Degorski v. Wilson, et al

Filing 224

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: the Court grants Plaintiff's motion and awards Plaintiff's counsel $177,570.00 in attorneys' fees. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 11/26/2014. Mailed notice(tbk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES DEGORSKI,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS WILSON, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 04-cv-3367

Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff James Degorski’s motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 [207]. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion and
awards Plaintiff’s counsel $177,570.00 in attorneys’ fees.1
I.

Background
Following a four-day jury trial, a jury entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff James

Degorski and against Defendant Wilson, finding that Defendant Wilson had violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights when he used excessive force against Plaintiff while Plaintiff was a pre-trial
detainee in the Cook County Department of Corrections. The jury found in favor of Defendant
Koch on Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim.2

The jury awarded Plaintiff $225,000 in

compensatory damages and $226,000 in punitive damages. Following trial, Defendant Wilson
filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e), requesting that the Court amend the judgment and remit
the punitive damages award to $0. In granting in part and denying in part Defendant Wilson’s
motion, the Court concluded that substantial evidence of malice, serious injuries, and an almost
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Plaintiff’s motion does not request, nor provide any support for, an award of costs, although Plaintiff
referenced approximately $9,500 in costs in her initial demand letter.

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Prior to trial, Plaintiff dismissed his state law claim of battery against Officer Wilson and against
Sheriff Dart pursuant to respondeat superior.

exact 1:1 ratio between punitive and compensatory damages in this case brought a significant
award of punitive damages within the bounds of reasonableness. The Court further concluded
that Defendant Wilson’s use of force was reprehensible because the evidence supported the
jury’s obvious conclusion, as reflected in its verdict, that Wilson’s actions were completely
unprovoked and vicious. In this case, the jury clearly credited Plaintiff’s version of the events—
namely, that he did nothing prior to Wilson’s assault. It was simply Plaintiff’s status as a highprofile pre-trial detainee charged with a serious crime (initially processed at the jail on the day of
the beating) that provoked Wilson to initiate a violent confrontation with Plaintiff. Plaintiff was
severely beaten, lost consciousness, and suffered several fractures to his face that required
surgery. Finally, the Court noted that the addition of the $1,000.00 in their award of punitive
damages reflected the jury’s “sound reasoning” in setting the amount of those damages, taking
into account not only Plaintiff’s physical injuries, but Defendant Wilson’s offensive actions in
his role as an law enforcement officer. Although the Court was constrained by Seventh Circuit
case law that “$125,000 approaches the upper end of what was necessary to punish [the officer’s]
lone act of attacking a prisoner for no good reason” and ultimately concluded that $226,000 in
punitive damages for a lone act was too much, the Court only reduced the amount of punitive
damages to $150,000, as opposed to the $0 requested by Defendant.

Defendants did not

challenge the jury award of $225,000 in compensatory damages against Defendant Wilson.
In April 2014, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote to Defendants’ counsel and disclosed her
estimated attorneys’ fees and costs associated with litigating this matter. Plaintiff’s counsel also
requested that defense counsel submit an accounting of defense costs and fees so that the parties
could prepare a joint fee statement pursuant to Local Rule 54.3. Plaintiff offered to forego the

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entire punitive damages award in exchange for Defendant Wilson foregoing his right to appeal
the judgment and agreeing to counsel’s fees and costs.
On May 1, 2014, the parties held a telephonic conference in an attempt to resolve the
outstanding monetary issues. The parties dispute the exact offers made, but it appears from a
disagreeable e-mail exchange between Ms. Bonjean and Assistant States Attorney Michael
Gallagher on May 2, 2014, that the best offer from Defendants was to (1) allow Plaintiff to retain
between $25,000 of his compensatory damages award and (2) agree that the IDOC would not
seek a court-ordered lien for his cost of incarceration over $10,000.

