Adams et al v. City Of Chicago et al

Filing 496

OPINION and Order Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 6/10/2014. Mailed notice (td, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SENECA ADAMS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
No. 06 CV 4856
v.

Hon. Charles R. Norgle

CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant City of Chicago's (the "City") motion for remittitur, or, in
the altemative, for a new trial on damages. For the following reasons, the motion is granted as to

Plaintiff Sicara Adams ('oSicara"). Her damages are remitted from $300,000 to $125,000. The

motion, as

it

pertains

to Plaintiffs

Seneca Adams ("Seneca") and

Tari Adams ("Tari")

(collectively, "Plaintiffs"), remains under advisement.

I. BACKGROUND
A.

Facts

Now thirty-years-old, Sicara is employed as a security guard after taking college criminal
justice courses. She was twenty when these events occurred. As relevant here, on September 14,
2004, twenty-year-old twins Seneca and Sicara shared an apartment with their eighteen-year-old

brother, Tari, and Sicara's four-year-old daughter, Ciara, in a neighborhood where they had lived
their entire lives. Their mother lived a short distance away. At the time, Sicara was four months
pregnant with her second daughter, Tyler. Sicara's boyfriend lived with them periodically.

At about 8:00 p.m. on September

14, 2004, hearing commotion outside, Tari and Sicara,

who were inside the apartment at the time, decided to go outside to see what was happening.

Tari left through the back door. Sicara left through the front door. Once outside, she saw Seneca

in a police car being beaten by one of the Defendant Officers.

'

Many spectators were present.

Shortly thereafter, the police cars drove away from the scene with Seneca in custody. Sicara
testified that she was worried because

it did not look like the officers

were driving in the

direction of the police station. Sicara and Tari then called their aunt and their mother to let them

know what was happening. After locking the apartment and checking on Ciara, Sicara and Tari
got into Sicara's car and Tari drove in the direction that the officers had gone in an attempt to
find Seneca. Sicara sat in the passenger seat.
Tari drove towards 26th and Sacramento, where they came upon a number of police cars
and officers huddled outside of their cars. Sicara testified that she saw Seneca in the back of one

of the police cars, crying with a swollen and bloody face. She then rolled down her window and

yelled to the officers, asking them what they were doing with Seneca. After that, "a police
officer came around to the driver's side and punched Tari in the face and tried to grab the gears

of the car." Tr. of Pl. Sicara Adams's Testimony at 15, tTfl 5-7 (N.D. Il1. Feb. 19, 2014)
[hereinafter Sicara

Tr.].

Sicara testified that they feared for their lives so Tari drove away and

headed back towards their apartment

left. They were 'Jerked"
of their car. Id. at

17

building. Tari stopped for a red light while waiting to turn

and felt a "big bang" and saw that a police car had hit the driver's side

, fll] 3,

7.

Sicara testified that this made a

"hole" in her car. Id. at 18, fl

1.

Neither Sicara, nor her unborn child, suffered any physical injuries from this collision. Tari then
drove off towards their community. Once the vehicle came to a stop on25th Place, Sicara said
that they were hit again from the back by a police car. The City disputes that that the car was
I

The Defendant Officers include former and current Chicago Police Officers Margaret Hopkins, Timothy
McKeon, Matthew Riley, John Dahlberg, Jennifer O'Shaugnessy, Keith Herrera, John Hurley, and
unknown Chicago Police Officers, who were members of the now-disbanded Special Operations Section
("SOS") of the Chicago Police Department. The Defendant Officers were dismissed from this lawsuit
before the case proceeded to trial on the issue of compensatory damages.

ever

hit in the back, and admits only that the car was struck at the driver's side door.

Notwithstanding this dispute, no injuries were sustained from any collision.
Sicara and Tari then exited the car. Eventually, Sicara was escorted to a police car, but
she was never placed in

handcuffs. Along the way, she watched as Tari was punched and kicked

by officers. The officers transported Sicara to the police station located at2lst and Damen. She
was then placed in a room with a bench and a couple of desks. She said that she was scared at
the

time-for

herself, for her daughter Ciara, and for her unborn child, whom she feared she may

have to give birth to in

jail.

