Myers v. Wickes Furniture Co., Inc.

Filing 114

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 2/21/2012:Mailed notice(slb, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
BRENDA MYERS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
WICKES FURNITURE CO., INC.,
Defendant.

No. 06 CV 04951
Judge Edmond E. Chang

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Brenda Myers brought this suit against Defendant Wickes Furniture
Co., Inc. for alleged violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. R. 34.1 Before
the Court is Wickes’s motion for summary judgment. R. 75. For the reasons explained
below, the motion is granted in part but largely denied in part.
I.
Myers was an Administrative Manager, Office Manager, and Office
Administrator for Wickes Furniture at its Bedford Park and North Riverside locations.
R. 77 ¶ 5.2 Myers was hired in 1998 as an Administrative Manager in Training for the
Bedford Park location. Id. ¶ 7. In December 1998, she was transferred to the North

1

The Court has jurisdiction over the federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
over the state claim under supplemental jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Citation to the docket
is “R.” followed by the entry number and, when applicable, the page or paragraph number.
2

The facts are drawn from the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements, viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-movant (Myers). R. 77; R. 86.

Riverside location in the same position. Id. ¶ 8. She returned to the Bedford location
as an Administrative Manager in July 1999. Id. ¶ 8. In June 2003, Myers’s job title
changed to Office Manager, and in February 2004, it again changed, this time to Office
Administrator. Id. The title changes were not promotions, but part of company-wide
changes in titles. Id. Myers was terminated on January 8, 2005, while she was working
as Office Administrator at the Bedford Park location. Id. ¶ 9. Myers’s responsibilities
included coordinating and training office personnel, coordinating payroll, resolving
customer and store issues, and assisting the store manager. Id.
Brenda Green was store manager of the Bedford location from October 2003
through Myers’s firing. Id. ¶ 10. Green’s boss from June 2003 through Myers’s firing
was Dave Mattea. Id. ¶ 11. The decision to fire Myers was made by Green and Mattea
and approved by the Vice President of Human Resources, Dick Petersen. Id. ¶ 12.
Wickes justifies Myers’s termination by alleging that Myers had “poor attitude and
behavior.” Id. Not surprisingly, Myers contests this and alleges that the termination
was retaliatory. R. 86, Response to ¶ 12.
A.

Myers’s Workplace Injury

Myers’s job as an Office Administrator did not require her to move furniture
from the warehouse to the showroom floor, but she took on that job duty (in addition
to her office duties) because she thought her help was needed. R. 77 ¶ 33. On July 24,
2003, Myers hurt her back while helping warehousemen move furniture into the store.
Id. ¶ 35. The following day, a day Myers was already scheduled to be off work, Myers
went to an urgent-care clinic to have her injury assessed. Id.
2

On July 25, 2003, Myers’s doctor imposed work restrictions prohibiting her from
moving furniture or lifting heavy objects for six weeks. Id. ¶ 36. Myers worked for the
next six weeks, but continued to be in pain, and while she was able to perform
everyday tasks (e.g., grocery shopping and cleaning), Myers did not go to church or go
out socially after her injury. Id. Upon learning of the injury, Wickes sent Myers to
physical therapy for a total of 30, twice-a-week sessions. Id. ¶ 37. Through this period
of physical therapy and the six-week restriction period, Myers admits that Wickes
honored all of the work restrictions. Id. ¶ 38.3 After completing physical therapy, in
December 2003 Wickes sent Myers to a physician for an independent medical
examination. Id. ¶ 38. Myers did not pick the physician for the independent
examination. Id. ¶ 38. The independent examination report stated that Myers had
reached “maximum improvement” and that no restrictions were necessary. Id. ¶ 39.
Because Myers had been cleared for work by the independent examination,
Wickes’s policy required her to bring in a doctor’s note for absences. Id. ¶ 39. Although
Wickes’s Local Rule 56.1 statement says a note would be due for any absence, id., Alisa
Schueneman, a human resources officer for Wickes testified that a doctor’s note would
be needed for an absence of three days or more. R. 87-2, Schueneman Dep. at 46:5-10.
On December 12, 2003, Myers brought a note from her treating doctor that said Myers
could work a six-hour shift so long as there was no prolonged standing, repetitive

3

The record does not make clear whether the restrictions that were originally imposed
for six weeks were extended to the conclusion of physical therapy, or whether the restrictions
changed over this period. Myers testified that before the independent examination, which
occurred in December 2003, all restrictions were adhered to by Wickes. R. 77 ¶ 38.