Despite Defendants’

representation that there was an offer to reasonably settle attorneys’ fees, the attached e-mails (to
which Defendants cite as support) do not reference an offer to settle attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff’s
counsel declined Defendants’ offer and reiterated Plaintiff’s own best offer that if Defendant
Wilson agreed to forego his appeal rights and the county agreed to pay Plaintiff’s counsel’s fees
and costs, Plaintiff would forfeit the entire punitive damages award. Plaintiff acknowledged that
numerous parties may stake claim to the remainder of Plaintiff’s award of damages but Plaintiff
could not agree to voluntarily forfeit nearly the entire award to the families of the victims,
particularly since Plaintiff continues to pursue his appellate remedies. Both parties declined to
continue negotiations. As of the filing of Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees, there is no
evidence that Defendants engaged in any discussion with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding fees and
costs and it appears that, until the filing of their response brief, refused to tender any information
about their own fees and costs.

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II.

Analysis
A.

General standards

In order to entice competent attorneys to prosecute civil rights cases, Congress enacted 42
U.S.C. § 1988, pursuant to which a “prevailing party” in a Section 1983 action is entitled to
“reasonable” attorneys’ fees. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). A civil rights
plaintiff is considered to be a “prevailing party” if he or she succeeds on “any significant issue in
the litigation.” Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-92
(1989). As a result of the substantial jury verdict in this case, there can be no dispute that
Plaintiff must be deemed a “prevailing party” who is entitled to an award of “reasonable”
attorneys’ fees.
In deciding the specific amount that is reasonable in the circumstances, the Supreme
Court has directed district courts to consider as a “starting point” (or “lodestar”) the number of
hours expended in the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at
433. The Court has stressed that the “most critical factor” in determining the reasonableness of a
fee award is “the degree of success obtained” by the prevailing party. Id. at 436. Courts
frequently attempt to measure success by viewing three factors: (i) the difference between the
actual judgment and the recovery sought, (ii) the significance of the legal issues on which the
plaintiff prevailed, and (iii) the public interest at stake in the litigation. See, e.g., Connolly v.
Nat’l Sch. Bus. Serv., Inc., 177 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1999).
The Supreme Court expressly has stated that when litigation of a § 1983 case leads to
“excellent results” for the prevailing party, the plaintiff’s attorney “should recover a fully
compensatory fee.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. As the Court further explained, “[n]ormally this
will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation, and indeed in some cases of

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exceptional success an enhanced award may be justified.” Id. Both the Supreme Court and the
Seventh Circuit have stressed that a fee award “should not be reduced simply because the
plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435;
see also Dunning v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 863, 873 (7th Cir. 1995). As the court of
appeals summarized, “Hensley makes clear that when claims are interrelated, as is often the case
in civil rights litigation, time spent pursuant to an unsuccessful claim may be compensable if it
also contributed to the success of other claims.” Jaffee v. Redmond, 142 F.3d 409, 413 (7th Cir.
1998).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims had their genesis in a relatively brief interaction between
Defendant Officers and Plaintiff. That interaction spawned ten years of litigation. The jury then
awarded Plaintiff almost half of a million dollars on his excessive force claim, although it denied
relief on Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim against Defendant Koch. Based on the evidence
presented at trial, this case is an exemplar of the cases in which “the plaintiff’s claims of relief
* * * involve a common core of facts or [are] based on related legal theories,” such that “much of
counsel’s time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide
the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis.” Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir.
1988). In such cases, “the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief
obtained by the plaintiff.” Id.; see also Bryant v. City of Chicago, 200 F.3d 1092, 1101 (7th Cir.
2000) (explaining that the court should focus on “the significance of the overall relief obtained
by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation”). Thus, due to the
substantial compensatory and punitive damages verdicts against Defendant Wilson, the Court
declines to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis and instead will focus on the