She was four months

pregnant. Sicara was also worried because, at

the time, she did not know what was happening to her brothers. Sicara just sat there. Hours

later, Seneca was brought into the room with Sicara. Sicara said that his face looked
unrecognizable-Seneca's face and lips were swollen, he had cuts and bruises, and had received

nine stiches. An hour or two later, Tari was brought into the room with Sicara and Seneca.
Sicara said that his face looked hurt and that he was wearing a hospital gown with some blood on

it.
The next morning, Sicara was transported to a different police station, located at Harrison
and Kedzie where she was placed in a

cell. This time, Sicara was fingerprinted,

photographed,

and processed, which she found degrading. She did not know what charges were being brought

against

her.

Sicara testified that she did not receive any food or water, but she did not say

whether she had asked for any. She said that she felt sick because "when you're pregnant,

it's-

it's hard. You're hungry all the time and you're sick." Sicara Tr. at 24, nn 18-20.

Sicara

testified that she was uncomfortable from the "steel, hard, cold bench" and that she "couldn't

eat." Id. at 24, fl\ 2l-22. Sicara was once again asked if she was given food or water at the
station and she testified that "[a]fter hours of complaining my mother came to visit me, and I let

her know how hungry

I

was, how weak

I

was from not eating, and she complained, and

eventually, hours after that, they eventually gave me water and a sandwich to eat." ld. at 25,

flfl

l-4.

Sicara was released in the early morning hours on September 16, 2004. In total, Sicara

spent slightly over twenty-four hours in the room and in

jail.

She was released on her own

recognizance (no cash bond).

On the morning that Sicara was released from jail, she and her mother watched Seneca
and Tari's bond hearing. Seneca and Tari appeared through a video monitor. Sicara said that
she felt helpless

looking at her brothers, and she watched as her mother cried and collapsed to the

floor. Following

the hearing, Seneca and Tari were transported to the Cook County Jail, where

they remained in custody for 204, and 46 days, respectively.

Later that day, a friend drove Sicara back to her apartment where her boyfriend-who

lived there periodically-was waiting for her. Sicara testified that she went to sleep for a couple

of hours, but when she awoke she did not feel safe in the apartment anymore, so she gathered
some of her belongings and moved in with her mother. Over time, she moved the rest of her

things to her mother's apartment. Her mother lived in a one-bedroom apartment. Sicara and

Ciara slept on an air mattress in the living room. During this time, both Sicara and Ciara
suffered from nightmares, which did not stop until her brothers were released from

jail,

and

sometimes she still has nightmares about the events that occurred the evening of September 14,

2004.

After she was released from custody, Sicara returned immediately to her job

at

Nordstrom's, where she worked as a sale's associate and cashier. She said that she did this to
keep herself busy and to save bond money for Seneca and
said that she

Tari. At the time of her

release, Sicara

still did not know the charges against her, but she did receive a summons.

She was

charged with disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor. Sicara complied with the summons and
appeared

in a courtroom in the back of a police station on the appropriate date. Sicara testified

that when she went to court, she signed her I-bond, and when her case was called, she walked up

to the judge, and her case was immediately dismissed. She could not recall whether an attorney
had represented her in the matter. Nothing indicates that she hired one.

Sicara also attended the court dates set for her brothers' criminal cases. She said that on
each court appearance she hoped that the charges against them would be dismissed as hers had

been. Once Tari and Seneca were bonded out and released from the Cook County Jail, they were
placed on house arrest for aperiod of time. In December of 2006, the charges against Seneca
and Tari were dropped and their records were expunged. Sicara testified that, at some point,
both Seneca and Tari left Chicago and moved to Arizona, where they currently reside.
Sicara testified how the events

of September 14,2004

chartged

her.

She said that she

became more protective of her daughters and that Ciara often asked where her uncles were. At
one point, Sicara took Ciara, her four-year-old child, to the
she thought that

jail to visit

Seneca and Tari because

it would help Ciara with her nightmares, and she wanted to provide emotional

support to her brothers. Sicara also said that the incident destroyed her faith

in the police

department. Whenever she thought about her old neighborhood where this occurred it reminded
her of how her family was broken and how her freedom had been questioned. See Sicara Tr. at
38, tltT l5-16. Sicara stated,

"I'll never forget

feeling like we were less of a people because we

weren't judged off our actions, we was judged off where we lived and the color of our skin. It

was horrible." Id. at 38,

tT''lT

17-20. Sicara went on to explain how the events changed her

brothers' personalities and how it caused them to move away to another state. She said that they
used to be very close when they lived together and Seneca and Tari would often take care

of

Ciara when she worked evenings. However, Sicara said that their family unit was broken when
Seneca and Tari moved to

Arizona. Sicara also moved to Arizona briefly in February of 2006,

two years after her arrest, but she returned to Chicago four months later. Sicara has never sought
medical attention, counseling, or psychiatric or psychological treatment

in relation to these

events.

