Chavez v. Guerrero et al

Filing 97

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Ruben Castillo on 12/16/2014. (ao,)

C/'--

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARILU

CHAVEZ,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

CstilEft 2 t t D

)

v.)
RICHARD GUERRERO, CITY OF
CHICAGO, and JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

No. 06

)

Chief Judge Rub6n Castillo

)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On October 1,2007, the Court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor

of

Defendant City of Chicago, and against Plaintiff Marilu Chavez on her claims pursuant to 42

U.S.C. $ 1983 ("Section 1983"). (R. 82, Min. Entry; R. 83, Order.) Presently before the Court is
Defendant's bill of costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). (R. 84, Def.'s Bill

of Costs.) For the reasons stated below, the Court awards Defendant $5,546.30 in costs.

BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case as outlined in its December 15,
2006 Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant's motion

to dismiss. See Chavez v. Guerrero, 465 F. Supp. 2d 864,866-68 (N.D. Ill. 2006). The facts are
repeated here only as they pertain to this

Plaintiff was involved in

a

bill of costs. Around 8:30

a.m. on

April 19,2005,

traffic accident near the intersection of Walton and Leavitt Streets in

Chicago, Illinois. (R. 21, Pl.'s Second Am. Compl.tT8.) A police officer arrived at the scene
and directed

Plaintiff to proceed to the police station at937 N. Wood

(Id.) At the police station, Plaintiff
Guerrero.

(ld.n9.) Plaintiff

Street to

fill

out a report.

came into contact with Chicago police officer Richard

alleged that after her initial contact with Officer Guerrero, he

accessed the police report regarding her accident and retrieved her phone number from the

report. (Id. n I I .) Plaintiff alleged that Officer Guerrero began harassing her both in person and
over the telephone on numerous occasions while he was on duty. (ld.fln 12-15.)

Plaintiff reported the harassment to unnamed police officers at the police station who

initially were uncooperative, but eventually referred her to Sergeant Marsala (first name

unknown). (1d.n[17-18.)

Sergeant Marsala told Plaintiff he would report her complaint to his

commander. (Id. fl 18.) After lodging her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that two unknown police
officers came to her place of employment and took her to the police station, where she was
detained for eight hours and prohibited from leaving. (Id.nn22-24.) Plaintiff alleged that after

this incident, she was continuously harassed by Chicago police officers. (1d.n30.) Plaintiff
alleged that police cars followed her on several occasions and that garbage was thrown on her car
several times, including around the time she was due to

testifr in a state criminal proceeding

against Officer Guerrero. (Id.fln 30-35.) Officer Guerrero was ultimately found guilty

of

misdemeanor telephone harassment in state court and was sentenced to a year of court

supervision. (Id.n 37.) As a result of these events, Plaintiff claimed to have suffered mental and
emotional damage, including fear, humiliation, anxiety, and lost enjoyment of
On

life. (Id. n39.)

April 19,2006, Plaintiff brought this action against Defendant, Officer Guerrero,

and

unnamed defendants from the Chicago Police Department John Does 1-10. (R. 1, Compl.)

Plaintiff

s second amended complaint contained six

counts: (1) in Count I, Plaintiff alleged that

Officer Guerrero violated her constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection in violation of
Section 1983; (2) in Count II, Plaintiff alleged that unknown police officers John Does l-5
violated her constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection; (3) in Count III, Plaintiff
alleged that unknown police officers John Does 6-10 violated her Fourth Amendment rights; (4)

in Count IV, Plaintiff brought a state law claim against Officer Guerrero for intentional infliction
of emotional distress; (5) in Count V, Plaintiff brought a state law claim against Defendant for
negligent supervision; (6) and in Count VI, Plaintiff brought a state law indemnification claim
against Defendant. (R. 21, Pl.'s Second Am. Compl. 1T'llT40-85.) On November 21,2006,

Plaintiff agreed to voluntarily dismiss Count

V. (R. 42,Min. Entry.) On December

15, 2006,

this Court granted Officer Guerrero's motion to dismiss Count I but denied the motion as to
Count

IV. (R.45,

Mem. Op. and Order.)

