Sommerfield v. City of Chicago et al

Filing 731

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 1/10/2013:Mailed notice(wp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DETLEF SOMMERFIELD,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 06 C 3132

v.
Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are the Parties’ Objections to the Report and
Recommendation

of

Magistrate

Judge

Jeffery

Cole

regarding

Plaintiff’s fee petition. For the reasons stated herein, the Court
overrules the parties’ objections and adopts Magistrate Judge
Cole’s Report and Recommendation.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court presumes familiarity with its October 31, 2012
Opinion and with Magistrate Judge Cole’s excellent recitation of
the

relevant

facts

in

this

matter.

ECF

Nos.

712,

709.

Accordingly, an abbreviated version of the facts follows.
In

2006,

Plaintiff

Detlef

Sommerfield

(“Plaintiff”

or

Sommerfield”) filed the instant suit against the City of Chicago
(“the City”) and Sergeant Knasiak alleging various counts of
religious and national origin discrimination, retaliation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Eventually, the case

proceeded to trial on three counts which claimed the City violated
Title VII.

Count I alleged religious harassment, Count II alleged

national origin harassment, and Count III alleged retaliatory
harassment.

The jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiff on

Counts I and II, awarding Plaintiff $30,000 and found in favor of
the City on Count III.
On June 8, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Attorneys Fees.
Due to the fact that this case was transferred to this Court only
a few months prior to trial, and because Judge Cole patiently
presided over the case during many of the proceedings for which
Plaintiff seeks fees, the Court referred Plaintiff’s Petition to
Judge Cole pursuant to Local Rule 72.1.
On

October

Report

and

Recommendation (“the Report”) for this Court’s consideration.

ECF

No. 709.

29,

2012,

Judge

Cole

issued

his

In it, he recommended that the Court reduce Plaintiff’s

fees from $1.5 million to an amount not to exceed $430,000.

Both

parties timely filed objections and responses to the Report for the
Court’s consideration.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil procedure 72(b) governs dispositive
motions referred to a magistrate judge.

FED . R. CIV . P. 72(b).

A

district court reviews de novo any portion of a magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation to which written objections have been
filed.

Id.

“The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the

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recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the
matter to the magistrate judge with further instructions.”

FED . R.

CIV. P. 72(b)(3).
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Report and Recommendation Summary

The Report begins by noting the exorbitant amount of time that
has lapsed since this case began in 2006.

Judge Cole found this

was

protracted

largely

due

to

the

time

spent

unnecessary discovery disputes.”

“on

Report at 1.

and

often

The Report then

points out the disproportionality that exists between Plaintiff’s
$1.5 million requested fees and the $30,000 jury award.
determining

what

the

proper

fee

award

should

be,

Id.

Judge

In
Cole

examined the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s claimed hours and the
reasonableness of Plaintiff’s claimed hourly rate to calculate the
appropriate lodestar figure.

He then reviewed the Hensley factors

and found a 50% reduction was warranted.
461 U.S. 424 (1983).

See Hensley v. Eckhert,

The Court agrees with this method.

See

Johnson v. GDF, Inc., 668 F.3d 927, 929 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating
that when a party is entitled to attorneys’ fees, the courts begin
by calculating the Plaintiff’s lodestar rate – the hours reasonably
expended

times

the

reasonable

hourly

rate

and

then

in

some

circumstances, adjusts the lodestar rate.).
In analyzing Plaintiff’s 3,812 claimed hours and reviewing
each of the Defendant’s objections with respect to those hours,
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Judge Cole suggested that this Court deduct 864 hours.

Next, the

Report analyzed the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s requested hourly
rate of $395 per hour.

In finding Plaintiff’s supporting evidence

for such a rate to be “a mixed bag” and finding Plaintiff’s
attorney’s (“Mr. Longo” or “Longo”) litigation tactics to at times
be “unreasonable, unfounded, repetitive, and dishonest,” Judge Cole
recommended that the hourly rate be reduced to an amount not
greater than $300.
After

Report at 26-27.

calculating

the

lodestar,

the

Report

considered

Plaintiff’s partial success at trial and the proportionality of
Plaintiff’s claimed fees with the damages recovered.