B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs initiated this action in the year 2006. Discovery was stayed for over two years

while criminal proceedings and other investigations were conducted as to the Defendant
Officers. The stay was lifted on June 1,2009 and discovery went forth. Ultimately, after years

of discovery, the parties reached an agreement wherein the City agreed to admit liability

and

proceed to a trial on the issue of compensatory damages only, in exchange for the dismissal

of

the individual Defendant Officers. Specifically, the City admitted to the following: (1) false
arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment as to all Plaintiffs; (2) excessive force, in violation

of the Fourth Amendment as to all Plaintiffs; (3) discrimination on the basis of race, in violation

of the Equal Protection

Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment as to all Plaintiffs; and

(4) malicious prosecution, in violation of Illinois state law as to Seneca and Tari.

This case proceeded to a jury trial on compensatory damages against the City on
February 18,2014. On February 20,2014, the jury found the following compensatory damages:
(1) $2,400,000 for Seneca; (2) $1,000,000 for Tari; and (3) $300,000 for Sicara. The City timely

filed the instant motion for a remittitur of the jury's verdict, which is fully briefed and before the

Court. At this time, the Court addresses the motion only

as

it pertains to Sicara.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Decision
A jury's determination of compensatory damages must be accorded substantial deference.
Ramsey v. Am.

Air Filter Co.,772F.2d 1303, 1313 (7th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted).

"oUnderlying this deference to a jury's assessment of damages is the acknowledgement that the
actual measure of damages is an exercise of factfinding."' Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook

Cnty., 207

F

. Supp. 2d 7 64, 771 (N.D.

lll.

2002) (quoting Cygnar v. City of Chi. , 865

F

.2d 827 ,

847 (7th Cir. 1989)). However, "the court must also ensure that the award is supported by

competent evidence." Ramsey, 772 F.zd

at 1313.

"'When assessing the propriety

of

a

compensatory damages award" upon a motion for remittitur or for a new trial, courts consider

"whether the award is monstrously excessive, whether there is no rational connection between

the award and the evidence, and whether the award is roughly comparable to awards made in

similar cases." Lampley v. Onyx Acceptance Qofp., 340 F.3d 478, 483-484 (7th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Dresser Indus.. Inc.. Waukesha Engine

Div. v. Gradall Co. , 965 F.2d 1442, 1446 (7th Cir. 1992) ("In this circuit, we will alter jury
awards only

if

they are monstrously excessive, born of passion and prejudice, or not rationally

connected to the evidence." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

B. Remittitur

as to Sicara Adams

The City argues that the damages award as to Sicara was excessive and unsupported by
the evidence. According to the City, the $300,000 award must have been based on passion and

sympathy as opposed to actual evidence of harm because the evidence showed that Sicara
suffered no physical injuries, she never sought any medical or mental health treatment and
testified only in general terms as to her fear and sadness, she suffered no lost wages or damage to

future employment, the charges against her were immediately dismissed, and she spent just over
twenty-four hours in jail.

A

successful $ 1983 plaintiff may not be awarded damages merely "to account for 'the

abstract value of a constitutional

right."' Horina v. City of Granite Citv,

538 F.3d 624, 637 (7th

Cir. 2008) (quoting City of Watseka v. Ill. Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1559 (7th Cir.

1986). A plaintiff must "prove that the denial of [her] constitutional rights resulted in an actual
injury." Id. "'Rights, constitutional

and otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum. Their purpose is to

protect persons from injuries to particular interests

. . . .'

Where no injury [is] present, no

ocompensatory' damages
[can] be awarded." Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. ]2. Stachura,477 U.S.

