United States of America and the State of Illinois, ex rel., Petra Hernandez v. Therapy Providers of America, Inc. Physical Therapy Associates Ltd., Therapy Providers of Illinois Ltd., et al
Filing
115
OPINION and Order Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 10/14/2014. (ao,)
qet
TN
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel., )
PETRA HERNANDEZ
Civil ActionNo. 06 CV 0760
Plaintiffs,
v.
Hon. Charles R. Norgle
THERAPY PROVIDERS OF AMERICA,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AT\ID ORDER
CHARLES R. NORGLE, District Judge
Before the Court is Relator Petra Hemandez's ("Relator") Petition for Attorney's Fees,
Expenses, and Costs. Relator requests attorneys' fees and costs for Robin Potter
& Associates in
the amount of $204,434.16 and $1,069.53, respectively; attomeys' fees and costs for Muriel
Renner LLC in the amount of $12,760.00 and $736.15, respectivelyi and attorneys' fees for The
Law Offices of Edward G. Renner in the amount of $13,425.00. Relator also requests the
payment of the attomeys' fees required to prosecute this motion, for a total of $232,424.84.|n
addition, Relator seeks an enhancement of the attorneys' fees by one-third to account for the
attomeys' contingent fee agreement. For the following reasons, the petition for attorneys' fees is
granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROT]ND
On February 9,2006, Relator initiated tlns qui tamlawsuitunder seal against seventeen
named defendants including corporate entities and individuals (collectively "Defendants"),
alleging violations of the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. S 3729, the Medicare Anti-
Kickback provisions, 42 U.S.C. $ 1395, and the Illinois False Claims Act ("IFCA"), 740
I11.
Comp. Stat.l75l3. Furthermore, Relator alleged that Defendants retaliated against her in
violation of the FCA, the IFCA and Illinois common law. Before filing the complaint, Relator's
attorneys Robin Potter and Edward Renner met with Assistant United States Attorney Kathryn
Kelly (*AUSA Kelly") in December of 2004, and gave an oral presentation regarding the qui tam
case. Attorneys for the federal govemment and the State of
Illinois investigated the case further
before the Relator's attorneys filed the complaint in2006. The parties reached a settlement
agreement with the federal govemment on September 8,2010, and reached a settlement
agreement with the State of
Illinois on November 29,2010. The parties settled the federal claims
for $l 17,420.00, of which Relator received S23,484.00; and settled the state claims for $25,000,
of which Relator received $6,200.00. On October 14,2011, the Court entered judgment pursuant
to the settlement agreements. Relator now moves for attorneyso fees and costs under $ 3730(d)
of
the FCA and $ 17514(d)(l) of the IFCA. The motion is tully briefed and before the Court.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Decision
Both the federal and state False Claims Acts allow a relator to "receive an amount for
reasonable expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs."
3l U.S.C. $ 3730(dxl);7a0Ill. Comp. Stat.l75l4(d)(l).The Court
calculates attomeys' fees in qui tam cases using the same standard as applied in 42 U.S.C.
$ 1988 civil rights actions. 132 CoNG. REC. H9382-03 (daily ed. Oct. 7,1986) (Statement
of
Rep. Berman), 1986 WL786917; see also Blum v. $tenson, 104 U.S. 1051 (1984). To determine
the amount of a reasonable attorneys' fee award, courts generally begin by calculating the
lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by an
attorney's reasonable hourly rate. See Hensle), v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433 (1983); see also
Schlacher v. Law Offices of Phillip J. Rotche & Assocs.. P.C.,574F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 2009).
"The district court may then adjust that figure to reflect various factors including the complexity
of the legal issues involved, the degree of success obtained, and the public interest advanced by
the litigation." Scblggher, 574
B.
F
.3d at 856-57 (citations omitted).