3

movement, or heavy lifting; the restrictions were to last for 8 weeks. R. 86 ¶ 12; R. 871, Exh. C at 2.
On January 10, 2004, Myers was hospitalized due to severe pain in her back. R.
86 ¶ 14. The following day, in an email to store manager Brenda Green, Dave Mattea
(Green’s supervisor) responded to the news by writing, “She went from 6 hours a day[]
to apparently zero and in the hospital.” Id. Upon returning to work, Myers was
required to work more than six hours per day, and Wickes also refused to honor the
lifting and standing restrictions. Id. ¶ 15. In an email on February 7, 2004, Mattea
wrote an email to his supervisor stating: “Brenda Green received a call from Brenda
Myers today stating that she was told NOT to work due to her back injury. Sigh.” Id. ¶
16 (capitalization in original). On February 18, Myers received updated restrictions
from her physician that imposed the same limitations for six weeks following that date.
Id. ¶ 18. In a response dated February 19, Wickes took the position that it would not
abide by the restrictions imposed by Myers’s physician because the independent
examination called for no further treatment or restriction. R. 87-1, Exh. D at 6.
On February 25, Myers saw a third physician who disagreed with the
independent examination’s conclusions, and stated that Myers should not be doing any
lifting, twisting, or turning while at work. R. 87-1, Exh. C at 4. On June 6, 2004, Myers
received further treatment from her treating physician, and he ordered Myers not to
work from June 6 to June 10. R. 86 ¶ 21.
On July 26, 2004, Myers requested July 29 off from work for a medical
appointment. R. 86 ¶ 22. Mattea approved the request on July 26, but then on July 27
4

told Myers she would have to reschedule the appointment. Id. Myers objected to
Human Resources, and Mattea perceived this objection as “threatening.” Id. ¶ 23. Due
to the missed day of treatment, Myers’s condition worsened, and she was required to
miss work from July 30 to August 5. Id. ¶ 24. Mattea responded to the news with an
email to human resources stating: “Amazing .... how is she being paid for last week[‘]s
missed days?” R. 86 ¶ 25 (ellipses in original); R. 87-1, Exh. D at 12. Wickes charged
these days against Myers’s FMLA entitlement. R. 87-1, Exh. D at 11.
On October 1, 2004, Myers told Green that she would need to leave early on
October 5 for an appointment. R. 86 ¶ 26. Green told Myers she would have to come in
on a scheduled day off to make up for the time. Id. Myers did so on October 3. Id.
Myers took off additional time under doctor’s orders from October 8 to 11 and
November 15 to 22. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. In response to Myers’s final request for work off,
Wickes’s short-term disability administrator processed an application for benefits for
Wickes. R. 87 ¶ 31. In an email regarding the application, the administrator wrote “I
have NO documentation to support this claim .... She should be informed that no
documentation is a[n] ‘absence without approval.’ She will be linking this all back to
the [workers’ compensation] issue anyway. I really can’t help that.” Id.; R. 87-1, Exh.
D at 15.
B.

Myers’s Job Performance and Behavior

During her employment with Wickes, Myers’s work performance, as
memorialized in several reviews and other correspondence, was checkered. In March
2000, Myers received the worst rating on a performance review, namely, a 4 on a scale
5

of 1 to 4, with 4 equaling the worst performance, and she was placed on a 90-day
Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). R. 77 ¶ 16; R. 77, Exh. M at 1-2. In February
2001, Myers received a 1 on her performance review (by this time, the scale had
changed to a range of 1 to 5, with 1 still equaling the best score). R. 77-16, Exh. F at
8.4 Accompanying that positive evaluation was a recommendation that Myers receive
a 5% increase in pay (this highest raise permitted by the form). Id.
In March 2002, Myers received a “3+” on the 5-point scale. R. 77 ¶ 17; R. 77-25,
Exh. N at 1. In October 2003, she received a “2.5” on the 5-point scale. R. 77-27, Exh.
P at 3. This review was performed by Derrick Asante, who was temporarily filling the
manager position while Wickes sought a replacement store manager. R. 77 ¶ 19.
Brenda Green filled the role of store manager in October 2003 (presumably shortly
after Asante’s review of Myers). R. 77 ¶ 20.
In March 2004, in a review performed by Brenda Green, Myers received an
overall score of 4 on the 5-point scale. R. 77 ¶ 21; R. 77-28, Exh. Q at 2-3. In July 2004,
Myers was named “Employee of the Quarter” at the store. R. 87-1, Exh. E at 2.
Although Green had no hand in selecting Myers for the award—the award is based on
a vote by the store workers, R. 86 ¶ 38—Green sent an email on July 15, 2004
memorializing the award, in which she wrote that “Myers has excelled in solving

