Brown v. Cook County, Illinois Sheriff Department

Filing 128

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 11/3/2011: For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motions for entry of default 126 and to vacate summary judgment 127 are denied. (For further details see written opinion.) Mailed notice (ma,)

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan

CASE NUMBER

07 C 1013

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

11/3/2011

Doris Brown vs. Deputy Sheriff Koeller

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motions for entry of default [126] and to vacate summary judgment
[127] are denied.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Doris Brown’s pro se motion for default judgment against
Defendant Joe Varan (Varan), Defendant Deena Trammer (Trammer) and Defendant Anthony Russell
(Russell). Since Brown is proceeding pro se the court will liberally construe her filings. On September 28,
2011, the court granted Defendant Sergeant Shelley Koeller’s (Koeller) motion for summary judgment. The
court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims brought against
Varan, Trammer, and Russell and dismissed such claims without prejudice and terminated this action. Since
the court determined it would not be appropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims
brought against Varan, Trammer, and Russell, and this case has already been terminated, the instant motion
for default judgment is improper and is denied.
This matter is also before the court on Brown’s pro se “Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment.”
(Mot.1). Brown requests that the court vacate its ruling on September 28, 2011, granting Koeller’s motion
for summary judgment, and dismissing the remaining state law claims without prejudice. To the extent that
Brown seeks to proceed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), Brown has not presented any new
arguments or evidence or shown that the court erred in its ruling. To the extent that Brown seeks to proceed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (Rule 60(b)), a motion to vacate brought pursuant to “Rule 60(b)
is an extraordinary remedy and” should be “granted only in exceptional circumstances. . . .” Pakovich v.
Verizon LTD Plan, 653 F.3d 488, 494 (7th Cir. 2011)(internal quotations omitted)(quoting McCormick v.
City of Chi., 230 F.3d 319, 327 (7th Cir. 2000)). In the instant action, Brown has not pointed to any
exceptional circumstances in this case that would warrant vacating the September 28, 2011 ruling. Brown
contends that she can proceed under Rule 60(b) because there was a “[f]raud upon the court” by Koeller.
(Mot 4). However, Brown’s argument regarding Koeller is merely a repetition of her arguments as to the
merits of her case and not a basis to vacate the final judgment in this case. Brown also argues that in regard
to Russell and Trammer, “[t]he court exceed[ed] its jurisdiction. . . .” (Mot. 5). The court declined to
07C1013 Doris Brown vs. Deputy Sheriff Koeller

Page 1 of 2

STATEMENT
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims brought against Russell and Trammer, dismissing
such claims without prejudice. Nothing in this court’s ruling prohibits Brown from seeking to proceed in
state court on such claims. Therefore, the “Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment” is denied.

07C1013 Doris Brown vs. Deputy Sheriff Koeller

Page 2 of 2