Bloch et al vs. Edward Frischholz et al

Filing 257

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/12/2011:Therefore, the Court denies Defendantss Motion to Vacate the Order of March 21, 2011. Entered by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/12/2011. Mailed notice(tsa, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Virginia M. Kendall

CASE NUMBER

5 C 5379

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

5/12/2011

Bloch vs. Frischholtz

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’s Motion to Vacate the Order of March 21, 2011.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
Defendants Edward Frischholz and the Shoreline Towers Condominium Association (together
“Defendants”) move to vacate the Court’s March 21, 2011 Order (“March Order”) granting Lynne Bloch’s
(“Bloch”) Renewed Motion to Vacate and Reinstate Claims. For the following reasons, the Court denies
Defendants’s Motion.
The Court, in its March Order, noted that it was not collaterally estopped from hearing Bloch’s state
law claims in Counts VII and VIII of her Second Amended Complaint because there was no final state court
judgment once the state court vacated its previous order dismissing her compliant with prejudice. The
Court’s March Order also highlighted the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding that “[f]or purposes of applying
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, finality requires that the potential for appellate review must have been
exhausted.” Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 499 N.E.2d 1373, 1375 (Ill. 1986). The Court further noted that
not all Illinois appellate courts have followed Ballweg. See Ill. Founders Ins. Co. v. Guidish, 618 N.E.2d
436, 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“[A] final judgment can serve as the basis to apply the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel even though the judgment is being appealed.”).
Defendants now argue that the state court may, on May 20, 2011, reconsider its order vacating its
earlier dismissal with prejudice of Bloch’s state law claims. Defendants’s reliance on the upcoming May 20,
2011 hearing, however, is unavailing. While the Court noted that Illinois courts have not uniformly applied
Ballweg, the Seventh Circuit has held that Ballweg controls over differing Illinois appellate court
interpretations of collateral estoppel and that “we are bound by the state supreme court’s opinion.” Minson v.
Vill. of Hopedale, 102 Fed. App’x 42, 44-45 (7th Cir. Jun. 17, 2004) (citing MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g
Co., Inc., 218 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2000).

5C5579 Bloch vs. Frischholtz

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STATEMENT
Here, as an initial matter, the state court’s order vacating its earlier dismissal with prejudice of
Bloch’s state law claims remains in place. Moreover, even if the state court reinstated its order dismissing
Bloch’s state law claims with prejudice, that order would not constitute a final judgment until the potential for
appellate review is exhausted. See Ballweg, 499 N.E.2d at 1375. As such, regardless of the action the state
court takes on May 20, 2011, there is no final judgment on the merits and the Court is not collaterally
estopped from reinstating Blochs’s state law claims.
Finally, as the Court noted in its March Order, reinstating Bloch’s state law claims is in accordance
with the Seventh Circuit’s mandate. See Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(“Bloch II”) (“[b]ecause of the reversal of summary judgment on three of the four federal claims, the state law
claims must also be reinstated.”).
Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’s Motion to Vacate the Order of March 21, 2011.

5C5579 Bloch vs. Frischholtz

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