4

Exhibit F, like many other exhibits filed with docket entry 77, is split into several
separate attachments on the electronic docket. Citations to specific page numbers refer to the
page number of the .pdf file for the particular attachment number; for example, in this
instance, the citation is to entry 77-16, which is the 16th attachment to entry 77, but is also
labeled “Exhibit F-6.” For all other citations to specific exhibits, the page number refers to the
page number of the specific exhibit.

6

critical[] problems, [and] looks upon them as exciting and challenging. . . . [Myers]
maximizes employees[’] energy and their capabilities. She is now coa[c]hing toward
achievements and success.” R. 87-1, Exh. F at 2.
In September 2004, Green conducted another review of Myers, and this review
turned out to be the last one before Myers was fired. R. 77 ¶ 21. The review does not
identify an overall numeric score, but notes in the comment section, “Overall
performance/ good job.” R. 77-30, Exh. S at 3. Myers did not receive any scores of 4 or
5 (remember that 5 equals the worst) in any of the review categories. R. 77 ¶ 23. The
review did not include any comments regarding poor attitude, negative behavior, or
similar concerns. R. 86 ¶ 35. As did all other reviews, this review form included: “Note:
An appraisal with any rating of a 4 or a 5 must be accompanied by a Performance
Improvement Plan.” R. 77-30, Exh. S at 3. As she had done for some of her prior,
negative reviews, Myers provided a written response challenging some of Green’s
conclusions and ratings. R. 77 ¶ 24; R. 77-31, Exh. T.
On December 2, 2004, Green issued a written “Disciplinary Action” and placed
Myers on a thirty-day performance improvement plan. R. 77 ¶ 25; R. 77-32, Exh. U.
Mattea (Green’s supervisor) was present when the disciplinary action and performance
improvement plan were given to Myers, and he signed the documents. Id. The
disciplinary action/performance improvement plan letter cited, among other things:
Myers’s attitude problems with co-workers and management (including eye rolling,
intimidation, and walking away “in a huff”) and a lack of respect for Green as Myers’s
immediate supervisor. Id. According to Wickes’s Vice President of Human Resources,
7

Dick Petersen, before issuing a performance plan, a manager should attempt to counsel
the employee. R. 86 ¶ 37. Furthermore, Petersen testified that in his 12 years at
Wickes he was involved in 20 to 100 performance plans, and could not recall an
instance of a performance improvement plan issuing without prior counseling steps.
Id. Wickes did not provide counseling or any other written or verbal notice before
issuing the performance improvement plan. Id. In addition to the limitations written
into Myers’s disciplinary action letter and performance improvement plan, Green also
told Myers that “she was not to speak to anybody in regard to . . . what was going on
because this was something between her and Wickes and [Green].” R. 103-1, Green
Dep. at 19:12-24. Again, Myers submitted a written response disagreeing with the
letter she received. R. 77 ¶ 27. Myers believed the disciplinary action was being taken
in response to her back injury. R. 77 ¶ 25.
On December 20, 2004, Myers filed an EEOC charge alleging discrimination
based on race, sex, age, and disability. R. 86 ¶ 1. A few weeks after assignment of the
performance improvement plan, Myers approached some her coworkers regarding her
EEOC charge. According to Green’s affidavit, “a few weeks” after the disciplinary
action letter, Myers bragged to two of her coworkers that she had filed a lawsuit
against Wickes and then threatened the coworkers that she would also sue them if
they testified against her. R. 77 ¶ 28; R. 1025 ¶ 15. Green identified the coworkers as
Sylvia Brixie and Gloria Lopeara in her deposition, and stated that they came to her

5

Green’s original affidavit, R. 79, was unsigned, but identical to her signed affidavit
found at docket entry 102.

