Knowles Electronics, LLC v. American Audio Components, Inc. et al

Filing 295

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang. For the reasons stated in the Opinion, AAC's motion for judgment on the pleadings, R. 284, is denied and Knowles' motion for judgment on the pleadings, R. 278, is grante d. Knowles is entitled to judgment in its favor on Count 1 and on all of AACs Counterclaims. The remaining aspects of the case are: (1) to reduce the Count 1 judgment to a sum certain; (2) litigate that aspect of Count 1 that seeks auditor access to information; and (3) litigate the indemnity claim (Count 2). As discussed in the Opinion, now is the time for a serious attempt to resolve the case and to avoid additional attorney's fees and costs, not to mention delay. The Court will discuss these issues with the parties at the next status hearing. Emailed notice(slb, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
KNOWLES ELECTRONICS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN AUDIO COMPONENT,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 06 C 6213
Judge Edmond E. Chang

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action to enforce a settlement agreement. More than ten years ago,
Knowles Electronics sued American Audio Component, AAC Acoustics Technologies
Holdings, and General MEMS Corporation for allegedly knocking off a Knowlesmade microphone. R. 169, Second Am. Compl.1 The original suit asserted claims for
tortious interference, unfair competition and violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets
Act, 765 ILCS 1065/1 et seq. The parties eventually reached a settlement that
covered the claims pending before this Court, as well as claims at issue in other
patent-related proceedings and threatened proceedings in other forums. See R. 254,
Knowles Compl. at Exh. B, Settlement Agreement. Under the terms of the
Settlement Agreement, Knowles licensed certain intellectual property to the
Defendants, who would pay Knowles royalties on products using that intellectual
property in accordance with an agreed payment structure. Settlement Agreement

1Citations

to the docket are indicated by “R.” followed by the docket number and,
where applicable, a page or paragraph number.

§ 2. In light of the settlement, this Court dismissed the case with prejudice. R. 197,
Order of Dismissal (Jan. 7, 2008).
But the dispute was revived in 2014, when AAC stopped paying royalties for
certain products—in violation of the Settlement Agreement, Knowles alleges.
Knowles Compl. ¶¶ 90-91; see also R. 260, Defs.’ Countercl. ¶ 24. In response,
Knowles filed an enforcement action2 against American Audio Components and
AAC Technologies Holdings3 (for convenience’s sake, these related parties, Knowles
Compl. ¶ 31; R. 260, Defs.’ Ans. ¶ 31, will be referred to together as “AAC”).4 See
Knowles Compl. AAC filed a counterclaim, asking for a declaration that it has not
infringed Knowles’ patents and that no royalties are owed. See Defs.’ Countercl.
Each side has moved for judgment on the pleadings, with Knowles seeking
judgment in its favor on its breach of contract claim and on all of AAC’s
counterclaims, R. 278, Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, and AAC in turn seeking
declaratory judgment on the Settlement Agreement’s interpretation, R. 284, Defs.’
Mot. for J. on the Pleadings. For the reasons stated below, Knowles’ motion is
granted in part and AAC’s motion is denied.
2Although

the Order of Dismissal, R. 197, stated that “the Court shall retain
jurisdiction over the parties and subject of this action for the purpose of enforcing the terms
of their” Settlement Agreement, that language cannot, on its own, confer subject-matter
jurisdiction on the enforcement action. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 382 (1994); see also R. 235, 4/8/16 Order. As explained in a prior Order, however,
there is an independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction because the parties are diverse
(Knowles is a citizen of Delaware and Illinois, American Audio Components is a citizen of
California, and AAC Technologies Holdings is a citizen of the Cayman Islands and China)
and the amount-in-controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; R. 253, 6/7/16 Order.
3This entity was known as AAC Acoustic Technologies Holdings Inc. in the original
litigation. R. 254, Knowles Compl. ¶ 28; R. 260, Defs.’ Ans. ¶ 28.
4Knowles did not name General MEMS Corporation in the enforcement complaint,
see Knowles Compl., so that entity is not a party to this revived action.

