Williams v. Jones
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For the foregoing reasons, the Warden's motion to dismiss 28 is granted and Williams's petition is dismissed. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 9/8/2014:Mailed notice(srn, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel.
ALVIN WILLIAMS, K52063,
Petitioner,
No. 06 C 4540
v.
Judge Thomas M. Durkin
RANDY PFISTER, Warden, Pontiac
Correctional Center,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Alvin Williams is serving a prison sentence of 45 years to life for first degree
murder at the Pontiac Correctional Center in Pontiac, Illinois, where he is in the
custody of Warden Randy Pfister. Williams seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. R. 9; R. 16. The Warden has moved to dismiss the petition for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), or in the alternative,
because it is untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). R. 28. For the following reasons,
the Warden’s motion is granted, and Williams’s petition is dismissed.
Background
Williams was convicted following a bench trial in Cook County on June 6,
2000, and sentenced on July 6, 2000. See R. 29-1 at 74; R. 29-4 at 7. On direct
appeal, Williams’s conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court, First
District. R. 29-1 at 1-71. The Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to
appeal on June 4, 2003. See People v. Williams, 792 N.E.2d 313 (Ill. June 4, 2003).
On January 2, 2003, while his direct appeal was pending, Williams filed a
postconviction petition with the Circuit Court of Cook County. R. 29-8 at 38. The
court denied the petition, the Appellate Court affirmed the denial, R. 29-3 at 1-3,
and the Supreme Court denied Williams’s petition for leave to appeal on May 25,
2005. See People v. Williams, 833 N.E.2d 8 (table) (Ill. May 25, 2005).
On June 15, 2005, Williams filed a “Motion for Discovery, Production of
Documents/Photos, etc.” in the Cook County Circuit Court, R. 29-10 at 5, which was
denied. The Appellate Court dismissed Williams’s appeal of that denial for lack of
jurisdiction on June 5, 2006. R. 29-3 at 28.
According to Williams, on February 8, 2006, he received additional evidence
relevant to his case that his attorney had failed to disclose to him. R. 16 at 2, 4-5.
Relying on this evidence, Williams filed an application for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition on May 25, 2006—more than three months after he allegedly
received the evidence. R. 29-12 at 9.
While his postconviction petition was pending, Williams filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in this Court on August 22, 2006. R. 1. Williams’s petition did
not include his allegation that he received additional evidence on February 8, 2006.
Prior to the Illinois Attorney General entering an appearance on behalf of the
Warden, the Court ordered Williams on October 23, 2006 to show cause why the
petition should not be dismissed as untimely, since he filed it more than one year
after May 25, 2005, when the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to
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appeal. R. 11. Williams responded with a “Motion to Withdraw Petition or allow for
Equitable Tolling.” R. 12. The Court dismissed Williams’s petition stating:
[T]he court finds that the petitioner has not provided a
basis for equitable tolling. The court therefore finds that
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be dismissed
as time-barred. . . . The petitioner’s motion to withdraw
his federal habeas petition is granted.
For the foregoing reasons, the court summarily
dismisses the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on
preliminary review pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases.
R. 14 at 2. The Court entered judgment against Williams. R. 15. Williams did not
appeal that judgment.
While Williams’s habeas petition was pending, the Cook County Circuit
Court denied his petition for leave to file a postconviction petition on September 1,
2006. R. 29-18 at 3, 7. The Appellate Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision on
August 24, 2009. See People v. Williams, 914 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 2009). The Supreme
Court denied Williams’s petition for leave to appeal on January 27, 2010. See People
v. Williams, 924 N.E.2d 460 (table) (Ill. Jan. 27, 2010).
Almost six months later, on July 20, 2010, Williams filed a petition for relief
from judgment pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 in the Cook County Circuit Court. R.
29-18 at 14-15. Again, the court denied the petition, the Appellate Court affirmed,
R. 29-3 at 63-64, and the Supreme Court denied Williams’s petition for leave to
appeal on May 30, 2012. R. 29-3 at 65.