Judge Cole

also considered Mr. Longo’s “pattern of filing frivolous and
unsupported motions,” as well as other distasteful litigation
tactics.

Id. at 28.

In light of these considerations, Judge Cole

suggested that the lodestar be reduced by 50% to yield a fee not to
exceed $430,000.
B.

Plaintiff’s Objections

Not surprisingly, Plaintiff objected to the entire reduction
in the Report. Specifically, Plaintiff objects that the Report (1)
ignored the City’s claimed hours; (2) ignored the affidavits
Plaintiff submitted in support of his hourly rate; (3) referenced
irrelevant factors in reducing the fee; (4) failed to take into
account only those objections raised by the City in their response
to Plaintiff’s petition; and (5) erred by taking into account the

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proportionality of Plaintiff’s requested fees with Plaintiff’s
success at trial.
1.
Plaintiff

argues

City’s Claimed Hours
that

the

reduction

in

the

Report

is

inappropriate because it fails to consider that the City spent
5,890 hours on this case.

Plaintiff claims that courts routinely

take into account the hours claimed from the opposing party when
determining whether the prevailing party’s hours are reasonable.
Other than this bare assertion, Plaintiff offers no authority for
support.
When determining the number of hours reasonably expended on
the litigation, the court first considers the number of hours
worked and subtracts hours spent on “unrelated [and] unsuccessful
claims and hours” and subtracts all hours which the attorney failed
to provide adequate documentation. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v.
Sealy Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 1985).

Additionally, when

determining what hours are reasonable, the Court excludes those
hours

which

are

unnecessary . . .”

“excessive,

redundant,

or

otherwise

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

With respect to Plaintiff’s contention that his claimed hours
are reasonable because of the number of hours the City spent on
this litigation, the Court disagrees.

The Court recognizes that

Local Rule 54.3(d)(5)(A) requires an opposing party to provide “the
time and work records . . . pertaining to the litigation . . .” if
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the opposing party questions the number of hours spent by the
prevailing party to prevent “hypocritical objections.” Farfaras v.
Citizens Bank & Trust of Chicago, 433 F.3d 558, 569 (7th Cir.
2006); L.R. 54.3(d)(5)(A).

Here, it is clear that the City

complied with the Local Rule.

While it is undeniable that the

City’s claimed hours exceed Plaintiff’s, those hours include the
time

spent

frivolous

defending
and

Plaintiff’s

unnecessary)

unsuccessful

motions.

(and

Moreover,

at

the

times
Report

thoroughly explains why each of the 864 hours was excluded.
As an example, the Report excluded 82.8 hours Mr. Longo
claimed was spent on a motion for sanctions.

Judge Cole reasoned

that such hours should be excluded because the motion addressed
“events that occurred two years prior and Mr. Longo had not
established bad faith or prejudice[,] [and] [t]he motion was
unreasonable and inordinately stale.”

Report at 18.

As another

example, the Report excluded 70 hours Longo claimed was spent on
one of his many motions for reconsideration.

In finding these

hours unreasonable, the Court noted that this motion was “a prime
example of needless and baseless motions for reconsideration[,]”
and “did not even pause to note or acknowledge the rigid standard
governing such motions.”

Id. at 20.

Indeed, the docket indicates that Mr. Longo filed motions of
this nature repeatedly.

In light of this, the Court is not

surprised that the City was forced to spend as much time as it did

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in responding to such motions.

Mr. Longo argues that because the

City spent substantial time in responding to his motions this
“demonstrate[s] that the [P]laintiff’s prosecution was skillful[.]”
Pl.’s Objection to Report Regarding Fee Pet. at 1.
this argument lacks merit.

The Court finds

The mere fact that the City had to

spend time responding to baseless or unnecessary motions does not
automatically transform the hours Longo spent on drafting such
motions

to

be

reasonable.