On June 19,2007, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a third amended complaint, (R. 54,

Pl.'s Mot. Leave Third Am. Compl.), and this Court denied the motion on July 5,2007, (R. 42,

Min. Entry). On August 30,2007, Defendant filed

a

motion for judgment on the pleadings as to

Counts tI and III pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

l2(c). (R. 78, Def.'s Mot. J. on

Pleadings.) On October 1,2007, this Court granted Defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings as to Counts II and III, and dismissed state law Counts IV and VI without prejudice,

with leave to re-file in state court. (R. 83, Order at 2.)
On October 3t,2007, Defendant filed a bill of costs pursuant to Rule 54(d), originally
seeking $6,413.50 in total costs (after correct calculations), (R. 84, Def.'s Bill of Costs), and an
accompanying memorandum, (R. 85, Def.'s Mem.). Specifically, Defendant requested $157.80

for exemplification and copies of papers;

$

129.00 for witness fees;

$ 1,1 1 1 .00

for service of

summons and subpoena fees; $662.50 for court reporter attendance fees; and $4353.20 for

deposition transcript costs.

I

(R. 84, Def.'s Bill of Costs at

bill of costs on December 7,2007, (R. 92, Pl.'s

1

.) Plaintiff

responded to Defendant's

Resp.), and Defendant replied on December 12,

2007, (R. 94, Def.'s Reply). Defendant conceded costs for exemplification and copies of papers

(now totaling $150.60 after correct calculations), key word indexes in deposition transcripts
($4.50, now bringing the total request for deposition transcripts to $4,348.70), witness fees (now

totaling $120.00), and service of summons and subpoena fees (now totaling $278.00). (ld. at2-

5.) The following

costs remain in dispute: (1) subpoena costs ($278.00); (2) transcripts costs,

including condensed transcripts ($4,348.70); and (3) court reporter attendance fees ($662.50).

(Id. at 1-5.) Defendant's bill of costs is presently before the Court.

LEGAL STANDARI)
Pursuant to Rule 54(d), "costs

-

other than attorney's fees

-

should be allowed to the

prevailing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(dX1). A district court may not tax costs under Rule 54(d),
however, "unless a federal statute authorizes an award of those costs." Republic Tobacco Co.

v.

N. Atl. Trading Co., lnc.,481 F.3d 442,447 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Crowford Fitting Co. v. J.T.
Gibbons, lnc.,482 U.S. 437, 441-43 (1987)). The list of recoverable costs authorized under 28

U.S.C. $ 1920 include:

(l)

Fees of the clerk and marshal;

(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for
use in the case;

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;

'

The Court notes that Defendant requests $5,015.70 for deposition transcript fees (after correct
calculations). (R. 84, Def.'s Bill of Costs at 1.) The invoices Defendant submitted in support of
its bill of costs show that $662.50 of the deposition transcript fees are court reporter attendance
fees. (R. 85-3, Ex. A, Dep. Tr. Invoices at 10-11.) Therefore, the Court will subtract the court
reporter attendance fees from the deposition transcript fee total in considering Defendant's bill of
costs. Accordingly, the Court calculates the deposition transcript fees as $4,353.20.

(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials
where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees . . . ; [and]
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and
salaries, fees, expenses, and costs ofspecial interpretation services . . .
28 u.S.C. $ 1e20 (l)-(6).
Even if authorized by statute, however, "a cost must be both reasonable and necessary to
the litigation for a prevailing party to recover

it." Little

v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am.,

Inc.,5l4

F.3d 699,702 (7th Cir. 2008). In short, the determination of whether to tax costs against the
losing party requires two inquiries: "(1) whether the cost imposed on the losing party is
recoverable and (2)

if

so, whether the amount assessed for that item was reasonable

."

Majeske

v.