2

I. Background
In deciding each party’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court
takes all well-pled allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the
nonmovant’s favor. Hayes v. City of Chi., 670 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2012). But
before diving into the enforcement dispute, some background on the initial legal
dispute is needed.
A. The Original Litigation
The lawsuit originally filed with this Court (call it the 2006 Litigation, for
convenience’s sake) revolves around a Knowles microphone—specifically, the
SiSonic MEMS Microphone, which Knowles introduced in the early 2000s after a
long period of research and development. Knowles Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4, 50. The
microphone’s design and manufacture incorporated a slew of trade secrets and
patents, including U.S. Patent Nos. 7,242,089, 7,166,910, and 6,781,231 (for ease of
reference, this Opinion will refer to these as the “’089 Patent,” the “’910 Patent,”
and the “’231 Patent,” respectively). Id. ¶¶ 3, 13, 53. The SiSonic enjoyed
considerable commercial success, which Knowles credits to the microphone’s
innovative qualities, and spawned a number of copycats and knockoffs. Id. ¶¶ 8-9,
54.
According to the 2006 Litigation complaint, AAC was among those companies
eager to jump on the SiSonic train. Knowles Compl. ¶¶ 15-16. To that end, Knowles
alleged, AAC hired one of Knowles’ employees and mined his knowledge of the

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SiSonic’s technology and manufacturing processes in order to develop a knockoff
product. Id. ¶¶ 10-13, 56-63. Knowles also accused AAC executives of sneaking into
Knowles’ manufacturing facility in Suzhou, China. Id. ¶ 61. When it discovered
what AAC was up to, Knowles filed suit in this Court for violations of the Illinois
Trade Secrets Act, tortious interference, and unfair competition. Id. ¶¶ 16, 64-65;
Defs.’ Ans. ¶¶ 64-65; see also Second Am. Compl. A separate complaint was filed
with the Office of Unfair Import Investigations at the United States International
Trade Commission that, in addition to trade secret allegations that are also
included in the district court complaint, raised patent infringement claims in
connection with the ’089 and ’231 Patents (the Opinion will refer to this as the ITC
Action). Knowles Compl. ¶¶ 67-71; Defs.’ Ans. ¶ 71.
B. The Settlement Agreement
A year into the 2006 Litigation, the parties resolved the case and executed
the Settlement Agreement. Knowles Compl. ¶¶ 17, 74; Defs.’ Ans. ¶¶ 17, 74. The
Agreement settled both the 2006 Litigation and the ITC Action, and also settled
patent-related proceedings that the parties had filed against one another in China.
Knowles Compl. ¶ 75; Defs.’ Ans. ¶ 75; Settlement Agreement at 1, § 3. Among
other things, the Agreement also granted AAC a license to use the ’089, ’910, and
’231 Patents, Settlement Agreement § 1.4, 2.1, in exchange for regular royalty
payments, id. § 1.5, 2.3-2.6. Royalties were calculated through a two-tier payment
structure, with different rates for “First Tier Royalty Products” and “Second Tier