8

feeling concerned and threatened by Myers’s behavior. R. 103-1, Green Dep. at 31. But
that is not Brixie’s account of what she told Green. According to Brixie, she was
approached by Myers around Christmas 2004, and Myers expressed that: she thought
Wickes was trying to wrongfully fire her, she had spoken to Human Resources but
found them unhelpful, and “felt she had to go to the EEOC.” R. 87-1, Exh. 2 ¶ 3. During
the conversation, Myers asked Brixie if the EEOC could contact her to discuss Myers’s
work performance. Id ¶ 4. Brixie agreed to speak with the EEOC, and said she would
tell the truth. Id. Brixie further states that (contrary to what Green claimed in her
deposition) Myers never threatened her with litigation, and that “Myers did not
threaten me in any way.” Id. ¶ 5. Lastly, Brixie states that she told the same thing to
Green, and later in May 2005, repeated the same story to an unnamed person in
Wickes’s Human Resources department. Id. ¶ 6-7.
Myers’s “threatening and inappropriate” behavior to her coworkers, coupled with
a general failure to meet the directives of her performance improvement plan, led
Wickes to fire Myers. R. 77 ¶¶ 29-30. According to Green, Myers’s inappropriate
conversation with her coworkers was the “last straw that led to her termination.” R.
103-1, Exh. A, Green Dep. At 29:18. Myers was fired January 8, 2005, effective
immediately. R. 86 ¶ 7. She was informed of her termination by Green and Mattea,
who both made the decision. Id. Per company policy, Petersen also had to, and did, sign
off on the termination decision. R. 77 ¶ 12. At that meeting, Myers was told that one
of the reasons she was being fired was because she was not supposed to be speaking
to anyone about her employment issues with Wickes but had done so. R. 86 ¶ 7. In
9

testimony before the Illinois Department of Employment Security, Green testified that
Myers was fired for asking coworkers to be witnesses for an EEOC complaint and
because of poor job performance. R. 87-1, Exh. B at 2.
II.
Summary judgment must be granted if “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether there is a genuine issue
of fact, the Court “must construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Foley v. City of Lafayette, 359 F.3d 925,
928 (7th Cir. 2004).
To avoid summary judgment, the opposing party must go beyond the pleadings
and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists
if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id. at 248. The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing
the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment will be granted against “a party who fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322. The
non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In other words, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
10

support of the [non-movant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on
which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
III.
A.

FMLA Interference

Count 1 of the Complaint is a claim for interference with Myers’s rights under
the Family and Medical Leave Act. R. 34 at 3. Myers explicitly abandoned this claim
in her summary judgment memorandum: “[Myers] agrees to the dismissal of Count I
of her Second Amended Complaint.” R. 88 at 9. As such, summary judgment is granted
as to Count 1.
B.

Disability Discrimination

Count 3 alleges discrimination by Wickes because of Myers’s disability. R. 34 at
5. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employers from discriminating
against disabled employees because of their disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A plaintiff
can prove disability discrimination by using either the direct or indirect method of
proof. Dickerson v. Bd. of Trustees of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 601 (7th
Cir. 2011).
1.

Disability

In this case, Wickes first argues that Myers’s ADA claim fails because she did
not suffer from a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA. R. 76 at 8. A disability
is defined under the ADA as: (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities of the individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
11

The type of “major life activities” that must be substantially limited to fall under the
purview of the ADA include caring for oneself and walking. § 12102(2). Myers argues
that she was substantially limited in caring for herself and in walking. R. 88 at 14-15.
There is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Myers suffered
from a disability. As evidence of impaired walking, Myers filed an affidavit in response
to Wickes’s summary judgment motion, and she averred:
Beginning in February 2004, and throughout the remainder of my Wickes’s
employment, the pain in my back, groin and legs caused me to drag my right leg
when I walked. I could sometimes walk with a limp. This condition has existed
to the point that since 2005, and to date, I have walked with the assistance of
a cane. R. 87, Exh. 1, Myers Declaration ¶ 27.
Myers included these facts in her Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Additional Facts, R. 86
¶ 20, and recited them in her response brief, specifically in responding to Wickes’s
argument that she was not disabled. R. 88 at 14-15. Yet Wickes did not address the
impaired-walking argument at all in its reply brief. See R. 96 at 4-5. And in Wickes’s
response to Myers’s declaration in support of her Statement of Additional Facts,
Wickes made three meritless arguments. R. 97 at 15 ¶ 20. Wickes argued that the
evidence was irrelevant (but it is plainly relevant to the disability issue), the evidence
was hearsay (but it is Myers’s own testimony of facts within her personal knowledge,
not told to her), and the evidence was not material (but that is a legal argument not
discussed by Wickes in its briefing).
To be sure, Myers’s declaration describing her impaired walking is possibly at
odds with her deposition answers to questions asking what restrictions she suffered
on her daily tasks; she specified only limitations on cleaning and grocery shopping. R.
12