City of Chi.,2l8 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2000). Although there is a strong presumption that the
prevailing party will recover costs, Parkv. City of ChL,297 F.3d 606, 617 (7thCir.2002),the

"party seeking an award of costs carries the burden of showing that the requested costs were
necessarily incurred and reasonable." Trs. of the Chi. Plastering Inst. Pension Trust v. Cork

Plastering Co., 570 F.3d 890, 906 (7th Cir. 2009). Once the prevailing party demonstrates that
particular costs should be allowed, the losing party then bears the burden to affirmatively show
that the taxed costs are not appropriate. Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co.,4l1 F.3d 854,
864 (7th Cir. 2005). Ultimately, the decision of whether to award costs is within the Court's

discretion. M.T. Bonk Co. v. Milton Bradley Co.,945 F.2d 1404, 1409 (7th Cir. 1991).

ANALYSIS
Plaintiff disputes Defendant's bill of costs based on the following reasons:

(l)

service

of

summons and subpoena fees and deposition transcript costs incurred by Defendant after October

1I,2006, are unreasonable and should not be allowed; and (2) even if costs incurred by

Defendant after October 11, 2006, are allowable, some fees are not recoverable or are
unnecessary. (R. 92, Pl.'s Resp. at2-3.) The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.

I.

Whether service of summons and subpoena costs and deposition transcript costs
incurred by Defendant between October 1112006, and September 41 2007, were
reasonable and recoverable

Plaintiff argues that costs for deposition transcripts ($4,348.70) and service of summons
and subpoena ($278.00) incurred between October 11,2006, the date Count I of the second
amended complaint was dismissed, and September 4,2007, the date the Court set the briefing

schedule for Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, were unnecessary to

Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and are therefore unrecoverable. (R. 92, Pl.'s
Resp.

at2-3.) Defendant

argues, however, that these costs were necessary because both parties

were actively litigating the case at the time the depositions were taken and the subpoenas were

served. (R. 94, Def.'s Reply at2.) The Court will address each issue separately.

A.

Deposition transcripts costs2

The Seventh Circuit has held that fees for deposition transcripts "necessarily obtained for
use in the case" are recoverable. Montanez v. Simon,755 F.3d 547, 557 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting

28 U.S.C. $ 1920(2)). The determination of necessity must be made in light of the facts known
at the time of the deposition, and "without regard to intervening developments that render the

deposition unneeded for further use." Mother & Father v. Cassidy, 338 F.3d 704,712 (7th Cir.

2003). "The proper inquiry is whether the deposition was 'reasonably necessary' to the case at
the time it was taken, not whether it was used in a motion or in court." Cengr v. Fusibond

2 Under Local Rule 54.1(b), "the costs of the transcript ... shall not exceed the regular copy rate
as established by the Judicial Conference of the United States and in effect at the time the
transcript or deposition was filed[.]" N.D. Ill. L.R. 54.1(b). The Court notes that the rate in
effect at the time the depositions were taken in this case was $3.30 for original transcripts, See
N.D. Ill. General Order, September 24,2002, and Defendant has complied with this rate in
calculating its deposition transcript request, (R. 85-2, Ex. A, Dep. Tr. Rates at 5).

Piping

Sys.,

Inc.,l35 F.3d 445,455 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Finchum

v. Ford Motor Co.,57

F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also Majeske,218 F.3d at825 ("[T]he introduction

of

testimony from a transcript is not a prerequisite for finding that it was necessary.").
In the instant case, the parties conducted discovery from February 27,2007, (R. 50, Min.
Entry), to August 6,2007, (R. 70, Min. Entry). This Court gave the parties a deadline

of

September 6,2007, to file any dispositive motions. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that the depositions
were not necessary because they were not utilized in Defendant's motion for judgment on the

pleadings. (R. 92, Pl.'s Resp. at 3.) The depositions were taken prior to the deadline to file
dispositive motions and before this Court rendered a decision on Defendant's motion. (R. 85-3,
Ex. A, Dep. Tr. Invoices at 10-17.) At that time, the parties were actively litigating this case, and
Defendant contends that it would have used evidence gleaned from the depositions in a possible

motion for summary judgment. (R. 94, Def.'s Reply at 2.) Instead of filing a summary judgment
motion, however, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings as a result of this Court's
denial of Plaintiff s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint that would have named
the John Doe defendants. (R. 94, Def.'s Reply at