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Royalty Products.” Id. The Agreement defined First Tier Royalty Products as those
incorporating the ’231 Patent:
AAC microphones … within the scope of, or covered by, the language of any
claim of the ’231 Patent including, without limitation, Part Numbers:
SM0102, SM0301, SM0301L, SM0301EL, SM0401L, SM0401EL, SDM0102,
SDM0301, SDM0401 and SDM0501.
Settlement Agreement § 1.5(A). And Second Tier Royalty Products were those
covered by the ’089 or ’910 Patents:
AAC microphones … within the scope of, or covered by, the language of any
claim of the ’089 or ’910 Patents including, without limitation, Part Numbers
SM0102B, SM0102BL, SM0301BL, SM0301BEL, SM0401BL, SM0401BEL,
SDM0102B, SDM0301B, SDM0401B, and SMD0501B.
Id. § 1.5(B). Presumably because some products involved overlapping claims of both
the ’231 Patent and the ’089 or ’910 Patents, the definition of Second Tier Royalty
Products clarified that those products fell in the First Tier rather than the Second
Tier camp:
Part Numbers SM0102, SM0301, SM0301L, SM0301EL, SM0401L,
SM0401EL, SDM0102, SDM0301, SDM0401 and SDM0501 [that is, the Part
Numbers specifically listed as First Tier Royalty Products and therefore
within the scope of the ’231 Patent], as presently configured and
notwithstanding that these products fall within the scope of or are covered by
one or more claims of the 089 or 910 Patents, shall not be considered Second
Tier Royalty Products.
Id.
Lastly (for the purposes of this Opinion), the Agreement contained a broad
mutual release of claims. Settlement Agreement § 4. The parties discharged one
another from all claims, known and unknown, related to the 2006 Litigation, the
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ITC Action, and the China proceedings. Id. § 4.1-4.2. What’s more, the Agreement
specified that the releases would not be restricted by laws or statutes limiting the
reach of general releases. Id. § 4.3.
Satisfied with this resolution, the parties asked the Court to dismiss the 2006
Litigation, and the Court granted that request on January 7, 2008. Knowles Compl.
¶ 76; Defs.’ Ans. ¶ 76; Order of Dismissal. The order directed the parties to “comply
with the terms of their Settlement … Agreement” and dismissed the case with
prejudice. Order of Dismissal.
C. The Enforcement Litigation
The parties abided by the Settlement Agreement without issue until mid2014, when AAC allegedly failed to provide a quarterly royalty report that was due.
Knowles Compl. ¶ 90. The payment for that quarter, which came the following
month, was less than what AAC had reported and paid in previous quarters. Id. ¶¶
91-92; Defs.’ Countercl. ¶ 24; Pl.’s Ans. to Countercl. ¶ 24. AAC justified this
shortfall by noting that all but one of the claims of the ’089 Patent had been
cancelled by the Patent and Trademark Office in March 2014, and arguing that,
under the Settlement Agreement, that meant AAC no longer needed to pay royalties
for products covered by the cancelled claims. Knowles Compl. ¶ 93; Defs.’ Countercl.
¶¶ 22-23; see also R. 260-4, Defs.’ Ans. and Countercl. at Exh. E, ’089 Patent
Reexam. Cert. These products included Part Numbers SM0102B, SM0401BL, and
SDM0401B. Defs.’ Countercl. ¶ 24; Pl.’s Ans. to Countercl. ¶ 24. Knowles disagreed
with AAC’s interpretation of the Agreement, and this enforcement litigation ensued.
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Both Knowles and AAC filed complaints under new case numbers in 2016. In
Knowles Elec., LLC v. AAC Techs. Holdings Inc., et al., No. 16 C 03527, Knowles
alleged that AAC’s failure to provide royalty reports, make appropriate royalty
payments, and allow a third-party auditor to examine its sales records amounted to
a breach of the Settlement Agreement (Count 1). Knowles Compl. ¶¶ 173-201. In
addition, Knowles asked for indemnification by AAC of the damages and costs of the
enforcement litigation (Count 2). Id. ¶¶ 202-212.
Separately, AAC commenced an action for declaratory judgment, AAC Techs.
Holdings Inc. et al. v. Knowles Elec., LLC, No. 16 C 01101, asking for a declaration
of noninfringement of the ’089 Patent (Counterclaim 1), noninfringement of the ’910
Patent (Counterclaim 2), and a declaration of no royalties owed for products covered
by the ’089 or ’910 Patents (Counterclaim 3). R. 238-1, Mot. to Consolidate at Exh.
A, 16 C 01101 Compl.
Knowles moved to consolidate both the 2016 cases under the original 2006
Litigation case number, R. 238, Mot. to Consolidate, and the motion was granted, R.
253, 6/7/16 Order. Knowles’ complaint in 16 C 03527 was re-filed in this case as R.
254, see Knowles Compl., and AAC incorporated its three claims from 16 C 01101
into its Answer and Counterclaims, R. 260, with two additions: a request for
declaration of no royalties owed on the ’231 Patent, based on the cancellation of
some of that patent’s claims5 (Counterclaim 4); and a request for judicial declaration

5The

cancellation of those claims is currently under appeal beforethe Federal
Circuit. Defs.’ Countercl. ¶ 27; Pl.’s Ans. to Countercl. ¶ 27.