Accordingly,

the

Court

overrules

Plaintiff’s first objection.
2.

Affidavits

Next, Plaintiff argues that the Report failed to consider the
affidavits Longo provided to support his claimed rate of $395 per
hour and support his claimed hours.

Plaintiff states that the

Report “ignored established case law that undisputed affidavits
must be accepted as true when deciding fee petitions.”
Objection to Report Regarding Fee Pet. at 1.

Pl.’s

Here again, the Court

finds Plaintiff’s interpretation of the relevant case law skewed.
First, for the reasons stated above, the Court does not find that
the affiants who stated Plaintiff’s claimed hours were reasonable
somehow trump Judge Cole’s findings that Plaintiff’s unnecessary
and baseless motions are not to be compensated. A prevailing party
who merely tells an attorney in a related area of law the number of
hours he spent on a case would only provide the attorney attesting
that such hours were reasonable a skeletal framework of a case. It

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is the court and the judge who understands the finite details and
intricacies of a case.
As an example, while Plaintiff claims that the Court must
accept as true attorney John P. DeRose’s affidavit which states
that Plaintiff’s time spent was reasonable, the Court wonders if
Mr. Longo informed Mr. DeRose that 70 of his claimed hours were
spent on a motion to reconsider that failed to recognize the legal
standard

governing

inappropriately

motions

presented

for

reconsideration

evidence

which

and

Plaintiff

instead

failed

to

present during the initial briefing. The Court also wonders if Mr.
Longo informed Mr. DeRose and the other affiants that his claimed
hours include 267 hours for a summary judgment motion which Judge
Joan Gottschall found to be if “not completely disingenuous . . .
then certainly meritless.”

ECF No. 494 at 10.

Regardless of

whether these affiants were informed of such details, the idea of
substituting the judgment of a detached affiant for the judgment of
a district court judge or a magistrate judge who regulated the
proceedings, read the parties’ briefs, and heard the parties’
arguments is ludicrous. Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s
contention that the Court must accept the affidavits which state
that Plaintiff’s hours are reasonable.
The Court next turns to Plaintiff’s assertion that the Court
must accept as true those affidavits which state that Plaintiff’s
hourly rate of $395 per hour is reasonable. Plaintiff cites People

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Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education, 90 F.3d 1307 (7th Cir.
1996) as support.
misplaced.

However, the Court finds Plaintiff’s reliance

In People Who Care, the Seventh Circuit reversed a

district court’s reduction of a prevailing party’s hourly rate
because the opposing party failed to present evidence to contradict
the prevailing party’s claimed rate.

Id. at 1313.

It found that

the district court was required to award the prevailing attorney
his claimed billing rate since the opposing party failed to submit
evidence to the contrary.

Id. at 1313-1314.

The same cannot be said in this case.

Here, it is clear that

the City not only disputed Plaintiff’s claimed rate, but also
provided

the

unreasonable.

Court

support

why

Plaintiff’s

hourly

rate

was

See Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Pet. for Attorney’s Fees;

Ex. J, ECF No. 693.

First, the City disputed that Plaintiff’s rate

was justified because of his 29 years of experience.

The City

claimed that while Mr. Longo may have been practicing law for 29
years, “that experience was not reflected in the manner in which he
handled this case” in part because of Longo’s unnecessary and
frivolous litigation tactics in this case.

Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s

Pet. for Attorney’s Fees at 12. The City also disputed Plaintiff’s
hourly rate by providing the Court an affidavit from its lead
attorney, James F. Bontana, who averred that $275 per hour was a
reasonable rate in this case.

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Plaintiff claims he presented “6 undisputed affidavits from
other attorneys testifying $395/hour is low.”
Report at 2 (emphasis in original).
blatant

misrepresentation.

Pl.’s Objection to

The Court finds this is a

Black’s

Law

Dictionary

defines

“undisputed” to mean “not questioned or challenged; uncontested.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1528 (7th ed. 1999).