77-6, Myers Dep. at 142-44, 147. But Wickes does not argue this point (perhaps the
walking impairment was described in other parts of Myers’s deposition). Nor does
Wickes argue that the walking impairment was not otherwise identified in discovery
and came as a surprise in the declaration. It might very well be that, after a full
evidentiary presentation at trial, a jury will conclude that the walking impairment was
not substantially limiting, or even that the evidence contradicts that there was a
walking impairment. But Myers offers enough evidence in support, and Wickes offers
nothing in response, so a jury must decide.
Myers’s additional basis for her disability argument—limitations on grocery
shopping and cleaning the house—also requires a jury resolution, although the survival
of this disability basis is a closer call than the walking impairment. Myers’s deposition
testimony does describe these limitations, but the testimony does not necessarily
establish that she was outright prevented from ever doing those chores, and the
testimony also suggests that a cause of the limitations was having to deal with the
demands of her full-time job:
It became difficult to go to the grocery store. You know, I would go sometimes,
but it was difficult. I didn’t do my shopping like I normally would. . . . I know I
got to the point where I couldn’t clean at home, clean my house, but again, I’m
working full-time. I kept working in pain every day. So when I got home, I didn’t
do much, if anything, except for prepare to go to work the next day.
R. 77-6, Myers Dep. at 142-43; see also id. at 142 (“. . . because I’m working full-time,
and I’m up and down, and then by the time I leave work, I could do nothing but go

13

home and try to take care of myself so I could report to work the next day.”).6 Also
weighing against Myers is Squibb v. Memorial Medical Center, 497 F.3d 775, 784 (7th
Cir. 2007), a case cited by Wickes. In Squibb, the plaintiff, similar to Myers, claimed
that she was “limited in her ability to do household tasks such as cooking, cleaning[,]
and grocery shopping, although she performs certain of these tasks on occasion.” Id.
Squibb stated that, “[i]n light of the tasks she admittedly can perform (driving,
bathing, brushing her teeth, dressing herself), we must conclude that, as a matter of
law, the limitations she claims do not demonstrate that she is ‘prevent[ed] or severely
restrict[ed]’ from caring for herself.” Id. (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534
U.S. 184, 198 (2002)). But Squibb did not purport to establish an absolute rule that the
ability to engage in the specified tasks would always bar a finding of disability. It
would be hard to set a blanket rule because the ADA’s text asks whether “an
individual” has a disability, and thus “whether a person has a disability under the ADA
is an individualized inquiry.” EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 546 F.3d 438, 442 (7th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999)). Here, for
example, Myers’s walking impairment—which caused her to drag her right leg and
sometimes walk with a limp—should also be considered when evaluating the
limitations she described in cleaning and grocery shopping, which both require
walking. Again, just as with the walking impairment, the Court is not concluding that

6

It is also not clear (at least from the deposition excerpts filed on the docket) what
corrective measures were applied to deal with the pain. See R. 77-5, Myers Dep. at 140 (cannot
recall what painkillers were prescribed initially), Myers Dep. at 148-49 (no pain management
component to the treatment other than painkillers).

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Myers will coast to victory with a jury. See e.g., EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 630 F.3d 635,
640 (7th Cir. 2010) (listing much more severe limitations on self-care). Indeed, the very
fact that she worked a full-time job and could list only limitations on grocery shopping
and cleaning will count against her. But Myers has presented enough to get to a jury
on whether her medical condition substantially limited the ability to care for herself.7
2.