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significance of the overall relief obtained by Plaintiff, which included a $225,000 compensatory
damages award, for which Wilson’s former employer owes a statutory duty to indemnify.
Plaintiff obtained an exceptional result in this litigation in no small part due to the risk
taken, as well as the efforts and skill deployed, by the attorneys working on this case. Section
1983 cases comprise a specialized federal practice area, one requiring knowledge of complex
constitutional issues, creative and aggressive advocacy, and superior trial practice abilities. There
are a limited number of firms able or willing to commit the massive time and advance the
necessary resources required to take on such cases competently, much less win them.
The fact that Defendants were unwilling to put any meaningful settlement money on the
table prior to trial (and even after a judgment was entered against them) only underscores the
uphill nature of the battle here. Notwithstanding the very real possibility of recovering nothing
had the jury found Defendant Wilson’s testimony more compelling than Plaintiff’s own
testimony, Plaintiff’s counsel proceeded to litigate the case aggressively, investing considerable
time and money. In the process, Plaintiff was provided with very capable representation by
attorneys Bonjean and Smith.
Recognizing the importance of vindicating constitutional rights through the § 1983
vehicle created by Congress, it is not unusual for district courts to grant, and courts of appeals to
affirm, attorneys’ fees that exceed (even substantially) the amount of the judgment when doing
so is reasonable in the circumstances. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Harvey, 489 F.3d 864, 872
(7th Cir. 2007) (affirming $507,000 fee award on $275,000 verdict); Tuf Racing Products, Inc. v.
American Suzuki Motor Corp., 223 F.3d 585, 592 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming $391,000 fee award
on $137,000 verdict).

But here, the total fees sought by Plaintiff’s counsel are less than

$200,000 (generated since Plaintiff’s current counsel entered their appearances on May 22,

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2012.)3 That is less than half of the $451,000 jury verdict received by Plaintiff (and still only a
little more than half of the remitted total damages amount of $375,000). The fact that Plaintiff
was awarded substantially more than counsel is requesting weighs heavily in favor of approving
the full lodestar amount.
Turning first to the three factors set forth by the Seventh Circuit in Connolly, 177 F.3d at
597, “the difference between the actual judgment and the recovery sought” indicates that
Plaintiff achieved an outstanding degree of success in this litigation. Critically, as noted above,
Defendants were unwilling from the start to engage in any meaningful settlement discussions,
despite the fact that the Cook County Sheriff’s Department terminated Wilson after the incident
underlying this lawsuit, and the State brought criminal charges against Wilson—both strong
indications that Plaintiff’s civil rights claims were meritorious.

The best and final offer

conveyed to Plaintiff by counsel for Defendant Wilson prior to trial was $5,000.00. At the final
pretrial conference, the Court one last time encouraged Defendants to consider settlement
discussions but Defendants refused to entertain the suggestion in any meaningful way.
Turning to the second and third factors, the legal issues on which Plaintiff prevailed and
the public interests at stake in this litigation both were significant; in the Supreme Court’s words,
“the damages a plaintiff recovers contribute significantly to the deterrence of civil rights
violations in the future,” and particularly “in the area of individual police misconduct, where
injunctive relief is generally unavailable.” City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986).
There is no doubt that this case was highly undesirable. Plaintiff was forced to represent himself
through much of this litigation because few attorneys were willing to take on his unpopular

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Bonjean and Smith represent that they have accumulated just under 400 hours of work on this case.
That number of hours does not take into account the attorneys’ fees and costs accumulated by prior
counsel, who died during the course of this litigation, to which Plaintiff may be entitled. In this regard,
Defendants likely are receiving a windfall that they do not appear to recognize or acknowledge.