Here, the City

contested Plaintiff’s hourly rate and contested the affidavits
Plaintiff provided.
As added support, the Court finds Pickett v. Sheridan Health
Care Center, 664 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2011) particularly persuasive.
In Pickett, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s fee
award because it found the district court inappropriately reduced
the award based on the fact that the prevailing party was also
receiving a percentage of the damages pursuant to a contingency fee
agreement.

Id. at 643.

In doing so, the Seventh Circuit noted

that its holding was not intended “to minimize the district court’s
duty to prevent windfall recovery to attorneys in fee-shifting
cases” and that it was within the court’s discretion to reduce the
attorney’s “claimed hourly rate if it found that the evidence did
not support the claimed rate -- e.g., because the third party
affidavits

[were]

experience . . . ”
In

this

supporting

actually

attorneys

with

dissimilar

Id.

case,

evidence

from

the
was

Report
a

“mixed
- 10 -

determined
bag”

that

because

Plaintiff’s
some

of

the

affidavits Mr. Longo alleged supported his rate were from attorneys
with dissimilar experience.

Report at 26.

Specifically, one of

Plaintiff’s affiants merely avers that $395 is a low rate for
attorneys, but fails to mention anything about an attorney who
provides the type of services that Mr. Longo provided in this case.
As such, the Court does not find this affidavit persuasive.
Moreover,

while

the

Court

acknowledges

a

few

of

Plaintiff’s

affidavits appear to be from attorneys who provide services similar
to Mr. Longo, the Court also must take into account whether those
affiants possess “similar skill.”

See Small v. Richard Wolf Med.

Instruments Corp., 264 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that
an attorney’s reasonable hourly rate should reflect the market rate
defined

by

the

experience.”).

rate

of

lawyers

with

“similar

ability

and

As the Report points out, while some of the

affidavits appear to be from attorneys with similar experience to
Mr. Longo, those affidavits do not reflect that the attorneys have
skills similar to Mr. Longo.

Indeed, the Report states “Longo

repeatedly dilated the proceedings needlessly either to enhance his
fee or because he lacked the skill to appreciate his own conduct.”
Report at 27.
The Court finds this fact, combined with the affidavit from
the City which claims that $275 per hour is reasonable, persuasive.
Thus, the Court adopts the Report’s $300 per hour rate for Mr.
Longo.

See, e.g., Connolly v. National School Bus Service, Inc.,

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177

F.3d

593

(7th

Cir.

1999)

(affirming

a

district

court’s

reduction of an attorney’s rate because the district court found
the defendant’s affidavit more persuasive than the evidence the
plaintiff presented).

The Court therefore rejects Plaintiff’s

objection that it is obligated to accept Plaintiff’s affidavits.
3.

Irrelevant Factors

Plaintiff next argues that the Report erred in relying on
irrelevant

factors.

Specifically,

Plaintiff

claims

that

the

Report’s reference to Mr. Longo’s reputation for filing frivolous
motions in other cases is irrelevant to the present case.
Court disagrees.

The

First, the Court reminds Plaintiff that the

Report explicitly stated, “the result would be the same even if all
that had occurred in other cases were totally ignored.”

Report at

6-7 (emphasis in original). Moreover, it is undeniable that one of
the factors a court may consider when determining whether the
lodestar figure is appropriate is an attorney’s reputation and
ability.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3.

Next, the Court finds the

authority Plaintiff cites as support is inapposite.

In Johnson v.

GDF, 668 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2012), the Seventh Circuit
reversed a district court’s fee award in part because the court
relied on a distinguishable case where an offer of judgment was
made.

The court noted that “given the fundamental differences

between this case and Spegon, it was unreasonable and therefore an
abuse of discretion” to support a reduction.
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Id.

While Plaintiff

contends Johnson stands for the proposition that a court cannot
examine an attorney’s conduct in prior cases to evaluate that
attorney’s reputation, this is simply inaccurate.

Plaintiff’s

reliance on the other cases cited in his brief is similarly
misplaced.
Notwithstanding

these

facts,

the

Court

finds

Plaintiff’s

objection largely irrelevant due to the fact that the Report was
clear that its conclusion would remain unchanged even if it did not
consider Mr. Longo’s reputation.