Evidence of Discrimination

Wickes also argues that, even if Myers’s disability is a jury question, there is
insufficient evidence of disability discrimination. R. 76 at 11-12. Specifically, Wickes
maintains that a reasonable jury could find only that Myers was fired for job
performance problems, namely, her purported inability to deal effectively with
coworkers and with supervisors. But Myers presents a persuasive mosaic (at least
convincing enough for a reasonable jury) of circumstantial evidence that the relevant
decisionmakers discriminated on the basis of disability. First, in the September 2004
performance evaluation, supervisor Green wrote in the comment section, “Overall
performance/ good job.” R. 77-30, Exh. S at 3. There was no overall numerical score, but
in the individual review categories, Myers did not receive any scores of 4 or 5 (5 equals
the worst). R. 77 ¶ 23. And the review did not include any comments regarding poor
attitude, negative behavior, or similar concerns. R. 86 ¶ 35. Yet just 3 months later, on
December 2, 2004, Green put Myers on a performance improvement plan. Of course,

7

It is worth noting that Myers does not argue that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
applies retroactively to her case. See Pennie v. United Parcel Service, 2009 WL 855787, at *15
(N.D. Ill. March 30, 2009).

15

it is possible that Myers’s performance deteriorated in those 3 months, but the
performance improvement plan is also suspicious because Green put Myers on the plan
without any prior counseling of Myers. The absence of prior counseling was contrary
to Wickes’s general practice: the company’s Human Resources Vice President, Dick
Petersen, testified that, before issuing a performance plan, a manager should attempt
to counsel the employee. R. 86 ¶ 37. Even more telling, in Petersen’s dozen years at
Wickes, he could not recall a single instance (out of the 20 to 110 plans in which he had
been involved) where a manager imposed a performance improvement plan without
first engaging in counseling, steps. Id. Wickes offers no explanation for the sudden
imposition of the performance improvement plan . It is also worth noting, in
considering whether the performance problems were pretext for discrimination (or
retaliation), that in July 2004, Myers was named “Employee of the Quarter” at the
store. R. 87-1, Exh. E at 2. This honor was awarded based on the vote of her coworkers,
R. 86 ¶ 38, whom supposedly Myers could not effectively deal with by December 2004.
Plus, when Green sent an email in July 2004 to announce the award, she wrote that
“Myers has excelled in solving critical[] problems, [and] looks upon them as exciting
and challenging. . . . [Myers] maximizes employees[’] energy and their capabilities. She
is now coa[c]hing toward achievements and success.” R. 87-1, Exh. F at 2. Again,
perhaps Myers’s ability to deal with coworkers plummeted after the July 2004 award
and the September 2004 evaluation, but a jury could reasonably draw another
conclusion.

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What’s more, overlaying all of this evidence is the negative tone of the emails
and reactions between Green, Mattea, and Human Resources—the parties who made
the termination decision—denigrating Myers’s requests for time off of work. Starting
as early as January 2004, Mattea (Green’s supervisor), complained to Green in an
email that Myers had gone from working 6 hours per day to requiring hospitalization:
“She went from 6 hours a day[] to apparently zero and in the hospital.” R. 86 ¶ 14.
After Myers returned, Wickes also refused to honor the lifting and standing
restrictions. Id. ¶ 15. In another email, this time in February 2004, Mattea expressed
his frustration with Myers’s back pain with an electronic “Sigh”: he wrote, “Brenda
Green received a call from Brenda Myers today stating that she was told NOT to work
due to her back injury. Sigh.” Id. ¶ 16 (capitalization in original). More emails and
reactions of this sort in July and October 2004 showed Mattea’s and Green’s continued
frustration with Myers’s back pain. R. 86 ¶¶ 22, 24, 25, 26; R. 87-1, Exh. D at 12. All
of these facts taken collectively allow a reasonable juror to conclude that Mattea and
Green discriminated on the basis of disability. To repeat, there is evidence to the
contrary, and evidence that there were non-discriminatory reasons for Mattea’s and
Green’s frustration, but the only question at this stage of the case is whether a
reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. Summary judgment is denied on the
disability discrimination claim.
C.

