Degorski v. Wilson, et al
Filing
204
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in part Defendant Wilson's motion and remits the punitive damages award to $150,000.00. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 7/16/2014. Mailed notice(tbk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES DEGORSKI,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS WILSON, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 04 CV 3367
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Thomas Wilson’s post-trial motion for remittitur altering
or amending judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 [198, 199]. For the
reasons stated below, the Court grants in part Defendant Wilson’s motion and remits the punitive
damages award to $150,000.00.
I.
Background
Following a four-day jury trial, a jury entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendant Wilson, finding that that Defendant Wilson had violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights when he used excessive force against Plaintiff while Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee in
the Cook County Department of Corrections. The jury awarded Plaintiff $225,000 in
compensatory damages and $226,000 in punitive damages. Following trial, Defendant Wilson
file a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e), requesting that the Court amend the judgment and remit the
punitive damages award to $0.
II.
Analysis
Defendant Wilson, moving pursuant to Rule 59(e), contends that the punitive damages
award in this case should be vacated because the award (i) is excessive under the Due Process
Clause and (ii) lacks a rational connection between the evidence and the award. In order to alter
or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e), the court must find a manifest error of law or fact. Moro
v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996); Quad/Graphics, Inc. v. One2One
Communications, LLC, 529 Fed. Appx. 784, 792 (7th Cir. 2013).
As noted, the jury awarded $226,000 in punitive damages against Defendant Wilson
individually. Punitive damages are recoverable in § 1983 actions where the defendant showed a
reckless or callous disregard to the federally protected rights of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
30, 35, 51 (1983). Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acted wantonly and
willfully or was motivated by ill-will or a desire to injure. Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887,
894 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Marshall v. Teske, 284 F.3d
765, 772 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A jury may award punitive damages in a § 1983 case if it finds that
the defendants’ conduct was motivated by evil intent or callous indifference to the plaintiff’s
federally protected rights.”). Wilson argues that the Court should vacate the jury’s award
of punitive damages because his actions do not meet this standard, or because Plaintiff’s
evidence and testimony did not support an award of punitive damages.
Because the parties point to the same evidence and factors in addressing both of
Defendant’s arguments, the Court also concurrently addresses whether the punitive damages
award offends the Due Process Clause and is supported by the evidence. In assessing whether a
punitive damage award is constitutionally appropriate, the Supreme Court has directed courts to
focus their evaluation on three guideposts: (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2)
the relationship between the amount of the punitive damages awarded and the harm or potential
harm suffered by the Plaintiff; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages award and
the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. See BMW of North America, Inc.
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v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996); see also G.G. v. Grindle, 665 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2011)
(in determining whether an award is reasonable, courts consider whether “(1) the award is
monstrously excessive; (2) there is no rational connection between the award and the evidence
* * *; and (3) whether the award is roughly comparable to awards made in similar cases”).
Here, tracking the Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction, the Court instructed the jury
that it may award punitive damages against a defendant “only if you find that his conduct was
malicious or in reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s rights.” The Court defined malicious conduct as
“accompanied by ill will or spite, or is done for the purpose of injuring Plaintiff” and reckless
disregard as “complete indifference to Plaintiff’s safety or rights.” Id.
The Court further
instructed the jurors that if they determined punitive damages to be appropriate, the following
factors were to be considered in assessing the amount: (1) “the reprehensibility of the particular
Defendant’s conduct;” (2) “the impact of the particular Defendant’s conduct on Plaintiff;” (3)
“the relationship between Plaintiff and particular Defendant;” (4) “the likelihood that the
particular Defendant would repeat the conduct if an award of punitive damages is not made;” and
(5) “the relationship of any award of punitive damages to the amount of actual harm the Plaintiff
suffered.”
The United States Supreme Court has held that the most important indicium of the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. Evaluating reprehensibility involves inquiry into whether the
injury was physical, whether it evinced a reckless disregard for the health of the target, whether
the target had a financial vulnerability, and whether the injury was clearly intentional. Kunz v.
DeFelice, 538 F. 3d 667, 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003)). Based on the evidence presented at trial, Plaintiff’s injury
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was clearly physical and evinced a reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s health. Defendant Wilson
punched Plaintiff repeatedly, knocking him temporarily unconscious. The blows caused Plaintiff
to lose a tooth and suffer at least six separate fractures to his face that required surgery and the
insertion of a metal plate in Plaintiff’s cheek bone.
The jury plainly concluded from the
evidence that Defendant Wilson’s actions not only were intentional, but clearly pre-meditated
and motivated by “evil intent.” Among other things, there was evidence that immediately prior
to attacking Plaintiff, Wilson put on leather “shake down” gloves. A reasonable jury could have
concluded that Wilson’s act of putting on leather gloves revealed his intent to physically injure
Plaintiff without leaving obvious injuries to Plaintiff’s face in the form of cuts, abrasions, and or
bruises and to protect his own hands from injury as a means of concealing his involvement in the
assault.1 On this note, the Seventh Circuit specifically has stressed that it “takes police brutality
very seriously as grounds for punitive damages.” Id. at 679 (citing Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d
914, 919 (7th Cir. 1996)). “The need to deter such behavior is plain: police brutality is a
longstanding problem with which many cities are still coming to grips.”