As such, the Court rejects

Plaintiff’s third objection.
4.

Plaintiff’s Response to the City’s Objections

In his fourth objection, Plaintiff argues that the Report
erred in not rejecting the City’s objections because Plaintiff’s
fees are “presumptively reasonable.”
at 5.
United

Pl.’s Objections to Report

As support, Plaintiff directs this Court to a handful of
States

Supreme

Court

cases.

However,

Plaintiff’s

interpretation of Supreme Court precedent is flawed.

In Perdue v.

Kenny A., 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1673 (2010) (one of the cases Plaintiff
references), the Supreme Court noted “[t]he lodestar method was
never intended to be conclusive in all circumstances.”

Instead,

there is a “strong presumption” that the lodestar figure [not
plaintiff’s

initial

fee

request]

is

reasonable,

but

that

presumption may be overcome in those rare circumstances in which
the lodestar does not adequately take into account a factor that
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may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee.”

Id.

Additionally,

case

in

City

of

Riverside

v.

Rivera,

(another

Plaintiff claims supports the proposition that his fee request is
“presumptively reasonable”) the Supreme Court explained that the
lodestar figure is a useful starting point for determining the
amount of a fee and while the lodestar is presumed to be reasonable
“[the] district court . . . should exclude from this initial fee
calculation hours that were not ‘reasonably expended’ on the
litigation.” City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 568 (1986)
citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34.
Plaintiff’s

contention

presumptively

reasonable,

that
the

Thus, the Court rejects

because
Court

his

should

fee
reject

request
the

is

City’s

objections.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the Report erred because the City
failed to meet its burden in establishing that Plaintiff’s fee
request was unreasonable. The Court disagrees. An objecting party
to a petition for attorney’s fees must state their objections with
particularity.

Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co., 776 F.2d at 664.

If

a party fails to object with specificity, then the objection may be
considered waived.

See Nilssen v. Gen. Electric, No. 06-C-4145,

2011 WL 633414 at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2011).
In its response to Plaintiff’s fee petition, the City provided
a table that listed all of the hours the City contested as
unreasonable.

The table included the title of the motions, their
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corresponding docket numbers, Plaintiff’s claimed hours, and the
reasons why the City believed such hours were not reasonable.

The

Report addressed each of those objections, agreeing with some and
disagreeing with others.

The Court finds such objections were

adequately specific and rejects Plaintiff’s contention that the
City failed to meet its burden.
Plaintiff also seems to argue that the Report reduced hours
improperly

merely

because

Plaintiff’s

motions

were

denied.

However, the Report expressly stated that the City’s objection to
the Plaintiff’s motion to strike was denied because “[t]here is no
authority

to

suggest

that

successful motions. . . .”

attorneys

only

Report at 16.

deserve

fees

for

Thus, Plaintiff’s

objections on this basis are also overruled.
Plaintiff also objects to the Report’s reduction of 67 hours
Plaintiff spent retaining an expert witness who was never called as
a witness.

The Report stated that because the basis for the

expert’s testimony was Mr. Longo’s personal summary of deposition
transcripts, (which was inadmissible evidence that caused the
expert’s report to be stricken), and because the expert was never
called as a witness, the Plaintiff could not be compensated for
such fees because they were not reasonably necessary for trial.
The Court agrees and excludes any hours spent on retaining this
expert or his inadmissible report.

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See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

5.
Finally,

Proportionality and Success

Plaintiff

objects

that

the

Report

erred

in

considering the proportionality between Plaintiff’s fee award and
the jury award.

Plaintiff claims that the Report fails to take

into the most recent Supreme Court case Perdue v. Kenny A., 130
S.Ct. 1662 (2010) which “focuses on the lodestar and nothing else.”
Pl.’s Objection to Report at 12.

However, this is yet another

misinterpretation of relevant case law by Plaintiff.