2.) If the Court had denied Defendant's

motion, the parties conceivably could have proceeded to a trial. Defendant reasonably prepared

for all contingencies by taking depositions in defense of its case. It is immaterial that the
depositions were not actually utilized in Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, as
they were reasonably necessary at the time they were taken. See Cengr, 135 F.3d at 455. The

Court recognizes that Defendant deposed Detective Robert Fujara after the motion for judgment
on the pleadings was filed, (R. 85-3, Ex. A, Dep. Tr. Invoice at 16), but the Court finds that the

deposition was still "reasonably necessary" at the time because it was taken prior to the Court
issuing its ruling on Defendant's pending motion. Plaintiff has failed to assert any basis for this

Court to determine that the depositions were unnecessary at the time they were taken. Therefore,

Plaintiff has not met her burden to demonstrate that the deposition costs are unrecoverable.
Beamon,41

I

See

F.3d at 864. Accordingly, the Court finds that the deposition transcript costs

incurred by Defendant were reasonably necessary, and thus the $4,348.70 is recoverable.

Plaintiff additionally argues that even if this Court determines that costs for depositions
taken in this case are recoverable, costs for the depositions of Dr. Ebrahim Ghodsizadeh

($366.30), one of Plaintiff

s

treating physicians, and Renato Vaan DeWeil ($222.75), Plaintiff

s

boyfriend, should be excluded. (R. 92, Pl.'s Resp. at 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the
depositions were unnecessary because Dr. Ghodsizadeh could only attest to issues related to
damages, and thus his deposition was taken prematurely, and that Vaan DeWeil was deposed

merely to "harass" Plaintiff. (Id. at 4-5.) Defendant argues that the depositions were necessary
at the time they were taken, however, because Defendant planned to use the evidence

in support

of a summary judgment motion in the event this Court permitted Plaintiff to file a third amended

complaint. (R. 94, Def.'s Reply at 5.)
Defendant deposed Vaan DeWeil on May 24,2007, and Dr. Ghodsizadeh on May 31,

2007. (R. 85-3, Ex. A, Dep. Tr. Invoices at 14-15.) At this time, Plaintiff and Defendant were
actively litigating the case in the midst of discovery. (See R. 50, Min. Entry.) After the
depositions were taken, the Court denied Plaintiff s motion for leave to file a third amended

complaint, on July 5,2007

. (R. 42, Min. Entry.) Defendant contends

that the deposition of Vaan

DeWeil was necessary because he was present for many of the incidents Plaintiff alleged in the
complaint. (R. 94, Def.'s Reply at 5.) Further, Plaintiff alleged that she suffered emotional
trauma, necessitating treatment by health care professionals, (R. 21, Pl.'s Second Am. Compl. at
8), and Defendant deposed Dr. Ghodsizadeh because he was Plaintiff s treating physician, (R.

94, Def.'s Reply at

4). The Court finds it eminently reasonable that Defendant

two individuals to defend itself against Plaintiff

s

deposed these

claims. In addition, Plaintiff offers no factual

support for her claim that Defendant deposed Vaan DeWeil solely to harass Plaintiff. Therefore,

Plaintiff fails to overcome the "strong presumption" in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing
party.

See

Park,297 F.3d at 617.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the depositions of Dr. Ghodsizadeh and Vaan DeWeil
were necessary in light of the circumstances, and the Court will not deduct $589.05 from

Defendant's bill of costs.

B. Subpoena service fees
Defendant also seeks subpoena service fees totaling $278.00 for Plaintiff s medical
records and other information. (R. 94, Def.'s Reply at2; see R. 85-2, Ex. A, Subpoena Fees

&

Invoices at3,8-12,14-15; R. 85-3, Ex. A, Subpoena Invoices at 1-3, 5-9.) Plaintiff argues that
the subpoena service fees are unrecoverable because the subpoenas sought materials unnecessary

to the Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. (R. 92, Pl.'s Resp. at2-3.) Similar to
its argument regarding deposition transcript costs, Defendant argues that the medical records and
other materials sought would have been utilized in a motion for summary judgment if Plaintiff
had been permitted to

file a third amended complaint. (R. 94, Def.'s Reply at 2.) Defendant

argues that the subpoena fees are therefore necessary and recoverable. (Id.)
Subpoena fees are authorized by 28 U.S.C. $ 1920(1). See Republic Tobacco Co.

v.