Id.
Thus, the
reprehensibility of [Wilson’s] conduct in his position of public trust justifies a substantial
punitive damages award.” Id.
The second guidepost is the ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages
awards.
There is no “simple mathematical formula” that courts must follow.
See Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 (2008); Gore, 517 U.S. at 580–82. Instead,
the Exxon Court acknowledged that “heavier punitive awards have been thought to be justifiable
when wrongdoing is hard to detect” or “when the value of injury and the corresponding
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Also indicative of reprehensibility, evidence was introduced at trial that Wilson’s attack on Plaintiff
prompted a fellow correctional officer to pull Wilson off of Plaintiff and yell, “what the fuck are you
doing?” Evidence also was presented that Wilson failed to report the incident or obtain necessary medical
care for Plaintiff.
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compensatory award are small.” Exxon, 554 U.S. at 494. In making the latter point, the Court
relied on Gore, which recognized that “low awards of compensatory damages may properly
support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious
act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.” 517 U.S. at 582. In this case, the
jury’s award of $225,000 in compensatory damages against Defendant was high for a beating of
this kind; thus, there is no reason to think that the “punitive” award was disguised compensation
for pain and suffering.
Rather, this is a case in which the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages is almost exactly 1:1. In fact, the reasonable inference to be drawn from
the jury’s decision to award Plaintiff $1,000.00 more in punitive damages than the already
substantial sum imposed as compensatory damages is that the jury found Defendant’s conduct so
reprehensible as to warrant severe punishment. Despite Defendant’s arguments to the contrary,
the jury’s punitive damages award evinces a rational connection to the evidence and an attitude
similar to that espoused by the Seventh Circuit: “the reprehensibility of [Wilson’s] conduct in
his position of public trust justifies a substantial punitive damages award.” Kunz, 538 F. 3d at
679.
In deciding whether an award of punitive damages violates due process, the Court also
considers “civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct” so that
it may show “substantial deference to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for
the conduct at issue.” E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 840 (7th Cir. 2013). (quoting
Gore, 517 U.S. at 583). Here, Defendant Wilson was criminally prosecuted for aggravated
battery as a result of beating Plaintiff. He was found not guilty. Aggravated battery is a class
three felony that carries a possible fine of $25,000.00 per offense. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05. He
also was terminated from his employment with the Cook County Sheriff’s Department. In light
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of these circumstances, a punitive damages award of $226,000 seems excessive in comparison to
a $25,000 fine, and comes on top of losing his employment. These factors counsel in favor of
remittitur.
The last inquiry involves a comparison of the facts of this case with similar cases.
Although “such comparisons are rarely dispositive given the fact-specific nature of damages
claims,” in the due process calculation “it is useful to compare the challenged punitive damages
award with other awards upheld in the past.” Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 892-93 (7th
Cir. 2009). The Seventh Circuit has noted that $125,000, an amount substantially less than the
$226,000 awarded to Plaintiff, is “larger than the punitive damages awards that we have upheld
in similar, though less recent, excessive force cases.” Id. at 894 (citing Bogan v. Stroud, 958
F.2d 180, 182, 186 (7th Cir. 1992) ($7,000 in total punitive damages against three prison officers
who beat and stabbed an inmate after subduing him); Hagge, 827 F.2d at 104, 110 ($25,000
against a police officer who kicked an arrestee and broke her leg); Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d
157, 159, 162 (7th Cir. 1985) ($25,000 against two police officers who beat an arrestee));
cf. Kunz, 538 F.3d at 671, 679 ($90,000 in total punitive damages where multiple police officers
beat an arrestee after he was subdued and, later at the station, beat out a false
confession); Marshall ex rel. Gossens v. Teske, 284 F.3d 765, 768–69, 772–73 (7th Cir.
2002) ($100,000 against three officers who chased a minor at gunpoint, arrested him, and
detained him for several hours without probable cause); Cooper, 97 F.3d at 916, 920 ($120,000
against seven prison guards who beat inmates and then refused requests for medical treatment).
Hendrickson is factually very similar to the instant case. Described by the Seventh Circuit as “a
rogue officer who attack[ed] a prisoner for no good reason,” the jury tagged the defendant with a
$125,000 punitive damages award, which the Seventh Circuit upheld. Hendrickson, 589 F.3d at
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89. Notably, the plaintiff in Hendrickson was partially disabled from two car accidents, but he
also was a convicted offender (as opposed to Plaintiff Degorski, who was a pre-trial detainee),2
he insulted the officer before the beating (although after provocation by the officer), and his
injuries were less serious. In upholding the punitive damages award, the Seventh Circuit noted
that “$125,000 approaches the upper end of what [is] necessary to punish [the officer’s] lone act
of attacking a prisoner for no good reason.” Id. at 894.