The Lodestar Calculation
To
justiff the attorneys' fees expended in this litigation, Relator submits fifty-five
pages
of the line item invoices from her three representative law firms, which spans from the first
conference between client and counselin2004 up to and including the work performed in
preparing the instant fee petition. Pl.'s Pet. for Att'ys Fees, Expenses, and Costs, Ex. C
[hereinafter "Relator's Attorneys' Complete Billing"]. Robin Potter & Associates billed 525.23
hours at attorney rates between $175 and $535 per hour, totaling $204,434.16; Muriel Renner,
LLC billed 69 hours at attomey rates between $200 and $300 per hour, totaling $12,760.00; and
The Law Offices of Edward Renner billed 49.4 hours at attorney rates between $200 and $300
per hour, totaling $13,425.00.1 Defendants do not contest Relator's attorneys' hourly rates or any
associated expenses. However, Defendants argue that Relator's attorneys' fees, especially those
of Robin Potter & Associates, are excessive because given the nature of the qui tarn case, the
U.S. Government's involvement aided Relator and reduced the amount of work that Relator's
attomeys had to perform.
"The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve
auditing perfection. So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may
use estimates in calculating and allocating an attomey's time." Fox v. Vice, 131 S.Ct. 2205,2216
'Relator has an outstanding balance with Robin Potter & Associates for $208,023.91 and with Muriel Renner, LLC
for $13,262, but Relator only moves for $204,434.1650 and $12,760.00, respectively. See Relator's Attorneys'
Complete Billing 45,51. The Court relies on the latter amounts, the amounts requested in Relator's petition.
(2011). "The district court also should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were
not reasonably expended." Hensley,46l U.S. at434 (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore,
ooin
determining the number of hours 'reasonably expended' by counsel in the litigation, the court
should ensrue that counsel exercises 'billing judgment."' Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 175
F.3d 544,553 (7th Cir. 1999). In examining whether the plaintifPs attomeys exercised "billing
judgment," the Court has broad discretion to strike vague or poorly documented billing entries
that an attorney would not ordinarily bill his or her client, hours billed at an attorney rate for
'tasks that are easily delegable to non-professional assistance," and hours billed at
a
paralegal
rate for clerical tasks. Id. (intemal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Montanez v.
Simon, 755 F.3d 547,555-56 (7thCir.2014).
Here, Defendants argue that the U.S. Government's involvement in this matter should
have reduced the hours Relator's attorneys needed to expend on the case. To support this
contention, Defendants include, among other things, a ten paragraph affrdavit from AUSA Kelly
who was assigned to the case. AUSA Kelly describes her interactions with Relator's counsel
over the course of the litigation. Supplement to Defs.' Resp. to Relator's Pet. for Att'ys Fees
Expenses, Ex.
&
A [hereinafter "Aff. of AUSA Kelly"]. AUSA Kelly declared that "[f]ollowing the
filing of the complaint, [her] contact with Relator's counsel consisted of responding to periodic
update requests" and that she "did not ask for assistance or request a meeting."
Kelly tT7. AUSA Kelly notes that
Aff. of AUSA
she held some conferences to discuss settlement matters,
which Relator's counsel attended, and she also "received a disclosure statement from the Relator
after the filing of the qui tam action." Id. fl 7-10. AUSA Kelly's affidavit supports Defendants'
contention that the government spearheaded this litigation. However, AUSA Kelly's statements
4
are at times conflicting and her declarations are "based on [her] best recollection of the matter";
she did not review the case
file before providing the affidavit. Id. fl 2.
In any event, simply because the government was involved in this case does not
necessarily equate to an unreasonable expenditure of attomey time on behalf of Relator. The
govemment's participation in a qui tam case leads to "dual participation of both the government
and the qui tam
plaintiff on the same side," not the entire replacement of the qui tam plaintiffor
her representative counsel. 132 CoNG. RBc. H9382-03. Generally, qui tam cases are complex
because of the relationship and number of parties involved, the complex legal framework and the
detailed investigation required to prove fraud. Instead of litigation between only a plaintiffand
defendant, this case included several corporate and individual defendants, as well as the
intervention of federal and state governments. Additionally, the participation of federal and state
governments does not necessarily mean that the govemment will always fully represent Relator's
interests. Here, the federal government did not proceed with the retaliation claims on behalf
of
Relator. See Defs.' Resp. in Opp'n to Relator's Pet. for Att'ys Fees, Expenses & Costs, Ex. 1 at
6 [hereinafter "Settlement Agreement"]. Relatoros afforneys' involvement ensured that their
client's interests were adequately represented throughout the litigation, not just until the point of
filing the complaint. It would have been a disservice to Relator if her attomeys had not contacted
and followed up with AUSA
Kelly and the other government attomeys who lead the case.