299,308 (1986) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,254 (1978)). "The fact that the
'monetary value of the particular injury is diffrcult to ascertain'-as is often the case when the
injuries asserted are humiliation, distress, and other harms associated with the denial of a rightdoes not preclude an award of damages." Horina, 538 F.3d at 637 (quoting Citv of Watseka, 796
F

.2d at 1558-1559). "But the plaintiff must nevertheless show that [s]he actually suffered those

injuries...."
While

Id.

it is undisputed

that Sicara's constitutional rights were violated, she can only

recover compensatory damages for actual injuries that resulted from those violations, not merely

to compensate for the violation itself. See id. The evidence of actual injury to Sicara included
generalized emotional harm that she suffered as a result

of her arrest and twenty-four-hour

detention. Sicara testified that she was nervous and scared when she was taken to the police
station, and, because she did not know how long she would remain in custody, she feared giving

birth to her child while in jail. See Sicara Tr. at 2l,nn 3-13. While in custody, Sicara said that
she

felt sick and uncomfortable while in the cell due to her pregnancy and that she couldn't eat.

Id. at 24, nn 18-24. Although she mentioned more than once that she was not given food or
water initially, she never specifically said whether she had asked for
Sicara's mother came

to see her and asked for food for her

any. However,

once

daughter, Sicara was given a

sandwich and some water. As further evidence of emotional injury, Sicara testified that she
feared for her safety too much to remain living in the apartment that she shared with her brothers,
so she moved in with her mother. Sicara also stated that she had nightmares about the events

until her brothers were released from jail, and that she still occasionally suffers from nightmares.
Although she also testified that her daughter, Ciara, suffered from nightmares, the jury was
instructed that Ciara is not a plaintiff and thus was not entitled to damages. Lastly, Sicara

testified generally about how the events of September 14,2004

chaurrged

her, how "horrible" it

felt to be "judged off where we lived and the color of our skin," and how she lost her faith in
police. Id. at 38, nn4-20.

1. Monstrously Excessive and Rationally Related to the Evidence
While the aforementioned emotional injuries are recoverable to a certain extent, Sicara's
testimony also contained a plethora of testimony relating to perceived damages for which she
cannot recover because no injury resulted, or the stated injuries are not related to the violation

of

her personal constitutional rights, but rather to those of her brothers. See Paul v. Davis , 424 U.S.

693, 700-701 (1976)

("Respondent .

has pointed

to no specific constitutional

guarantee

safeguarding the interest [s]he asserts has been invaded. Rather, [s]he apparently believes that
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause should ex proprio vigore extend to [her] a right

to be free of injury wherever the State may be characteized as the tortfeasor. But such a reading
would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever
systems may already be administered by the States.").

First, and most significantly, Sicara is not entitled to compensatory damages for having
witnessed the excessive force that was used against Seneca and Tari, for their time spent in jail,

and for the time they and their attorneys spent challenging the charges against them.
Nevertheless, Sicara testified passionately and in great detail about the beatings that she saw, the

injuries to Seneca and Tari, the sadness of seeing her mother cry at their bond hearing, the worry
and fear that she had for them while they were incarcerated and fighting the false charges against

them, the change in her brothers' personalities since these events, and ultimately the break-up

of

their family unit since Seneca and Tari moved to Arizona. These same sentiments were
reiterated by defense counsel during closing arguments; however, these do not constitute injuries
compensable following the violation of Sicara's constitutional rights. Sibling loss of consortium

is not recognized under $ 1983. See O{tiz v, Bqrgos,807 F.2d 6, 9 (lst Cir. 1986) (finding no
constitutional right to the companionship of adult relatives); see also Rusp v. Watts, 414 F.3d

783,791(7th Cir. 2005) (overruling Bell v. City.of Milwaukee,746F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984),
and finding that the plaintiff-parents had no constitutional right to recover for the loss of society

and companionship of their adult son when that relationship was terminated as an incidental
result of state action); Nighps v. Liberio , 973
lesser services comprehended

F

.2d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Deprivations of the

in the portmanteau term 'consortium' are not deprivations of

liberty within the restricted meaning that the term bears in the Constitution."). Furthermore,

"like all persons who claim a deprivation of constitutional rights, [Sicara is] required to prove
some violation

of [her] personal rights."

Coon v. Ledbg{er,780 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir.

1986). She has no standing to recover for the violation of her brothers' constitutional rights,
irrespective

of what

she may be able

to recover as a bystander under state tort law.

Id.

"Protecting familial relationships does not necessarily entail compensating relatives who suffer a

10

loss as a result of wrongful state conduct, especially when the loss is an indirect result of that

conduct." Harpole v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs.,820F.2d923,928 (8th Cir. 1987).
Next, it is undisputed that Sicara never suffered any physical injuries. Although the City
admits that the Defendant Officers used excessive force against Sicara, she stated that neither she

nor her unborn child was hurt as a result of the collision. The incident was described as merely

being'Jerked" and'Jarred," and that it left a "hole" in the driver's side door of her car. Sicara
Tr. at

17

,

\

7; 18, lTfl 2,

7

.