Retaliation

Myers alleges retaliation for asserting rights protected under various federal
laws throughout her complaint. R. 34 at 4 (“Count II - Retaliation Under the FMLA”);
17

R. 34 at 5 (“Count III - Discrimination and Retaliation Against Plaintiff Because of Her
Disability”); R. 34 at 6 (“Count IV - Retaliation”) (asserting a claim for retaliation
against rights exercised under the ADA, Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act). These counts can be grouped into two claims.8
1.

FMLA Retaliation

In addition to granting employees the right to take family and medical leave, the
FMLA also bars employers from discriminating against employees who exercise their
FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). Specifically, the FMLA prohibits employers from
taking into account FMLA leave as a factor in employment decisions. 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.220. When an employee alleges a retaliatory discharge under the FMLA, she may
establish that her employer engaged in retaliation through one of two ways: the
indirect method and the direct method. Goelzer v. Sheboygan County, 604 F.3d 987, 995
(7th Cir. 2010).
To proceed under the indirect method, Myers “must show that after taking
FMLA leave (the protected activity) [she] was treated less favorably than other
similarly situated employees who did not take FMLA leave, even though [she] was
performing [her] job in a satisfactory manner.” Hull v. Stoughton Trailers, 445 F.3d

8

Myers’s complaint references ADA retaliation in both Counts 3 and 4. R. 34. Title VII
and ADEA retaliation are explicitly referenced in Count 4. Id. While the parties’ memoranda
separate FMLA retaliation from the other federal-law retaliation claims (based on Title VII,
ADA, and ADEA), the parties do not separate out ADA retaliation versus Title VII retaliation
versus ADEA retaliation. Following that lead, the Court will address the FMLA claim, and
then address the other claims together.

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949, 951 (7th Cir. 2006). Neither party has asserted any facts concerning similarlysituated employees, so Myers must proceed to the direct method.
Under the direct method, a plaintiff must present evidence that her employer
took materially adverse action against her on account of her protected activity.
Burnett, 472 F.3d at 481. “If [the evidence is contradicted,] ‘the case must be tried
unless the defendant presents unrebutted evidence that he would have taken the
adverse employment action against the plaintiff even if he had no retaliatory
motive . . . .’ ” Id. (quoting Stone v. City of Indianapolis Public Util. Div., 281 F.3d 640,
644 (7th Cir. 2002)). The plaintiff can overcome summary judgment by producing
circumstantial evidence of retaliation such that a jury could infer retaliation. Phelan
v. Cook Cnty., 463 F.3d 773, 788 (7th Cir. 2006).
The parties do not dispute that Myers engaged in protected activity when she
requested medical leave for her back injury. Wickes’s defense to the FMLA retaliation
claim relies solely on an argument that “Myers[’s] claim is devoid of any direct or
circumstantial evidence to support her assertion that she was terminated for any
reason other than her well-documented poor attitude and behavior problems.” R. 76 at
7 (emphasis in original). But as explained above, there is a genuine issue over whether
Myers was indeed unable to deal with coworkers or acting insubordinately. Her most
recent job performance evaluation did not mention those problems, and indeed
supervisor Green summed up Myers’s overall performance with the “good job”
compliment. Add in the lack of counseling, contrary to Wickes’s practice, before the
imposition of the performance improvement plan, plus the cutting comments and
19

reactions to Myers’s absence and restrictions arising from the back injury, and the
evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Myers’s firing was in retaliation for
her asserting her FMLA rights.
2.

ADA/Title VII/ADEA Retaliation

Count 4 of the complaint alleges retaliation for asserting rights under various
federal laws. R. 34 at 6. To prevail on these retaliation claims, a plaintiff can proceed
under the direct or indirect method. Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 799 (7th Cir.
1999). The direct method requires a plaintiff to show that: (1) she engaged in protected
activity; (2) she suffered an adverse action; and (3) there is a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse action. Moser v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 406
F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 2005) (direct method for Title VII retaliation claims); Dickerson,
657 F.3d at 601(ADA retaliation direct-method elements are the same); Brenner v.
Brown, 36 F.3d 18, 19 (7th Cir. 1994) (same elements apply to ADEA retaliation
claims).9 “Myers proceeds only under the direct method of proof.”10 R. 88 at 2. Wickes
concedes that Myers’s firing constitutes an adverse action, R. 76 at 13, and so the only