One year after that, on May 30, 2013, Williams filed a motion in this Court
requesting that the Court reinstate his habeas petition because his “previously
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unexhausted claims” are now “fully exhausted.” R. 16 at 2. Williams contends that
this Court “allowed [him] to voluntarily withdraw his petition, as it was a mixed
petition with several of the claims pending in state court.” Id. Williams argues that
he is entitled to equitable tolling due the “extraordinary circumstances beyond [his]
control . . . that all of the documentary evidence needed to support his claims could
not have been obtained prior to February 8, 2006, through the exercise of due
diligence, because his trial/appellate attorney intentionally withheld the documents
from him.” Id. The Court granted Williams’s motion to reinstate and ordered the
Warden to respond. R. 27.
Analysis
The Warden argues that Williams’s petition is “an unauthorized successive
petition” because (1) the Court has already dismissed his petition as untimely, and
(2) Williams “voluntarily dismissed his prior petition ‘in the face of an imminent
loss.’” R. 28 at 11. The Court, however, has already granted Williams’s motion to
reinstate his petition because the “arguably ambiguous dismissal order [R. 14] may
have left the petitioner with the impression that his petition had been dismissed
without prejudice. For that reason, perhaps, the petitioner did not appeal the final
judgment. In view of the equivocal ruling, as well as the petitioner’s assertion that
he is entitled to equitable tolling, he will be granted leave to proceed on his claims.”
R. 19 at 1. Thus, the Court will not dismiss Williams’s petition for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
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Nevertheless, Williams has again waited too long to pursue habeas corpus
relief. Williams argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he filed a
petition for leave to file a postconviction petition in state court. The problem with
Williams’s argument is that merely filing a petition for leave to file a postconviction
petition does not toll the statute of limitations. Rather, only a “properly filed”
postconviction petition has that effect. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). And a petition for
leave to file a postconviction petition is not a properly filed petition, but merely a
request to file properly. See Martinez v. Jones, 556 F.3d 637, 638-39 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“[W]e have clearly held that where state law requires pre-filing authorization—
such as an application for permission to file a successive petition—simply taking
steps to fulfill this requirement does not toll the statute of limitations. Instead the
second petition tolls the limitations period only if the state court grants permission
to file it.”) (internal citation omitted). Since Williams’s petition for leave was denied,
he never properly filed a petition, and the statute of limitations was never tolled.
Williams contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling because “he could
not have presented the issue he discovered to this court until he first presented
them to state courts.” R. 32 at 8 (¶ 24). Williams argues that equitable tolling is
appropriate in this circumstance, otherwise “no Illinois prisoner who discovers the
factual predicate for his claims after his initial post conviction [sic] petition would
ever be entitled to habeas review if the Illinois courts find the claims do not
constitute ‘newly discovered’ evidence.” R. 32 at 7 (¶ 20). But as the Warden points
out, “a prisoner seeking state postconviction relief might avoid [the] predicament”
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Williams describes “by filing a ‘protective’ petition in federal court and asking the
federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies
are exhausted.” See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005).1 Thus, the
proceedings in state court addressing Williams’s petition for leave to file a
postconviction petition are not a basis to equitably toll the statute of limitations.
In any event, even if Williams’s interpretation of equitable tolling had any
merit (which as the Court has explained, it does not), Williams’s petition is
untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) and its one-year statute of limitations
because more than a year of untolled time has elapsed. Williams alleges that he
discovered additional evidence on February 8, 2006. He then waited 106 days until
May 25, 2006, to file a petition for leave to file in the Cook County Circuit Court.
The Appellate Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s denial of Williams’s petition on
January 27, 2010, and Williams waited another 174 days until July 20, 2010, to file
a petition for leave to appeal with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied
his petition for leave on May 30, 2012, and Williams waited a year to move to
reinstate his petition in this Court on May 30, 2013. Adding all of this time
together, one year and 280 days of untolled time has elapsed since Williams alleges
he discovered new evidence on February 8, 2006. Thus, even accepting the logic
Of course, Williams did file a habeas petition during the pendency of his petition
for postconviction relief in state court. But Williams failed to secure a stay or inform
the Court that his postconviction petition raised the issue of newly discovered
evidence, which might have provided a basis to secure a stay. Instead, Williams
moved to voluntarily dismiss his petition. This strategy did not serve to toll the
statute of limitations.
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underlying his argument that equitable tolling should apply to his case, Williams’s
motion is untimely.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Warden’s motion to dismiss, R. 28, is granted
and Williams’s petition is dismissed.
ENTERED:
______________________________
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: September 8, 2014
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