Furthernore, Tari and Sicara were still able to drive the vehicle back

to their neighborhood and park following this incident at the red light. Sicara did not

seek

medical attention while in custody or at any time thereafter. Plaintiffs presented no evidence to
show that Sicara was ever concerned about having been injured. Although she testified that she
feared the possibility of having to give birth in jail, she never said that she was worried about the
health of her unborn child or the status of her pregnancy. Indeed, Sicara affirmatively stated that
her unborn child was not harmed. That Sicara was four months pregnant at the time of her false

arrest, without evidence

to

support any injury

or aggravation

arising therefrom,

is

not

compensable. There was simply no evidence of physical injury.

In addition, it is well established that "a plaintiff may receive only one full compensation
for his or her injuries, and double recovery for the same injury is not allowed." Duran v. Town

of Cicero. 653 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although defense counsel informed the jury that the City was liable for excessive force, false
arrest, and racial discrimination

of

Sicara,2 she can only recover

for her emotional

distress

injuries once, regardless of the number of claims. With respect to racial discrimination, Sicara

2

The 3ury instructions provided, "The Defendant, City of Chicago, admits the following[:] . . . Sicara
Adams was falsely arrested by Chicago Police Officers. During the course of the events, force in excess
of that allowed by the Constitution was used. These acts caused emotional distress to Sicara Adams."
Jury Instructions, at 16 [Doc. No. 475].

t1

never testified regarding any remarks made to her by the arresting ofhcers or the officers at the

two police station when she was detained.

Finally, while the fear and emotional pain Sicara felt by being in her old neighborhood
where the September 14, 2004 incident occurred may be recoverable to a certain point, the
choices that she made to deal with that fear do not constitute compensable injuries. For example,
the City is not liable for Sicara's choice to live with her mother in a one-bedroom apartment and
sleep on an air mattress with her four-year-old daughter, instead of remaining in her apartment

and sleeping in a bed. In addition, Sicara is not entitled to compensation because Seneca and

Tari-and indeed herself for about four months-decided to leave the family in Chicago

and

move to Arizona.

Although unrecoverable, the jury was inundated with the above-described facts during

Plaintiffs' testimonies,

as

well

as during the closing arguments. One

impassioned closing arguments

of the issues regarding the

is Plaintiffs' counsel's tendency to use the plural to avoid

naming the individual Plaintiffs. For example, counsel asserts, "You get home and they get
beaten

more ."

Tr. of Closing Arguments at

4,I1l

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2Ol4) (emphasis

added). It is not disputed that Sicara was not beaten or even handcuffed. Counsel goes on to say

that "they are sitting there and they have to see each other beaten, battered, broken." Id. at 4,
'tTfl

19-20 (emphasis added). Additionally, Plaintiffs' counsel argues that "they get moved from a

jail to Cook County Jail." Id. at 5, tTfl 10-11. The record, however, is clear that Sicara

never

went to Cook County Jail, but rather was transferred from one police station to another. Sicara
was never searched in the manner that counsel describes her Co-Plaintiffs being searched. Id. at

U-17. Further, counsel

argued that "after this happened to them [Plaintiffs], they had to

move to Arizona." Id. at 9, fl

5. This is not the record. The record is that, two years after the

5, nn

t2

events

of September 14,2004, Sicara moved to Arizona, remained there for four months, and

then returned to Chicago.

In addition, Plaintiffs' counsel's reference to inmates of the Cook County Jail as "those
animals" and "being locked in a cage with an animal" is disturbing. Id.

at26,nnn-24. During

his rebuttal, Plaintiffs' counsel refers to the inmates as "animals" no less than six times, and uses
the word "cages" no less than three times. See id. at26-27. These comments suggest to the jury

that the "animals" were attacking or were likely to attack the brothers in the Cook County Jail
and that this supposition is somehow compensable in damages to

Sicara-who herself was never

in the Cook County Jail. The Court further notes that the Cook County Jail is a place that houses
human beings who are awaiting trial, and not serving time for felony convictions. None of the

Plaintiffs was moved to a prison in the Illinois Department of Corrections. These generalized
and emotionally charged arguments cannot serve to support damages never sustained specifically

by Sicara.
Based on the size of the verdict, as compared to the evidence of recoverable injury, the

jury was clearly inflamed with passion and prejudice-*caused by the evidence of
damages which are not recoverable under the

perceived

law-when reaching its award. "[O]bviously the

slighter the emotional distress, the lower the ceiling on a reasonable award of damages. . . ."