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of

the

parties’

rights

and

obligations

under

the

Settlement

Agreement

(Counterclaim 5).
With everything now under one umbrella case, the parties have filed crossmotions for judgment on the pleadings. AAC’s motion requests judgment on the
pleadings as to Count 5 of its counterclaims (Contract Interpretation), Defs.’ Mot.
for J. on the Pleadings, essentially asking the Court to declare that (1) on the ’089
Patent, AAC only needs to pay royalties on products within the scope of the current
uncancelled claims of that patent; and (2) on the ’231 Patent, AAC no longer needs
to pay royalties on any of the products previously covered by that patent, so long as
the cancellations of certain ’231 Patent claims are affirmed by the Federal Circuit.
R. 285, Defs.’ Br. and Resp. Br. at 1-2. Knowles asks the Court to issue judgment in
its favor on Count 1 of the Knowles Complaint (Breach of Contract), holding AAC
responsible for continued payment of royalties on Part Numbers SM0102B,
SM0401BL, and SDM0401B and any other products covered by the cancelled
claims, and against AAC on all of its counterclaims. R. 278, Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the
Pleadings.
II. Legal Standard
The cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings are brought under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), which tests the sufficiency of claims and
counterclaims based on the pleadings. See Hayes, 670 F.3d at 813. When reviewing
a 12(c) motion, the Court draws “all reasonable inferences and facts in favor of the
nonmovant.” Wagner v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 840 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2016). A
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party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the same
standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Hayes, 670 F.3d at 813.
Judgment on the pleadings is proper if the non-moving party cannot prove any set
of facts sufficient to support his claim for relief. Id. In deciding this type of motion,
the Court considers the pleadings alone, which consist of the complaint, the answer,
and any documents attached as exhibits. N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City
of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998).
III. Analysis
The question at the heart of the parties’ dispute this: what effect, if any, does
the cancellation of Knowles’ patent claims have on AAC’s obligation to pay royalties
on products that fall within the scope of those claims? Knowles urges the Court to
hold that there is no effect: AAC still owes royalties. Pl.’s Br. at 9-13. But AAC
argues that the cancellations free AAC from the duty to pay royalties on products
that had been covered by those claims. Defs.’ Br. and Resp. Br. at 4-9. In the case of
the ’089 Patent, that would mean that AAC no longer has any royalty obligations
for products incorporating the ’089 Patent. See id.; Defs.’ Countercl.. ¶¶ 22-23.
Although the specific products in dispute are Part Numbers SM0102B, SM0401BL,
and SDM0401B, Defs.’s Countercl. ¶ 24; Pl.’s Ans. to Countercl. ¶ 24, the parties’
arguments extend beyond those three microphones.
To resolve this dispute, the Court looks to the relevant provisions of the
Settlement Agreement. Under Illinois law, which governs the Agreement (neither
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party argues otherwise), see § 9.3, the Court “initially looks to the language of [the]
contract alone. If the language of the contract is facially unambiguous, then the
contract is interpreted by the trial court as a matter of law without the use of parol
evidence.” Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 882, 884 (Ill. 1999)
(internal citations omitted).
Here, the Settlement Agreement mandates that AAC “shall pay” royalties on
First Tier Royalty Products and Second Tier Royalty Products. Settlement
Agreement § 2.3-2.6. The scope of those two product categories is set forth in the
Definitions section. Id. § 1.5(A), (B). First Tier Royalty Products are those that are
covered by the ’231 Patent, and the definition specifies certain products by Part
Number:
AAC microphones … within the scope of, or covered by, the language of any
claim of the ’231 Patent including, without limitation, Part Numbers
SM0102, SM0301, SM 0301L, SM 0301EL, SM0401L, SM0401EL, SDM0102,
SDM0301, SDM0401 and SDM0501.
Id. § 1.5(A). Second Tier Royalty Products means the microphones covered by the
’089 or ’910 Patents (except for those also covered by the ’231 Patent), and similarly
the Agreement specifies certain products by Part Number. In pertinent part, the
definition says:
AAC microphones … within the scope of, or covered by, the language of any
claim of the ’089 or ’910 Patents including, without limitation, Part Numbers
SM0102B, SM 0102BL, SM0301BL, SM0301BEL, SM0401BL, SM0401BEL,
SDM0102B, SDM0301B, SDM0401B, and SMD0501B.
Id. § 1.5(B).