In Perdue,

the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a lodestar figure
could be increased because of the superior performance of an
attorney.

Id.

at

1669.

In

reversing

a

district

court’s

enhancement of the lodestar figure, the Supreme Court reasoned that
since the lower court failed to provide “a reasonably specific
explanation” for the enhancement, it could not affirm the award.
Id. at 1676.
Despite

Plaintiff’s

claims

that

Perdue

stands

for

the

proposition that consideration of the Hensley factors is no longer
appropriate, the Court finds this assertion lacks merit.

In

Perdue, the Supreme Court examined a number of factors that could
warrant an upward enhancement (or a downward reduction) of the
lodestar figure.

Id. at 1674-75. In that case, the Court reversed

the award because the lower court failed to provide reasoning for
its decision.

Id. at 1676.

Here, the Report provides an extremely

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thorough analysis of the fee award and provides justifications for
the reduction of the lodestar figure.
Moreover, as the City points out, since Perdue, the Seventh
Circuit, in Sottoriva v. Claps, 441 Fed.Appx. 384, 386 (7th Cir.
2011), affirmed a 67 percent lodestar reduction in part because the
Plaintiff was only partially successful with his claims.

In

Sottoriva, the Seventh Circuit pointed out the Supreme Court’s
disapproval of mere “claim counting” to justify fee awards, but
noted “[w]here a plaintiff is only partially successful in his
case,

the

most

important

factor

in

determining

attorney fee is the degree of success achieved.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

a

reasonable
Id. citing

In this case, it is clear that the

Report did not merely count the number of claims where Plaintiff
prevailed and award attorneys’ fees; instead it calculated a
reasonable lodestar and rigorously analyzed the Hensley factors to
find a 50% reduction appropriate.

The Court therefore overrules

Plaintiff’s final objection.
C.

The City’s Objections

The City agrees with the Report’s reasoning, but argues that
an additional 50 percent reduction to the lodestar is necessary.
The City claims a further reduction is warranted because (1) the
case law in the Report supports a further reduction; and (2)
Plaintiff’s lack of success.

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1.

Case Law Cited in Report

The City argues that the authority referenced in the Report
suggests that a further reduction to the lodestar is necessary.
The City contends that while the cases cited in the Report had
prevailing party’s who received as much as a 67 percent lodestar
reduction, the Court should further reduce Plaintiff’s fees here
because he has initially “made such a bloated request.”

Def.’s

Objections to the Report at 5.
The City references Cooke v. Stenfani Management Services,
Inc., 250 F.3d 564, 570 (7th Cir. 2001), as support for the fact
that a further reduction in fees is warranted.

In Cooke, the

Seventh Circuit reversed a jury’s punitive damages award, but
affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees.

Id.

In Cooke, the

Plaintiff initially sought $300,000 in damages, but after appeal
only received $7,500.

Id. at 569.

After reducing duplicative and

excessive fees and reducing the lodestar figure by 50 percent, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of $49,835.38 in fees.
The Court here finds the proportionality and limited success
in this case similar to that in Cooke.

Here, Plaintiff initially

sought $1.5 million dollars and was awarded approximately $30,000,
approximately 1/50 of his initial request. In Cooke, the plaintiff
received 1/40 of its initial request.

Id. at 570.

Based on these

numbers, the Court finds Cooke supports a 50 percent reduction.

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The City next argues that Spegon v. The Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 175 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 1999), supports a reduction of more
than 50 percent.

The Court disagrees.

In Spegon, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a 50 percent reduction
in the lodestar due to a plaintiff’s partial success at trial.
at 559.

Id.

In finding the district court’s reduction reasonable, the

Seventh Circuit noted, when “determining the proper amount to
reduce a plaintiff’s fee award to reflect the degree of success
obtained, the district court has considerable discretion.”

Id.

Like the court in Spegon, here the Court takes into account
Plaintiff’s limited success at trial along with the other factors
in Hensley to find that a 50 percent reduction is appropriate.