North Atlantic Trading Co., 481 F.3d 442, 447 (7th Cir. 2007); Little, 514 F.3d at 701. In
particular, "fees for subpoenaing medical records are allowable." Dishman v. Cleary, 279 F.R.D.
460,467 (N.D. Ill.2012); see also Gillman v. Crown Equip. Corp., No. 95 C 1914,1996 WL
556706, at *5 (N.D.

Ill.

Sept. 26,1996) (same). The prevailing party must show "that the

9

requested costs were necessarily incurred and reasonable." Cork Plastering Co.,570 F.3d at
906.

Here, all of the subpoenas were served prior to this Court's denial of Plaintiffls motion

for leave to file

a

third amended complaint. (R. 85-2, Ex. A, Subpoena Fees & Invoices at 3, 8-

12,14-15; R. 85-3, Ex. A, Subpoena Invoices at l-3,5-9.) Defendant contends that it needed the
materials it collected through subpoenas to prepare for filing a motion for summary judgment

if

this Court permitted Plaintiff to file a third amended complaint. (R. 94, Def.'s Reply at 2.)
Defendant also argues that securing Plaintiff s medical records was necessary to defend against

Plaintiff

s

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. (R. 85, Def.'s Mem. at 5.) While

Defendant has not provided a detailed rationale regarding the necessity of the subpoenaed
materials, the Court concludes that the subpoena fees were "necessarily incurred." Cork

Plastering Co., 570 F.3d at 906.

In addition, the Court finds the subpoena fees reasonable, as the fee rate of $20-persubpoena does not exceed the allowable rate of $45 in effect at the time the subpoenas were

served. See Revision to U.S. Marshals Serv. Fees

for

Servs.,73 Fed. Reg. 69552,69553 O{ov.

19, 2008) (outlining the 2000 rates that remained in effect until 2008); see also Collins v.

Gorman,96 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1996) (Permitting prevailing parties to "recover [subpoena
service fees] that do not exceed the marshal's fees, no matter who actually effected service").
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the subpoena service fee costs are

unrecoverable. See Beamon,411 F.3d at864. Thus, the Court will permit Defendant to recover
$278.00 in subpoena service fees.

10

II.

Whether fees for deposition transcript copies are recoverable
In addition to the original transcript fees for Plaintiff and Officer Guerrero, Defendant

also seeks fees for copies of their depositions. (R. 85-3, Ex. A, Dep. Tr. Invoices at I

l-12.) The

condensed transcript fees amount to $213.25, and Defendant has included them as part of the

total costs for deposition transcripts. Defendant ordered these voluminous transcripts in a
condensed format because the reduced number of pages made the transcripts'omuch more

manageable" as exhibits. (R. 94, Def.'s Reply at

4.) Plaintiff

argues that courts typically do not

permit recovery of fees for condensed transcripts. (R. 92,P1.'s Resp. at 5.) Defendant counters
that Local Rule 54.1(b) permits fees for copies of transcripts.
Local Rule 54.1(b) provides that "only the cost of the original of such transcript or
deposition together with the cost of one copy each where needed by counsel and, for depositions,
the copy provided to the court shall be allowed." L.R. 5a.1(b); see also Cengr,135 F.3d at 456
(demonstrating that under rules promulgated by the Judicial Conference, prevailing parties are

permitted to recover for both an original deposition transcript and a copy of the transcript).

Plaintiff is correct that some courts have not permitted fees for condensed transcripts.
Ochano v. Flores,206 F. Supp. 2d 941, 945 (N.D.

