Hernandez et al v. Cook County Sheriff's Office et al
Filing
395
Memorandum Opinion and Order: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion to vacate is granted in part in that the Court vacates its order dismissing Plaintiffs' 1983 claims against the Sheriff's Office and claim for intentional inf liction of emotional distress against all Defendants, and denied in part in that the court does not vacate its order dismissing Plaintiffs' claim for false imprisonment. 372 If Defendants intend to move for summary judgment on the remaining cl aims, Defendants must do so by November 6, 2013. Defendants' Motion for bill of costs 377 and Motion for attorney fees 381 are dismissed without prejudice. Case reopened. Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 10/7/2013:Mailed notice(srn, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
IVAN HERNANDEZ, ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ,
BILL JONES, GENE MICHNO, MARVIN
BAILEY AND RICHARD DAVIS,
Plaintiffs,
No. 07 C 855
v.
Judge Thomas M. Durkin
COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
MICHAEL F. SHEAHAN, in his official
capacity, CAROL KAUFMAN, as
representative of the estate of TIMOTHY
KAUFMANN, in his individual capacity,
SCOTT KURTOVICH, in his individual
capacity, DENNIS ANDREWS, in his
individual capacity, THOMAS SNOOKS, in
his individual capacity, the COUNTY OF
COOK,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs are six correctional officers with the Cook County Sheriff’s Office.
Plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law alleging that former
Cook County Sheriff Michael Sheahan, and certain officials in his office, conspired
to retaliate against Plaintiffs for their support of a certain candidate in the election
for sheriff by investigating and disciplining Plaintiffs in connection with an escape
from the Cook County Jail. R. 55. On June 18, 2013, the Court closed the case in
light of a decision by the Seventh Circuit holding that the individual defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity. R. 368, 369, 370, 371. Plaintiffs have moved to
vacate that Order. R. 372. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted in
part such that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the Sheriff’s Office and claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants are reinstated,
and denied in part in that Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claim remains terminated.
Background
On February 11, 2006, several detainees escaped from the Cook County Jail.
See R. 177 ¶¶ 5-6 (citing R. 149 at 5). Later that day, a correctional officer, Darin
Gater, confessed to being complicit in the escape. See R. 150-2, 154-2. Gater also
implicated Plaintiffs and stated they were motivated to “help [Richard] Remus” in
his campaign to be elected sheriff by discrediting the then-current Sheriff Michael
Sheahan and his chief of staff Tom Dart, R. 150-2 at QH03222; R. 154-2 at 134, who
Sheahan supported as a candidate in the sheriff election. See R. 148-2 at 266-78.
Plaintiffs were thereafter suspended and otherwise disciplined. See R. 199 ¶¶ 7-10.
Plaintiffs brought claims for political retaliation, violation of their First
Amendment rights (based on earlier complaints Plaintiffs had made regarding
conditions in the jail), conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
false imprisonment. See R. 55. Plaintiffs supported their claims with evidence that
Gater’s statement was coerced and various statements the individual defendants
made suggesting that their investigation was motivated by Plaintiffs’ support for
Remus. See R. 331 (Hernandez v. Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 2012 WL 1079904, at
*2-5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012)). Defendants moved for summary judgment on all
claims and asserted a qualified immunity defense for the individual defendants. R.
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142. The Court denied the motion as to all but the First Amendment claim. R. 226.
Defendants appealed the denial of qualified immunity, and the Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded. See Hernandez v. Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 634 F.3d
906 (7th Cir. 2011). On remand, the Court again denied Defendants’ motion for
qualified immunity. R. 331 (Hernandez, 2012 WL 1079904).
Defendants appealed the denial of qualified immunity and the Seventh
Circuit reversed. Hernandez v. Sheahan, 711 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2013). Without
addressing whether the facts could make out a violation of a constitutional right,
the Seventh Circuit held that it was objectively reasonable for the individual
defendants to have investigated Plaintiffs because they had probable cause to do so
based on Gater’s statement implicating Plaintiffs. Id. at 817-18. The court held that
Plaintiffs’ allegations that Gater’s statement was coerced could no longer be
credited because “Gater failed to suppress the statement in state court proceedings
on those very grounds.” Id. at 818; see R. 312-4 at 6 (transcript of state court
proceedings). The court concluded that “[d]ue to the fact the authorities had
probable cause to investigate the Officers, we are less concerned about other
possible motivations for their treatment.” Hernandez, 711 F.3d at 818.