As

such, the Court does not find Spegon supports a further reduction
as the City contends.
Finally, the City argues that Sottoriva v. Claps, No. 06-3118,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124560 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2010), supports a
greater reduction than the Report provided. In Sottoriva, however,
a Plaintiff only succeeded on one of his three claims and had only
limited success on that claim.

Id. at *7.

In finding more than a

50 percent reduction warranted, the court noted that plaintiff
“lost most of his primary claim.”

Id.

The same cannot be said in this case.

It is undeniable that

the jury in this case found the City liable under Title VII for
religious

harassment

and

national
- 19 -

origin

harassment.

While

Plaintiff sought a much greater award than he received, he still
prevailed on two of his three claims at trial. Moreover, the Court
does not find the claim that he did not prevail on – retaliation
harassment – was Plaintiff’s “primary” claim that warrants a
greater lodestar reduction.

Id.

The Court therefore rejects the

City’s first objection.
2.

Plaintiff’s Lack of Success

The City’s second objection is that the Court should apply a
second 50 percent lodestar reduction to the already reduced amount
in the Report because Plaintiff was unsuccessful on “distinctly
different claims and interrelated claims.”

Def.’s Objections to

the Report and Recommendation Regarding Pl.’s Pet. for Attorney’s
Fees at 6.

The City cites Nanetti v. University of Illinois, 944

F.2d 1416 (7th Cir. 1991), as support.
Nanetti inapposite.

The Court, however, finds

In Nanetti, the Seventh Circuit reversed a

district court’s double reduction of a lodestar in part because the
reduction

was

“apparently

failure.”

Id. at 1421.

invoked

for

essentially

the

same

In finding that the district court should

only have reduced the party’s lodestar by 35 percent as opposed to
50 percent, the Seventh Circuit noted that two reductions to a
lodestar are appropriate only when they arise as “the result of
separate and distinct shortfalls of the litigation.”

Id.

Here, the City claims that Plaintiff was unsuccessful on
distinct claims, and also asserts that Plaintiff was unsuccessful
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on 85 percent of this case.

With respect to this argument, the

City seems to suggest that the Court should look not only to those
claims that were presented to the jury, but to the entire number of
claims which were disposed of prior to trial.

What the City fails

to take into account, however, is that the Seventh Circuit and
Hensley have “expressly rejected this mechanical “claim-chopping”
approach.”

O’Sullivan v. City of Chicago, 484 F.Supp.2d 829, 843

(N.D. Ill. 2007) citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 n.11.

Instead,

the Seventh Circuit instructs that the Court should evaluate the
fee award in light of the “overall level of success” attained by
Plaintiff.
Notwithstanding this, the Court briefly addresses the merits
of the City’s objection.

In its brief opposing Plaintiff’s fees,

the City argued that Plaintiff lost 85 percent of his case because
13 claims were disposed of at summary judgment.

However, the City

grossly overstates the number of “claims” which were disposed of
prior to trial.
five

claims

In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff lodged

against

the

City.

Count

I

alleged

religious

discrimination, Count II alleged national origin discrimination,
Count III alleged retaliation, Count IV alleged the City violated
Sections 1981 and 1983 as a result of the City’s failure to train
its officers regarding discrimination, and Count V alleged the City
violated

Sections

1981

and

1983

because

Sergeant

Knasiak

discriminated and harassed Plaintiff and the City allowed such

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harassment to continue or acted with a deliberate indifference to
it.

ECF No. 190.

remained.

After summary judgment, only Counts I-III

[See Dkt. 494].

Thus, the Court rejects the City’s

argument that a double reduction is warranted because Plaintiff was
unsuccessful on distinct claims and because Plaintiff lost 85
percent of his case.
Accordingly,

the

Court

adopts

the

Report’s

50

percent

reduction to the lodestar.
IV.
For

the

reasons

CONCLUSION

stated

herein,

the

Court

overrules

the

parties’ objections, and adopts Magistrate Judge Cole’s Report and
Recommendation and awards Plaintiff the sum of $430,000 in fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
DATE:1/10/2013

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