Because of the complexity of this case, the Court does not find that Relator's attorneys' fees are
outright excessive due to the involvement of the government attomeys, as Defendant contends.
The invoices submitted with the petition, however, show that Relator's attorneys did not
always exercise "billing judgment." Speson, 175 F.3d at 553. For example, in February of 2010,
Robin Potter & Associates billed 22.62 hours for predominantly sending emails and having
discussions with co-counsel. Relator's Attomeys' Complete Billing at32-35. Several of these
line-item billing entries are vague and appear to be duplicates. On page thirty-three of the billing
invoice, there are three separate charges with the identical description: "Receipt and review
email from AUSA Kelly
re:2ll8ll0 meeting." Id. at 33. It appears that Robin Potter &
Associates billed five hours to prepare for a status meeting on February 18, 2010 that lasted less
than an hour and fifteen minutes. Over the course of the litigation, which is now in its eighth year
and documented in
fifty five pages of attorney invoices,
these seemingly small charges add up.
The Court has reviewed the billing records and the arguments of both sides, and
reduces the lodestar of Robin Potter
it
& Associates attorneys' fees by fifteen percent to account
for their lapse in billing judgment. See Dutchak v. Cent. States" Southeast and Southwest Area
Pension Fund,932F.2d 591,597 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that there is nothing impermissible as
a matter
of law for a district court to reduce an attomey's fees by a percentage). Accordingly, the
Court finds reasonable a lodestar amount of $173,769.04 for Robin Potter & Associates. The
Court finds that the lodestar for Muriel Renner LLC and The Law Offices of Edward G. Renner
attorneys' fees are reasonable and declines to make any adjustnents.
C. Lodestar Reduction for Relator's Degree of Success on the Merits
Next, Defendants argue that the amount of attorneys' fees requested is unreasonable
because Relator was only partially successful on her claims and therefore her attorneys' fees
should be reduced accordingly. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) ("Indeed, 'the
most critical factor' in determining the reasonableness of a fee award 'is the degree of success
obtained."' (quoting Hensley. 461 U.S. at 436)). Specifically, Defendants contend that
l)
the
amount of money awarded to Relator reflects only a technical or de minimzs victory; 2) Relator
elected not to pursue the retaliation claims any further; and 3) only five of the seventeen
defendants were held liable and bound by the settlement agreement.
To support their de minimus argument, Defendants rely on Farrar and compare this case
to two other qui tam cases from other federal district courts. 506 U.S. at ll4-15; see also United
States ex reI.. Bahrani v. Conagra, No. 0G-cv-1077,2009
WL 2766805, at *5 (D. Colo. Aug. 28,
2009), vacated in part on other grounds,624F.3d 1275 (l0th Cir. 2010); United States ex rel.
Angell v. Plannine Research Corp., C.A.No. 94.618-4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27,1994).In Farrar, the
plaintiff sought $17 million dollars, but only received
506 U.S. at
a
nominal damage award of one dollar.
ll4. However, the damage award in this case was not nominal or de minimus;
Plaintiffs received almost $150,000.
See
Hyde v. Small,l23F.3d 583,585 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a $500 compensatory damage award was not nominal). The Court rejects
Defendants' argument that the requested attomeys' fees should be reduced based on a technical
or de minimr.ls victory.
Defendants also argue that Relator was only partially successful on her claims because
she elected not to pursue her retaliation claims
following settlement of her FCA and IFCA
claims. The Court finds this argument meritless under United States ex. rel. Fallon v. Accudyne
Cotp., 97 F.3d937 (7th Cir. 1996). In Fallon, six relators and the Department of Justice settled
with the defendant on one of two counts under the FCA, leaving the second count in the "hands
of the relators." Id. at 938. As part of the settlement, the defendant affirmatively promised to pay
relators' reasonable attorneys' fees. Id. at939. The relators did not pursue the second count any
further after the settlement, the district court dismissed the case in reliance on the settlement, and
it awarded over $1.2 million in attomeys' fees. Id. The defendant challenged the award of
attorneys' fees, arguing that it would have prevailed on the second count, if litigated to judgment,
therefore, relators were only partially successful on their claims and the award was unreasonable.