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cause, evincing the collective view among the plaintiffs’ bar that the case was a difficult one on
which to prevail. Indeed, Plaintiff’s first attorney withdrew from the case on December 15,
2009—likely not coincidence following Plaintiff’s conviction of seven counts of first degree
murder. Plaintiff then made thorough yet unsuccessful efforts to find replacement counsel as
evidenced by a letter written to the Court by Plaintiff on July 20, 2010. Plaintiff was finally able
to secure counsel, Barbara Clinite, who filed an appearance on March 19, 2011. However, Ms.
Clinite passed away roughly eight months later. Jennifer Bonjean, a practicing Illinois attorney
with a principal office in Brooklyn, New York, and Christopher Smith, a Chicago civil rights
attorney, agreed to represent Plaintiff on May 22, 2012. In filing their appearances, Plaintiff’s
counsel took on a case after their client had been convicted of heinous and notorious crimes. At
the time that they agreed to represent Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s counsel likely understood that any jury
would learn that Plaintiff had been convicted of multiple murders.
After consideration of the pertinent factors, the Court finds that Plaintiff achieved an
outstanding degree of success after a four-day trial. Because the jury’s verdict (even following
the Court’s remittitur) constitutes an excellent result for Plaintiff (as well as an appropriate, wellreasoned result by the jury), the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s attorneys should recover a “fully
compensatory fee.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. The Court believes that 100% of the fees sought
is warranted because Plaintiff’s counsel took on a very difficult case, Defendants refused to
meaningfully negotiate prior to or even after trial, and, most importantly, the evidence submitted
at trial overwhelming supported the jury’s conclusions as to liability. See Sottoriva v. Claps, 617
F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that “the district court is entitled to considerable discretion
in arriving at an award that it deems reasonable,” but that “the district court must justify its

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decision. This explanation may be ‘concise,’ but it must still be an explanation—that is, a
rendering of reasons in support of a judgment—rather than a mere conclusory statement.”).
B.

Cook County’s Responsibility for Attorneys’ Fees

Defendants have objected to the imposition of any attorneys’ fee award against Sheriff
Dart and Cook County. In support of their position, Defendants note that the indemnification
obligation imposed on the Sheriff and Cook County pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102 does not
extend to attorneys’ fees, citing Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96 (2001). See also 745
ILCS 10/9-102 (stating that “[a] local public entity is empowered and directed to pay any tort
judgment or settlement for compensatory damages (and may pay any associated attorney's fees
and costs) for which it or an employee while acting within the scope of his employment is liable
in the manner provided in this Article”).

According to Defendants, under Illinois law, Cook

County is authorized in its discretion to pay attorneys’ fees and costs, but is not required to do
so.
Yang indeed states that a “tort judgment” as contemplated by the Tort Immunity Act does
not encompass attorneys’ fees against municipalities within its definition of compensatory
damages. Yang, 195 Ill. 2d 96. The Seventh Circuit likewise recently concluded that 745 ILCS
10/9-102 (governing a public entity’s payment of attorney fees and costs) was permissive, not
mandatory. See Winston v. O’Brien, --- F.3d ---, 2014 WL 5786953, at *4-5 (7th Cir. Nov. 7,
2014) (“In sum, the plain language of § 9–102 gives the City discretion in deciding to indemnify
attorney’s fees associated with an award of compensatory damages”). Plaintiff reasonably does
not dispute this reading; instead, Plaintiff contends that the County’s collective bargaining
agreement with its employees explicitly states that it “shall be responsible for, hold officers
harmless and pay for damages or moneys which may be adjudged, assessed, or otherwise levied

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against any officer covered by this agreement,” assuming the officer was acting within his scope
of employment and cooperates with the County in defense of any suit. Thus, Plaintiff contends
that the CBA requires Cook County and Sheriff Dart to indemnify Defendant Wilson for any
attorneys’ fees levied against him.
That may well be the case—indeed, it seems like Cook County, which is on the hook for
compensatory damages, also should be on the hook for attorneys’ fees should compensatory
damages be levied against one of its employees4—but that is a question for another day and most
likely another court. See Winston, --- F.3d ---, 2014 WL 5786953 at *5 (holding that “the CBA
with the police union does not convert § 9-102 into a mandate to pay fees”). It is not entirely
clear whether the parties believe this Court could decide this matter.