Guided by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hendrickson, the Court concludes that
substantial evidence of malice, serious injuries, and an almost exact 1:1 ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages in this case brings a significant award of punitive damages within the
bounds of reasonableness. Defendant Wilson’s use of force was reprehensible because the
evidence supports the jury’s obvious conclusion, as reflected in its verdict, that Wilson’s actions
2
When law enforcement officers apply physical force to suspects, detainees, or prisoners, the
constitutional standard depends on the status of the person on the receiving end. A person who is not in
custody and who is a target of police force is protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
unreasonable seizures of the person. The Fourth Amendment standard is objective: was the application of
force unreasonable in light of all the relevant circumstances confronting the officer at the time? Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–97 (1989). A person convicted of a crime and serving a custodial sentence
is protected by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth
Amendment standard differs from the Fourth because the officer’s state of mind is critical. The plaintiff
must prove that the correctional officer intentionally used extreme or excessive cruelty toward the
plaintiff for the purpose of harming him, and not in a good faith effort to maintain or restore security or
discipline. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986). In Graham, the Supreme Court explained
that the less protective Eighth Amendment standard applies “only after the State has complied with the
constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.” 490 U.S. at 398–99. The
person in between is the pretrial detainee. That person is protected from excessive force by the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments because he may not be “punished” until he has
been adjudged guilty through due process of law. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n. 16
(1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977). The Seventh Circuit has recognized that
pretrial detainees receive more protection than convicted prisoners (see, e.g., Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d
467, 474 (7th Cir. 2009)), but “[j]ust what the excessive force standard for a pretrial detainee looks like in
detail is not as clear.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443, 456-57 (7th Cir. 2014). The detainee may
often be held in a jail with convicted offenders under conditions that seem indistinguishable from prison,
yet he has not been convicted and is still entitled to a presumption of innocence. The Supreme Court has
not settled the standard for pretrial detainees. Graham explicitly left it open. 490 U.S. at 395 n. 10. The
Seventh Circuit’s case law “points in the direction of a standard identical or close to the objective Fourth
Amendment standard, but there are conflicting signals * * *.” Kingsley, 744 F.3d at 456-57.
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were completely unprovoked and vicious. In Hendrickson, the inmate was goaded into leveling
an assault at the officer before the beating; here, the jury clearly credited Plaintiff’s version of
the events – namely, that he did nothing prior to Wilson’s assault. It was simply Plaintiff’s status
as a high-profile pre-trial detainee charged with a serious crime (processed at the jail on the day
of the beating) that provoked Wilson to initiate a violent confrontation with Plaintiff. And the
confrontation was even more violent than in Hendrickson, where the plaintiff was treated
initially for pain all over and then for ongoing back pain. Here, Plaintiff was severely beaten,
lost consciousness, and suffered several fractures to his face that required surgery.3 Furthermore,
the jury awarded punitive damages against Defendant Wilson in an almost exact 1:1 ratio to
compensatory damages. The addition of the $1,000.00 in their award of punitive damages
reflects the jury’s “sound reasoning” in setting the amount of those damages, taking into account
not only Plaintiff’s physical injuries, but Defendant Wilson’s offensive actions in his role as an
law enforcement officer.
Thus, while the Court is constrained by the Seventh Circuit’s
assessment in Hendrickson that “$125,000 approaches the upper end of what was necessary to
punish [the officer’s] lone act of attacking a prisoner for no good reason” and concludes that
$226,000 in punitive damages for a lone act is too much, the Court concludes that an amount
above $125,000 is appropriate in these unique circumstances. Therefore, the Court grants in part
Defendant Wilson’s request for remittitur [198, 199], but reduces the amount of punitive
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Defendant has stressed Dr. Goldin’s trial testimony that a fracture of the kind suffered by Plaintiff “can
even occur in sports such as boxing or basketball” and “can be caused by a single blow.” Blows to the
face plainly are part of the sport of boxing and the participants accordingly are poised to anticipate and
defend against their adversary’s strikes. Given the absence of warning or provocation evident on the
record and the force with which the blows here were struck, the only accurate sports analogy that comes
to mind is the infamous punch thrown by Kermit Washington of the Los Angeles Lakers that nearly killed
Rudy Tomjanovich of the Houston Rockets. See generally John Feinstein, THE PUNCH: ONE NIGHT,
TWO LIVES, AND THE FIGHT THAT CHANGED BASKETBALL FOREVER (2003).
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damages to $150,000, as opposed to the $0 requested by Defendant.4
Dated: July 16, 2014
______________________________
Robert M. Dow, Jr.
United States District Judge
4
In view of the Illinois statute providing that, with certain relatively small exceptions, inmates must bear
the costs of their own incarceration and authorizing the Department of Corrections to institute legal
proceedings for reimbursement of those costs, it appears likely that Plaintiff himself will receive, at most,
only a small percentage of the compensatory and punitive damages awarded. See 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(a)(e); People ex rel. Illinois Dep’t of Corrections v. Hawkins, 952 N.E.2d 624 (Ill. 2011). The families of
the victims of the murders of which Plaintiff was convicted also may have a claim to some or all of the
money awarded to Plaintiff.
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