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The parties differ over whether the definitions of the Royalty Products, be
they in the First Tier or Second Tier, are dependent on the validity of the various
patents. Nothing in the text of the definitions suggests that validity of the patents
matters, and indeed the definitional text and other provisions of the Settlement
Agreement dictate only one reasonable reading: AAC agreed to pay royalties on, at
the very least, the specified Part Numbers, regardless of validity.
This is so for a couple of reasons. First, there is no mention in the definitions
that the validity of the patents is a requirement to finding that an AAC microphone
is covered by definitions. Instead, the definitions say that microphones “within the
scope of, or covered by, the language of any claim” of the patents are deemed
Royalty Products. Settlement Agreement § 1.5(A), (B) (emphasis added). So long as
the AAC microphone is within the “language” of the claim, then it is a Royalty
Product, period. Another textual clue that validity does not matter is that the
definitional section goes on, beyond the general definition of products covered by the
language of the claim, to specifically identify Part Numbers that are deemed to be
Royalty Products. Settlement Agreement § 1.5(A), (B). The three Part Numbers at
issue (SM0102B, SM0401BL, and SDM0401B) as to the ’089 Patent are thus
deemed, via their specific listing, to be Second Tier Royalty Products—all without
reference to validity of the patent.
AAC argues that the Agreement lists those Part Numbers as mere
“illustrati[ons]” of Second Tier Royalty Products but that those Part Numbers are
“not part of the definition.” Defs.’ Br. and Resp. Br. at 6. To support its argument,

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AAC reaches far back in the United States Reports to invoke a general statement
from Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismark Lumber Co., in which the Supreme
Court explained that “the term ‘including’ is not one of all-embracing definition, but
connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle.” 314 U.S. 95,
100 (1941). But that description of what “including” means does not help AAC. All
that says is that someone cannot take a specific item on an “including” list and use
that to limit the more general definition. Id. at 99 (holding that lower court erred by
using specific type of tax on “including” list “as delimiting the scope of the” more
general term). So, naturally, the reason the term “including” “is not one of allembracing definition,” id. at 100, is because the specific items that are explicitly
included make up only a part of the whole definition. Inclusion on the list does not
signify agnosticism about whether the item is part of the definition at all.
Other provisions of the Settlement Agreement—and indeed the overall
context of the settlement itself—support the conclusion that the specified Part
Numbers are Royalty Products no matter the patents’ validity. In the “Dismissal of
Claims” section of the Settlement Agreement, AAC agreed “not to seek invalidation
of the ’231 Patent, the ’089 Patent, or the ’910 Patent or assist others in seeking
invalidation of those patents, except as may be required by law.” Settlement
Agreement § 3.2. So AAC was abandoning any argument that those patents were
invalid. It would make little sense for AAC to surrender on invalidity and yet be
able to condition payment of royalties on invalidity. And remember the overarching
purpose of the Settlement Agreement: to resolve not just the 2006 Litigation, but

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also the threatened ITC Action—which included claims against AAC for
infringement of the ’089 and ’231 Patents. Settlement Agreement at 1; Knowles
Compl. ¶¶ 68-71, 75; Defs.’ Ans. ¶ 75. The purpose of the Settlement Agreement
was to give the parties certainty and resolution on the various disputes between
them. That purpose was highlighted by the Dismissal of Claims section, as well as
broad mutual releases that discharged the parties from all claims, known or
unknown, “connected with the matters raised in any of the Litigation or any
existing … products” of the opposing party. Settlement Agreement § 4.1-4.2. In fact,
the Agreement expressly waived either party’s right under any laws or statutes that
purported to limit the applicability of the general releases. Id. § 4.3. Against the
backdrop of this attempt to definitively resolve their disputes, no text in the
Settlement Agreement expresses an intent that the specified Part Numbers could be
the subject of an escape hatch triggered by the outcome of other (or future) patent
invalidity actions.
One final point weighs in Knowles’ favor: Illinois courts recognize that they
are trying to interpret contracts as of the time the contract was executed. In other
words, when deciding contractual meaning, “[g]reat weight is to be given to the
principal, apparent purpose and intention of the parties at the time that they entered
into the contract.” Schwinder v. Austin Bank of Chi., 809 N.E.2d 180, 194 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). When Knowles and AAC entered into
the Settlement Agreement, AAC abandoned invalidity arguments (and even agreed
not to help anyone else assert invalidity), so at the time of the Agreement’s