At a recent status

conference, the parties seemed to be in agreement that this issue was outside the scope of the
issues presently before the Court, and no party has provided this Court with authority showing
that it would have jurisdiction to resolve the issue if it were squarely presented. The § 1983 suit
is the suit before this Court, and it has gone to judgment. Any dispute between Defendant
Wilson and Cook County as to whether the attorneys’ fees awarded against Defendant Wilson
are covered by another aspect of those parties’ relationship, to the extent it cannot be settled
between the parties, appears to be an issue for arbitration under the terms of the CBA or for suit
in state court. The only issue here is the amount of the fee award that is appropriate in this case.
C.

Hours Reasonably Expended

The remaining question is what hours were “reasonably expended” in this case? In their
response brief, Defendants raise a number of general objections to Plaintiff’s hours and rate. In
essence, Plaintiff contends that Defendants waived these objections by failing to provide their
4

If that were not the case, the incentive for lawyers to take on these kinds of cases would decrease
significantly.

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specific objections prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s motion as required by Local Rule 54.3. Local
Rule 54.3(d) contemplates that parties will state their objections with clarity and particularity to
facilitate resolution of fee disputes, where possible, without court intervention. See, e.g., OhioSealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 664 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that the party
opposing a fee petition must “state objections with particularity and clarity”). On April 2, 2014,
Plaintiff tendered to defense counsel a letter setting forth counsel’s billing rates, an estimate of
the hours expended, arguments in support of the fee petition, and other supporting materials.
The local rule provides the opposing party with 21 days to respond, which, in this case, would
have been before the end of April. Rather than respond with a simple estimate of defense
counsel’s hours and rates, defense counsel (who had filed appearances in this matter and
represented Defendants through trial and post-trial motions) claimed that they had no authority to
negotiate attorneys’ fees and costs, refused to estimate their hours spent on the case, and ignored
Plaintiff’s counsel’s express request that the parties swap information pursuant to local rules.
Plaintiff’s counsel later learned that Michael Gallagher, a Cook County State’s Attorney
who had not filed an appearance in the case, had decision-making authority with respect to
negotiating an agreement on fees and costs. Nevertheless, there is no indication on the record of
a timely response from Defendants that included an estimate of defense counsel’s hours; the first
communication as to those hours that the Court has seen occurs in the written response to
Plaintiff’s motion that was filed in late September. As detailed above, months earlier (in May)
the parties engaged in brief, unsuccessful settlement discussions. Defendants have not pointed to
any written submissions contemporaneous with those discussions confirming that they gave
Plaintiff any estimates of their hours or billing rates or any documentation demonstrating that

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they made a reasonable offer to Plaintiff to settle the fee dispute. Plaintiff then filed the instant
petition.
Local Rule 54.3 sets forth a process that, when done properly, aids the Court in the fair
disposition of petitions for attorneys’ fees. Although Plaintiff’s initial letter to Defendants was
in the vein of an estimate, it was fairly detailed and included both an estimate of hours and a
notice of her billing rates, as well as reasons why counsel believed her estimates to be
reasonable. It also included a specific request that Defendants “[k]indly provide Plaintiff’s
counsel with an accounting of all of Defendants’ attorneys fees and cost.” Defendants then
refused to engage in the process by refusing to turn over an estimate of their hours and rates or a
written response to her statement of reasons. This response precluded meaningful resolution of
the issues, despite representations to the Court that the parties were working toward settlement of
these issues. In view of Defendants’ lack of timely compliance with the Local Rule’s directives,
the Court concludes that Defendants have waived their specific objections to Plaintiff’s fee
entries.
In any event, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s hours and billing rate and finds both to be
reasonable given counsel’s two-and-a-half-year representation of Plaintiff, culminating in a fourday trial at which Plaintiff bore the burden of proof and post-trial motions. Attorney Bonjean
reports a total of 289.6 hours while Smith reports 105 hours. Together, Bonjean and Smith spent
a total of 394.6 hours of work. This is approximately 25 hours less than Plaintiff’s original
estimate. The billing records reflect work necessary to the preparation of a four-day jury trial as
well as hours reasonably expected to be expended during a trial. These totals also account for

