Puente v. Sternes

Filing 119

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 8/2/2012. Respondent's motion to alter judgment [ 107 ] is denied. [For further detail see written opinion.] Mailed notice (lw, ).

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Joan B. Gottschall

CASE NUMBER

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

04 C 4877

DATE

8/2/2012

Puente vs. Chandler

CASE
TITLE
DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Respondent’s motion to alter judgment [107] is denied.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
On April 5, 2012, this court concluded that petitioner Raul Puente was entitled to relief on his habeas
petition because trial counsel rendered constitutionally defective assistance by pursuing a mistaken identification
defense at trial. In so doing, the court determined that it did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The
respondent has now filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),
and seeks an evidentiary hearing on Puente’s ineffective assistance claim.
The respondent’s first argument is that there was no error under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)1 because the state
court’s two factual errors were not material to Puente’s claim. This is an attempt to re-litigate an issue that has
already been decided by the court. In its August 2010 opinion, this court noted that both of these erroneously
found facts were relied upon by the Illinois Appellate Court in its Strickland analysis. See U.S. ex rel. Puente v.
Chandler, No. 04 C 4877, 2010 WL 3167201, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2010). The court will not revisit that issue
here.
Next, the respondent insinuates that after this court found a material § 2254(d)(2) error it went on to find
that Puente was automatically entitled to habeas relief. The court did no such thing. In its August 2010 opinion,
the court specifically explained that even though the state court had unreasonably determined facts against the
clear and convincing weight of the evidence, Puente still had to establish that he was entitled to relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a). In its April 2012 order, the court determined that Puente had established ineffective assistance
of counsel and was entitled to relief under § 2254(a). (See Order of Apr. 5, 2012.)
The respondent next takes issue with the fact that the court had previously ordered an evidentiary hearing,
but ultimately declined to hold one. The court had ordered the hearing in August 2010, but it revisited the
decision in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), which addressed the availability of an
evidentiary hearing for claims brought under § 2254(d)(1). After receiving supplemental briefing on Pinholster,
this court concluded that no evidentiary hearing was needed because Puente’s claim succeeded under § 2254(a)
on the record before the state court of review. (See Order of Apr. 5, 2012.) The respondent seems to believe that
the court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing is based upon some misapprehension of Pinholster, but
that is not the case. Pinholster merely stands for the proposition that a petitioner must overcome the hurdle
presented by § 2254(d)(1) based on the state-court record before the court will decide whether an evidentiary
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STATEMENT
hearing is warranted. Puente did overcome that hurdle, albeit in the context of § 2254(d)(2), and therefore he was
eligible to receive a hearing if he otherwise satisfied the standards set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). See U.S. ex
rel. Hooper v. Ryan, --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2012 WL 1230724, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2012). But as the court
pointed out, it had never stated that an evidentiary hearing was necessary for Puente to succeed on his claim,2
and indeed, when it revisited the petition the court determined that no hearing was needed. The simple truth is
that when the respondent believed she would prevail without an evidentiary hearing, she opposed the hearing—in
fact, the respondent filed an earlier motion for reconsideration on this very issue. (See Mot. to Reconsider, ECF
No. 61.) But now that the respondent has learned that she will not prevail—after ignoring in her earlier briefing
some of the very issues she now seeks to present3—she attempts to reopen the matter.
Finally, the respondent argues that if the hearing is held, she will be able to present evidence that trial
counsel was reasonable in his decision to forego the involuntary manslaughter defense, because at a March 2011
deposition (which this court ordered when it was going to permit expansion of the record) Puente’s trial counsel
testified that Puente had denied to counsel that he was the shooter. The court agrees with Puente that this
evidence, which was available since March 2011, is not new or timely, and is contradicted by the record
(including by deposition testimony provided by Puente’s original trial counsel). More importantly, this evidence
is not a part of the state-court record upon which this court rested its decision. The court’s conclusion that Puente
has established that he is entitled to habeas relief remains unchanged, and the respondent’s motion is denied in
its entirety.
1
The respondent references § 2254(d)(1) instead of § 2254(d)(2), but as this court determined that the state court of review made an
“unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented,” § 2254(d)(2), the court presumes this is a typographical
error.
2

The respondent walks a fine line in characterizing this court’s earlier orders, making it appear as though the court stated in no
uncertain terms that it required an evidentiary hearing to make a decision on Puente’s petition. (See, e.g., Mot. to Alter or Amend at 5
(“No new evidence has been provided to this Court since it stated that it needed additional facts to determine whether petitioner’s
allegations were true.”); Reply to Pet’r Resp. at 2 (“[T]his Court had stated that it needed to hear trial counsel’s reasons for selecting
the misidentification defense that ultimately proved unsuccessful at trial.).)

3

For instance, as the court has already pointed out, the respondent failed to address Puente’s allegation that the Illinois Appellate
Court made factual errors. See Puente, 2010 WL 3167201, at *3 (“[P]etitioner also argues that the Illinois Appellate Court violated 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) when it made two significant factual errors. Surprisingly, respondent fails to make any argument on this issue, or
even acknowledge Puente’s allegations of factual errors made by the state appellate court.”).

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