Ill.20A\;

See

Winery v. City of Chi, No. 96 C

1208,2000 WL 1222152, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22,2000). Other courts in this District, however,
have permitted recovery for condensed transcript costs, noting that under Local Rule 54.1 the

losing party can be taxed for the cost of a deposition transcript plus one copy. See Rexam
Beverage Can Co. v. Bolger,No. 06 C2234,2008 WL 5068824, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25,2008);
Angevine v. Watersaver Faucet Co., No. 02 C 8114,2003 WL 23019165, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec.

23,2003).

11

In the instant case, similar to the prevailing parties in Rexam and Angevine,Defendant
seeks to recover costs

for

a condensed

transcript in lieu of a full-sized copy. Local Rule 54.1(b)

entitles Defendant to a copy of each transcript for use by either counsel or the court. The Court
finds it appropriate to award Defendant these costs on this basis alone. The fact that the
transcripts are condensed is a cost-saving benefit to the Plaintifl who was charged at a rate

of

$.25-$.50 per page, well below the rate of $.83 permitted for deposition transcript copies under

Local Rule 54.1 in August2007. See N.D. Ill. General Order, September 24,2002; Rexam,2008

WL 5068824, at *8. Accordingly, the Court will not deduct $213.25 from Defendant's
deposition transcript fee request.

III.

Whether Defendant may recover fees for court reporter attendance
Defendant seeks court reporter attendance fees in the amount of $662.50. (See R. 85-3,

Ex. A, Dep. Tr. Invoices at l0-1

l.)

Plaintiff argues that court reporter attendance fees are not

recoverable under 28 U.S.C. $ 1920. (R. 92, Pl.'s Resp. at 5.) The Seventh Circuit has
repeatedly upheld the awarding of court reporter attendance fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

$

1920(2). See Held v. Held,137 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998); Finchum,sT F.3d at 534; see
also Extra Equips. E Exportacao Ltda. v. Case Corp.,54l F.3d 719,727 (7th Cir.2008) ("Since

the [court] reporter cannot make the transcript without attending the hearing, the separate
attendance fee is properly regarded as a component of the fee for the transcript."). Court reporter
fees must be reasonable, and

"[h]ourly fees in excess of $60.00 are ordinarily unreasonable."

Dishman,279 F.R.D. at 468, see also Lewis v. City of Chi., No. 04 C 6050, 2012WL 6720411,
at *6 Q.{.D. Ill. Dec.2l,2012) (Castillo, J.);McColloughv. O'Neill,
737847, at *2 Q'{.D. Ill. Feb. 28,2003).

t2

No.0l

C 6510,2003 WL

Here, Defendant submitted invoices for two depositions that specifically set forth court
reporter attendance fees. (R. 85-3, Ex. A, Dep. Tr. Invoices at l0-11.) For Georgette LePage's
deposition, the court reporter charged an hourly rate of $50.00 for 4.5 hours, for a total

of

$225.00. (Id. at 10.) For Plaintiffs deposition, the court reporter charged an hourly rate of
$50.00 for eight hours. (Id. at I

l.)

The court reporter charged for an additional half hour at an

increased hourly rate of $75.00 for working outside of regular business hours, adding $37.50
fees, for a total of $437.50

in

. (ld.) This additional half-hour charge employs arate that is in

excess of the permitted $60.00 hourly rate. See Lewis,201,2WL 6720411,

at*6 (allowing

defendant to recover court reporter attendance fees at only a $60.00 hourly rate, not a $70.00

hourly rate). Therefore, the Court will recalculate the half hour of services at the $60.00 hourly
rate, permitting the Defendant to recover $30.00 for this additional

time. In total, the Court

awards Defendant $655.00 in court reporter attendance fees.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's bill of costs (R. 84) is GRANTED in part.
Defendant is awarded $120.00 (witness fees) + $150.60 (exemplification) + $272.00 (subpoena
fees) + $4,348.70 (deposition transcripts) + $655.00 (court reporter attendance fees), totaling

$5,546.30 in costs taxable to Plaintiff.

ENTERED:
Judge Ru'Hn Castillo
United States District Court

Dated: December

lZOtl
13