Plaintiffs argue the Court was wrong to dismiss the case in its entirety
because the Seventh Circuit’s decision leaves untouched Plaintiffs’ “§ 1983 claims
against the Sheriff’s Office [and] Plaintiffs’ state law claims against all Defendants.”
R. 372 at 1. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims were properly dismissed
because the “Monell claims are entirely dependent on the actions of the individual
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defendants,” R. 374 at 4, and the Seventh Circuit’s probable cause finding is
“[d]ispositive of both state law claims.” Id. at 8.1
Discussion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows the Court to correct its own legal
errors. Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 659 (7th Cir. 2013). A decision to
grant relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b) is within the Court’s discretion. Id. at
657-58.
A.
Plaintiffs’ Monell Claims
Defendants argue that the Court should not vacate its order dismissing
Plaintiffs’ Monell claims, because a verdict against the Sheriff’s Office would be
“inconsistent” with the Seventh Circuit’s holding that the individual defendants’
actions were objectively reasonable. R. 374 at 5 (citing Thomas v. Cook County
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir. 2009)). Defendants extrapolate from the
particular facts in Thomas to interpret Thomas to hold that absent liability of
individual state actors, a state or municipal agency can only be liable for a
constitutional violation if the nature of the claim is such that the violation could
have occurred without individual intent. R. 374 at 5-6. Defendants then rely on
During oral argument on September 24, 2013, defense counsel highlighted the
Seventh Circuit’s attribution of the following statement to Plaintiffs’ brief on
appeal: “Political retaliation is the lifeblood of this case. If the Court finds qualified
immunity, Plaintiffs’ suit is imperiled as tort law counts would be the only
remnants.” Hernandez, 634 F.3d at 912. R. 394 at 36:14-20. To avoid further
confusion, the Court notes that this statement is actually from Defendants’ brief on
appeal, not Plaintiffs’ brief. See Appellants’ Brief and Required Short Appendix,
filed Apr. 1, 2010, Hernandez et al. v. Cook County Sheriff’s Office et al., No. 10-1440
(7th Cir.), Doc. No. 16, at 42.
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Tanner v. City of Waukegan, 2011 WL 686867 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2011), to argue that
because “claims of retaliation and conspiracy involve elements of intent . . . .
Plaintiffs cannot show how municipal policies and practices at issue in their
Complaint” could “negate intent.” R. 374 at 5-6 (citing Tanner, 2011 WL 686867, at
*4 (holding that a claim of retaliation against a municipality must be predicated
upon liability of an individual state actor, and that the reasoning of Thomas
justifying the possibility of municipal liability absent individual liability was not
applicable in the context of a retaliation claim)). Thus, Defendants contend that
because retaliation requires individual intent, the Sheriff’s Office cannot be liable
here because the individual defendants are not liable.
But Tanner’s holding that a municipal policy cannot absolve an individual
actor of liability for retaliatory actions is inapposite here where the individual
defendants were absolved of liability due to qualified immunity as opposed to a lack
of intent, as was the case in Thomas. Defendants’ reliance on Tanner’s reasoning
shows that Defendants miss Thomas’s central logic which is that municipal liability
is predicated upon the existence of a constitutional violation committed by
individuals, not the legal liability of those individuals for their actions. Thus, in
Thomas, the individuals were not liable for their actions, but their actions
nevertheless caused a constitutional violation for which the municipality could be
liable. See Thomas, 604 F.3d at 305 (“[T]he jury could have found that the [state
actors] were not deliberately indifferent to Smith’s medical needs, but simply could
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not respond adequately because of the well-documented breakdowns in the County’s
policies for retrieving medical request forms.”).
Here, the Seventh Circuit’s holding that the individual defendants are
qualifiedly immune does not mean that there was no constitutional violation, i.e.,
that the individual defendants did not act with retaliatory intent. The question of
whether the actions of the individual defendants were motivated by retaliatory
intent and constituted a constitutional violation remains undecided.2 And since that
question is open, the question of whether the municipality is liable for that alleged
constitutional violation is also still open.