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counsel’s post-trial efforts, in which they had to respond to Defendant Wilson’s post-trial motion
as well as issues pertaining to the fee dispute.5
Plaintiff’s two lawyers seek to be compensated at a rate of $495 per hour. Attorney
Jennifer Bonjean has 15 years of legal experience and Attorney Christopher Smith has 24 years
of legal experience. Bonjean founded her law firm in 2007, specializing in civil rights and
criminal defense litigation. She handles civil rights litigation in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and the
District of New Jersey. Bonjean has extensive trial and appellate practice experience in the
federal and state courts of New York, New Jersey, and Illinois.

Similarly, Christopher Smith

has 24 years of experience, much of it relevant to the issues presented in this case. Attorney
Smith recently filed a supplemental affidavit indicating that earlier this year a court approved
without objection a $450 hourly rate for Mr. Smith’s work in § 1983 litigation.
The Court’s review of the case law in this district suggests that rates at or above $450 per
hour sit at the upper end of the spectrum for § 1983 cases.6 To be sure, there are a few cases
approving fees above that level. See, e.g., Fox ex rel. Fox v. Barnes, 2013 WL 4401802, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013) (approving rates of $495 and $505 for experienced civil rights
litigators). The Court finds that the $450 hourly rate approved earlier this year for Attorney
5

In their response brief, Defendants report that counsel representing Defendants Koch and Dart
accumulated 368.1 hours on this case, while counsel for Defendant Wilson totaled 171.6 hours.

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Plaintiff urged the Court to rely on the Laffey matrix in assessing the reasonableness of the requested
rates. The Laffey matrix is a table of hourly rates prepared by the United States Attorney’s Office in the
District of Columbia for attorneys in the Washington, D.C. area. The Seventh Circuit has not explicitly
endorsed the use of the Laffey matrix, and in fact has questioned its application (see Pickett v. Sheridan
Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 649-50 (7th Cir. 2011)), but courts in this district have accepted it as
evidence of a reasonable hourly rate. See Hadnott v. City of Chicago, 2010 WL 1499473, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Apr.12, 2010) (Schenkier, M.J.) (citing cases and concluding “that the Laffey Matrix is ‘satisfactory
evidence’ of the prevailing rate, so that the burden shifts to opposing counsel to show why a lower rate is
essential”). In this case, the Court has looked to comparable civil rights cases in this circuit rather than
relying on the Laffey matrix.

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Smith is appropriate for both of Plaintiff’s experienced counsel in this case. Attorney Smith has
almost a decade more experience than Attorney Bonjean, but rates for lawyers in New York and
New Jersey are, on average, higher than rates for lawyers in Chicago, so no differential between
the two is warranted. The Court further finds that the requested hourly fees are appropriate to
compensate Plaintiff’s lawyers for their very capable representation and the excellent result that
they obtained for their client in this challenging case.
*****
In sum, because Plaintiff won a substantial verdict in this civil rights action, Plaintiff
clearly qualifies as a prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees under § 1988. In consideration
of the applicable factors, the Court concludes that Plaintiff obtained an excellent result and
should recover “a fully compensatory fee.” In other words, for the reasons set forth above, the
Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to 100% of the traditional lodestar—reasonable hours
multiplied by counsel’s reasonable hourly rates. Finally, as explained in detail above, the Court
finds that Defendants have waived the specific objections to Plaintiff’s entries in view of their
failure to comply with the spirit and letter of Local Rule 54.3 as they neither provided estimates
of their hours and rates on a timely basis nor engaged in meaningful discussion about Plaintiff’s
request for attorneys’ fees.
III.

Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s petition for attorneys’ fees [207] and

awards Plaintiff $177,570.00 (394.6 hours of work multiplied by $450.00/hour) in fees.

Dated: November 26, 2014

_________________________________
Robert M. Dow, Jr.
United States District Judge
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