7
Id. Rejecting this argument, the Fallon court held that accepting the defendant's argument
"would not only undermine parties' incentives to settle but also squander judicial resources to
permit a litigant to weasel out of a bargain as Accudyne [was] trying to do." Id. at 940.
The Settlement Agreement between the parties here is similar to the parties' agreement in
Fallon. The Settlement Agreement entitled Relator to "expenses or attomey's fees and costs
under 31 U.S.C. $ 3730(d)." Settlement Agreement 6. The Settlement Agreement resolved the
underlying FCA claims, but allowed Relator to further litigate her retaliation claims without the
government as a party. Id. On October 14,2011, the Court entered the following stipulation:
"The parties have settled and resolved by and through their Settlement Agreements, all claims
between the plaintiffs and defendants on the underlying Medicare and Medicaid fraud claims.
The only remaining claim consists of a claim for attorneys' fees by the plaintiff Petra Hemandez
...
." Stip. of J. in a Civil Action
1. Obviously, Relator dismissed or abandoned her claims
before the stipulation was entered. However, when a qui tam case settles, like it did here and in
Fallon, the question before the Court is "whether the [attorneys'] bill is reasonable, but not the
question whether the United States (through the relators) 'prevailed"'on all counts. Fallon, 97
F.3d at 940.
Similarly, the Court finds disingenuous Defendants' argument that Relator achieved
limited success on the merits because only five of the seventeen defendants were held liable and
bound by the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement contains five signatures on
behalf of Defendants; however, these signatures represent both individual and corporate
defendants. Settlement Agreement 16. Five corporations and three individuals are bound by the
Settlement Agreement for a total of eight out of the seventeen named Defendants, not five.
Regardless, the Settlement Agreement resolved all of the underlying claims on the underlying
Medicare and Medicaid fraud claims, not a portion of them. Accordingly, the Court rejects
Defendants' argument that Relator achieved only minimal success.
D. Relatorts Request to Increase the Lodestar
In addition, Defendants object to Relator's request for the Court to increase the lodestar
to account for the contingent nature of Relator's attorneys' fee agreement. In seeking an increase,
Relator relies on the legislative history of the FCA. See 132 CoNc. REC. H9382-03.
While the Court may increase the lodestar in exceptional circumstances, it usually
declines to do so, because high quality legal representation is already reflected in the attorneys'
hourly rate used to calculate the lodestar. Blum,465 U.S. at897-99. Relator provides no
evidence that her attomeys' representation was exceptional. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme
Court explicitly rejected the practice of enhancing attorneys' fees because of contingent fee
agreements. City of Burlineton v. Dazue. 505 U.S. 557 , 566 (1992) (*[T]he interest in ready
administrability that has underlain our adoption of the lodestar approach and the related interest
in avoiding burdensome satellite litigation counsel strongly against adoption of contingency
enhancement." (citations omitted)). Relator does not cite a single case in the Seventh Circuit that
has applied a contingency enhancement in a qui tam case. And, the Court declines to do so here.
E. Relator's Request for Additional Fees Related to the Instant Petition
Finally, Relator asks the Court to award the attomeys' fees associated with the instant
petition. Defendants do not object. Relator already included these fees in the total amount
of
attomeys' fees requested in her petition, supported by the invoice attached to the petition. Thus,
the Court finds any further adjustments unnecessary.
9
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Relator's petition for attomeys' fees is granted in part and
denied in part. The Court awards $173,769.04 in attorneys' fees and $1,069.53 in costs to Robin
Potter & Associates, a fifteen percent reduction from the requested attorneys' fee. The Court
awards $12,760.00 in attorneys' fees and $736.15 in costs to Muriel Renner LLC. The Court
awards $13,425.00 in attomeys' fees to The Law Offrces of Edward G. Renner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
CHARLES RONALD NO
United States District Court
DATE: October 14,2014
l0
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