Avitia v. Metro. Qlub, 49 F3d 1219, 1229 (7th Cir. 1995). In light of the

sparse and vague

evidence submitted to support Sicara's emotional damages, composed almost entirely of her own

conclusory statements, the $300,000 award is monstrously excessive and not rationally related to
the evidence presented.

13

2.

Comparable Awards in Similar Cases

Additionally, the $300,000 award is not comparable to awards given in similar cases. By
way of example, the City submitted several cases with substantially lower verdicts supported by

more evidence of injury than was presented in the instant case. In Fox v. Hayes, the jury
awarded the plaintiff $1.7 million in compensatory damages on the plaintiff s false arrest claim
where he was detained for thirty-six hours while falsely accused of the murder and sexual assault

of his young daughter following a coerced confession. 600 F.3d 819, 825 (7th Cir. 2010). The
Seventh Circuit found that "because the

jury

awarded less than half that amount on [the

plaintiff s] malicious prosecution claim, which covered the remaining242 days of incarceration,
the award is simply unsupported by the evidence . . . [and] the false arrest damage award cannot

stand." Id. at 846. The Seventh Circuit ordered that the plaintiffs damages be reduced to
$16,000 on his false arrest claim. Here, Sicara was in

jail for almost twelve hours

less than the

plaintiff in Fox, and under significantly less serious circumstances as she was only facing

a

misdemeanor disorderly conduct charge. Yet Sicara was awarded $300,000, while the plaintiff

in Fox had his false arrest award reduced to $16,000.
In Moore v. Cily of Chicago, the plaintiff was involved in a dispute with roofers working

atanadjoiningproperty. No.02C5130,2007WL3037121,at*1 (N.D. Ill.Oct. 15,2007).

She

called the police multiple times in one aftemoon and accused the workers of trespassing and
damaging her property. Id. at

*1-2.

She also accused the police of failing to help

her. Id. The

plaintiff was ultimately arrested and detained for approximately twelve hours. ld. at

*2.

The

plaintiff suffered minor injuries to her arm following the arrest, and she suffered a seizure during
her detention because she did not have access to her medication. Id. at

plaintiff $250,000, and the court denied the defendants' motion for

t4

a

*3.

The

jury awarded the

remittitur. Moore v. City of

Chi., No. 02 C 5130, 2008 WL 4542734, at *2 (N.D.

Ill. Jul. 25,2008). The court found

that,

although the award was "generous" in light of the brief detention and lack of significant injuries,

the verdict was nevertheless justified because the plaintiff was "so fragile, mentally

and

physically," with a long history of depression, and with a "mental and physical history [that]
caused her to be far more vulnerable than most persons."

I1!. While, in the instant case, Sicara

was pregnant at the time of her false arrest, she conceded that she suffered no physical injuries
and merely experienced minor discomforts associated with her pregnancy. Sicara did not present

evidence showing herself as an emotionally fragile

plaintiff. To the contrary,

Sicara testified as

to how: she returned to work immediately following the incident, she attended some college, she
became

a security officer, and

she has raised her two daughters. Sicara's perseverance

distinguishes her from the plaintiff in Moore. Absent evidence
Sicara is not entitled to such a "generous" amount as the

of

aggravating vulnerabilities,

jury found in Moore.

In Bohannon v. Peselow, the court upheld a compensatory

damages award

of $10,000,

which would amount to approximately $28,310 today, in a case where "the plaintiff spent sixteen

hours in

jail,

spent months contesting a pandering charge, and suffered the stigma

of

being

branded a pimp and the embarrassment of having to deny that he attempted to sell his girlfriend's
sexual favors." 652 F.2d 729,734 (7th Cir. 1981). Sicara's $300,000 award is more than ten
times greater than that in Bohannon, without the added injury of having to contest charges.

In Walker v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit found that it was reasonable for the

jury to award the plaintiff $0 in compensatory damages following his false arrest and twelve
hour detention because the plaintiff failed to prove any damages. 513 F. App'x 593 (7th Cir.

