Report”
Pastor may offer opinions concerning CPD policy and procedure concerning what ought
to be included in an arrest report. He may opine on whether those policies and procedures were
followed in this case, so long as he discloses which specific policies and procedures form the
basis of his opinion. Pastor may not testify that Officer Lucas’s story is “unbelievable,” that it
“defies explanation that these experienced tactical police officers were actually on a stake out,”
or that “the underlying basis for the officers’ presence . . . [is] problematic.” He is no more
qualified than the jury to make these inferences, and such imprecise assessments would not be
helpful to the trier of fact.
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The motion is granted in part and denied in part. Because Janusz failed to disclose many
of Pastor’s opinions regarding CPD policies and procedures, as well as the bases and reasons for
these opinions, the exclusion of the opinions is “automatic and mandatory . . . unless nondisclosure was justified or harmless.” Tribble v. Evangelides, 670 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 2012)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37)(c)(1)). If Janusz discloses additional opinions, Defendants may renew
their motion to bar on the ground that Janusz’s failure to disclose was neither justified nor
harmless.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 4: To Bar All Monell-Related Evidence
Janusz agrees that he will not introduce any Monell-related evidence. The only dispute
concerns the testimony of Evelyn White. White is the Internal Affairs Division agent who
investigated a complaint filed by Janusz.
Defendants contend that White’s testimony relates solely to the Monell claim and is
therefore irrelevant. Janusz agrees not to elicit any Monell testimony from White but seeks to
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question her concerning her reasons for not interviewing Paula Siragusa, the passenger in
Janusz’s car. At her deposition, White testified that she did not interview Siragusa because she
could have been an informant.
Defendants object to this opinion as irrelevant and speculative. The court disagrees. The
opinion is relevant because it supports Janusz’s claim that Siragusa was an informant, which in
turn supports his conspiracy claim. The opinion is a permissible lay opinion because it is
rationally based on White’s perception that drugs were involved and that the police did not list
the informant’s name.
Accordingly, the motion is granted insofar as it seeks to exclude Monell related evidence,
but denied insofar as it seeks to bar the testimony of White.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 5: To Bar Improper Character Evidence
Defendants move to bar improper character evidence, including complaint register files
documenting citizen complaints against Defendants and any reference to Joseph Miedzianowski.
Janusz states that he intends to introduce the complaint register files only if Defendants put their
character at issue by suggesting that they are exemplary officers, and that he has no intention of
making any reference to Joseph Miedzianowski.

Accordingly, the motion is granted by

agreement of the parties.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 6: To Bar Evidence Relating to Alan Lucas’s
Divorce Proceedings and Testimony from Josephine Lucas
Defendants move to bar evidence relating to Alan Lucas’s divorce proceedings and
testimony from Josephine Lucas. Janusz states that he intends to introduce such evidence and
testimony only if Defendants put Alan Lucas’s character at issue by suggesting that he is an
exemplary officer. Accordingly, the motion is granted by agreement of the parties.

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Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 7: To Bar Testimony of or Evidence Related to
John Grizzoffi
Defendants seek to bar any evidence related to police officer John Grizzoffi, claiming
that such evidence is irrelevant and would confuse the issues and mislead the jury.
Janusz contends that this evidence is relevant because it supports Jansusz’s conspiracy
claim. That claim alleges that Defendants entered into an agreement with Paula Siragusa, the
Morizzo brothers, Grizzoffi, and others to have Janusz arrested so that he would be tainted as a
witness in a lawsuit brought by Keystone Illinois, Inc. (“Keystone”) against the Morizzo
brothers. Judge Nordberg denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the
conspiracy claim, finding that “the evidence of a ‘set up’ is sufficient to let the jury observe the
witnesses and view the exhibits to determine who is lying.” Janusz v. City of Chi., 797 F. Supp.
2d 884, 891 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
In its opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Janusz submitted
evidence suggesting that Grizzoffi played a role in the conspiracy by copying Janusz’s
confidential police records shortly after he was arrested and forwarding those records to Anthony
Morizzo. Grizzoffi previously worked part-time for Keystone and knew the Morizzo brothers.
Janusz alleges that Anthony Morizzo used the records he received from Grizzoffi to persuade
Keystone to settle the lawsuit by arguing that Janusz’s arrest tainted him as a credible witness.
Keystone settled the lawsuit and then fired Janusz on January 19, 2002.
Defendants argue that the evidence relating to Grizzoffi is too attenuated to establish a
conspiracy because Grizzoffi did not participate in the arrest, did not provide evidence to the
officers, was not involved in the prosecution of Janusz, and was not named as a defendant in this
case. But the fact that there may be no direct evidence linking Grizzoffi to a conspiracy does not
render the Grizzoffi evidence irrelevant, as a “conspiracy is almost never susceptible to direct
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proof, but rather must be established from circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from
evidence, coupled with common-sense knowledge of the behavior of persons in similar
circumstances.” Henderson v. Harthsorn, No. 08 C 2086, 2011 WL 11464, at *7 (C.D. Ill. Jan.
4, 2011) (citing McClure v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 720 N.E.2d 242, 258 (Ill. 1999)).
The Grizzoffi evidence helps establish a link, albeit an indirect one, between the police and the
Morizzo brothers. The court agrees with Janusz that the evidence is relevant and would not
overly confuse the issues or mislead the jury. The motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
Given the foregoing, the following motions in limine are granted: Janusz’s motions in
limine Nos. 1 and 2 and Defendants’ motions in limine Nos. 2, 5, and 6; the following motions in
limine are granted in part and denied in part: Defendants’ motions in limine Nos. 3 and 4; and
the following motions in limine are denied: Janusz’s motion in limine No. 3 and Defendants’
motions in limine Nos. 1 and 7.

/s/
JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL
United States District Judge
DATED: December 13, 2013

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