13

formation, there is no reason to think that the parties envisioned invalidity as a
basis to discontinue royalties on the specified Part Numbers. If AAC wanted its
royalty obligations to be conditioned on the ongoing validity of the underlying
patents, it could have negotiated that with Knowles and proposed a provision in the
Settlement Agreement saying so. But it did not. So AAC will have to abide by the
deal that it struck in 2007, and continue to pay royalties on Part Numbers
SM0102B, SM0401BL, and SDM0401B (and any other products that constitute
First or Second Tier Royalty Products, as specified on the Part Numbers listings) for
the rest of the time required under the Settlement Agreement. Judgment is granted
in favor of Knowles on Count 1 of the Knowles Complaint; specifically, the Court
holds that AAC has breached the Settlement Agreement and must pay the withheld
royalties. The same analysis directly takes care of AAC’s contract-based
counterclaims. Specifically, the Court holds that AAC is not entitled to judgment on
its Counterclaim 3 (Declaration of No Royalties Owed, ’089 and ’910 Patents),
Counterclaim 4 (Declaration of No Royalties Owed, ’231 Patent), and Counterclaim
5 (Contract Interpretation). On those Counterclaims, judgment is entered in favor of
Knowles and against AAC.
AAC’s other counterclaims also must fail in light of the interpretation of the
Settlement Agreement. Specifically, Counterclaims 1 and 2 explain that Knowles
has accused AAC of infringing the ’089 Patent and the ’910 Patent by withholding
royalty payments under the Settlement Agreement. Defs.’ Countercl. ¶¶ 34, 41.
AAC seeks a declaration that the specified Part Numbers do not infringe “any valid

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and enforceable claim” of the ’089 Patent and the ’910 Patent. Defs.’ Countercl.
¶¶ 35, 42. So Counterclaims 1 and 2 really turn on the resolution of the Settlement
Agreement: if AAC is obligated to pay royalties under the Settlement Agreement
despite the invalidity of the patents, then the sought-after noninfringement
declarations do not matter. Conversely, if AAC is not obligated to pay royalties
under the Settlement Agreement for products covered by invalidated claims, then
Knowles would not accuse AAC of infringement. Having decided that the
Settlement Agreement does require royalty payments for the listed Part Numbers
regardless of validity, there is no live controversy. So Counterclaims 1 and 2 are
dismissed as moot.6
IV. Conclusion
AAC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, R. 284, is denied and Knowles’
motion for judgment on the pleadings, R. 278, is granted: Knowles is entitled to
judgment in its favor on Count 1 and on all of AAC’s Counterclaims. What remains
in the case is (1) to reduce the Count 1 judgment to a sum certain; (2) litigate that
aspect of Count 1 that seeks auditor access to information; and (3) litigate the
indemnity claim (Count 2). But these remaining issues seem readily resolvable, and
now that the parties have the decision on the cross motions, the parties must
engage in settlement negotiations. So, rather than enter Rule 54(b) partial

The Court directed the parties to brief whether claim preclusion blocks AAC from
asserting the noninfringement counterclaims, but there is no need to address that issue
because the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement itself is enough to resolve the
counterclaims.
6

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judgments, the time is ripe for a serious attempt to resolve the case and to avoid
additional attorney’s fees and costs, not to mention delay. The Court will discuss
these issues with the parties at the next status hearing.

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: March 8, 2017

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