To the extent that Defendants argue that the Seventh Circuit’s holding that
the individual defendants’ actions were “objectively reasonable” negates the
possibility that they acted with retaliatory intent, the Seventh Circuit has declined
to endorse this reasoning. The Seventh Circuit “has explicitly reserved the question
whether government defendants per se avoid First Amendment § 1983 claims by
demonstrating that they had probable cause.” See Hernandez, 634 F.3d at 915
(citing Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 657 (7th Cir. 2002)). To succeed on a claim
for retaliation a plaintiff ultimately must show that a plaintiff’s protected activity
(here support for Remus) was the “but for” cause of the retaliatory action (here
Defendants disciplining Plaintiffs). See Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 941-43 (7th
Cir. 2004). While the Seventh Circuit’s finding that the individual defendants’
As the Seventh Circuit said, in light of the existence of probable cause, “we are less
concerned about other possible motivations for their treatment.” Hernandez, 711
F.3d at 818.
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actions were objectively reasonable because they had probable cause may be
evidence that Plaintiffs’ support for Remus was not the “but for” cause of their
discipline, this is a question that requires evaluation of the factual record on
summary judgment.
The Court already determined on summary judgment that there is a triable
issue of fact regarding the individual defendants’ motives. R. 226. But the Court
reached this decision without benefit of the Seventh Circuit’s clarification that
Gater’s statement was not coerced. Now that the Seventh Circuit has determined
that Gater’s statement was not coerced the parties should have the opportunity to
re-brief whether summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims
against the Sheriff’s Office. Therefore, the Court vacates its decision dismissing
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the Sheriff’s Office.
B.
Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims
Defendants argue that the Seventh Circuit’s holding that the individual
defendants had probable cause to investigate Plaintiffs is “[d]ispositive of both state
law claims.” R. 374 at 8. “Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim of false
imprisonment.” Poris v. Lake Holiday Prop. Owners Ass’n, 983 N.E.2d 993, 1007 (Ill.
2013). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that their false imprisonment claim should
survive because a question of qualified immunity is only appealable “to the extent
that it turns on an issue of law,” Kiddy-Brown v. Blagojevich, 408 F.3d 346, 353 (7th
Cir. 2005), and, thus, “[t]he Seventh Circuit did not and could not have decided
factual disputes even on the issue of probable cause.” R. 386 at 13.
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Plaintiffs are incorrect that the Seventh Circuit may not make factual
determinations in the course of deciding a qualified immunity question that turns
on an issue of law. See Fleming v. Livingston Cnty., 674 F.3d 874, 879 n.3 (7th Cir.
2012) (“[E]ven in cases in which the question of qualified immunity is factually
intertwined with the question of whether officers violated the Fourth Amendment . .
., judges must still make an immunity determination separate from the jury’s
finding on whether the officers violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” (citing
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197 (2001)). Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has
noted that “[w]hether the known facts add up to probable cause is a legal question.”
Bridewell v. Eberle, -- F.3d --, 2013 WL 5188658, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2013).
Additionally, the court’s holding that probable cause existed here was based on the
legal determination that whether Gater’s statement was coerced was no longer in
question because “the state court ruled that Gater’s statement was voluntary,” and
it provided the “factual basis for the jury’s verdicts” against Gater. Hernandez, 711
F.3d at 818. Thus, there is no question that the Seventh Circuit held that the
individual defendants had probable cause to investigate Plaintiffs. And due to the
existence of probable cause, the Court will not vacate its order dismissing Plaintiffs’
false imprisonment claim.
On the other hand, probable cause is not a complete defense to a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants’ reliance on Rebolar v. City
of Chicago, 897 F. Supp. 2d 723 (N.D. Ill. 2012) is misplaced. R. 374 at 8. In
Rebolar, the existence of probable cause was relevant to the court’s holding that
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that the defendants’ conduct was not “extreme and outrageous,” but the court did
not hold that the existence of probable cause alone was dispositive of the issue. 897
F. Supp. 2d at 741. Therefore, because the Seventh Circuit’s decision did not dispose
of Plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court vacates
its decision dismissing that claim.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted in part in that the
Court vacates its order dismissing Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the Sheriff’s
Office and claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against all
Defendants, and denied in part in that the Court does not vacate its order
dismissing Plaintiffs’ claim for false imprisonment. If Defendants intend to move for
summary judgment on the remaining claims, Defendants must do so by November
6, 2013.
ENTERED:
______________________________
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: October 7, 2013
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