2013). The court stated that "'when the injured party's own testimony if the only proof of
emotional distress, he must explain the circumstances of his injury in reasonable detail; he

15

cannot rely on mere conclusory statements."' Id. at 595 (quoting Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d

91,9,929 (7th Cir. 2003)). Evidence at Walker's trial showed that he was joking and laughing

with his friends during his detention, "which the jury could view as contradicting his assertion
that he was 'very upset'. Such testimony would allow a reasonable ju.y to find . . . that Walker
suffered no emotional distress from his arrest and detention, unlawful though it was."

Id. Like

the plaintiff in Walker, Sicara relied largely on conclusory statements to support her claims

of

emotional distress. In addition, she too had evidence presented to the jury which tended to
contradict her claims of emotional distress. Sicara returned to work immediately following her
release from

jail.

She did not seek medical attention for herself or her unborn child

following the

events. Sicara never sought counseling or other mental health treatment. Indeed, the evidence
showed that now ten years after the incident, Sicara has successfully moved on and created a
stable life for herself and her daughters. Although the jury here could have reasonably awarded
some level of compensation based on the evidence of emotional distress, the evidence does not
support an award of $300,000, particularly in light of the contradictory evidence.

Ignoring the City's proffered cases, Plaintiffs submit a collection of their own cases to
support the verdict as given by the jury; however, only one of the cases from within this circuit is

specifically argued as applicable to Sicara's recovery. In Mason v. City of Chicago, the jury
awarded the plaintiff $625,000 on his claims of excessive force and malicious prosecution. 641

F. Supp. 2d 726,727 (N.D. Ill. 2009). The plaintiff in Mason suffered from a fractured orbital
bone, incurred $60,000 in medical bills, had eye complications, and suffered a decreased sense

of

smell and lingering neurological damage. Id. at730-731. In addition to the physical injuries, the

plaintiff, lay witnesses, and expert witnesses testified to his emotional injuries which included:
(1) decreased performance at work, (2) a transformed personality, (3) impaired relationships with

t6

family and friends, (4) decreased levels of physical activity, (5) irrational fear when he saw a
people who resembled the defendant-officer, (6) diminished self-confidence, particularly in
relation to the scar left by his injuries, and (7) fear of being seen with his girlfriend who was
present during the incident. ld. at

73I. In denying a motion for remittitur, the court stated that

"either the physical or the emotional set
[$625,000] verdict was not irrational."

Id.

of

injuries would be sufficient to conclude the

Plaintiffs here argue that "the $300,000 awarded to

Sicara Adams for her serious emotional damages-just as significant as those endured by the
Mason plaintiff-cannot be irrational." Pls.' Resp. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Remittitur

ll-12.

Plaintiffs' statement is a gross exaggeration of the evidence presented as to Sicara. First, Sicara
provided the only testimony in support of her emotional damages, as opposed to the Mason

plaintiff who presented both expert and lay witnesses in addition to his own testimony. Second,
Sicara never testified as to specific emotional injuries beyond general words such as "fear,"
"sadness," and

"horrible." She did not suffer with work, and in fact returned to her job

immediately upon her release. She attended some college and took criminal justice courses.

With respect to changes in her personality and relationships with her family, she said only that
she was distrustful of police and became more careful and protective of her daughters.

Sicara testified as to the changes in her brothers' personalities, and that

Although

it is hard having

them

live so far away, as discussed above, she cannot recover for the injuries to her brothers or the
choices that they made following the events
presented

of September 14, 2004. In short, the evidence

in support of Sicara's emotional injuries is not comparable to that presented in Mason.

Thus, this case is easily distinguishable with respect to the amount of the verdict.
Because the Court finds that the $300,000 verdict

for Sicara is monstrously

excessive

based upon the evidence presented at trial, and is an outlier amongst verdicts in similar cases, the

l7

City's motion for a remittitur is granted. It is well established that "[j]udges

and

juries must not

be casual with other people's money." Avitia, 49 F.3d at 1229. Although still a generous
amount, the Court finds that only $125,000 of the jury's verdict can be reasonably supported by

the evidence presented at

trial.

The verdict as to Sicara is therefore reduced to $125,000.

Because the motion for remittitur is granted, the Court denies the City's motion in the alternative

for

a new

trial on damages.

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City's motion for a remittitur is granted as to Sicara.
Sicara's damages are hereby remitted to $125,000. The motion as it pertains to Seneca and Tari
remains under advisement.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

United States District

DATE: June 10,2014

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Court

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