9

Wickes argues that the retaliation claim should be limited to Title VII retaliation,
because the January 2005 EEOC charge was based on Title VII alone. R. 96 at 3. Wickes
waived this argument by raising it for the first time in reply. Hernandez v. Cook County
Sheriff’s Office, 634 F.3d 906, 913 (7th Cir. 2011). Moreover, Wickes did not include a copy of
the EEOC charge with its reply brief. An actual examination of the EEOC charge, which was
attached to the complaint, R. 1, shows that Myers did allege retaliation under the ADA. The
cover-page text does say retaliation for “Title VII” protected activity, but then the form marks
“Disability” as the grounds of discrimination. R. 1, 2005 Charge ¶ 9. Additionally, the
substantive handwritten allegations reflect retaliation allegations, including being disciplined
in violation of company policy and procedures, Charge ¶ 13.
10

As she must; because, as noted above, Myers has not presented any similarly-situated
analysis.

20

remaining questions are whether Myers engaged in protected activity and whether the
termination and protected activity are linked. The first question is quickly answered.
Myers filed her EEOC claim on December 20, 2004, and filing an EEOC charge is
explicitly recognized as protected activity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
To prove causation, Myers may offer a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer the necessary connection
between protected activity and adverse action, or she can provide direct evidence.11
Coleman v. Donahoe, —F.3d—, 2012 WL 32062 at *18 (7th Cir. Jan. 6, 2012). Once
again, as explained above, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that
retaliation, not performance problems was the basis for the firing. The timing is also
suspicious because Myers filed the EEOC charge on December 20, 2004, and just a few
weeks later, on January 8, 2005, she was fired. Suspicious timing is a piece of evidence
from which a retaliatory intent can be drawn. Id. at *19. Not only did Myers file an
EEOC charge, but she tried to enlist the help of coworkers in proving her claim.
Green’s reaction to that attempt—it was supposedly the “last straw” and required
Myers’s firing—comes close to an admission of retaliation. Asking for help from
coworkers to provide truthful testimony is itself protected activity; an employer cannot
forbid discussions with coworkers simply because, as Green thought, the employer
considers an EEOC charge as a matter between the employer and the employee. To be

11

In addition to succeeding under a “convincing mosaic” theory, Myers might also
succeed in showing causation via direct evidence. Green specifically identified Myers’s
conversation with Brixie as the final straw, and Brixie’s declaration identifies the EEOC
charge as the substance of their conversation.

21

sure, Green believed that Myers had approached coworkers in a threatening manner,
which would not be protected activity, but at least one of the coworkers flatly denied
that Myers had been threatening. Summary judgment is denied as to the retaliation
claims in Counts 3 and 4.
C.

Retaliatory Discharge

Myers’s final claim is a state-law claim for retaliatory discharge due to her
assertion of a workers’ compensation claim. To prove this claim, Myers must show that:
(1) she was employed at Wickes before her injury; (2) she exercised a right under the
Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act; and (3) her discharge was causally related to the
exercise of her right under the Act. Clemons v. Mechanical Devices Co., 704 N.E.2d 403,
406 (Ill. 1998). A valid, nonpretextual basis for the termination decision prohibits a
finding of causation. Id. It is on this basis that Wickes seeks summary judgment. R.
76, 14-15. But, as discussed above, Myers has offered evidence that could permit a
reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the purported performance problems were a
pretext. Additionally, there is evidence of a link between the termination decision to
Myers’s workers’ compensation claim, namely, an email from the short-term disability
administrator, supra § I.A., which may be interpreted by a reasonable juror as an
accusation that Myers was lying or cheating with her workers’s compensation claim.
This email ties together the causation analyses of the FMLA retaliation claim and the
retaliatory discharge claim, because it suggests that Wickes was treating the exercise
of FMLA and workers’ compensation rights as one in the same. And, as explained
above, Mattea and Green expressed frustration with Myers’s exercise of these rights.
22

These facts allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that part of the termination
decision was premised on Myers’s assertion of her workers’s compensation claim.
Accordingly, summary judgment is denied as to Count 5.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, Wickes’s motion for summary judgment, R. 75, is
granted in part and denied in part. It is granted as to Count 1, but denied as to the
disability discrimination claim in Count 3 and the retaliation claims in Counts 3, 4,
and 5.
ENTERED:
___________________________
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: February 21, 2012

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